Lynn Moya v. Michael J Astrue, No. 5:2009cv00850 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Carla Woehrle, IT IS ORDERED that: 1. The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED. 2. This action is REMANDED to defendant, pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for further proceedings as discussed in this order. (SEE ORDER FOR FURTHER DETAILS) (lmh)
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Lynn Moya v. Michael J Astrue Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 EASTERN DIVISION 11 12 LYNN MOYA, 13 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, v. 14 15 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 16 Defendant. 17 No. EDCV 09-850 CW DECISION AND ORDER 18 19 The parties have consented, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to the 20 jurisdiction of the undersigned Magistrate Judge. 21 review of the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits. 22 discussed below, the court finds that the Commissioner’s decision 23 should be reversed and this matter remanded for further proceedings. I. 24 25 Plaintiff seeks As BACKGROUND Plaintiff Lynn Moya was born on March 5, 1957, and was fifty-one 26 years old at the time of her administrative hearing. [Administrative 27 Record (“AR”) 28.] 28 relevant work experience. [AR 71.] She has an eighth grade education and no past Plaintiff alleges disability on 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 the basis of a mental condition and auditory hallucinations [AR 30, 2 36.] 3 4 II. PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT Plaintiff’s complaint was lodged on May 1, 2009, and filed on May 5 12, 2009. 6 Plaintiff’s Administrative Record (“AR”). 7 parties filed their Joint Stipulation (“JS”) identifying matters not 8 in dispute, issues in dispute, the positions of the parties, and the 9 relief sought by each party. 10 11 12 On October 6, 2009, Defendant filed an Answer and On October 4, 2010, the This matter has been taken under submission without oral argument. III. PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income (“SSI”) on 13 July 17, 2006, alleging disability since July 16, 2006. [AR 9.] 14 the application was denied initially on September 25, 2006, and upon 15 reconsideration on April 26, 2007, Plaintiff requested an 16 administrative hearing, which was held on June 2, 2008, before an 17 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). [AR 21.] 18 by counsel and gave testimony at the hearing. [AR 9.] 19 benefits in a decision dated June 26, 2008 [AR 18.] 20 Council denied review on April 16, 2009, the ALJ’s decision became the 21 Commissioner’s final decision. [AR 1.] 22 23 IV. After Plaintiff was represented The ALJ denied When the Appeals STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 24 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. 25 ALJ’s) findings and decision should be upheld if they are free of 26 legal error and supported by substantial evidence. 27 court determines that a finding is based on legal error or is not 28 supported by substantial evidence in the record, the court may reject 2 The Commissioner’s (or However, if the 1 the finding and set aside the decision to deny benefits. 2 v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001); Tonapetyan v. 3 Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001); Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 4 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 5 1097 (9th Cir. 1999); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 6 1998); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); Moncada 7 v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995)(per curiam). 8 9 See Aukland 2001); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. It is “relevant evidence 10 which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 11 conclusion.” 12 a finding, a court must review the administrative record as a whole, 13 “weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 14 detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.” 15 can reasonably support either affirming or reversing,” the reviewing 16 court “may not substitute its judgment” for that of the Commissioner. 17 Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-721; see also Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at 1162. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports 18 V. Id. “If the evidence DISCUSSION 19 A. 20 To be eligible for disability benefits a claimant must THE FIVE-STEP EVALUATION 21 demonstrate a medically determinable impairment which prevents the 22 claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity and which is 23 expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at 24 least twelve months. 25 721; 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 26 Disability claims are evaluated using a five-step test: 27 Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. 