Editha Mejia v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 2:2016cv06596 - Document 23 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING this case for the award of benefits. (See document for further details). (mr)
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Editha Mejia v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EDITHA MEJIA, 12 Case No. CV 16-6596 SS Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1 Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 15 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 20 I. 21 INTRODUCTION 22 23 Editha Mejia (“Plaintiff”) seeks review of the final decision 24 of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the 25 “Commissioner” or the “Agency”) denying her application for social 26 security benefits. 27 28 The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1 Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security and is substituted for former Acting Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Dockets.Justia.com 1 § 636(c), to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States 2 Magistrate Judge. 3 the Commissioner is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for an award 4 of benefits consistent with this decision. For the reasons stated below, the decision of 5 6 II. 7 THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 8 9 To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must 10 demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 11 that prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity 12 and that is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous 13 period of at least twelve months. 14 721 15 impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the 16 work she previously performed and incapable of performing any other 17 substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 18 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 19 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). The 20 21 To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ 22 conducts a five-step inquiry. 23 steps are: 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 24 25 (1) Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial 26 gainful activity? 27 disabled. If so, the claimant is found not If not, proceed to step two. 28 2 The 1 (2) Is the claimant’s impairment severe? 2 claimant is found not disabled. 3 If not, the step three. 4 (3) If so, proceed to Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal one of 5 the specific impairments described in 20 C.F.R. 6 Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? 7 claimant is found disabled. 8 step four. 9 (4) If so, the If not, proceed to Is the claimant capable of performing her past 10 work? 11 If not, proceed to step five. 12 (5) If so, the claimant is found not disabled. Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, 13 the claimant is found disabled. If so, the claimant 14 is found not disabled. 15 16 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 17 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); 20 C.F.R. 18 §§ 404.1520(b)-(g)(1) & 416.920(b)-(g)(1). 19 20 The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through 21 four, and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. 22 Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54. 23 affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing the record 24 at every step of the inquiry. 25 claimant meets her burden of establishing an inability to perform 26 past work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform 27 some 28 national economy, taking into account the claimant’s residual other work that exists Additionally, the ALJ has an Id. at 954. in 3 If, at step four, the “significant numbers” in the 1 functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and work experience. 2 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721; 20 3 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). 4 so by the testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to the 5 Medical-Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 6 Subpart P, Appendix 2 (commonly known as “the Grids”). 7 v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). 8 has 9 limitations, the Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ must take the both exertional The Commissioner may do (strength-related) and Osenbrock When a claimant non-exertional 10 testimony of a vocational expert. 11 869 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 12 (9th Cir. 1988)). Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 13 14 III. 15 THE ALJ’S DECISION 16 17 The ALJ employed the five-step sequential evaluation process 18 in evaluating Plaintiff’s case. 19 Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through 20 December 31, 2018, and had not engaged in substantial gainful 21 activity since July 27, 2013, her alleged onset date. 22 Administrative Record (“AR”) 17). 23 Plaintiff 24 schizoaffective disorder, conversion disorder, and depression. (AR 25 17). had the following At step one, the ALJ found that (Certified At step two, the ALJ found that severe impairments: psychosis, 26 27 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an 28 impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 4 1 equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 2 P, Appendix 1. (AR 18). 3 4 At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC 5 to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with 6 the following nonexertional limitations: she can have “occasional” 7 interaction with the public; work should not require more than 8 occasional 9 critical checking of work; work should be limited to simple, 10 routine, repetitive tasks in a work environment not requiring more 11 than occasional production or pace work; and work should involve 12 only simple work-related decisions, with few if any changes in the 13 work place. 