Consuelo Del Carmen Perdomo v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 2:2016cv03443 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER by Magistrate Judge Jean P. Rosenbluth. Consistent with the foregoing and under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner, DENYING Plaintiff's request for remand, and DISMISSING this action with prejudice. (See Order for Further Details) (kl)
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Consuelo Del Carmen Perdomo v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CONSUELO DEL CARMEN PERDOMO, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. ) Case No. CV 16-3443-JPR ) ) ) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ) AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 17 18 19 I. PROCEEDINGS Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner’s final decision 20 denying her applications for Social Security disability insurance 21 benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income benefits 22 (“SSI”). 23 undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 24 matter is before the Court on the parties’ Joint Stipulation, 25 filed February 22, 2017, which the Court has taken under 26 submission without oral argument. 27 the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the The For the reasons stated below, 28 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 II. 2 BACKGROUND Plaintiff was born in 1962. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 3 72.) 4 country cleaning hotel and motel rooms. 5 She completed third grade in El Salvador and worked in this (AR 39.) On July 31, 2012, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and 6 SSI, alleging in each that she had been unable to work since 7 January 4, 2011, because of headaches, blurred vision, and back, 8 neck, and left-arm pain. 9 applications were denied initially and on reconsideration (AR 58, (AR 61-62, 83-84.)1 After her 10 60, 61-71, 83-93, 94-107, 122-35, 137-38), she requested a 11 hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (AR 172). 12 was held on November 3, 2014, at which Plaintiff, who was 13 represented by counsel, testified through an interpreter; a 14 vocational expert also testified. 15 decision issued January 30, 2015, the ALJ found Plaintiff not 16 disabled. 17 Appeals Council, and on May 3, 2016, it denied review. 18 This action followed. 19 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 20 (AR 9-34.) (AR 35-57.) A hearing In a written Plaintiff requested review from the (AR 1-3.) Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 21 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. 22 decision should be upheld if they are free of legal error and 23 supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. 24 See id.; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Parra The ALJ’s findings and 25 26 1 27 28 Plaintiff’s concurrently filed application for widow’s insurance benefits based on a “prescribed period” ending on August 31, 2013, was denied by the ALJ (AR 15-16), and that ruling is not challenged by Plaintiff here. 2 1 v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial 2 evidence means such evidence as a reasonable person might accept 3 as adequate to support a conclusion. 4 401; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). 5 It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. 6 Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. 7 Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). 8 substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court 9 “must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both Richardson, 402 U.S. at To determine whether 10 the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from 11 the Commissioner’s conclusion.” 12 720 (9th Cir. 1996). 13 either affirming or reversing,” the reviewing court “may not 14 substitute its judgment” for the Commissioner’s. 15 IV. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, “If the evidence can reasonably support Id. at 720-21. THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY 16 People are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social 17 Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial 18 gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is 19 expected to result in death or has lasted, or is expected to 20 last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 21 § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 22 1992). 42 U.S.C. 23 A. 24 The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to The Five-Step Evaluation Process 25 assess whether a claimant is disabled. 