Karen Sawasky v. Michael J. Astrue, No. 5:2010cv00147 - Document 19 (C.D. Cal. 2011)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Margaret A. Nagle. The Court finds that the Commissioners decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from material legal error. Neither reversal of the Commissioners decision nor remand is warranted. (mz)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 KAREN SEWASKY,1 ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________) NO. EDCV 10-147-MAN MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 17 18 Plaintiff filed a Complaint on February 8, 2010, seeking review of 19 the denial by the Social Security Commissioner ( Commissioner ) of 20 plaintiff s application for a period of disability and disability 21 insurance benefits ( DIB ). 22 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to proceed before the undersigned United 23 States Magistrate Judge. 24 November 12, 2010, in which: 25 Commissioner s decision and remanding this case for the payment of On March 3, 2010, the parties consented, The parties filed a Joint Stipulation on plaintiff seeks an order reversing the 26 27 28 1 On April 6, 2010, plaintiff filed a Notice of Errata and Request To Correct the Spelling of Plaintiff s Name ( Notice of Errata ) noting that plaintiff s name was misspelled in the Summons and Complaint. According to plaintiff s Notice of Errata, the correct spelling of plaintiff s surname is Sewasky, not Sawasky. 1 benefits or, alternatively, for further administrative proceedings; and 2 defendant requests that the Commissioner s decision be affirmed. 3 Court has taken the parties Joint Stipulation under submission without 4 oral argument. The 5 6 SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 7 8 Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and DIB. 9 (A.R. 9, 89-95, 112.) Plaintiff, who was born on August 4, 1966,2 claims 10 to have been disabled since June 13, 2005, due to bipolar disorder and 11 affective mood disorder.3 12 Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as an inside salesperson 13 with responsibility for training and personnel. (A.R. 91, 101, 105; Joint Stip. at 2.) (A.R. 33, 106.) 14 15 After the Commissioner denied plaintiff s claim initially and upon 16 reconsideration (A.R. 38-42, 45-49), plaintiff requested a hearing (A.R. 17 51, 55-56). 18 counsel, appeared and testified at a hearing before Administrative Law 19 Judge F. Keith Varni (the ALJ ). 20 Joseph Mooney also testified. 21 denied 22 subsequently denied plaintiff s request for review of the ALJ s decision On February 18, 2009, plaintiff, who was represented by plaintiff s claim (A.R. 17-35.) (A.R. 32-34.) (A.R. 9-16), Vocational expert On April 3, 2009, the ALJ and the Appeals Council 23 24 2 25 At the time of the alleged disability onset date, plaintiff was 38 years old, which is defined as a younger individual. (A.R. 15; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563.) 26 3 27 28 Plaintiff s initial application alleged disability due to bipolar disorder (A.R. 105); however, plaintiff later claimed disability due to affective mood disorder as well (see, e.g., Joint Stipulation ( Joint Stip. ) at 2). 2 1 (A.R. 1-3). That decision is now at issue in this action. 2 3 SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 4 5 The ALJ found that plaintiff meets the insured status requirements 6 of the Social Security Act through December 1, 2010. 7 ALJ also found that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful 8 activity since June 13, 2005, the alleged onset date of her claimed 9 disability. (Id.) (A.R. 11.) The The ALJ further found that, at the time of the 10 alleged onset date, plaintiff was a younger individual with at least 11 a high school education. 12 has a severe mental impairment from substance abuse and a resulting 13 mood disorder. 14 does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 15 medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR. Part 404, 16 Subpart P, Appendix 1. (A.R. 15.) The ALJ determined that plaintiff (A.R. 11.) The ALJ also determined that plaintiff (A.R. 11-12.) 17 18 The ALJ determined that plaintiff has the residual functional 19 capacity ( RFC ) to perform a full range of work at all exertional 20 levels but mentally, [plaintiff] can perform routine, repetitive entry 21 level work that is minimally stressful, requires no contact with the 22 general public and only superficial interpersonal contact with co- 23 workers and supervisors. (A.R. 12.) 24 25 The ALJ concluded that plaintiff is unable to perform her past 26 relevant work. (A.R. 14.) However, having considered plaintiff s age, 27 education, work experience, and RFC, as well as the testimony of the 28 vocational expert, the ALJ found that jobs exist in the national economy 3 1 that plaintiff could perform, including those of cleaner, housekeeper, 2 packager, and assembler. 3 that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social 4 Security Act from June 13, 2005, through the date of his decision. 5 (A.R. 16.) (A.R. 15.