14 Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 15 limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely credible. 16 20). 17 status examination performed by Dr. David Starr, Ph.D.; assigned 18 “little weight” to a global assessment of functioning (“GAF”) score2 19 assessed by treating physician Dr. David Kent; and assigned “some 20 weight” 21 Disability Determination Services physicians. supervision, (AR 19). defined as requiring a supervisor’s In making this finding, the ALJ ruled that (AR The ALJ also discussed the results of a consultative mental to the opinions of non-treating non-examining State (AR 21-22). 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Clinicians use a GAF score to rate the psychological, social, and occupational functioning of a patient. A GAF score between 41 and 50 indicates serious symptoms (e.g. suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job). Morgan v. Comm’r, 169 F.3d 595, 598 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999). 5 1 At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not 2 perform her past relevant work. 3 considered Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC 4 and 5 significant numbers in the national economy, including dishwasher, 6 potato 7 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled 8 under the Agency’s rules. concluded peeler that Plaintiff machine (AR 23). could operator, At step five, the ALJ perform and jobs janitor. available (AR in 23-24). (AR 24). 9 10 IV. 11 STANDARD OF REVIEW 12 13 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 14 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The court may set aside 15 the Commissioner’s decision when the ALJ’s findings are based on 16 legal error or are not supported by “substantial evidence” in the 17 record as a whole. 18 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097); Smolen v. 19 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 20 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989)). Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 21 22 “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than 23 a preponderance.” 24 Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). 25 evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to 26 support a conclusion.” Id. (citing Jamerson, 112 F.3d at 1066; 27 Smolen, 28 evidence supports a finding, the court must “‘consider the record 80 F.3d Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson v. at 1279). To 6 determine It is “relevant whether substantial 1 as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 2 detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.’” Aukland, 257 F.3d 3 at 1035 (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 4 1993)). 5 or reversing that conclusion, the court may not substitute its 6 judgment for that of the Commissioner. 7 21 (citing Flaten v. Sec’y, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720- 8 9 V. 10 DISCUSSION 11 12 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in four ways. First, 13 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly found that Plaintiff 14 did not meet a listing at step three. 15 Points and Authorities (“P. Mem.”) at 1, 4-7). 16 contends that the ALJ erred in failing to “evaluate and weigh” the 17 opinion of Dr. Starr. 18 that the ALJ improperly assigned “little weight” to the GAF score 19 assessed by Dr. Kent and “some weight” to the opinions of the State 20 agency physicians. 21 that the ALJ erred in discrediting her testimony regarding the 22 intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms. 23 at 1, 9-11). (Plaintiff’s Memorandum of (Id. at 1, 7-8). (Id. at 1, 8-9). Second, Plaintiff Third, Plaintiff contends Fourth, Plaintiff contends (Id. 24 25 For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees with 26 Plaintiff that this case should be remanded because the ALJ failed 27 to properly evaluate the medical evidence in formulating an RFC 28 7 1 and improperly discredited Plaintiff’s testimony.3 2 record as a whole, including the improperly discredited testimony 3 and medical evidence, establishes that Plaintiff is entitled to 4 benefits, the Court remands this case for an award of benefits. 5 See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2014). Because the 6 7 1. 8 The ALJ Did Not Properly Evaluate The Medical Evidence In Formulating an RFC 9 10 Social Security regulations require the Agency to “evaluate 11 every medical opinion [it] receive[s],” generally giving more 12 weight to evidence from a claimant’s treating physician. 13 § 404.1527(c). 14 opinion of the nature and severity of the claimant’s impairments 15 is well-supported by accepted medical techniques, and consistent 16 with the other substantive evidence in the record, that opinion is 17 ordinarily controlling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Orn v. Astrue, 18 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 19 1012 (even when contradicted, treating or examining physician’s 20 opinion is owed deference, and often the “greatest” weight). 20 C.F.R. Where the Agency finds the treating physician’s 21 Where a treating source is not given “controlling weight,” 22 23 the Agency must give “good reasons” for the deviation. 24 § 404.1527(c)(2); Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 & n.11. 25 treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the 26 ALJ must provide “specific and legitimate reasons” for rejecting 20 C.F.R. If the 27 28 3 Because the Court remands on these grounds, it is unnecessary to address Plaintiff’s other arguments. 8 1 the treating physician’s opinion. 