Linda Johnson v. Michael J Astrue, No. 5:2008cv01704 - Document 18 (C.D. Cal. 2009)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION by Magistrate Judge Stephen J. Hillman: For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed and the Complaint is dismissed. (See document for further details.) (pcl)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA-EASTERN DIVISION 11 12 13 14 15 LINDA JOHNSON, 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Comm., Social Security Administration, Defendant, ) ED CV 08-01704-SH ) ) MEMORANDUM DECISION ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) I. PROCEEDINGS 23 This matter is before the Court for review of the Decision by the 24 Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff s application for Supplemental 25 Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 26 § 636(c), the parties have consented that the case may be handled by the 27 undersigned. The action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which authorizes the 28 Court to enter judgment upon the pleadings and transcript of the record before the 1 1 Commissioner. The plaintiff and the defendant have filed their pleadings, the 2 defendant has filed the certified transcript of record, and the parties have filed a 3 joint stipulation. After reviewing the matter, the Court concludes that the decision 4 of the Commissioner should be affirmed. 5 On September 13, 2006, Plaintiff, Linda Johnson filed an application for 6 Supplemental Security Income alleging an inability to work since June 1, 1998, due 7 to disability. The claim was denied initially on January 18, 2007, and upon re- 8 consideration on May 2, 2007. The Plaintiff filed a timely written request for a 9 hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on May 21, 2007. The Plaintiff 10 appeared and testified at a hearing held on June 10, 2008 in San Bernardino, CA. 11 (AR 4-18). Following receipt of a Decision denying benefits on June 30, 2008, 12 Plaintiff sought review to the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council declined 13 review on September 25, 2008. (AR 1-3). 14 Plaintiff makes six challenges to the ALJ s determination. Plaintiff alleges 15 that the ALJ erred 1) in failing to properly consider treatment reports regarding 16 Plaintiff s right shoulder pain; 2) in failing to provide legally sufficient reasons for 17 rejecting the opinions of Plaintiff s treating psychiatrist; 3) in failing to properly 18 consider State Agency findings regarding Plaintiff s physical limitations; 4) in 19 failing to properly consider State Agency findings regarding Plaintiff s mental 20 limitations; 5) in failing to make proper credibility findings about Plaintiff s 21 testimony and 6) in failing to properly consider the type, dosage, and side effects of 22 Plaintiff s prescribed medications. 23 Each of Plaintiff s contentions will be addressed in turn. 24 25 26 ISSUE NO. 1: The ALJ Properly Considered Treatment Reports Regarding Right Shoulder Pain 27 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly consider treatment reports 28 regarding Plaintiff s right shoulder pain. In response, Defendant argues that the ALJ 2 1 properly considered the treatment notes regarding Plaintiff s right shoulder pain. 2 A treating physician s opinion is entitled greater weight than that of an 3 examining physician. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) 4 (citing Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987)); 20 C.F.R § 416.927 5 (d) (1). The treating physician s opinion is not, however, necessarily conclusive as 6 to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability. Magallanes v. 7 Bowen, supra (citing Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761-62 n.7 (9th Cir. 8 1989)). The weight given a treating physician s opinion depends on whether it is 9 supported by sufficient medical data and is consistent with other evidence in the 10 record. 20 C.F.R §416.927 (b)- (d). The [Commissioner] may disregard the treating 11 physician s opinion whether or not that opinion is contradicted. Magallanes v. 12 Bowen, supra (citing Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986)). A 13 treating physician s medical opinion unsupported by medical findings, personal 14 observations, or test results may be rejected. See Burkart v. Bowen, 856 F. 2d 1335, 15 1339 (9th Cir. 1988). 16 A medical opinion is considered uncontroverted if all the underlying medical 17 findings in the record of plaintiff s physical impairments are similar. Sprague v. 18 Bowen, supra. To reject the uncontroverted opinion of a claimant s physician, the 19 [Commissioner] must present clear and convincing reasons for doing so. 20 Magallanes v. Bowen, supra (citing Rodriguez, supra, 876 F.2d at 761-62); see also 21 Morgan v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 596 (9th Cir. 1999) ( When a non-treating 22 physician s opinion contradicts that of the treating physician but is not based on 23 independent clinical findings, or rests on clinical findings also considered by the 24 treating physician the opinion of the treating physician may be rejected only if the 25 ALJ gives specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial 26 evidence in the record. ; Montijo v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 729 F.2d 27 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1984). 