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded 6 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW 8 9 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner s 10 decision to determine whether it is free from legal error and supported 11 by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 12 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 13 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 14 conclusion. 15 a mere scintilla but not necessarily a preponderance. 16 Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003). While inferences from the 17 record can constitute substantial evidence, only those reasonably drawn 18 from the record will suffice. 19 1066 (9th Cir. 2006)(citation omitted). Orn v. Astrue, 495 Substantial evidence is such relevant Id. (citation omitted). The evidence must be more than Connett v. Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 20 21 Although this Court cannot substitute its discretion for that of 22 the Commissioner, the Court nonetheless must review the record as a 23 whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 24 detracts from the [Commissioner s] conclusion. 25 Health and Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988); see also 26 Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). 27 responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 28 testimony, and for resolving ambiguities. 4 Desrosiers v. Sec y of The ALJ is Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 2 The Court will uphold the Commissioner s decision when the evidence 3 4 is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Burch v. 5 Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 6 review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his decision and may not 7 affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely. 8 at 630; see also Connett, 340 F.3d at 874. 9 the Commissioner s decision if it is based on harmless error, which 10 exists only when it is clear from the record that an ALJ s error was 11 inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination. Robbins 12 v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006)(quoting Stout v. 13 Comm r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch, 400 F.3d 14 at 679. However, the Court may Orn, 495 F.3d The Court will not reverse 15 16 DISCUSSION 17 18 Plaintiff makes the following two claims: (1) the ALJ did not 19 consider the findings of plaintiff s treating clinicians properly; and 20 (2) the ALJ failed to pose a complete hypothetical to the vocational 21 expert. (Joint Stip. at 2.) 22 23 24 I. The ALJ Committed No Error In Considering The Findings Of Plaintiff s Clinicians. 25 26 To establish the existence of a medically determinable impairment, 27 an ALJ must rely on evidence from acceptable medical sources. 28 Security Ruling 06-03p, 2006 SSR 5 LEXIS 5, *3; see 20 Social C.F.R. § 1 404.1513(a). Acceptable medical sources include licensed physicians, 2 licensed or certified psychologists, licensed optometrists, licensed 3 podiatrists, and qualified speech language pathologists. 4 404.1513(a)(1)-(5). 5 . . . medical opinions, Social Security Ruling 06-03p, 2006 SSR LEXIS 6 5, *3, an ALJ may consider evidence from other sources, such as 7 therapists and clinicians, to understand the nature and severity of a 8 claimant s impairment as well as how the impairment affects a claimant s 9 ability to work, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(emphasis added). 20 C.F.R. § While only acceptable medical sources can give Ultimately, 10 the ALJ has the discretion to determine the appropriate weight to accord 11 the opinion of a source other than an acceptable medical source. 12 e.g., Diaz v. Shalala, 59 F.3d 307, 313-14 (9th Cir. 1995)(ALJ may 13 determine weight to give to opinion of other source ); Social Security 14 Ruling 06-03p, 2006 SSR LEXIS 5, *7-8, *15-16 (noting that the ALJ 15 generally should explain the weight given to opinions from . . . other 16 sources ). See, 17 18 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to consider properly three 19 treatment 20 Behavioral Health ( SBDBH ). 21 November 2, 2006, the clinician:4 22 initial indications of dysfunction were unemployed, social isolation, 23 hopeless, [and] helpless (A.R. 174); (2) noted that plaintiff had 24 coherent thought processes, fair insight, poor judgment, congruent 25 affect, problems with concentration, but no problems with memory, notes from clinicians at San Bernardino Department of In the first treatment note, dated (1) determined that plaintiff s 26 27 28 4 Although difficult to read, it appears that Maria E. Morgan, CTI, completed the treatment note, which was later signed by Davis Powell, MFT. (A.R. 173-77.) 6 1 perceptual process/hallucinations, or thought content/delusions 2 (A.R. 176); (3) diagnosed plaintiff with Major Depressive Disorder, 3 Recurrent, Moderate (A.R. 177); and (4) assessed plaintiff with a GAF 4 score of 47 (A.R. 177). The second treatment note,5 dated April 3, 2007, 5 indicated that plaintiff s: 6 perceptual process, thought process, thought content, and memory were 7 within normal limits; (2) 8 and (3) insight and judgment were good. 9 second treatment note, plaintiff was assessed with a GAF score of 42. (1) appearance/hygiene, behavior, speech, mood/affect was depressed and anxious ; (A.R. 168-69.) In this The third treatment note,6 dated November 8, 2009, had 10 (A.R. 169.) 