Maria Cacau v. Michael J Astrue, No. 5:2008cv00034 - Document 16 (C.D. Cal. 2008)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Marc L. Goldman. It is ordered that the case be remanded to the Commissioner for proceedings consistent with this opinion. (db)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 EASTERN DIVISION 10 11 MARIA CACAU, Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, 15 16 Defendant. 17 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. EDCV 08-00034-MLG MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 18 Plaintiff Maria Cacau seeks judicial review of the Commissioner s 19 denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income benefits 20 ( SSI ) under the Social Security Act. For the reasons stated below, 21 this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 22 opinion. 23 24 I. Facts and Procedural History 25 Plaintiff was born on December 12, 1952, and she has an eighth- 26 grade education. (Administrative Record ( AR ) 412, 501.) Plaintiff has 27 no relevant work history with the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 416.965. (AR 28 429.) 1 Plaintiff filed an application for SSI benefits on October 5, 1999, 2 alleging a disability onset date of March 1, 1997, due to a number of 3 different impairments. (AR 22; Joint Stip. 2.) The Commissioner denied 4 Plaintiff s 5 Plaintiff s timely request, Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) F. Keith 6 Varni held a hearing on June 21, 2001, at which Plaintiff testified and 7 was 8 determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security 9 Act, applying the five-step sequential analysis mandated by the Social 10 Security Regulations in reaching his decision.1 (AR 10-15.) The Appeals 11 Council denied Plaintiff s request for review on January 10, 2002, (AR 12 4), and Plaintiff filed an action for judicial review in this Court on 13 February 19, 2002. Cacau v. Barnhart, Case No. EDCV 02-102-MLG. application represented by initially counsel. and (AR 10.) on On reconsideration. July 24, 2001, After the ALJ 14 On January 25, 2002, Plaintiff filed a second application for SSI 15 benefits. The Commissioner found Plaintiff to be disabled as of that 16 date and began paying benefits accordingly. (AR 422.) In the meantime, 17 Plaintiff continued to pursue her initial application, seeking SSI 18 benefits 19 stipulation, this Court remanded the case to the Commissioner for 20 further administrative proceedings on June 8, 2004. (AR 245-48.) for the period between 1999 to 2002. Upon the parties 21 Plaintiff appeared for a second hearing before ALJ Varni on July 22 24, 2004. (AR 409.) On May 24, 2006, the ALJ issued a decision again 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 The five-step inquiry is as follows: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant s impairment is severe ; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals one of the listings in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) whether the claimant is able to return to past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant can do other types of work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). These steps are cumulative, meaning that the ALJ need not consider further steps after finding that a step does not favor the claimant. 2 1 concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant time 2 period. (AR 237-44.) Plaintiff filed a new lawsuit in this Court on 3 August 8, 2006. Cacau v. Barnhart, No. EDCV 06-823 MLG (C.D. Cal.). Once 4 again, the parties stipulated that the case should be remanded for 5 further proceedings, which the Court ordered on February 16, 2007. (AR 6 437-38.) 7 A third hearing was held before ALJ John W. Belcher on August 28, 8 2007, at which Plaintiff, two medical experts, and a vocational expert 9 testified. (AR 422.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged 10 in substantial gainful activity during the relevant time period, and 11 that she had several severe impairments, including mixed connective 12 tissue 13 gastroesophageal reflux disease, and anxiety disorder, not otherwise 14 specified. (AR 424.) After concluding that Plaintiff s impairments did 15 not meet or equal the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 16 P, Appendix 1, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had retained the 17 residual functional capacity ( RFC )2 to perform light work between 18 Octobr 5, 1997 and January 25, 2002, with the following limitations: she 19 could sit for four hours out of an eight-hour day; finger and handle 20 frequently but not constantly; and stoop crouch, kneel, crawl, balance, 21 and climb stairs occasionally but not frequently, with no climbing disease, mild anemia, hypertension, urinary incontinence, 22 23 24 25 2 26 27 28 A claimant s RFC is what he or she is capable of doing despite physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). RFC is an assessment of an individual s ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). 3 1 stairs,3 ladders, or scaffolds, no walking on uneven terrain, no using 2 vibrating tools, and no exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights. 