28 Contrary to Plaintiff s contention, the ALJ properly considered the treating 3 1 source reports including the medical reports and follow up visits regarding 2 Plaintiff s shoulder impairment. (AR 12). Substantial evidence supported the ALJ s 3 finding that the Plaintiff s right shoulder did not constitute a significant physical 4 impairment. (AR 12). 5 In making his Decision, the ALJ carefully considered and evaluated the 6 Plaintiff s right shoulder pain. The ALJ noted that the Plaintiff was treated for what 7 was thought to be right shoulder tendinitis, that an MRI showed a partial tear of the 8 inferior surface of the tendon of the rotator cuff with slight tendonitis and 9 tendonopathy, and that right shoulder x-rays were normal. (AR 12, 282-283). The 10 ALJ further noted that a January 2007 physical examination showed a limited range 11 of motion in the right shoulder, a positive drop test and tenderness, a full range of 12 motion of the elbow and cervical spine, and no muscle atrophy or neurological 13 deficits. (AR 12, 280-281). The ALJ also discussed that while treating physician, 14 Dr. Michael Vizcarra diagnosed impingement syndrome of the right shoulder and 15 recommended a cortisone injection and physical therapy, there was no evidence of 16 further treatment for the condition. (AR 12, 280-281). 17 As such, while the ALJ accepted that Plaintiff has an impingement syndrome 18 of the right shoulder, the ALJ properly concluded that the Plaintiff s shoulder 19 impairment did not meet or equal the criteria specified in the 1.00 (musculoskeletal 20 system) for listed impairments. (AR 10, 12). In addition, as the Defendant notes, 21 Plaintiff not receiving treatment for her impingement syndrome further supports 22 ALJ s finding that Plaintiff s shoulder impairment was not disabling. Also, while 23 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly rejected the treating source reports 24 regarding Plaintiff s shoulder restrictions without legally sufficient reasons, there 25 are no treatment records indicating substantial shoulder restrictions. 26 Plaintiff argues that certain specific findings of the medical reports and 27 follow-up visits were not discussed in ALJ s Decision. The ALJ need not discuss 28 all evidence presented and is only required to explain why significant evidence has 4 1 been rejected. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-1395. (9th Cir. 1984). In 2 making findings, an ALJ may draw inferences logically from the evidence. Sample 3 v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). A reviewing court may draw 4 specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ s opinion. It is proper for a court 5 to draw inferences from the ALJ s opinion discussing relevant physician s findings 6 and opinion if those inferences are there to be drawn. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 7 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989). In the present case, the ALJ discussed the significant 8 findings concerning its assessment of the right shoulder pain; however, the ALJ was 9 not required to note every piece of evidence used in his determination. Hence, the 10 ALJ properly considered and assessed the treating source reports regarding 11 Plaintiff s right shoulder. 12 13 14 ISSUE NO. 2: The ALJ Properly Considered the Opinions of the Treating Psychiatrist 15 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of Plaintiff s 16 treating psychiatrist, Dr. Umakanthan, without providing legally sufficient reasons. 17 Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that the ALJ discredited Dr. Umakanthan s 18 Work Capacity Evaluation, dated August 30, 2007 without providing legally 19 sufficient reasons. In response, Defendant argues that the ALJ properly rejected the 20 opinions of Plaintiff s treating psychiatrist. 21 A treating physician s opinion is entitled greater weight than that of an 22 examining physician. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) 23 (citing Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987)); 20 C.F.R § 416.927 24 (d) (1). The treating physician s opinion is not, however, necessarily conclusive as 25 to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability. Magallanes v. 26 Bowen, supra (citing Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761-62 n.7 (9th Cir. 27 1989)). The weight given a treating physician s opinion depends on whether it is 28 supported by sufficient medical data and is consistent with other evidence in the 5 1 record. 20 C.F.R §416.927 (b)- (d). The [Commissioner] may disregard the treating 2 physician s opinion whether or not that opinion is contradicted. Magallanes v. 3 Bowen, supra (citing Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986)). A 4 treating physician s medical opinion unsupported by medical findings, personal 5 observations, or test results may be rejected. See Burkart v. Bowen, 856 F. 2d 1335, 6 1339 (9th Cir. 1988). 7 A medical opinion is considered uncontroverted if all the underlying medical 8 findings in the record of plaintiff s physical impairments are similar. Sprague v. 9 Bowen, supra. To reject the uncontroverted opinion of a claimant s physician, the 10 [Commissioner] must present clear and convincing reasons for doing so. 11 Magallanes v. Bowen, supra (citing Rodriguez, supra, 876 F.2d at 761-62); see also 12 Morgan v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 596 (9th Cir. 1999) ( When a non-treating 13 physician s opinion contradicts that of the treating physician but is not based on 14 independent clinical findings, or rests on clinical findings also considered by the 15 treating physician the opinion of the treating physician may be rejected only if the 16 ALJ gives specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial 17 evidence in the record. ; Montijo v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 729 F.2d 18 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1984). 