2 157 F.3d at 725. “Where an ALJ does not explicitly reject a medical 3 opinion or set forth specific, legitimate reasons for crediting 4 one medical opinion over another, he errs. 5 errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight 6 while 7 explanation that another medical opinion is more persuasive, or 8 criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a 9 substantive basis for his conclusion.” doing nothing more than Orn, 495 F.3d at 632; Reddick, ignoring In other words, an ALJ it, asserting without Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012- 10 13 (citing Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1996)). 11 Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ failed to 12 properly evaluate the medical evidence, including the treating 13 doctor’s opinions, in formulating an RFC. 14 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly failed to “evaluate 15 16 and weigh” Dr. Starr’s opinion. 17 12, 18 examination. 19 anxiety and depression,” occasional panic attacks, hearing voices, 20 some sleep disturbance and nightmares, and suicidal thoughts. 21 431). 22 haloperidol, 23 Plaintiff’s 24 questions testing her mental status. 25 diagnosed 26 type, first episode, currently in remission. 27 reported that Plaintiff had “problems with mood and thinking,” 28 “problems with mood and anxiety with occasional panic attacks,” 2013, Dr. Starr (P. Mem. at 1, 7-8). performed (AR 430-33). a consultative On November psychological Plaintiff reported “problems with (AR Plaintiff reported that she had been prescribed Seroquel, and Loestrin. appearance, Plaintiff with (AR demeanor, 431). Dr. and responses examined to (AR 431-32). schizoaffective 9 Starr disorder, (AR 432). several Dr. Starr depressive Dr. Starr 1 and hallucinations. 2 “marginally oriented” and had difficulty paying attention and 3 concentrating; her fund of information was “extremely limited”; 4 she did not think abstractly; her judgment was impaired; and she 5 required assistance to manage funds. 6 assign Dr. Starr’s opinion any particular weight, but discussed 7 the examination and stated that Dr. Starr “never opined that 8 [Plaintiff] was precluded from work activity within the confines 9 of the [RFC].” (AR 432). Dr. Starr found that Plaintiff was (AR 432). The ALJ did not (AR 21-22). 10 11 Although the RFC assessed by the ALJ limited Plaintiff’s 12 interaction with others and the complexity of Plaintiff’s work, 13 (AR 19), the Court disagrees with the ALJ’s apparent conclusion 14 that the RFC fully accounts for the limitations and conditions 15 observed by Dr. Starr. 16 explain how the RFC accounts for Plaintiff’s limited fund of 17 information, suicidal thoughts, and hallucinations, (AR 432), or 18 whether these conditions have any effect on Plaintiff’s ability to 19 work. 20 discussion of Dr. Starr’s observations was inadequate. For example, the ALJ does not adequately The Court therefore agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ’s 21 22 Plaintiff also alleges that the ALJ erred in assigning “little 23 weight” to a GAF score of 45 assessed by treating physician Dr. 24 David A. Kent, M.D., when Plaintiff was released from psychiatric 25 hospitalization on September 6, 2013. 26 this score “little weight” because it was “merely a snapshot view” 27 of 28 reflective of “the entire period at issue.” Plaintiff’s functioning “at 10 a (AR 21, 360). particular The ALJ gave time” (AR 21). and not The Court 1 agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ’s opinion overlooks without 2 explanation the GAF score of 45 assessed by treating physician Dr. 3 Michael Millward on October 17, 2013, (AR 517-18), and a GAF score 4 of 29 assessed by Dr. James Piktel at Intermountain Hospital on 5 December 22, 2014. (AR 597). 6 Piktel reported that Plaintiff had been involuntarily admitted to 7 Intermountain Hospital due to “overwhelming suicidal ideation and 8 auditory hallucinations.” 9 herself with a knife, but allegedly her boyfriend took the knife 10 away. 11 Elsewhere in his evaluation, Dr. (AR 594). Plaintiff “had a plan to kill In the ER, she was observed hitting herself with a chair.” (AR 594). 12 13 Defendant argues that a GAF score is not a “medical opinion,” 14 and that the ALJ need not have discussed Plaintiff’s GAF scores at 15 all. (Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“D. Mem.”) 16 at 6-8). 17 measure a claimant’s ability to function in a work environment, 18 the Agency has endorsed the use of GAF scores as one form of 19 evidence reflective of mental functioning. 20 Message 13066 (effective July 22, 2013) (“We consider a GAF rating 21 as opinion evidence.”). 22 the GAF score assessed by Dr. Kent, rejecting it because it was 23 “merely a snapshot view” of Plaintiff’s condition. 24 noted supra, however, other physicians assessed low GAF scores at 25 other 26 contradicting the ALJ’s sole stated reason for not affording more 27 weight to Dr. Kent’s score. 28 indicating serious limitations in functioning, over a considerable Preliminarily, although a GAF score does not directly times during SSA Administrative In any event, the ALJ chose to analyze Plaintiff’s treatment (AR 21). history, As directly Because there were numerous GAF scores 11 1 period of time, the ALJ should have evaluated this evidence. 2 ALJ therefore failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the 3 score assessed by Dr. Kent. The Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012-13. 4 5 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in assigning “some 6 weight” to the opinions of non-treating, non-examining State agency 7 physicians. 