3 (AR 425.) Additionally, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff needed to work 4 in an air-conditioned environment, and that she could perform at least 5 basic mental work-related activities involving no safety operations on 6 a sustained full time basis with customary breaks. (AR 425-26.) 7 After noting that Plaintiff had no past relevant work as 8 contemplated by the regulations, the ALJ determined that, prior to 9 January 25, 2002, Plaintiff could have worked as an electronics 10 assembler, hand packer, or packing machine operator. (AR 429.) The ALJ 11 concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled between October 5, 1999, and 12 January 25, 2002. (AR 430.) 13 Plaintiff filed the present action on January 17, 2008, alleging 14 that the ALJ erred as follows: (1) that the ALJ failed to consider a 15 consulting 16 determination; (2) that the ALJ failed to consider a state agency 17 physician s opinion; (3) that the ALJ posed an incomplete hypothetical 18 to the vocational expert at the hearing; (4) that the ALJ did not 19 establish 20 assembler, hand packer, or packing machine operator; and (5) that the 21 ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff s credibility. (Joint Stip. 3.) 22 Plaintiff asks this Court to order an award of benefits, or, in the 23 alternative, to remand the case for a new administrative hearing. (Joint 24 Stip. 24.) psychiatrist s that Plaintiff opinion could in perform reaching the jobs the of disability electronics 25 26 3 27 28 The ALJ offered two conflicting assessments of Plaintiff s ability to climb stairs in this RFC - that she should could climb stairs occasionally, and that she never climb stairs. This conflict is not materials to this Court s decision. 4 1 II. 2 Standard of Review The Court must uphold the Social Security Administration s 3 disability determination unless it is not supported by substantial 4 evidence or is based on legal error. Ryan v. Comm r of Soc. Sec., 528 5 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008)(citing Stout v. Comm r of Soc. Sec. 6 Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006)). Substantial evidence means 7 more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is evidence 8 that 9 conclusion. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 10 2007)(citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 11 2006)). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, 12 the reviewing court must review the administrative record as a whole, 13 weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts 14 from the Commissioner s conclusion. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 15 720 (9th Cir. 1996). If the evidence can support either affirming or 16 reversing the ALJ s conclusion, the reviewing court may not substitute 17 [its] judgment for that of the ALJ. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882. a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 18 19 III. The ALJ Failed to Address Relevant Medical Opinions in Assigning 20 Plaintiff s Residual Functional Capacity 21 On April 7, 2000, consulting psychiatrist Linda Smith, M.D., 22 completed a psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff for the Social Security 23 Administration. (AR 109-13.) Dr. Smith diagnosed Plaintiff with panic 24 disorder and opined that Plaintiff would have the following functional 25 limitations: 26 (1) 27 28 mild impairment in her ability to understand, remember, or complete simple commands; (2) moderate impairment in her ability to understand, remember, or 5 1 2 complete complex commands; (3) mild impairment in her ability to interact appropriately with 3 4 supervisors, coworkers, and the public; (4) moderate impairment in her ability to comply with job rules 5 6 such as safety and attendance; (5) moderate impairment in her ability to respond to changes in 7 8 the normal workplace setting; and (6) moderate impairment in her ability to maintain persistence and 9 10 pace in a normal workplace setting. (AR 113.) In addition, a non-examining state agency psychiatrist, K.L. 11 Immerman, 12 assessment of Plaintiff on July 27, 2000. (AR 162-65.) Dr. Immerman 13 opined 14 understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions, to work in 15 coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted by 16 them, to interact appropriately with the general public, and to set 17 realistic goals or make plans independently of others. (AR 162-63.) Dr. 18 Immerman ultimately concluded that Plaintiff could perform nonpublic, 19 simple, and repetitive tasks. (AR 165.) M.D., that completed Plaintiff a was mental moderately residual limited functional in her capacity ability to 20 At the August 28, 2007, hearing, a non-examining psychologist, 21 Joseph Malancharuvil, Ph.D., testified as a medical expert. (AR 505.) 22 Dr. Malancharuvil disagreed with Dr. Smith s panic disorder diagnosis, 23 testifying that Plaintiff instead suffered from an anxiety disorder, not 24 otherwise 25 reasons for disagreeing with Dr. Smith during the hearing, and opined 26 that Plaintiff s mental limitations only precluded her from safety 27 operation on hazardous machinery. (AR 509-10.) 