19 Dr. Jeremiah Umakanthan is Plaintiff s treating psychiatrist who has treated 20 Plaintiff intermittently since February 2004. (AR 13). The ALJ provided clear and 21 convincing reasons for not providing much weight to Dr. Umakanthan s report by 22 pointing to insufficient objective medical evidence, and internal inconsistency 23 between Dr. Umakanthan s reports and other evidence. (AR 16). 24 As discussed by the ALJ, although Dr. Umakanthan stated that Plaintiff had 25 complained of auditory and visual hallucinations, he did not provide supportive 26 objective findings. (AR 16, 297). Further, the ALJ noted that a State Agency 27 psychiatrist reported that the recently noted psychotic symptoms are not verified 28 by objective signs, and appear more in line with what is reported in response to 6 1 stress, rather than endogenous psychotic illness. (AR 16, 302). Also, as discussed 2 by the ALJ, Dr. Umakanthan never indicated that Plaintiff was medically non- 3 compliant and frequently missed appointments, despite treatment records indicating 4 that Plaintiff missed appointments and was medically non-compliant. (AR 14, 16). 5 In fact, the ALJ noted that Dr. Umakanthan contradicted his own treatment notes by 6 reporting that Plaintiff seems to understand medication regimen and follow as 7 instructed. (AR 16, 298). Moreover, Social Security Ruling 96-7p states that if a 8 claimant fails to follow a treatment plan recommended by a claimant s physicians 9 without a good reason, she will be found not disabled. See 20 CFR 416.930; AR 10 14. As such, the ALJ discussed sufficient and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. 11 Umakanthan s opinion. 12 13 14 ISSUE NO. 3: The ALJ Properly Considered the Opinions of the State Agency Physician 15 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of Dr. Wahl, 16 a state agency physician, regarding Plaintiff s physical limitations. The Defendant 17 argues that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Wahl s opinion. 18 According to the Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-6p, findings of fact made 19 by state agency medical and psychological consultants and other program 20 physicians and psychologists regarding the nature and severity of an impairment(s) 21 must be treated as expert opinion evidence of a non-examining source. ALJ s may 22 not ignore these opinions and must explain the weight given to these opinions in 23 their decisions. Id. 24 Non-examining physician opinions with nothing more cannot constitute 25 substantial evidence. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F. 3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995). 26 However, the opinion of a non-examining testifying medical physician may serve 27 as substantial evidence when supported by and consistent with other evidence in the 28 record. Morgan v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 1999). 7 1 The ALJ sufficiently weighed the evidence provided by Dr. Wahl and 2 properly adopted a light functional capacity based on the mild objective findings 3 and objective evidence. (AR 15). The State Agency review physicians determined 4 that Plaintiff was limited to light exertion, with limitations to frequent pushing and 5 pulling with the right upper extremity, no overhead reaching with the right upper 6 extremity; no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffold; no more than occasional climbing 7 ramps and stairs; and no more than occasional crawling. (AR 15, 304-308). 8 The ALJ provided sufficient explanation for not adopting the state agency 9 physician s opinion on Plaintiff s shoulder restriction. The ALJ indicated that there 10 was insufficient evidence to show that the Plaintiff endures chronic pain or is 11 impaired when performing the functions reported by the State Agency. (AR 15). 12 The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff had not received any recent treatment for her 13 shoulder condition since her four month period of treatment from September 2006 14 to January 2007. (AR 15). While Dr. Michael Vizcarra diagnosed impingement 15 syndrome of the right shoulder and recommended a cortisone injection and physical 16 therapy, there is no evidence of further treatment for the condition. (AR 12). Hence, 17 the ALJ noted that Plaintiff did not follow the recommended treatment plan. 18 Further, as discussed in Issue 1, the ALJ adequately evaluated evidence concerning 19 the Plaintiff s right shoulder pain and properly concluded that there was insufficient 20 evidence to conclude a disabling physical impairment. (AR 12). 21 As such, the ALJ provided sufficient reasons for not accepting the shoulder 22 restrictions reported by the State Agency. 23 24 25 ISSUE NO. 4: The ALJ Properly Considered The Opinions Of The State Agency Psychiatrist 26 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly consider and discuss the 27 opinion of state agency physician Dr. Gregg. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Gregg s 28 Mental Residual Capacity Assessment dated December 19, 2006 was not discussed 8 1 in the ALJ s Decision. The Defendant argues that the ALJ properly evaluated 2 medical evidence concerning Plaintiff s mental limitations. 3 Dr. Gregg s Mental Residual Capacity Assessment dated December 19, 2006 4 reported that the Plaintiff is moderately limited in her ability to understand, 5 remember and carry out detailed instructions, complete a normal work week without 6 interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, and to perform at a consistent 7 pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods, and the ability to 8 interact appropriately with the general public. (AR 253-254). 9 As the Defendant notes, while the ALJ did not specifically refer to Dr. Gregg 10 by name, the ALJ discussed the moderate mental limitations of the Mental Residual 11 Capacity Assessment. The ALJ noted that the Plaintiff has moderate difficulties in 12 activities of daily life and social functioning. (AR 10). The ALJ discussed that 13 Plaintiff has moderate difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence or pace. 14 (AR 10). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff has no episodes of decompensation. (AR 15 10). 16 Moreover, the ALJ properly considered and translated the paragraph B and 17 C findings into work-related functions in the residual functional capacity analysis. 18 (AR 10-11). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff is limited to habituated work 19 involving 3-5 steps of instructions, and that Plaintiff cannot perform work involving 20 complex tasks, or more than moderate stress. (AR 11). Moreover, as the Defendant 21 notes, the ALJ s finding that Plaintiff should not be exposed to complex tasks or 22 more than moderate stress is consistent with Dr. Gregg s Mental Residual Capacity 23 Assessment. Hence, the ALJ properly evaluated the State Agency physician s 24 assessment of Plaintiff s mental limitation. 25 /// 26 /// 27 28 ISSUE NO. 5: The ALJ Made a Proper Credibility Finding 9 1 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to make proper credibility findings 2 regarding Plaintiff s testimony, and failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 3 discounting Plaintiff s credibility. In response, Defendant argues that the ALJ 4 provided sufficiently specific reasons for discrediting Plaintiff s testimony. 5 The Commissioner's assessment of plaintiff's credibility should be given great 6 weight. Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985). If the ALJ s 7 decision is based on a credibility assessment, there must be an explicit finding as to 8 whether the plaintiff's testimony was believed or disbelieved and the testimony must 9 not be entirely discounted simply because there was a lack of objective findings. 10 Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, if the 11 Commissioner chooses to disregard plaintiff's testimony, the Commissioner must 12 set forth specific cogent reasons for disbelieving it. Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 13 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2001). 14 Once the plaintiff produces objective medical evidence of an underlying 15 impairment, the ALJ may still reject the plaintiff's excess pain testimony, but only 16 by setting forth clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Light v. Social Sec. 17 Admin., 119 F.3d 780, 792 (9th Cir. 1997); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 18 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). 19 In evaluating a claimant's credibility, the ALJ may consider the claimant's 20 reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies within the claimant's testimony or as 21 between his testimony and conduct, the claimant's daily activities, work history, as 22 well as testimony from physicians or third parties concerning the nature, severity, 23 and effect on the symptoms of which the claimant complains. Light, supra; see also 24 Reddick, supra (although disability claimants should not be penalized for trying to 25 lead normal lives despite their limitations, when the level of their activities are 26 inconsistent with their claimed limitations, those activities have a bearing on the 27 claimants' credibility). 28 In his Decision, the ALJ provided substantial evidence for discounting the 10 1 credibility of Plaintiff s testimony. Among other factors, the ALJ s credibility 2 determination considered Plaintiff s inconsistent testimony, work-related activities, 3 medical non-compliance, and failure to follow treatment plans. (AR 14-15). 4 The ALJ provided specific and legitimate inconsistencies in the Plaintiff s 5 testimony. Plaintiff stated that she compulsively cleans her house all day, but 6 reported sleeping during the day. (AR 15, 167, 169). While she stated having back 7 pain when standing or cooking, she can prepare frozen meals, pizza and sandwiches. 8 (AR 15, 169). Even though she reported a dislike for going outside because of 9 being afraid of people, she drives and shops. (AR 15, 170). Further, at times she 10 socializes and goes places alone. (AR 171). 11 Moreover, the ALJ pointed to inconsistencies between Plaintiff s testimony 12 and objective evidence. While Plaintiff stated a difficulty tying shoes and putting 13 on shirts and pants, evidence did not show her shoulder impairment affecting her to 14 such an extent. (AR 15). Further, while she reported having difficulty sleeping, 15 hearing things and seeing things that are not there, there is no objective evidence 16 documenting psychotic symptoms. (AR 15, 174). 