26 §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 27 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended Apr. 9, 1996). 28 step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is 3 20 C.F.R. In the first 1 currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the 2 claimant is not disabled and the claim must be denied. 3 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). 4 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful 5 activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine 6 whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of 7 impairments significantly limiting her ability to do basic work 8 activities; if not, the claimant is not disabled and her claim 9 must be denied. 10 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of 11 impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to 12 determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments 13 meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments set 14 forth at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1; if so, 15 disability is conclusively presumed. 16 416.920(a)(4)(iii). §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 17 If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments 18 does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth 19 step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant 20 has sufficient residual functional capacity (“RFC”)2 to perform 21 her past work; if so, she is not disabled and the claim must be 22 denied. 23 has the burden of proving she is unable to perform past relevant 24 work. 25 burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. The claimant If the claimant meets that Id. 26 27 28 2 RFC is what a claimant can do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. §§ 404.1545, 416.945; see Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). 4 1 If that happens or if the claimant has no past relevant 2 work, the Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that 3 the claimant is not disabled because she can perform other 4 substantial gainful work available in the national economy. 5 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. 6 That determination comprises the fifth and final step in the 7 sequential analysis. 8 Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. 9 10 B. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Process At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 11 substantial gainful activity since January 4, 2011, the alleged 12 onset date. 13 severe impairments of osteoarthritis of the neck, obesity, mild 14 carpal tunnel syndrome “on the left,” and depression. 15 step three, she determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not 16 meet or equal a listing. 17 (AR 18.) At step two, she found that Plaintiff had (Id.) At (Id.) At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to 18 perform light work except that she was literate but not fluent in 19 English and was limited to simple tasks with no more than 20 occasional contact with the public, coworkers, and supervisors. 21 (AR 19-20.) 22 Based on Plaintiff’s RFC and the VE’s testimony, the ALJ 23 found that she could perform her past relevant work as a “hotel 24 housekeeper,” DOT 323.687-014, 1991 WL 672783. 25 noted that Plaintiff “actually performed” the light, unskilled 26 job at the “light to medium level.” 27 testimony, the ALJ compared Plaintiff’s RFC to the physical and 28 mental demands of the job and found that she could perform her 5 (Id.) (AR 27.) The ALJ Referencing the VE’s 1 past work only as it was “generally performed.” (Id.) 2 Accordingly, the ALJ found her not disabled, ending the 3 sequential evaluation process without reaching step five. 4 27-28.) 5 V. (AR THE ALJ’S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF COULD PERFORM HER PAST 6 RELEVANT WORK WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 7 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding her capable 8 of performing her past relevant work. 9 Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ mischaracterized her (See J. Stip. at 3-8.) 10 past relevant work as “housekeeper,” DOT 323.687-014, 1991 WL 11 672783, a light-work job, when her actual job duties were more 12 closely aligned with the DOT description of “housecleaner,” DOT 13 323.687-018, 1991 WL 672784, a heavy-work job. 14 For the reasons stated below, the ALJ did not err. (Id. at 5-6.) 15 A. 16 Plaintiff’s past job duties are described in relevant part Relevant Background 17 in an initial disability report dated August 22, 2012 (AR 257- 18 64), and a work-history report dated August 27, 2013 (AR 319-20). 