11 similar findings to plaintiff s April 3, 2007 treatment note, with the 12 notable exception that plaintiff was assessed with a GAF score of 48. 13 (A.R. 171-72.) 14 15 Contrary to plaintiff s contention, the ALJ properly considered the 16 findings of plaintiff s clinicians in determining the severity and 17 nature 18 plaintiff s ability to perform work. 19 the 20 impairment or combination of impairments met or equaled a Listing; (2) 21 determining 22 considering the medical record and opinion evidence for purposes of 23 determining plaintiff s RFC; and (4) assessing plaintiff s credibility. of plaintiff s clinicians impairment findings whether in: plaintiff s and (1) how her impairment affects Specifically, the ALJ considered assessing mental whether impairment was plaintiff s severe; (3) 24 25 5 26 The second treatment note appears to be completed by V. Chatez (A.R. 168), who plaintiff contends is her treating clinician (Joint Stip. at 3). 27 6 28 The name of the clinician who completed this treatment note is illegible. 7 1 In his decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff has a severe mental 2 impairment from substance abuse and a resulting mood disorder (20 C.F.R. 3 § 404.1520(c)). (A.R. 11.) In determining that plaintiff s impairment 4 or combination of impairments did not meet or equal a Listing, the ALJ 5 specifically 6 plaintiff s 7 concentration, persistence, or pace. 8 determination that plaintiff has no restrictions in activities of daily 9 living, the ALJ cited normal mental status examinations of plaintiff in 10 which she was reported to be alert and oriented, . . . [with] no memory 11 deficits, normal thought processes and content, no delusions/paranoia 12 and fair insight and judgment. (A.R. 12.) The ALJ specifically cited, 13 inter alia, treatment notes from the clinicians at SBDBH. 14 Similarly, 15 difficulties in social functioning, the ALJ referenced plaintiff s 16 normal mental examinations as well as plaintiff s mood disorder, which 17 the ALJ noted might cause some interference in social interaction. 18 (Id.) 19 plaintiff s clinicians at SBDBH. 20 plaintiff has no difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence, 21 or pace, the ALJ noted that [o]n mental examination, there [wa]s no 22 evidence of any cognitive deficits, and [plaintiff] was alert and 23 oriented in all four spheres. 24 there were no abnormal thought processes or delusions. 25 again cited treatment notes from plaintiff s clinicians at SBDBH. (Id.) referenced limitations in the in determining clinicians daily that living, findings social in determining functioning, and For example, in support of his plaintiff has mild to (Id.) moderate In support of his finding, the ALJ cited the treatment notes from (Id.) Lastly, in finding that Memory was within normal limits, and (Id.) The ALJ 26 27 Beyond considering the clinicians treatment notes for purposes of 28 determining whether plaintiff s impairment met or equaled a Listing, the 8 1 ALJ also considered their treatment notes in determining whether 2 plaintiff s mental impairment was severe. (A.R. 11, 13.) In his 3 decision, the ALJ noted that [plaintiff] alleges disability due to 4 bipolar disorder. (A.R. 13.) Notwithstanding plaintiff s allegations, 5 the ALJ noted that State Agency review psychiatrists concluded that 6 [plaintiff] did not have a severe impairment. 7 [plaintiff] the benefit of the doubt, [the ALJ found that] she has a 8 severe mental impairment since she does receive mental health services 9 and medication from [SBDBH] for a mood disorder. (Id.) However, giving (Id.) Thus, it 10 appears that the ALJ considered the findings of the clinicians from 11 SBDBH in determining that plaintiff s mood disorder was a severe 12 impairment - i.e., an impairment that more than minimally limits 13 [plaintiff s] ability to perform basic work activities. (A.R. 11.) 14 The ALJ also considered the findings of the SBDBH clinicians in 15 16 determining plaintiff s RFC. 17 referenced 18 received routine outpatient treatment for complaints of mood swings, 19 depression and anxiety. 20 cited Exhibit 3F - an exhibit which includes all three treatment notes 21 from plaintiff s treating clinicians. (Id.) Further, the ALJ generally 22 discussed the mental examinations performed by plaintiff s treating 23 clinicians and other medical sources. 24 [m]ental status examinations have been normal. 25 and oriented, had no memory deficits, normal thought processes and 26 content, no delusions/paranoia and fair insight and judgment (Exhibit 27 2F, p. 15; Exhibit 3F, pages 4, 7 and 10; Exhibit 8F, p. 13). 28 12.) the treatment notes In his decision, the ALJ generally from (A.R. 13.) SBDBH, noting that plaintiff In so doing, the ALJ specifically The ALJ noted that plaintiff s [Plaintiff] was alert (A.R. Additionally, the ALJ noted that there was no evidence of any 9 1 cognitive deficits, . . . . [and plaintiff s m]emory was within normal 2 limits and there were no abnormal thought processes or delusions 3 (Exhibit 2F, p. 15; Exhibit 3F, pages 4, 7 and 10; Exhibit 8F, p. 13). 