Christopher Todd Brown v. M. Soto et al, No. 2:2023cv05926 - Document 22 (C.D. Cal. 2024)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 15 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. For the reasons stated above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part with leave to amend. (lom)
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Christopher Todd Brown v. M. Soto et al Doc. 22 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHRISTOPHER TODD BROWN, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL OFFICER M. SOTO; CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL OFFICER D. ENGLISH; and DOES 1 20, Defendants. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 2:23 cv 05926 DDP (PDx) ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [Dkt. 15] Presently before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. Dkt. 15 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff opposed. Dkt. 17 (“Opp.”). Defendants replied. Dkt. 18 (“Reply”). Having considered the parties submissions and heard oral argument, the court adopts the following order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion. I. BACKGROUND 26 Shortly after midnight on July 24, 2021, Plaintiff Christopher Todd Brown 27 (“Brown”) was pulled over by Defendants California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) Officer 28 Soto and Officer English (collectively “Defendants”). Dkt. 14, First Amended Complaint Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 3 4 5 (“FAC”) ¶ 13–14. One of the CHP officers asked Brown if he had been drinking and Brown told the officer he had drank beer within the previous two hours. Id. ¶ 15. Brown was asked to perform several field sobriety tests (FSTs) which, he alleges, he did without incident. Id. ¶ 16. Brown alleges that after completing several FSTs, he requested a Sergeant be called to the scene and Officer Soto attempted to dissuade him from calling a 6 Sergeant. Brown further alleges that Officers Soto and English then assaulted him, 7 including grabbing and throwing him to the ground “without any legal justification.” Id. 8 ¶ 17. 9 Brown was arrested, and the police report prepared by Officer Soto 10 recommended Brown be charged with driving under the influence, driving with blood 11 alcohol of 0.08% or greater, lack of insurance, and delaying, obstructing or resisting 12 arrest, as well as with enhancements for refusing a chemical test and driving with blood 13 alcohol of 0.15% or greater. Id. ¶ 18. The police report stated, falsely according to Brown, 14 that Officers Soto and English grabbed Brown because he attempted to run between them 15 and that the officers unintentionally fell on to Brown. Id. ¶ 17. The dashboard camera 16 (“dash cam”) did not capture audio during this period of time, which Brown alleges is 17 the result of manipulation or foul play by Defendants and that other aspects of the 18 recording may have been manipulated as well. Id. ¶ 17. 19 Brown alleges that he suffered serious injuries as a result of the force used by 20 Officers Soto and English, including a torn rotator cuff, shoulder injuries, and back 21 injuries. Id. ¶ 19. Brown also alleges that medical care for his injuries was delayed until a 22 blood draw for a blood alcohol test was administered despite his willingness to take a 23 breath test. Id. ¶ 20. Subsequently, all charges against Brown were dropped. Id. ¶ 21. 24 He did, however, retain counsel to represent him in Department of Motor Vehicle 25 (“DMV”) proceedings. Id. ¶ 22. Further, Brown alleges that he suffered, in addition to 26 his physical injuries, severe emotion distress and psychosocial injuries as well as lost 27 income due to his incarceration and injuries. Id. ¶ 23–24. 28 2 Brown filed the operative complaint asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for: 1 2 3 4 5 (1) excessive force; (2) malicious prosecution/false reports/conspiracy; and (3) deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See generally FAC. Defendants move to dismiss several causes of action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and assert Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the excessive force 6 and deliberate indifference to medical needs claims.1 See generally Mot. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD Dismissal is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when the 8 9 complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 10 A complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 11 face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Facial plausibility requires the 12 plaintiff to plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 13 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 14 (2009). In resolving a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the factual 15 allegations in the complaint, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 16 and determines whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. See id. But a 17 court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” 18 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The determination of whether a complaint 19 satisfies the plausibility standard is a “context specific task that requires the reviewing 20 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 21 22 23 Defendants’ motion seeks dismissal of a false arrest claim. Mot. 4:4–7:9. However, Brown amended his 1 24 complaint to remove this cause of action prior to the Defendants submitting their motion to dismiss. See 25 26 27 28 Opp. 3:5–8; see generally FAC. Accordingly, the Court will not address the arguments to dismiss the false arrest claim and will focus only on the claims in the operative complaint, Dkt. 14. 