19 The initial disability report was completed by a Social Security 20 field-office case worker who interviewed Plaintiff over the phone 21 (see AR 253-55 (Aug. 22, 2012 disability report noting 22 “teleclaim” interview conducted with Plaintiff)); the work- 23 history report was completed by Plaintiff’s counsel (AR 28, 253; 24 see also J. Stip. at 4). 25 In the initial disability report, Plaintiff described her 26 past work as hotel “cleaning maintenace [sic].” 27 job purportedly required eight hours of walking; eight hours of 28 standing; one hour each of sitting, climbing, stooping, and 6 (AR 259.) The 1 crouching; three hours each of kneeling and crawling; and two 2 hours of reaching each day. 3 lift and carry towels and sheets; the heaviest weight she lifted 4 was 20 pounds and she frequently lifted 10 pounds. 5 (AR 260.) Plaintiff was required to (Id.) In the work-history report, Plaintiff described her past 6 work as “housekeeping - hotel” (AR 319), which involved cleaning 7 hotel rooms, making beds, changing sheets, cleaning bathrooms and 8 showers, and vacuuming carpets (AR 320). 9 “machines, tools, or equipment”; “frequent” walking, standing, The job involved using 10 climbing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, reaching; “frequent” 11 handling, grabbing, or grasping big objects; “occasional” 12 crawling and writing, typing, or handling small objects; and 13 lifting less than 10 pounds frequently. 14 weight Plaintiff lifted was 50 pounds. 15 carrying” duties of the job required that she “load [a] supply 16 cart with cleaning items,” including sheets and towels, and “push 17 [a] supply cart to rooms to be cleaned.” 18 (Id.) (Id.) The heaviest The “lifting and (Id.) At the November 3, 2014 hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel argued 19 that the initial disability report had an “incorrect description” 20 of Plaintiff’s work history. 21 she described Plaintiff’s past relevant work as “a hotel maid or 22 housekeeper” and alleged that she had to lift “as much as 10/20 23 pounds all the way up to 50 pounds.” 24 testified that she worked “cleaning rooms” in “houses and 25 hotels.” 26 all during the workday. 27 a cart filled with soap, various things” or “go to the storage or 28 to the laundry room to get towels.” (AR 42.) (AR 37.) In her opening statement, (AR 39.) Plaintiff She either walked or stood and did not sit at (AR 44.) 7 Her job required her to “take (Id.) Both the linens and 1 the cart were “very heavy,” requiring that Plaintiff lift up to 2 40 or 50 pounds and push “60 to 80 pounds” when the cart was 3 full. (Id.) 4 The VE characterized Plaintiff’s past relevant work as 5 “hotel housekeeper, Code 323.687-014,” “generally performed” as a 6 light, unskilled job but performed by Plaintiff at the “light to 7 medium” exertional level.3 8 E,” Plaintiff’s Aug. 2013 work-history report).) 9 the VE whether there was any conflict between that job “at light” (AR 51-52 (referencing “Exhibit 13The ALJ asked 10 exertion and the way it is typically performed and the VE 11 responded that there was not. 12 hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform her 13 past relevant work of “hotel housekeeper” as it is “generally 14 performed” but not as she actually performed it. 15 questioned by Plaintiff’s counsel, the VE testified that she had 16 “done a lot of job analysis for [the housekeeper] job,” and an 17 individual limited to “six hours of standing and walking” could 18 perform the job as “generally performed.” 19 (Id.) The VE testified that a (Id.) When (AR 53-55.) In a posthearing brief, Plaintiff’s counsel objected to the 20 VE’s classification of Plaintiff’s past work as “housekeeper” and 21 requested a supplemental hearing, arguing that “[p]er the 22 claimant’s description of her regular work duties,” her past work 23 was that of a “housecleaner,” DOT 323.687-018, a heavy-work, 24 unskilled job. (AR 386.) The ALJ denied Plaintiff’s request for 25 26 3 27 28 The VE contrasted Plaintiff’s past relevant work of “hotel housekeeper” with her past job “cleaning houses,” which was not performed at a substantial gainful level and therefore not considered by the VE in her analysis. (See AR 51.) 8 1 2 a supplemental hearing to address the issue. (AR 28.) An individual performing the job of “cleaner, housekeeper,” 3 DOT 323.687-014, 1991 WL 672783, the light-work job the VE 4 identified and the ALJ found to be Plaintiff’s past work, 5 [c]leans rooms and halls in commercial establishments, 6 such as hotels, restaurants, clubs, beauty parlors, and 7 dormitories, 8 following 9 carries linens. performing duties: any Sorts, combination counts, Makes beds. folds, of [the] marks, or Replenishes supplies, such 10 as drinking glasses and writing supplies. 