Nancy Ray v. Michael J. Astrue, No. 5:2008cv00523 - Document 22 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Patrick J. Walsh. The Agencys decision is affirmed. (rp)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 NANCY RAY, Plaintiff, 11 12 13 v. 14 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 15 Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. ED CV 08-0523 PJW MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 16 17 Before the Court is Plaintiff s appeal of a decision by Defendant 18 Social Security Administration ( the Agency ), denying her application 19 for Disability Insurance benefits ( DIB ) and Supplemental Security 20 Income ( SSI ). 21 disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is supported by 22 substantial evidence, the decision is affirmed. 23 Because the Agency s decision that Plaintiff was not In October 2005, Plaintiff applied for SSI and DIB. 24 (Administrative Record ( AR ) 87, 91.) After the Agency denied the 25 application initially and on reconsideration, Plaintiff requested and 26 was granted a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ). 27 49, 60, 66-68.) 28 at the hearing and testified. (AR On October 10, 2007, Plaintiff appeared with counsel (AR 6-29.) On November 1, 2007, 1 the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. 2 appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied Plaintiff s request for 3 review. (AR 2-4.) (AR 2, 34-48.) Plaintiff She then commenced this action. 4 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by failing to properly 5 consider: 1) lay witness testimony (claim one); 2) the treating 6 doctors opinions (claims two and three); 3) the severity of 7 Plaintiff s mental impairment (claim four); and 5) the functional 8 limitations caused by the impairment (claim five). 9 6, 8-10, 13-15, 17-18, and 19-20.) (Joint Stip. at 3- In addition, Plaintiff alleges 10 that the ALJ s hypothetical question to the vocational expert did not 11 include all of Plaintiff s functional limitations (claim six). 12 Stip. at 20-22.) 13 that these claims are without merit. 14 (Joint For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds In her first claim, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ ignored the 15 written testimony of her daughter, Andrea Martin, who completed two 16 third-party function reports. 17 one, dated December 21, 2005, Martin reported that Plaintiff stayed in 18 bed most of the time, occasionally accompanying her to buy food or go 19 to church. 20 to go out in public or be around people because she was paranoid, no 21 longer cooked dinner, seemed to no longer care about things, and had 22 to be reminded to do everyday chores such as keeping herself clean or 23 doing laundry. 24 Plaintiff did not hear very well and was forgetful, which made it hard 25 for her to follow instructions. 26 June 5, 2006, Martin essentially repeated her claims from the first 27 report. (AR 156.) (AR 156-63, 167-74.) In the first Martin also reported that Plaintiff was unable (AR 157, 158.) Martin also stated in the report that (AR 161.) (AR 169-72.) 28 2 In a second report, dated 1 An ALJ is required to consider statements of lay witnesses, 2 whether these statements are made at the administrative hearing or 3 submitted in writing before the hearing, and to give reasons that are 4 germane to each witness for discounting them. 5 Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006); Schneider v. Comm r, 6 Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that 7 ALJ must consider lay witness evidence in the form of written 8 submissions). 9 Stout v. Comm r, Soc. The ALJ noted Martin s reports that Plaintiff essentially does 10 nothing but stay in bed or watch television . . . [and] needs 11 reminders in everything including to take care of her personal hygiene 12 and to take medication. 13 reports did not warrant a finding of greater limitation because 14 Plaintiff s daily activities reflect a dependent lifestyle that 15 appears to be one of choice rather than due to any established 16 impairment. 17 sufficient to support the ALJ s decision to discount the witness s 18 testimony. 19 the daughter s observations, any error was harmless in that the Court 20 can confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ accepting these 21 additional observations would have concluded that Plaintiff was 22 disabled. 23 is rejected. 24 (AR 46.) (AR 46.) The ALJ found, however, that these This reason was germane to the witness and is To the extent that the ALJ may not have considered all of See Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056. For these reasons, this claim In her second claim, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not 25 adequately discuss the findings of a treating psychiatrist. 26 Stip. at 8-10.) 27 28 (Joint For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees. In general, a treating doctor s opinion is given deference over the opinions of non-treating doctors. 3 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 1 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Where a treating doctor s opinion is 2 contradicted by another doctor s, an ALJ must provide specific and 3 legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence in the record, 4 for relying on the non-treating doctor s opinion instead of the 5 treating doctor s opinion. Id. On February 7, 2004, four months before the alleged onset date in 6 7 this case, Plaintiff was brought to Arrowhead Regional Medical Center 8 by police for a 5150" evaluation after complaining of visual and 9 auditory hallucinations.1 (AR 175-81.) A psychiatrist, whose name is 10 illegible, filled out an evaluation/admission form, in which he or she 11 noted that Plaintiff was disheveled, but cooperative and alert, and 12 that her memory was intact and her speech normal in rate, rhythm, and 13 tone. 14 (AR 178.) 