8 State agency opinions “do not as a general matter deserve as much 9 weight as (AR 22). those of The ALJ’s opinion acknowledged that the examining or treating physicians,” but 10 nevertheless ruled that “those opinions do deserve some weight, 11 particularly in a case like this in which there exist a number of 12 other reasons to reach similar conclusions (as explained throughout 13 this decision).” 14 “supported a finding of ‘not disabled.’” (AR 22). The ALJ noted that the opinions (AR 22). 15 16 The Court agrees that the ALJ’s reasons for assigning “some 17 weight” to the opinions of the State agency doctors and relying on 18 them in finding Plaintiff “not disabled” are so vague as to preclude 19 review of his decision on this issue. 20 relied on these opinions rather than the opinions of treating or 21 examining physicians, he did not provide sufficient reasons for 22 doing so. To the extent that the ALJ Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012-13. 23 24 For the foregoing reasons, the Court agrees with Plaintiff 25 that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence in 26 formulating an RFC. 27 \\ 28 \\ 12 1 2. The ALJ Improperly Discredited Plaintiff’s Testimony 2 3 Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant 4 is malingering, the ALJ’s 5 testimony regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects 6 of her symptoms must be “clear and convincing.” 7 Comm’r, 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009). 8 “ordinary 9 inquiry. techniques of reasons for credibility Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. (1) a plaintiff’s rejecting a claimant’s Valentine v. The ALJ may use evaluation” during this The ALJ may consider, among reputation for truthfulness; 10 other 11 (2) inconsistencies in her testimony or between testimony and 12 conduct; 13 (5) testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the 14 nature, 15 complains. 16 2002); see also Smolen, 80 F.3d 1273 at 1284. 17 credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the 18 record, the court may not engage in second-guessing. 19 F.3d at 958-59. things: (3) her severity, daily and activities; effect of (4) the her work symptoms record; of which and she Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. If the ALJ’s Thomas, 80 20 21 22 As Plaintiff observes, the ALJ’s only clear statement regarding Plaintiff’s credibility was: 23 24 [Plaintiff] alleges an inability to perform work activity 25 due to symptoms of her mental impairments such as an 26 inability to concentrate, poor memory, limited focus, 27 forgetfulness, panic attacks, and an inability to work 28 with others due to anxiety and auditory hallucinations. 13 1 Her physical complaints have been discussed above and 2 found non-severe. 3 4 After 5 undersigned 6 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to 7 cause 8 statements 9 limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 10 careful the consideration finds alleged that of the evidence, however, intensity, the medically [Plaintiff’s] symptoms; concerning the [Plaintiff’s] persistence and credible for the reasons explained in this decision. 11 12 (AR 20). 13 that he found not credible and to link that testimony to specific 14 portions of the record rebutting Plaintiff’s testimony. 15 cannot conclude that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons 16 for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony. 17 775 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The government argues that 18 [c]laimant’s 19 headaches a week conflicts with the medical record. 20 matter, the ALJ never connected the medical record to [c]laimant’s 21 testimony about her headaches. Although the ALJ made findings . . . 22 concerning [c]laimant’s treatment for headaches, he never stated 23 that he rested his adverse credibility determination on those 24 findings. 25 argument that the history of treatment for headaches is a specific, 26 clear, and convincing reason to support the credibility finding.”); 27 Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015). (“Our 28 review of the ALJ’s written decision reveals that . . . she simply The ALJ wholly failed to identify the specific testimony testimony For that that reason she has, alone, 14 we The Court See Burrell v. Colvin, on average, reject the one or two As an initial government’s 1 stated her non-credibility conclusion and then summarized the 2 medical evidence supporting her RFC determination. 3 the sort of explanation or the kind of ‘specific reasons’ we must 4 have in order to review the ALJ’s decision meaningfully, so that 5 we may ensure that the claimant’s testimony was not arbitrarily 6 discredited. 7 district court could be reasonable inferences drawn from the ALJ’s 8 summary 9 exclusively the ALJ’s to make, and ours only to review. . . . 10 Because the ALJ failed to identify the testimony she found not 11 credible, she did not link that testimony to the particular parts 12 of the record supporting her non-credibility determination. 13 was legal error.”). Although of the the evidence, inconsistencies the This is not identified credibility by determination the is This 14 15 Defendant nevertheless argues that the ALJ provided 16 appropriate reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony. 17 analyzing whether Plaintiff’s impairments were “severe,” the ALJ 18 stated 19 following a car accident in July 2013, treatment notes in November 20 2013 stated that Plaintiff was in no “acute distress” and was not 21 in pain. 22 used a cane at times, there was “never a provider who prescribed a 23 cane as there were no medical findings that she needed assistance 24 with gait.” 25 with pain medications” after the accident, and “was quite active 26 with walking and exercising. 27 severe as alleged.” 