11 and 12 furniture, hangs drapes, and rolls carpets. 13 other duties as described under CLEANER (any industry) I 14 Master Title. renders personal assistance to Checks wraps patrons. Moves Performs 15 1991 WL 672783. 16 it can be designated according to type of establishment or area 17 cleaned, such as “[m]otel [c]leaner (hotel & rest.).” 18 The “alternate title” for the job is “maid,” and Id. An individual performing the job of “housecleaner,” DOT 19 323.687-018, 1991 WL 672784, the heavy-work job Plaintiff claims 20 better describes her past work, 21 [p]erforms any combination of [the] following duties to 22 maintain hotel premises in [a] clean and orderly manner: 23 Moves and arranges furniture. 24 draperies. 25 Prepares sample rooms for sales meetings. 26 decorations, apparatus, or furniture for banquets and 27 social functions. Collects soiled linens for laundering, 28 and receives and stores linen supplies in linen closet. Turns mattresses. Dusts venetian blinds. 9 Hangs Polishes metalwork. Arranges 1 Performs other duties as described under CLEANER (any 2 industry) I Master Title. 3 ironing boards, baby cribs, and rollaway beds to guests 4 rooms. 5 and remove debris from driveway and garage areas. May deliver television sets, May clean swimming pool with vacuum. May clean 6 1991 WL 672784. 7 cleaner,” “mover,” and “night cleaner,” and it can be designated 8 according to specialization, such as “curtain cleaner,” “linen- 9 room worker,” “porter, lobby,” or “vacuum worker.” 10 The “alternate titles” for the job are “hall Id. In her January 30, 2015 decision, the ALJ characterized 11 Plaintiff’s past work as that of a “hotel housekeeper,” DOT 12 323.687-014, which Plaintiff “actually performed at the light to 13 medium level.” 14 individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform the past work as it 15 was “generally performed,” the ALJ so found. 16 noted Plaintiff’s objections to the accuracy of the initial 17 disability report and overruled them, finding that Plaintiff 18 “provided the responses to the questions” in the report and that 19 her “testimony about the amount of weight she lifted in her past 20 work changed” after her attorney completed the work-history 21 report. (AR 28.) 22 opinion. (Id.) (AR 27.) Noting the VE’s testimony that an (Id.) The ALJ The ALJ gave “great weight” to the VE’s 23 B. 24 At step four of the five-step disability analysis, a Applicable Law 25 claimant has the burden of proving that she cannot return to her 26 past relevant work, as both actually and generally performed in 27 the national economy. 28 Cir. 2001); §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th 10 Although the burden of 1 proof lies with the claimant at step four, the ALJ still has a 2 duty to make factual findings to support her conclusion. 3 249 F.3d at 844. 4 findings of fact” as to “the individual’s RFC,” “the physical and 5 mental demands of the past job/occupation,” and whether “the 6 individual’s RFC would permit a return to his or her past job or 7 occupation.” 8 2015) (citing SSR 82–62, 1982 WL 31386, at *4 (1982)). 9 Pinto, In particular, the ALJ must make “specific Ocegueda v. Colvin, 630 F. App’x 676, 677 (9th Cir. Although the claimant is the “primary source for vocational 10 documentation,” the ALJ may use the VE to assist in the step-four 11 determination as to whether the claimant is able to perform her 12 past relevant work. 13 (at step four, VE’s testimony “may be helpful in supplementing or 14 evaluating the accuracy of the claimant’s description of his past 15 work”). 16 information about those work demands,” and “[d]etailed 17 information about strength, endurance, manipulative ability, 18 mental demands and other job requirements must be obtained . . . 19 . from the claimant, employer, or other informed source.” 20 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *3. 21 Id.; see §§ 404.1560(b)(2), 416.960(b)(2) “Adequate documentation of past work includes factual SSR Lastly, the ALJ can properly discharge her responsibility by 22 comparing the specific physical and mental demands of the 23 claimant’s past relevant work with her actual RFC. 24 F.3d at 844-45; see SSR 82–62, 1982 WL 31386, at *2 (step four 25 “requires careful consideration of the interaction of the 26 limiting effects of the person’s impairment(s) and the physical 27 and mental demands of his or her [past relevant work] to 28 determine whether the individual can still do that work”). 