4 (Id.) 5 treating clinicians and treating physician, Sean Faire, M.D., noting 6 that they went from 42 (Exhibit 3F, p. 7) to 55 (Exhibit 3F, p. 4). 7 (Id.) Further, in finding the assessed GAF scores to be not credible, 8 the ALJ specifically cited to pages 7 and 10 of Exhibit 3F which contain 9 the GAF assessments from some of the SBDBH clinicians. The ALJ also referenced the GAF scores assessed by plaintiff s (A.R. 14.) 10 Lastly, 11 in assessing plaintiff s credibility, the ALJ again 12 referenced the findings of the SBDBH clinicians. 13 alia, that plaintiff s laundry list of mental symptoms . . . are 14 rebutted by the records from [SBDBH] in which mental status examinations 15 were consistently normal. 16 plaintiff s testimony that she frequently stays in bed and needs 17 hygiene prompts was exaggerated and unsupported by treating source 18 records, showing normal mental status examination. 19 alert and oriented, had no memory deficits, normal thought processes and 20 content, no delusions/paranoia and fair insight and judgment (Exhibit 21 2F, p. 15; Exhibit 3F, pages 4, 7 and 10; Exhibit 8F, p. 13). 22 14.) 23 of the treatment records from clinicians at SBDBH. (A.R. 14.) The ALJ found, inter The ALJ also found that [Plaintiff] was (A.R. Again, the ALJ specifically cited to exhibits which contain some 24 25 Accordingly, because the ALJ plainly made both general and specific 26 references to their findings throughout 27 contention that the ALJ failed to consider the findings of plaintiff s 28 treating clinicians is without merit. 10 his decision, plaintiff s To the extent plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed error by 1 2 not providing 3 clinicians opinions regarding plaintiff s GAF scores, plaintiff s 4 contention 5 clinicians are not acceptable medical sources or treating sources, 7 6 and thus, there is no requirement that the ALJ give specific and 7 legitimate reasons for disregarding their opinions. 8 Ruling 06-03p, 2006 SSR LEXIS 5 (noting that only acceptable medical 9 sources can give . . . medical opinions ); Bain v. Astrue, 319 Fed. 10 Appx. 543, 546 (9th Cir. 2009)(noting that an ALJ has only to provide 11 germane reasons for discrediting the opinion of a non-acceptable 12 medical source)(citing Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 13 1993); Kus v. Astrue, 276 Fed Appx. 555, 556 (9th Cir. 2008)(noting that 14 [a]s with other witnesses, the ALJ was required to take into account 15 evidence 16 expressly determine[d] to disregard such testimony and gave reasons for 17 doing so )(quoting Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001)). 18 Further, an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence. 19 Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 20 2003)(citation and internal quotations omitted). is from specific and unpersuasive. [non-acceptable legitimate As an medical reasons initial sources] for rejecting matter, the plaintiff s Social Security unless he or she 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 Plaintiff relies on Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2003), and claims that her clinicians should be considered treating sources because they were working as [a] team headed by a physician. (Joint Stip. at 4-5.) While plaintiff s treating physician, Sean Faire, M.D., completed an Outpatient Medication Record, prescribed plaintiff medication, and worked at SBDBH with plaintiff s clinicians, there is no evidence that Dr. Faire worked with plaintiff s clinicians as part of a medical team. Moreover, there is no evidence that the clinicians were supervised by Dr. Faire, and thus, the clinicians opinions cannot be attributed to Dr. Faire. Accordingly, plaintiff s contention is without merit. 11 Moreover, 1 the ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons for 2 determining that plaintiff could work, notwithstanding these assessed 3 GAF scores. The ALJ noted that plaintiff s GAF scores were not 4 supported the 5 [plaintiff s] 6 examinations were normal (Exhibit 3F, pages 4, 7 and 10; Exhibit 8F, p. 7 13). 8 . . . show good improvement, the denial of serious mental symptoms, 9 stable mood, that [plaintiff] was doing well . . . with no medication 10 side effects ; and there was no reason why [plaintiff] could not do 11 work within the [assessed RFC]. 12 and legitimate reasons for his determination that plaintiff s assessed 13 GAF scores did not establish an inability to work. by mood (A.R. 14.) objective was evidence, depressed and because [o]n anxious but The ALJ further noted that: (Id.) examination, mental status [t]reating records Thus, the ALJ did give specific 14 15 Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to provide specific and 16 legitimate reasons for rejecting the clinicians findings regarding 17 plaintiff s depression and trouble concentrating. (Joint Stip. at 5-6.) 