28 “noted that, although (AR 18). a (AR 18). treatment Plaintiff complained of physical In pain The ALJ also found that, although Plaintiff The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff “did well (AR 20). record Thus, the accident was likely not as Defendant also argues that the ALJ showing 15 largely normal physical 1 findings.” (D. Mem. at 9 (citing AR 20-21)). 2 Plaintiff’s mental impairments, Defendant argues that the ALJ 3 “showed how Plaintiff’s psychological conditions stabilized with 4 medication 5 “treatment gap” between May 2014 and January 2015. 6 10 (citing AR 21-22)). after treatment in September With respect to 2013” and noted a (D. Mem. at 9- 7 8 9 A court can only affirm based upon the reasons that the ALJ actually relied upon in his decision. 1225 10 1219, 11 administrative law require us to review the ALJ’s decision based 12 on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ — not post 13 hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator 14 may have been thinking.”). 15 no 16 Defendant’s 17 conclusion. clear (9th reasons Cir. for “post hoc 2009) Bray v. Comm’r, 554 F.3d (“Long-standing principles of As discussed supra, the ALJ provided discrediting Plaintiff’s rationalizations” do testimony, not and disturb this 18 19 Moreover, several of the justifications asserted by Defendant For example, although a claimant’s 20 are overstated or questionable. 21 failure to seek or follow prescribed medical treatment may suggest 22 that the alleged impairment is not severe or disabling, see Fair, 23 885 F.2d at 603, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned against drawing 24 such 25 impairments. 26 (claimant’s failure to seek treatment for depression is an improper 27 basis from which to conclude that the claimant does not suffer from inferences when evaluating a claimant’s asserted mental Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996) 28 16 1 it).4 2 can be consistent with a claim of disability. See Lester v. Chater, 3 81 F.3d 821, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Occasional symptom-free periods 4 – and even the sporadic ability to work – are not inconsistent with 5 disability.”). Additionally, symptom-free periods or temporary improvement 6 7 Defendant’s remaining justifications for the ALJ’s decision 8 appear to be based on alleged inconsistencies between the medical 9 evidence and Plaintiff’s impairments. However, it is improper to 10 reject subjective testimony based solely on its inconsistencies 11 with the objective medical evidence. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1227. 12 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court agrees with Plaintiff 14 that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 15 discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her limitations. 16 17 3. The ALJ’s Errors Warrant Remand For An Award Of Benefits 18 The Court remands for an award of benefits where “(1) the 19 20 record 21 proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed 22 to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, 23 whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the 24 improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ 25 would has be been required fully to developed find the and claimant further administrative disabled on remand.” 26 27 28 Moreover, the ALJ identified a “treatment gap” between May 2014 and January 2015, (AR 22), but, as noted supra, it appears that Plaintiff was psychiatrically hospitalized in December 2014 due to overwhelming suicidal ideation and hallucinations. (AR 594). 4 17 The “credit-as- 1 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (citations omitted). 2 true” rule allows courts the flexibility to remand for further 3 proceedings only where the record as a whole “creates serious 4 doubt” that a claimant is disabled. Id. at 1021. 5 6 Remand for benefits under Garrison is appropriate. The Court 7 is satisfied that the record has been fully developed, that further 8 administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, and that 9 if the discounted testimony and opinions were credited as true, 10 Plaintiff would be entitled to benefits. 11 12 Particularly, the Court observes that the record as a whole 13 leaves no serious doubt that Plaintiff is disabled. 14 F.3d at 1021. 15 2, 2015 hearing before the ALJ. 16 body “hurts a lot,” her right hand “malfunctions,” and she hears 17 voices, which tell her to “run” or “kill [her]self,” “a lot.” 18 60, 19 hospitalizations for psychiatric issues along with medical and 20 physical impairments that, taken together, would be disabling. 64). Garrison, 759 Plaintiff was 51 years old at the time of the April Plaintiff’s (AR 55). medical She testified that her history documents (AR two 21 22 The Court also notes that Plaintiff was granted disability 23 benefits for a subsequent application covering the period after 24 June 16, 2015. 25 the subsequent grant of benefits is not itself determinative of 26 issues in this case, which covers an earlier time period, (D. Mem. 27 at 11-12), it has some impact on the Court’s analysis of whether 28 there would be any value in further administrative proceedings. (Dkt. No. 19). Although Defendant is correct that 18 1 2 Accordingly, the Court remands with directions to the Agency to calculate and award benefits to Plaintiff. 3 4 VI. 5 CONCLUSION 6 7 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be 8 entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING 9 this case for the award of benefits. The Clerk 10 of the Court shall serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on 11 counsel for both parties. 12 13 DATED: June 22, 2017 14 15 16 /S/ SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN LEXIS/NEXIS, WESTLAW OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 19
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