11 Pinto, 249 1 To ascertain the requirements of occupations as generally 2 performed in the national economy, the ALJ may rely on VE 3 testimony or information from the DOT. 4 1898704, at *2 (Dec. 4, 2000) (at steps four and five, SSA relies 5 “primarily on the DOT (including its companion publication, the 6 SCO) for information about the requirements of work in the 7 national economy” and “may also use VEs . . . at these steps to 8 resolve complex vocational issues”); SSR 82–61, 1982 WL 31387, at 9 *2 (Jan. 1, 1982) (“The [DOT] descriptions can be relied upon — SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 10 for jobs that are listed in the DOT — to define the job as it is 11 usually performed in the national economy.” (emphasis in 12 original)). 13 ‘trumps’ when there is a conflict.” 14 at *2; see also Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 15 1995) (noting that DOT “is not the sole source of admissible 16 information concerning jobs” (alteration and citations omitted)). 17 “Neither the DOT nor the VE . . . automatically SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704, When a VE provides evidence at step four or five about the 18 requirements of a job, the ALJ has a responsibility to ask about 19 “any possible conflict” between that evidence and the DOT. 20 SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *4; Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 21 1149, 1152-54 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that application of SSR 22 00-4p is mandatory). 23 accept VE testimony that contradicts the DOT only if the record 24 contains “persuasive evidence to support the deviation.” 25 249 F.3d at 846 (citing Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435); see also 26 Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008) 27 (finding error when “ALJ did not identify what aspect of the VE’s 28 experience warranted deviation from the DOT”). See When such a conflict exists, the ALJ may 12 Pinto, 1 Jobs are classified as “sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and 2 very heavy” according to their “physical exertion requirements.” 3 §§ 404.1567, 416.967. 4 no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or 5 carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds,” though “the weight 6 lifted may be very little.” 7 work” involves “lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with 8 frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 9 pounds.” “Light work” generally involves “lifting §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b). §§ 404.1567(c), 416.967(c). “Medium “Heavy work” involves 10 “lifting no more than 100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting 11 or carrying of objects weighing up to 50 pounds.” 12 §§ 404.1567(d), 416.967(d). 13 C. 14 The ALJ’s classification of Plaintiff’s past relevant work Analysis 15 as “hotel housekeeper,” DOT 323.687-014, and her finding that 16 Plaintiff was “capable of performing” that job “as generally 17 performed” are supported by substantial evidence. 18 (AR 27.) The ALJ properly relied on the VE’s characterization of 19 Plaintiff’s past work. 20 rejected her work-history report and hearing testimony and 21 instead relied on the description of her past work from the 22 August 22, 2012 initial disability report, which was, according 23 to Plaintiff, “completed by an unidentified individual” with “no 24 indication” that it was “translated to Plaintiff who is not 25 fluent in English” or that “she was given an opportunity to 26 review, correct and sign” it. 27 part, the August 2012 report described Plaintiff’s past work as 28 “cleaning maintenace [sic],” requiring her to lift up to 20 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly (J. Stip. at 4-5.) 13 In relevant 1 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. (AR 259-60.) 2 Instead of crediting that report, Plaintiff argues, the ALJ 3 should have relied on her work-history report — which, in 4 relevant part, labeled her past work as “hotel housekeeping,” 5 described work activities of cleaning hotel rooms, making beds, 6 changing sheets, cleaning bathrooms and showers, and vacuuming 7 carpets, and noted that she was required to lift less than 10 8 pounds frequently and up to 50 pounds — and her hearing 9 testimony, which labeled her past work as “hotel maid or 10 housekeeper,” described work activities of cleaning rooms, 11 loading and pushing a cart of supplies, and retrieving clean 12 towels and linens and noted that she was required to lift “up to 13 40 or 50 pounds” and push “60 to 80 pounds.” (AR 39-44.) 14 After listening to her testimony and specifically 15 considering her work-history report, the VE classified 16 Plaintiff’s past work as a “hotel housekeeper,” performed by 17 Plaintiff as a “light to medium” job. 18 13-E,” Plaintiff’s Aug. 2013 work-history report).) 