3 1 2 3 4 5 III. DISCUSSION A. Excessive Force Claim Brown alleges Defendants deprived him of his Constitutional rights by using excessive and illegal force when they grabbed him and threw him to the ground during the stop. See FAC ¶¶ 17, 26. Defendants argue that the excessive force claim must be 6 dismissed for failure to state a claim and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. See 7 Mot. 7:10–8:22. 8 9 Defendants assert that Brown’s excessive force claim must be dismissed because Brown has “failed to allege any facts showing that Defendants were neither provoked 10 nor justified in their actions.” Mot. 8:1–2. However, the FAC does allege facts from 11 which a reasonable inference can be drawn that Defendants’ use of force was neither 12 provoked nor justified. Brown alleges he performed several FSTs indicating that he was 13 complying with the officers’ requests. FAC ¶ 17. Further, Brown specifically alleges that 14 force was used “without legal justification” from which it can be inferred there was no 15 provocation and Brown was complying. Id. Ultimately, Defendants’ argument seems to 16 rest upon their alternative version of events in which Brown was resisting arrest and 17 these conflicting narratives cannot be resolved at this early stage of litigation without 18 developing the factual record. Defendants further assert that Brown has failed to 19 “specify which Defendant grabbed him and threw him to the ground as required for 20 Section 1983 pleadings.” Mot. 8:3–4. However, Brown’s complaint does specify that it 21 was Officers Soto and English who grabbed and threw him to the ground. FAC ¶ 17. 22 The Court finds that Brown has sufficiently alleged his excessive force claim and 23 Defendants arguments to the contrary unavailing. 24 Additionally, Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity 25 regarding the excessive force claim. Mot. 8:9 22. Specifically, Defendants argue that 26 Brown “must cite a case clearly establishing that officers can be held liable for excessive 27 28 4 1 2 3 4 5 force in similar circumstances where officers grab and bring a suspect down to the ground during a stop that escalates to an arrest for a DUI.” Mot. 8:17–20. Qualified immunity shields Government officials from civil liability unless their conduct “violate[s] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity is 6 a two step inquiry in which a court must decide: (1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has 7 alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the 8 right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant s alleged misconduct.” 9 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). 10 Generally, qualified immunity should be resolved “at the earliest possible stage of 11 litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). However, to evaluate a Fourth 12 Amendment excessive force claim, the Court must determine “whether the officers’ 13 actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting 14 them.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). The “objective reasonableness” of an 15 officer’s use of force is nearly impossible to assess on a motion to dismiss because the 16 issue typically turns on factual questions. See Via v. City of Fairfield, 833 F. Supp. 1189, 17 1195 (E.D. Cal. 2011). As discussed above, simply taking the allegations in complaint as 18 true, as the Court must, there was no need for the force and, therefore the force was 19 objectively unreasonable. See PB v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 20 Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001). However, Defendants would still be 21 entitled to qualified immunity if their argument that the right at issue was not clearly 22 established is correct. 23 “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable 24 official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v. 25 Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 26 Defendants argue that Brown must cite a case in which the officers grabbed and threw a 27 suspect to the ground during a stop which ultimately led to a DUI arrest. Mot. 8:17–20. 