18 With respect to plaintiff s depressed state, plaintiff contends that it 19 would have an impact on her ability to be around people and properly 20 interact with people at her job. 21 her difficulty concentrating, plaintiff claims that it would indicate 22 that she would be unable to remember what her job tasks would be or how 23 to complete a job assignment. (Joint Stip. at 5.) With respect to (Id.) 24 25 Significantly, the ALJ noted that plaintiff s mood was depressed on 26 examination, but that treating records, including records from SBDBH 27 clinicians, show[ed] good improvement, the denial of serious mental 28 symptoms, stable mood, that [plaintiff] was doing well . . . and no 12 1 reason why [plaintiff] could not do work with the [assessed RFC]. 2 (A.R. 14.) 3 finding that plaintiff did not meet a Listing, found that plaintiff did 4 not have any difficulties concentrating, because, as noted supra, mental 5 examinations showed no evidence of cognitive deficits, memory within 6 normal limits, no abnormal thought processes or delusions, and that 7 plaintiff was alert and oriented in all four spheres. 8 ALJ cited evidence from SBDBH clinicians, as well as from acceptable 9 medical sources, in support of his finding. With respect to concentration difficulties, the ALJ, in (A.R. 12.) The It thus appears that the 10 ALJ appropriately rejected the clinicians findings that plaintiff is 11 too depressed to work with and around people and has difficulties 12 concentrating that would render her unable to work. 13 14 Even assuming arguendo that the ALJ committed error in rejecting 15 the SBDBH clinicians findings, any such error was harmless, because 16 plaintiff s assessed RFC does not appear to be inconsistent with the 17 clinicians findings that plaintiff is depressed and has some difficulty 18 concentrating. In pertinent part, the ALJ recognized plaintiff s severe 19 mental impairment from substance abuse and her resulting mood disorder 20 (A.R. 11), and thus, the ALJ included appropriate limitations in 21 plaintiff s RFC - restricting plaintiff to routine, repetitive entry 22 level work that is minimally stressful, requires no contact with the 23 general public and only superficial interpersonal contact with co- 24 workers and supervisors (A.R. 12). 25 does not appear to be inconsistent with any limitations arising out of 26 plaintiff s depressed state and poor concentration. In other words, plaintiff s RFC 27 28 Accordingly, there is no basis for finding reversible error in 13 1 connection with the ALJ s consideration of the findings of plaintiff s 2 SBDBH clinicians. 3 4 II. The ALJ Posed A Complete Hypothetical To The Vocational Expert. 5 6 Hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert must set forth See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 7 all the claimant s limitations. 8 756 (9th Cir. 1989); Embrey v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988). 9 The hypothetical questions, however, need not include all conceivable 10 limitations that a favorable reading of the record may suggest - only 11 those limitations the ALJ finds to exist. 12 Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2005); Rollins v. Massanari, 13 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 756-57; 14 Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1986). See, e.g., Bayliss v. 15 16 Here, the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert 17 included all limitations the ALJ found to exist. 18 plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed error by not including 19 additional mental limitations, plaintiff s contention is without merit. 20 In pertinent part, plaintiff s clinicians found that plaintiff was 21 depressed and anxious; had feelings of hopelessness, helplessness, and 22 social isolation; had concentration problems, fair insight, and poor 23 judgment; and assessed plaintiff with GAF scores of 42, 47, and 48. 24 clinicians did not opine on whether plaintiff had any resulting work- 25 related limitations.8 Therefore it is unclear To the extent what The additional 26 8 27 28 At best, the only limitation included in the clinicians treatment notes is plaintiff s problems with concentration; however, as the ALJ included the limitation that plaintiff be restricted to routine, repetitive work, no reversible error was committed. 14 1 limitations, if any, the ALJ failed to include in his hypothetical to 2 the vocational expert. 3 problems in his hypothetical question by limiting plaintiff to routine, 4 repetitive, entry-level work that is minimally stressful, requires no 5 contact with the general public, and requires only a superficial degree 6 of interpersonal contact with co-workers and supervisors. (A.R. 33-34.) 7 Accordingly, no reversible error was committed by the ALJ. Moreover, the ALJ addressed plaintiff s mental 8 CONCLUSION 9 10 11 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Commissioner s 12 decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from material 13 legal error. Neither reversal of the Commissioner s decision nor remand 14 is warranted. 15 16 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered affirming 17 the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of 19 this Memorandum Opinion and Order and the Judgment on counsel for 20 plaintiff and for defendant. 21 22 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 23 24 DATED: July 26, 2011 25 26 27 MARGARET A. NAGLE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28 15

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