19 Plaintiff’s argument, the VE apparently did not rely on the 20 August 22, 2012 report: she based her findings on Plaintiff’s 21 later work-history report and hearing testimony. 22 Indeed, the VE’s opinion that Plaintiff performed her past work 23 at the “light to medium” level clearly indicates that she at 24 least partially credited Plaintiff’s later description of lifting 25 up to 50 pounds. 26 objection that the August 2012 report was incorrect (see AR 28), 27 she nonetheless gave “great weight” to the VE’s opinion, which 28 did not rely on the earlier report. (AR 51-52 (citing “Exhibit Contrary to (AR 52.) And although the ALJ overruled Plaintiff’s 14 1 Further, there is no apparent conflict between Plaintiff’s 2 hearing testimony and work-history report and the “cleaner, 3 housekeeping” job as performed at the “light to medium” exertion 4 level. 5 320); the VE testified that she performed the “housekeeper” job 6 at a “light to medium” exertional level, which by definition 7 would involve “lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with 8 frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 9 pounds,” see §§ 404.1567(c), 416.967(c). Plaintiff described lifting 50 pounds at most (see AR 44, Plaintiff reported that 10 she cleaned hotel rooms, made beds and changed sheets, cleaned 11 bathrooms, vacuumed carpets, loaded a cart with cleaning 12 supplies, pushed the cart to and between rooms, lifted linens, 13 and retrieved towels and linens from a storage location (see AR 14 39-44, 320); an individual performing the “cleaner, housekeeping” 15 job “cleans rooms . . . such as hotels,” “[m]akes beds,” 16 “[r]eplenishes supplies,” and “carries linens,” see DOT 323.687- 17 014, 1991 WL 672783. 18 The job description suggested by Plaintiff, “housecleaner,” 19 has almost no overlap with Plaintiff’s reported past job duties: 20 it is a “heavy work” job, involving “lifting no more than 100 21 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects 22 weighing up to 50 pounds.” 23 Plaintiff does not allege that she was required to lift 50 pounds 24 frequently or lift more than that amount even occasionally. 25 job duties of “housecleaner” include moving and arranging 26 furniture; turning mattresses; hanging draperies; dusting blinds; 27 polishing metalwork; preparing rooms for meetings; arranging 28 rooms for banquets and social functions; delivering large items See §§ 404.1567(d), 416.967(d). 15 But The 1 such as televisions, cribs, and roll-away beds to guest rooms; 2 cleaning swimming pools; and cleaning and removing debris from 3 outside areas. 4 Plaintiff does not describe her past work as including any of 5 those activities. 6 involves “collect[ing] soiled linens for laundering” and 7 “receiv[ing] and stor[ing] linen supplies in linen closet,” 8 activities that somewhat overlap with Plaintiff’s purported past 9 duties of loading a supply cart with sheets (AR 320) and going to See DOT 323.687-018, 1991 WL 672784. But And although the “housecleaner” job also 10 the laundry room to get towels (AR 42), those activities are 11 sufficiently covered by the “housekeeper” duties of “carr[ying] 12 linens” and “replenish[ing] supplies.”4 13 Finally, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding 14 that Plaintiff could perform the “cleaner, housekeeping” job as 15 generally performed. 16 existed between that job “at light” exertion and the way it is 17 typically performed, and the VE responded no. 18 compared Plaintiff’s RFC, to which she does not object, to the 19 “physical and mental demands” of the “hotel housekeeper” job and 20 found that Plaintiff was able to perform it as “generally 21 performed.” 22 between Plaintiff’s RFC and the DOT job description for “cleaner, (AR 27.) The ALJ asked the VE whether any conflict (AR 52.) The ALJ Indeed, no apparent conflict exists 23 4 24 25 26 27 28 To the extent any conflict existed between the “housekeeper” job and Plaintiff’s description of her past work duties, the ALJ discredited her later statements regarding the “amount of weight she lifted in her past work” and found her statements “concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects” of her symptoms “not entirely credible,” a finding that Plaintiff does not challenge. (See AR 20, 28; J. Stip. at 5.) Thus, no error occurred even were Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ relied on the initial disability report true. 16 1 housekeeping.” Plaintiff has the RFC for light work with certain 2 nonexertional limitations (AR 20); the job of housekeeper is a 3 light-work job. 4 housekeeper requires “level-one” reasoning, which is “the lowest 5 rung on the development scale,” requiring “only the slightest bit 6 of rote reasoning.” 