28 5 1 2 3 4 5 However, this level of factual similarity is not what it demanded. The law “do[es] not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Based on the facts alleged by Brown, every reasonable officer would have known that such use of force violated Brown’s rights. In this Circuit, “the right to be free from any kind of non trivial force where the 6 7 plaintiff either did not resist or only passively resisted the officer,” has long been clearly 8 established. Rice v. Morehouse, 989 F.3d 1112, 1126 (2021). The Ninth Circuit has 9 specifically found grabbing and throwing a suspect to the ground without justification to 10 be excessive. See Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003). In Meredith, the 11 officers use of force was in response to the plaintiff “passively resisting” by requesting a 12 search warrant. Id. Similarly, here, the only “resistance” alleged in the complaint was 13 Brown’s request for a Sergeant to be called to the scene. FAC ¶ 17. The facts of Meredith 14 are sufficiently similar to those alleged by Brown to clearly establish grabbing Brown and 15 throwing him to the ground for requesting a Sergeant be called violated his Fourth 16 Amendment rights. Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this 17 basis. 18 19 20 21 Thus, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Claim of Excessive Force. B. Malicious Prosecution/False Reports/Conspiracy Claim Brown’s second claim alleges a violation of his Constitutional rights based on 22 malicious prosecution, false reports, and conspiracy. See FAC ¶ 31–36. Though the 23 complaint does not distinguish among these claims, the Court will address each 24 separately. Defendants initially sought dismissal of all three causes of action. See Mot. 25 8:23–13:3. However, in their reply, Defendants withdrew their request to dismiss the 26 malicious prosecution claim. Reply 2:27–28. Thus, the Court will not address those 27 arguments. 28 6 1 2 3 4 5 As for Brown’s conspiracy claim, Brown’s opposition did not address or even acknowledge Defendants’ arguments regarding the conspiracy claim. See Opp. 7:5–8:5. The Court construes the failure to do so as abandonment of the conspiracy claim. See Jenkins v. Cnty. of Riverside, 398 F.3d 1093, 1095 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005); Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Rozier v. Dep’t 6 of Homeland Sec. Fed. Protective Serv., No. 2:21 cv 07232 SB AFM, 2022 WL 2199938, at *3 7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2022); Wells v. FAA, No. 3:22 cv 00187 JMK, slip op. at 2 (D. Alaska 8 Sept. 12, 2023). Accordingly, the Court dismisses the conspiracy claim with leave to 9 amend. 10 Therefore, only the false reports claim remains for the Court’s consideration. 11 Defendants assert several arguments for dismissal, all of which are unavailing. First, 12 Defendants assert that “false reports” is not a cause of action and that his claim must fail 13 for not properly alleging it as a violation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process for 14 deliberate fabrication of evidence. Mot. 11:6–9. However, it is clear from the complaint 15 that Brown is alleging deliberate fabrication of evidence and even specifically invokes the 16 Fourteenth Amendment. See FAC ¶¶ 17, 32. Brown alleged that Officer Soto made false 17 statements in the police report that Brown was resisting arrest “to cover up their 18 infliction of excessive force on Plaintiff.” FAC ¶ 32. Further, Brown alleges that the lack 19 of sound for the period of time in dispute was the result of “foul play by the 20 Defendants.” FAC ¶¶ 17, 32. Regardless the label, the substance of Brown’s claim is 21 clearly an allegation of deliberate fabrication. 22 Defendants next argue that Brown has failed to state “facts that Defendants 23 continued their investigation of Brown despite knowing he was innocent.” Mot. 12:10– 24 12. “[T]here is a clearly established constitutional due process right not to be subjected to 25 criminal charges on the basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the 26 government.” Deveraux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2001). In Deveraux, the 27 Ninth Circuit stated that the Plaintiff “must, at a minimum, point to evidence that 28 7 1 2 3 4 5 supports at least one of the following two propositions: (1) Defendants continued their investigation of [the plaintiff] despite the fact that they knew or should have known that he was innocent; or (2) Defendants used investigative techniques that were so coercive and abusive that they knew or should have known that those techniques would yield false information.” Id. at 1076. However, the Ninth Circuit has since made clear “those 6 methods of proving deliberate fabrication [in Deveraux] are unnecessary in a case 7 involving direct evidence of deliberate fabrication.” Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 799 (9th 8 Cir. 2017); see also Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 9 2010). When the claim is that the police have cooked up their own evidence or 10 manipulated evidence to fit their narrative, the officers’ beliefs or knowledge of 11 innocence are irrelevant. See Spencer, 857 F.3d at 800 (“In sum, the Constitution prohibits 12 the deliberate fabrication of evidence whether or not the officer knows that the person is 13 innocent.”). Because we are at the motion to dismiss stage, Brown need not point to 14 direct evidence. It is sufficient that he has alleged the officers purposefully included false 15 statements in the police report and potentially manipulated the dash cam recording. 