15 including just two days before she was brought in. 16 She also told the doctor that she experienced auditory and visual 17 hallucinations only when intoxicated with speed. 18 psychiatrist diagnosed Plaintiff with mood disorder, not otherwise 19 specified, and assessed a global assessment of functioning ( GAF ) 20 score of 50. 21 Plaintiff that night. 22 (AR 177.) Plaintiff denied suicidal or homicidal ideations. She admitted using methamphetamines for the previous month, (AR 178.) (AR 177, 179.) (AR 177.) The He or she prescribed Risperdal and discharged (AR 178.) The ALJ noted this visit to Arrowhead Regional, emphasizing 23 Plaintiff s admission at the time that she had been on a month-long 24 drug binge and that she only experienced hallucinations when she was 25 26 27 28 1 Section 5150 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code provides that a mentally-disordered person who is a danger to herself or others may be involuntarily committed to a mental health facility for a 72-hour treatment and evaluation period. 4 1 using drugs. 2 opinion of psychiatrist Linda Smith, a consultative examiner who had 3 examined Plaintiff twice in connection with her current social 4 security application and once before in connection with an earlier 5 application. 6 completely faking a psychotic disorder and that she had no significant 7 mental impairments that would preclude her from working. 8 288-96.) 9 (AR 43.) The ALJ rejected this opinion in favor of the (AR 44-45.) Dr. Smith concluded that Plaintiff was (AR 248-57, The ALJ s reasons for discounting the treating psychiatrist s 10 opinion -that Plaintiff s purported breakdown was due to binging on 11 methamphetamine for a month -was specific and legitimate and supported 12 by substantial evidence in the record. 13 opinion was not error. 14 2007) (reaffirming ALJ may reject a treating doctor s opinion that is 15 contradicted by another doctor s opinion so long as she provides 16 specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in 17 the record for doing so). Thus, his rejection of the See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. For this reason, this claim is rejected. 18 In her third claim, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not 19 properly consider the opinions of treating psychiatrist Imelda Alfonso 20 and treating psychologist Jon Held, both of whom saw Plaintiff in 2007 21 at the San Bernardino County Department of Behavioral Health. 22 Stip. at 13-15.) 23 reported that she was disheveled, that her mood was depressed, and 24 that she reported hearing voices telling her they will kill her. 25 (AR 309.) 26 and severe with psychotic features, and assessed a GAF score of 42. 27 (AR 309.) 28 completed by clinician Lizeth Peter on January 29, 2007, in which (Joint Dr. Alfonso saw Plaintiff on February 5, 2007, and Dr. Alfonso diagnosed major depressive disorder, recurrent On March 7, 2009, Dr. Held endorsed a form, apparently 5 1 Plaintiff was diagnosed with major depressive disorder, recurrent 2 severe with psychotic features, and a GAF score of 42. (AR 319.) 3 In his decision, the ALJ noted these treating source statements 4 and the GAF assessments, but concluded that [a]lthough such a [GAF] 5 score does indicate some limitations in her functioning, this score 6 represents merely a snapshot in time and is not supported by the 7 overall medical evidence of record and does not speak directly to her 8 work capacity over a consecutive 12 month period or longer. 9 44.) (AR 43- Accordingly, the ALJ gave more weight to Dr. Smith s opinion 10 that Plaintiff did not suffer from a severe mental impairment that 11 caused functional limitations. 12 (AR 44.) This was not error. GAF scores are a snapshot of a patient s then-current 13 functioning. 14 Disorders, Fourth Edit., Text Revision, at p. 33. 15 assessed Plaintiff s GAF at the San Bernardino Mental Health Clinic 16 made clear that their assessments were of Plaintiff s current GAF. 17 (AR 309.) 18 on it, in part, to discount these opinions. 19 See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental The doctors who Thus, the ALJ did not err in pointing this out and relying In addition, as the ALJ pointed out, these scores and the 20 opinions that went along with them were inconsistent with the medical 21 record, which established that Plaintiff did not suffer from the 22 extreme psychiatric maladies she complained of. 23 have set forth which parts of the record were inconsistent with the 24 doctors conclusions, the Court finds that in this failure can be 25 overlooked because there was so much in this record to support the 26 ALJ s discounting of these doctors opinions. 27 28 Though the ALJ should As a starting point, the Court notes the context in which Plaintiff went to the clinic for treatment. 6 Plaintiff applied for 1 benefits prior to this case and that application was denied. 2 In October 2005, she filed the current application. 3 That application was denied initially in April 2006, and on 4 reconsideration in November 2006. 5 2006, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. 6 January 12, 2007, that requested was granted. 7 days later, on January 29, 2007, Plaintiff reported to the San 8 Bernardino Mental Health Clinic and complained about her 9 hallucinations. 10 (AR 37.) (AR 87, 91.) (AR 49-53, 60-65.) In December (AR 66.) (AR 67-68.) On Seventeen (AR 311.) Plaintiff s argument must also be considered in the context of 11 the ALJ s findings regarding Plaintiff s credibility. 12 that Plaintiff was not credible and noted that Dr. Smith believed that 13 she was simply pretending to be suffering from a psychotic impairment. 