28 3 1 Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate. Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, the claimant is automatically determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995, as amended 10 April 9, 1996); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142, 107 11 S. Ct. 2287, 96 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1987); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; 20 12 C.F.R. § 404.1520, § 416.920. 13 “not disabled” at any step, there is no need to complete further 14 steps. 15 If a claimant is found “disabled” or Tackett, 180 F.3d 1098; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Claimants have the burden of proof at steps one through four, 16 subject to the presumption that Social Security hearings are non- 17 adversarial, and to the Commissioner’s affirmative duty to assist 18 claimants in fully developing the record even if they are represented 19 by counsel. 20 1288. 21 made, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner (at step five) to 22 prove that, considering residual functional capacity (“RFC”)1, age, Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 and n.3; Smolen, 80 F.3d at If this burden is met, a prima facie case of disability is 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Residual functional capacity measures what a claimant can still do despite existing “exertional” (strength-related) and “nonexertional” limitations. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.s. 5-6 (9th Cir. 1989). Nonexertional limitations limit ability to work without directly limiting strength, and include mental, sensory, postural, manipulative, and environmental limitations. Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 1993); Cooper, 800 F.2d at 1155 n.7; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(c). Pain may be either an exertional or a nonexertional limitation. Penny, 2 F.3d at 959; Perminter v. Heckler, 4 1 education, and work experience, a claimant can perform other work 2 which is available in significant numbers. 3 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, § 416.920. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, 4 B. THE ALJ’S EVALUATION IN PLAINTIFF’S CASE 5 Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 6 gainful activity since her disability application date (step one). 7 The ALJ held that Plaintiff had a medically determinable impairment, 8 namely adjustment disorder due to polysubstance abuse, and that she is 9 also hypertensive and has minor degenerative changes of the lumbar 10 spine. The ALJ found, however, that Plaintiff did not have a severe 11 impairment or combination of impairments (step two). [AR 11.] 12 Accordingly, Plaintiff was found not “disabled” as defined by the 13 Social Security Act. [AR 18.] 14 C. 15 The parties’ Joint Stipulation raises the following disputed 16 issues: 17 1. 18 ISSUES IN DISPUTE Whether the ALJ properly considered the treating physician’s opinion; 19 2. Whether the ALJ properly developed the record; 20 3. Whether the ALJ properly considered the type, dosage and side effects of Plaintiff’s prescribed medications; 21 22 4. 23 24 25 26 Whether the ALJ properly considered the lay witness statement; and 5. Whether the ALJ properly considered the severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairment. [JS 2.] 27 28 765 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1985); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(c). 5 1 As discussed below, Issue Five is dispositive. 2 D. 3 At step two of the sequential evaluation, an impairment or SEVERITY OF THE IMPAIRMENT 4 combination of impairments may be found “not severe” only if the 5 evidence establishes a “slight abnormality that has no more than a 6 minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.” 7 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 8 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 9 306 (9th Cir. 1988). Webb v. Barnhart, If an ALJ is “unable to determine clearly the 10 effect of an impairment or combination of impairments on the 11 individual’s ability to do basic work activities, the sequential 12 evaluation should not end with the not severe evaluation step.” 13 433 F.3d at 687 (quoting SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856 at *4). 14 two involves a “de minimis screening device [used] to dispose of 15 groundless claims.” 16 1290). 17 Webb, Thus, step Webb, 433 F.3d at 687 (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff lacked a medically severe 18 impairment or combination of impairments because Plaintiff’s 19 statements “concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects 20 of [the alleged] symptoms are not credible...” [AR 12.] 21 presents medical records from 1994 to 1997, and 2005 to 2008. 22 the alleged onset date is July 17, 2006, only the most recent records 23 are relevant. 24 and reported symptoms varied greatly. 