17 indicating that her back impairment causes extreme limitations. (AR 15). Also, there is no evidence 18 In addition, the Plaintiff s daily activities, if rigorous enough to be a fair 19 proxy for the demands of work, can constitute a basis to find allegations of disabling 20 pain (or other subjective symptoms) not credible. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F. 2d 597, 603 21 (9th Cir. 1989) (daily activities may be reason to discredit excess pain allegation if 22 claimant is able to spend a substantial part of the day performing activities that are 23 transferable to a work setting). As discussed in ALJ s Decision, the Plaintiff 24 engages in a variety of activities which can be transferred to 25 work-related activities. (AR 14-15). For example, she helps her three school aged 26 children get ready for school and prepares frozen meals, pizza and sandwiches. (AR 27 14-15, 169). 28 Further, the ALJ may find that a claimant s refusal of recommended course 11 1 of treatment, or her failure to take a prescribed medication that would alleviate the 2 alleged disabling symptoms, supports a finding that the claimant is not credible. See 3 20 CFR §404.1530 (a) and 416.930 (a) ( In order to get benefits, you must follow 4 treatment prescribed by your physician if this treatment can restore your ability to 5 work. ); 20 CFR 404.1530 (b) and 416.930 (b) ( If you do not follow the prescribed 6 treatment without a good reason, we will not find you disabled. ); Fair v. Bowen, 7 885 F. 2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was consistently 8 medically non-complaint, and failed to receive follow up treatments without any 9 good reason. She consistently missed appointments with her psychiatrist, Dr. 10 Umakanthan, and failed to follow his medical directions. (AR 13-14, 291,292,312, 11 315, 316, 354, 355, 358, 359). Accordingly, the ALJ provided clear and convincing 12 reasons for determining that Plaintiff s testimony was not entirely credible. 13 14 15 ISSUE NO. 6: The ALJ Properly Considered the Effects of Plaintiff s Medications 16 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly consider the type, dosage, and 17 side effects of Plaintiff s prescribed medications. In response, Defendant argues that 18 the ALJ properly assessed the side-effects of Plaintiff s medication. 19 In evaluating symptoms, the Social Security Ruling 96-7p requires 20 consideration of the type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of any medication 21 the individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms. See 20 C.F.R 22 §416.929 (c)(3)(iv) 20; §404.1529 (c) (3) (iv). Further, the ALJ must consider any 23 symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions, such as medication side 24 effects, that are consistent with the objective medical evidence or other evidence. 25 See §20 C.F.R 416.929 (c)(3)(iv). 26 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ denied Plaintiff s disability claim based on her 27 medical non-compliance and that her tiredness symptoms resulting from her 28 Seroquel dosage could explain her non-compliance. This argument is without merit. 12 1 As discussed in issue 5, Plaintiff s non-compliance was one of many factors that the 2 ALJ considered for discounting Plaintiff s credibility. Moreover, as the Defendant 3 notes there is very minimal evidence regarding the side effect of being tired from 4 Plaintiff s dosage of Seroquel which was reported only once in June 19, 2007. (AR 5 319). In addition, there was no evidence to suggest that this side effect effected 6 serious functional limitations and restrictions. 7 Furthermore, a symptom that diminishes the capacity for work activities must 8 last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. See §20 C.F.R 416.929 (c)(4). In 9 the present case, as the Defendant notes, the Plaintiff s alleged side effect did not 10 meet the 12-month durational requirement. Plaintiff reported feeling tired during the 11 day from Seroquel on June 12, 2007. (AR 319). However, she did not report 12 experiencing side effects on July 19, 2007(AR 318), or August 28, 2007 (AR 316). 13 Plaintiff failed to come to three visits (AR 317) and she did not report further side 14 effects on other visits (AR 312, 313, 316). 15 In addition, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider the dosage 16 changes to Plaintiff s medications. Contrary to Plaintiff s contention, the ALJ is not 17 required to mention every detail of the record in his Decision and is only required 18 to explain why significant evidence has been rejected. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 19 F.2d 1393, 1394-1395. (9th Cir. 1984). Also, the ALJ may draw inferences logically 20 from the evidence. Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). Also, 21 there was no evidence indicating that the dosage changes effected Plaintiff s 22 functional limitations. Hence, the ALJ properly considered the side effects and 23 dosage changes of Plaintiff s medications. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 28 CONCLUSION AND ORDER For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed 13 1 and the Complaint is dismissed. 2 DATED September 22, 2009 3 4 5 6 _______________________________________ STEPHEN J. HILLMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14

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