28 specified. (AR 507-08.) Dr. Malancharuvil explained his In his decision, the ALJ relied heavily on Dr. Malancharuvil s 6 1 testimony, with little to no reference to either Dr. Smith s or Dr. 2 Immerman s 3 impairment was an anxiety disorder, not otherwise specified, as Dr. 4 Malancharuvil 5 diagnosed. (AR 424.) In assessing Plaintiff s credibility, the ALJ noted 6 that Plaintiff had not sought significant treatment for mental illness, 7 which suggested to him that her mental problems if present have been at 8 most mild. (AR 428.) Though he questioned the severity of her mental 9 impairment, the ALJ indicated that he deferred to the findings of Dr. 10 Malancharuvil and the consultative psychiatric examiner of record, 11 which presumably would be Dr. Smith. (Id.) This was the only statement 12 the 13 psychiatric 14 incorporate the limitations those reports suggested. 15 16 ALJ reports. He concluded diagnosed, made in his reports, rather decision and the that than that RFC Plaintiff s panic even disorder arguably assessment he severe as mental Dr. Smith references reached did the not The ALJ posed the following hypothetical to the vocational expert at the hearing: 17 Okay, I want you to assume an individual who at all times 18 during the relevant period was [a] younger individual who has 19 a limited education and no experience in the work place. This 20 person would be limited to lifting no more than 20 pounds 21 occasionally, less than 10 pounds frequently with pushing and 22 pulling limitations consistent with the lifting and carrying 23 limitations. This person could stand or walk for four hours 24 out of an eight-hour day and sit for six hours out of an 25 eight-hour day provided that they did not have to climb 26 ladders, ropes or scaffolding or walk on uneven ground. 27 However, they could occasionally climb stairs, balance, bend 28 or stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl. The person should avoid any 7 1 concentrated exposure to extreme heat or cold, should not work 2 with laboratory tools, should not work around [inaudible] or 3 fast-paced machinery or at unprotected heights. The individual 4 would also not be allowed to perform safety operations. 5 (AR 515-16.) The vocational expert testified that a person with such 6 limitations could work as an electronics assembler, hand packer, and 7 packing machine operator. 8 It is the ALJ s responsibility to resolve conflicts and ambiguities 9 in the medical record and to determine credibility. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 10 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 11 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ determines which medical opinions should be 12 given the most weight. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 13 1996). Moreover, the ALJ need not accept the opinion of any medical 14 source, including a treating medical source, if that opinion is brief, 15 conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings. Bayliss v. 16 Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 17 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); accord Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 18 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). 19 In this case, the ALJ simply adopted Dr. Malancharuvil s opinion 20 without in any way addressing the limitations suggested by two other 21 psychiatrists. Whether the limitations presented in the consultative 22 reports would preclude Plaintiff from all work is a question that this 23 Court cannot answer, and which should have been presented to the 24 vocational expert at the hearing. 25 It is unclear why the ALJ did not specifically discuss these 26 opinions, either by rejecting them outright or by explaining how they 27 fit within his RFC determination. While the ALJ is not bound by these 28 non-treating psychiatrists assessments, 8 he may not ignore their 1 opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f); SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *1 2 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). His failure to acknowledge the these reports 3 suggesting 4 assessment and disability determination that does not include them is 5 error. additional mental limitations while reaching an RFC 6 Because the ALJ failed to explain his reasoning for rejecting Dr. 7 Smith s and Dr. Immerman s reports in reaching Plaintiff s RFC, or, 8 alternatively, why the RFC determination does not conflict with those 9 reports, 10 the case must be remanded. The Court need not address Plaintiff s other assignments of error. 11 12 IV. Conclusion 13 For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that the case be 14 remanded to the Commissioner for proceedings consistent with this 15 opinion. 16 17 DATED: October 9, 2008 18 19 20 21 ______________________________ MARC L. GOLDMAN United States Magistrate Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9
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