14 (AR 46.) 15 unchallenged credibility finding undermines Plaintiff s claim that the 16 ALJ erred in rejecting the treating psychiatrist s and psychologist s 17 findings because these opinions were based on Plaintiff s statements 18 to these doctors. 19 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that ALJ was free to disregard 20 physician s opinion that was premised on subjective complaints, where 21 ALJ properly discounted claimant s credibility); Siska v. Barnhart, 22 No. C 00-4788 MMC, 2002 WL 31750220, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2002) 23 (holding that claimant failed to show that ALJ erroneously rejected 24 the treating physician s assessment where that assessment was based on 25 the claimant s properly rejected subjective statements). 26 The ALJ found Plaintiff has not challenged this credibility finding. This See, e.g., Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, With this backdrop, the Court turns to the merits of Plaintiff s 27 claim. It is clear that the ALJ did not err in discounting the 28 doctors opinions. What Plaintiff is really complaining about is that 7 1 the ALJ did not accept her version of the facts. The ALJ was 2 presented with two divergent sets of facts. 3 and the Agency reviewing doctors, suggested that there was little if 4 anything wrong with Plaintiff, particularly when she was not taking 5 drugs, and that she was feigning a mental illness. 6 Plaintiff s treating doctors, suggested that Plaintiff suffered from a 7 severe psychiatric impairment. 8 Plaintiff testify under oath at the hearing. 9 reported that she did not know how old she was, where she was born, or One set, from Dr. Smith The other, from The ALJ had the benefit of seeing There, Plaintiff 10 how old two of her three children were. 11 the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not credible and accepted Dr. Smith s 12 version of the facts over the treating doctors versions. 13 ample evidence in the record for him to do so. 14 will not be disturbed. 15 (AR 4-5, 13.) Ultimately, There was As such, this finding In her fourth claim, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in 16 finding at step two that her mental impairment was not severe. 17 Stip. at 17-18.) 18 Held found that she was more than minimally impaired and argues that 19 that should be enough to support a favorable finding at step two. 20 (Joint Stip. at 17-18.) 21 mistaken and that the ALJ did, in fact, find that her mental 22 impairment was severe. (Joint Stip. at 18.) 23 (Joint She notes, for example, that Dr. Alfonso and Dr. The Agency argues that Plaintiff is simply At step two of the five-step disability analysis, an ALJ is 24 tasked with identifying those impairments that have more than a 25 minimal effect on a claimant s ability to do basic work activities. 26 Powell v. Chater, 959 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 27 intended to be a de minimis screening device to allow the ALJ to 28 8 It is 1 dispose of groundless claims at an early stage. 2 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 Smolen v. Chater, 80 Contrary to the Agency s argument, the ALJ found at step two that 4 Plaintiff s mental impairments were not severe. (AR 39 ( Because the 5 claimant s medically determinable mental impairments, including the 6 claimant s history of polysubstance abuse, cause no more than mild 7 limitation in any of the first three functional areas and no 8 limitation in the fourth area, they are not severe (20 C.F.R. 9 404.1520a(d)(1) and 416.920a(d)(1)). ).) However, this finding was 10 consistent with the ALJ s ultimate conclusion in this case, namely, 11 that Plaintiff did not suffer from a psychotic disorder and was 12 exaggerating her symptoms to make it appear that she did. 13 Further, and importantly, this finding was also supported by the 14 medical record. (AR 43-47.) As such, the ALJ did not err here. 15 In her fifth claim, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not make 16 the specific findings required by the governing regulations regarding 17 the degree of functional limitation imposed by her severe mental 18 impairment. 19 ยงยง 404.1520a(e)(2), 416.920a(e)(2).) 20 reasons. 21 severe. 22 failed to make. 23 determinable mental impairments, including the claimant s history of 24 polysubstance abuse, cause no more than mild limitation in any of 25 the first three functional areas and no limitation in the fourth 26 area, they are not severe (20 C.F.R. 404.1520a(d)(1) and 27 416.920a(d)(1)). ).) (Joint Stip. at 19-20, citing 20 C.F.R. Plaintiff is mistaken for two First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff s impairment was not Second, he did make the specific findings Plaintiff claims he (AR 39 ( Because the claimant s medically Thus, this claim is rejected. 28 9 1 In her sixth claim, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to 2 incorporate the functional limitations caused by her mental impairment 3 into the hypothetical questions that he posed at the vocational expert 4 at the administrative hearing. 5 argument, too, is rejected. The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have 6 a severe mental impairment. Therefore, there was no need to include 7 in the hypothetical question to the vocational expert any functional 8 limitations caused by the non-existent mental impairment. 9 v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2005). 10 (Joint Stip. at 20-22.) This See Bayliss For all these reasons, the Agency s decision is affirmed. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 DATED: September 29, 2009. 13 14 15 PATRICK J. WALSH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 S:\PJW\Cases-Soc Sec\RAY, N 0523\NancyRayMemo_Opinion.wpd 10
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