25 Plaintiff’s symptoms, it is clear that Plaintiff’s impairments satisfy 26 the de minimis standard required in a “severity” determination. 27 28 The record Because However, between 2005 to 2008, Plaintiff’s condition Despite the fluctuation in In 2005, the staff psychiatrist at Patton State Hospital found plaintiff to be cooperative, euthymic, goal directed, and with no 6 1 acute psychotic symptoms. [AR 263.] In 2006, the examining 2 psychiatrist Dr. Linda Smith found that Plaintiff was inconsistent and 3 generally not credible, and was manipulated and maneuvered during her 4 examination. 5 polysubstance abuse [AR 266-274.] In 2006 to 2007, Plaintiff’s most 6 recent parole assessments indicated that her symptoms varied greatly. 7 At times she reported feeling better and having less mood swings 8 (12/11/2006), then later hearing voices and having problems 9 sleeping(1/22/2007 and 2/2/2007). At this time, Dr. Smith diagnosed Plaintiff with At her last parole appointment she 10 did not refill her medication because she was doing better 11 (2/26/2007). [AR 293.] However, in 2007, the director of her housing 12 facility indicated that Plaintiff dressed abnormally, she could not 13 make decisions, focus, and comprehend, but could perform chores with 14 assistance, handle money and budgets, and work on computers. [AR 84.] 15 During this same period, Plaintiff also indicated that she cannot 16 bathe, hears voices, and cannot do her hair. [AR 94.] 17 On April 1, 2008, Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Marcia 18 Hudson, indicated on a county welfare form that Plaintiff was not able 19 to work and had limitations affecting her ability to do so. [AR 301.] 20 Also included in the record are various Medication Visit 21 Interdisciplinary Notes completed by Dr. Hudson. 22 Interdisciplinary Note dated January 24, 2008 indicates that Plaintiff 23 has “295.70" Schizoaffective Disorder and “304.80" polysubstance 24 dependencies. [AR 309.] 25 indicates that Plaintiff has “295.70 - continued AVH” (auditory visual 26 hallucinations) and “304.80 - SFR.” [AR 308.] 27 April 1, 2008 indicates that Plaintiff has “AVH/Anxiety 295.70.” [AR 28 307.] The first The next note dated February 27, 2008 7 The final note dated 1 Although the ALJ has called into question the evidentiary value 2 of these records, the finding of non-severity at step two was not 3 “clearly established by the medical evidence.” 4 see also Yuckert, 841 F.2d at 306 (“Despite the deference usually 5 accorded to the Secretary's application of regulations, numerous 6 appellate courts have imposed a narrow construction upon the severity 7 regulation applied here.”). 8 considering the record as a whole, Plaintiff has offered evidence that 9 was sufficient to satisfy the de minimis threshold at step two. Webb, 433 F.3d at 687; Under this narrow standard, and Webb, 10 433 F.3d at 687. Although the court “do[es] not intimate that 11 [plaintiff] will succeed in proving that [s]he is disabled,” the ALJ 12 should continue the sequential evaluation beyond step two “because 13 there was not substantial evidence to show that [plaintiff’s] claim 14 was groundless.” 15 the Plaintiff did not suffer from a severe mental impairment should be 16 reversed, and the matter should be remanded for further proceedings. Id., at 688. Accordingly, the ALJ’s finding that 17 F. 18 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings is within REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 19 the discretion of the district court. 20 1175-1178 (9th Cir. 2000). 21 further proceedings, or where the record has been fully developed, it 22 is appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct an immediate 23 award of benefits. 24 remand for further proceedings turns upon their likely utility). 25 However, where there are outstanding issues that must be resolved 26 before a determination can be made, and it is not clear from the 27 record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled if 28 all the evidence were properly evaluated, remand is appropriate. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, Where no useful purpose would be served by Harman, 211 F.3d at 1179 (decision whether to 8 Id. 1 Here, as set out above, outstanding issues remain before a finding of 2 disability can be made. 3 Accordingly, remand is appropriate. VI. ORDERS 4 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 5 1. The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED. 6 2. This action is REMANDED to defendant, pursuant to Sentence 7 Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for further proceedings as discussed 8 above. 9 10 3. The Clerk of the Court shall serve this Decision and Order and the Judgment herein on all parties or counsel. 11 DATED: October 26, 2010 12 13 _____________________________ CARLA M. WOEHRLE United States Magistrate Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9
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