16 Defendants further argue that even if the statements that Brown was resisting 17 arrest were false, Brown has failed to state facts to support that the alleged discrepancy is 18 more than mere carelessness or technical inaccuracy. Mot. 12:14–17. To be certain, mere 19 carelessness or technical inaccuracy in a police report does not give rise to a 20 constitutional claim. See Spencer, 857 F.3d at 798; O’Doan v. Sanford, 991 F.3d 1027, 1046 21 (9th Cir. 2021). However, the allegations of fabrication in FAC go far beyond mere 22 carelessness or technical inaccuracy, which would be things like writing the suspects 23 address down incorrectly or poorly describing an accident scene. The complaint alleges 24 that Defendants made a deliberate choice to lie and took active steps to manipulate 25 evidence to the contrary. FAC ¶¶ 17, 32. Taken as true, these intentional actions cannot 26 possibly be construed as mere carelessness or technical inaccuracy. 27 28 8 1 2 3 4 5 Lastly, Defendants assert that the alleged fabrication has not harmed Brown. Mot. 12:18. Defendants argue that Brown’s primary injury was having to retain counsel to defend him in DMV proceedings which would have occurred even if the allegedly false statements were not included in the report because Brown would have still been arrested and faced criminal charges for driving under the influence, refusing a chemical test, and 6 driving without insurance. Mot. 12:18–26. However, these were not the only criminal 7 charges the FAC alleges the report recommended. FAC ¶ 18. The report also 8 recommended he be charged with a violation of Penal Code Section 148(a)(1) for 9 delaying, obstructing, or resisting arrest. Id. Though the charges against Brown were 10 ultimately dropped, the right is to be free from being “subjected to criminal charges on the 11 basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government.” Deveraux, 12 263 F.3d at 1074–75. The fact that Brown was subjected to criminal charges based upon 13 fabricated evidence is sufficient injury in and of itself, even if never prosecuted. See 14 Caldwell v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 889 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018). 15 Thus, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Malicious 16 Prosecution and Deliberate Fabrication of Evidence. However, the Court GRANTS 17 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Conspiracy Claim with leave to amend. 18 19 C. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs Claim Defendants also seek dismissal of Brown’s third claim for deliberate indifference 20 to serious medical needs. Defendants argue that Brown’s claim must be dismissed 21 because Brown failed to allege that the Defendants were aware of his injuries. “Claims 22 for violations of the right to adequate medical care ‘brought by pretrial detainees against 23 individual defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment’ must be evaluated under an 24 objective deliberate indifference standard.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 25 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 883 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016). 26 “[T]he elements of a pretrial detainee s medical care claim against an individual 27 defendant under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are: (i) the 28 9 1 2 3 4 5 defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant s conduct 6 obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff s 7 injuries.” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125. Brown alleges he suffered serious injuries and his access to medical care was 8 9 delayed until after a blood alcohol test was performed. FAC ¶¶ 19–20, 23–24. However, 10 as Defendants point out, the FAC does not state that Brown expressed to the officers how 11 severe his pain was or that Brown believed he needed prompt medical attention. Nor 12 does the FAC allege that the pain or need for medical attention would have been plainly 13 evident to the officers. In absence of alleged facts that indicate Defendants were aware of 14 Brown’s injuries, the Court cannot infer that the Defendants made an intentional decision 15 regarding those injuries and, therefore, Brown has failed to state a claim that Defendants 16 were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. 17 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Third Claim 18 of Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs. Because this defect can be cured by 19 amendment, the dismissal is with leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 20 (9th Cir. 2000). 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 23 and GRANTED in part with leave to amend. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: January 24, 2024 25 26 For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in part ____ ___ DEAN D. PREGERSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28 10
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