7 (C.D. Cal. 2005); DOT, app. C, 1991 WL 688702. 8 no more than occasional contact with the public, coworkers, and 9 supervisors (AR 20); other than “render[ing] personal assistance She is limited to simple tasks (id.); the job of Meissl v. Barnhart, 403 F. Supp. 2d 981, 984 She is limited to 10 to patrons,” all of the activities performed by a housekeeper 11 appear to be performed away from other people. 12 but not fluent in English (id.); the housekeeper job requires 13 level-one language skills, which is the lowest level of language 14 development contemplated by the DOT, see DOT, app. C, 1991 WL 15 688702; cf. Meza v. Astrue, No. C-09-1402-EDL, 2011 WL 11499, at 16 *21 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2011) (rejecting argument that illiterate 17 Spanish-speaking plaintiff was incapable of performing work 18 requiring level-one language development, and collecting cases). 19 Substantial evidence derived from Plaintiff’s own work-history 20 report and testimony supports the finding that she can perform 21 the job of hotel housekeeper as it is described in the DOT. 22 She is literate Plaintiff cites Pinto and Carmickle v. Commissioner, Social 23 Security Administration, 533 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2008), for the 24 proposition that an ALJ may not rely on a “generic” occupational 25 classification of work to find a claimant capable of performing 26 her past work. 27 Here, unlike in Pinto and Carmickle, the VE provided a specific 28 job description and classification directly applicable to (J. Stip. at 6-7.) 17 That argument lacks merit. 1 Plaintiff’s past work cleaning hotel rooms and found that she 2 could perform the job as it is generally performed in the 3 national economy. 4 that reliance on a “generic occupational classification” is not 5 likely to be a reliable source for finding a claimant able to 6 perform her past work, reliance on a DOT job description to 7 determine “[w]hether the claimant retains the capacity to perform 8 the functional demands and job duties of the job as ordinarily 9 required by employers throughout the national economy” is. 10 Although it is correct, as Plaintiff claims, SSR 82–61, 1982 WL 31387, at *2. 11 Here, the VE testified that Plaintiff’s past relevant work 12 was as a “hotel housekeeper, Code 323.687-014,” which corresponds 13 to the “cleaner, housekeeping” job description in the DOT. 14 51.) 15 designated according to type of establishment cleaned. 16 323.687-014, 1991 WL 672783. 17 “generic classification”; the VE even tailored the “cleaner, 18 housekeeping” job to the type of establishment Plaintiff cleaned. 19 See Pinto, 249 F.3d at 846 (noting that definition of “Packager, 20 Hand” in DOT “contains more than two dozen different possible 21 jobs”); Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1167 (finding error in part 22 because VE “failed to specify a DOT classification, instead 23 generically referring to the position as a ‘counter sales 24 position’ or ‘customer service job’”). 25 that she had “done a lot of job analysis” for the “housekeeper” 26 job and had performed “job analysis in smaller hotel settings 27 like a motel and then in larger settings such as the Hilton 28 setting.” (AR The “alternate title” for the job is “maid,” and it can be (AR 53, 55.) DOT “Hotel housekeeper” is not a In fact, the VE testified The ALJ properly relied on the VE’s 18 1 specific expertise. 2 (9th Cir. 2005).5 3 4 5 Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 Accordingly, remand is not warranted. VI. CONCLUSION Consistent with the foregoing and under sentence four of 42 6 U.S.C. § 405(g),6 IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered 7 AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner, DENYING Plaintiff’s 8 request for remand, and DISMISSING this action with prejudice. 9 10 DATED: June 19, 2017 11 ______________________________ JEAN ROSENBLUTH U.S. Magistrate Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 5 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff also argues that the VE improperly classified her past work “based on the least demanding functions of her past work.” (J. Stip. at 7.) But as explained above, Plaintiff’s own descriptions of her work in the work-history report and her hearing testimony match the job description of “cleaner, housekeep[er]” as performed at a light to medium level. 6 That sentence provides: “The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 19
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