Rosario Renteria v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 2:2016cv00152 - Document 18 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. (sp)
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Rosario Renteria v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 ROSARIO RENTERIA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) NO. CV 16-152-E MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 18 PROCEEDINGS 19 20 Plaintiff filed a complaint on January 7, 2016, seeking review of 21 the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. The parties consented to 22 proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on February 24, 2016. 23 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on June 14, 2016. 24 Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on July 11, 2016. 25 Court has taken the motions under submission without oral argument. 26 See L.R. 7-15; “Order,” filed January 11, 2016. 27 /// 28 /// The Dockets.Justia.com 1 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 2 3 Plaintiff sought disability insurance benefits, asserting she has 4 been disabled ever since she fell at work in July of 2005 5 (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 39-47, 195). 6 date was September 30, 2009 (A.R. 23, 199). 7 Judge (“ALJ”) examined the documents in the record and heard testimony 8 from Plaintiff and a vocational expert (A.R. 21-465). 9 certain severe impairments, including “degenerative disc disease of 10 the right knee” and “degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine” 11 (A.R. 23). 12 September 30, 2009, Plaintiff retained the residual functional 13 capacity to perform a limited range of light work (A.R. 23-24). 14 ALJ determined that this functional capacity would have permitted the 15 performance of Plaintiff’s past relevant work (A.R. 25). 16 Council denied review (A.R. 7-9). Plaintiff’s last insured The Administrative Law The ALJ found The ALJ also found, however, that through at least The The Appeals 17 18 STANDARD OF REVIEW 19 20 Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the 21 Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s 22 findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the 23 Administration used correct legal standards. 24 Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 25 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner, 26 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). 27 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 28 support a conclusion.” See Carmickle v. Substantial evidence is “such Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 2 1 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Widmark v. 2 Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). 3 4 If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may 5 not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. 6 Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by 7 isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. 8 Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, 9 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 10 But the detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. 11 12 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 13 quotations omitted). 14 15 DISCUSSION 16 17 After consideration of the record as a whole, Defendant’s motion 18 is granted and Plaintiff’s motion is denied. The Administration’s 19 findings are supported by substantial evidence and are free from 20 material1 legal error. Plaintiff’s contrary arguments are unavailing. 21 22 A social security claimant bears the burden of “showing that a 23 physical or mental impairment prevents [her] from engaging in any of 24 [her] previous occupations.” Sanchez v. Secretary, 812 F.2d 509, 511 25 26 1 27 28 The harmless error rule applies to the review of administrative decisions regarding disability. See Garcia v. Commissioner, 768 F.3d 925, 932-33 (9th Cir. 2014); McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886-88 (9th Cir. 2011). 3 1 (9th Cir. 1987); accord Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 2 (1987). 3 working for twelve continuous months. 4 U.S. 212, 218-25 (2002); Krumpelman v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 586, 589 (9th 5 Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1025 (1986). 6 demonstrate [she] was disabled prior to [her] last insured date.” 7 Morgan v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir. 1991); see 42 U.S.C. 8 § 416(i)(2)(C), 416(i)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. 404.131; see also Vertigan v. 9 Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001); Flaten v. Secretary of Plaintiff must prove her impairments prevented her from See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 Plaintiff “must 10 Health and Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 1995) (where 11 claimants apply for benefits after the expiration of their insured 12 status based on a current disability, the claimants “must show that 13 the current disability has existed continuously since some time on or 14 before the date their insured status lapsed”). 15 supports the conclusion Plaintiff failed to carry her burden in this 16 case. Substantial evidence 17 18 Significantly, no physician opined Plaintiff was totally disabled 19 prior to her last insured date. See Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 20 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (in upholding the Administration’s decision, the 21 Court emphasized: “None of the doctors who examined [claimant] 22 expressed the opinion that he was totally disabled”); accord Curry v. 23 Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990). 24 25 During the worker’s compensation proceedings following 26 Plaintiff’s fall, two physicians who examined Plaintiff opined she was 27 capable of performing at least light work (A.R. 278, 294-95). 28 opinion of an examining physician can provide substantial evidence to 4 The 1 support an administrative conclusion of non-disability. 2 See, e.g., Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631-32 (9th Cir. 2007). 3 4 State agency physicians reviewed the records and opined that 5 Plaintiff was not disabled as of September 30, 2009 (A.R. 57-58, 63- 6 65, 71-73). 7 See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (where the 8 opinions of non-examining physicians do not contradict “all other 9 evidence in the record” an ALJ properly may rely on these opinions); 10 These opinions also support the administrative decision. Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d at 1130 n.2. 11 12 The results of medical testing also tended to support the 13 administrative decision. Examination and testing in late 2005 showed 14 Plaintiff possessed an essentially full range of motion (A.R. 285-87). 15 Electrodiagnostic studies in 2005 and MRIs in 2006 were generally 16 consistent with the administrative findings (A.R. 292). 17 18 Some of Plaintiff’s own actions and statements also supported the 19 administrative findings. For example, in 2006, Plaintiff subjectively 20 reported only “slight” pain to an examining physician (A.R. 323). 21 Plaintiff testified that she looked for work during the period of 22 claimed disability (A.R. 46-47). 23 sought employment during the period of claimed disability can weigh 24 against a finding of disability. 25 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Copeland v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 536, 26 542 (9th Cir. 1988) (claimant’s job search efforts discredited his 27 allegations of disability). 28 /// The fact that a disability claimant See Bray v. Commissioner, 554 F.3d 5 1 The vocational expert testified that a person with the residual 2 functional capacity the ALJ found to exist could perform Plaintiff’s 3 past relevant work (A.R. 49-50, 51). 4 this testimony in denying disability benefits. 5 Secretary of Health and Human Services, 882 F.2d 1474, 1478-80 (9th 6 Cir. 1989); Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1986). The ALJ properly could rely on See Barker v. 7 8 9 To the extent any of the medical evidence is in conflict, it was the prerogative of the ALJ to resolve such conflicts. See Lewis v. 10 Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001). When evidence “is 11 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,” the Court must 12 uphold the administrative decision. 13 at 1039-40; accord Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 14 2002); Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 15 Court will uphold the ALJ’s rational interpretation of the evidence in 16 the present case notwithstanding any conflicts in the record. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d The 17 18 To the extent Plaintiff attempts to rely on her subjective 19 complaints, such complaints furnish insufficient cause to disturb the 20 administrative decision. 21 face value would not necessarily prove Plaintiff suffered from pain of 22 disabling severity for twelve continuous months prior to the 23 September 30, 2009 expiration of her insured status. 24 indicated, Plaintiff sometimes reported the pain as “slight.” 25 asked at the administrative hearing to recount her functional capacity 26 as of her date last insured, she proved unwilling or unable to do so 27 (A.R. 42). 28 have pain,” “I am limited” and “I wasn’t well” (A.R. 41, 47). First, even taking Plaintiff’s complaints at As previously When Plaintiff testified she did not go back to work because “I 6 1 Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the nature and timing of her alleged 2 pain and functional difficulties was far too vague to help carry her 3 burden of proof. 4 5 Moreover, assuming arguendo Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, if 6 credible, could support a conclusion of disability as of September 30, 7 2009, the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s credibility. 8 assessment of a claimant’s credibility is entitled to “great weight.” 9 Anderson v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 1990); Nyman v. An ALJ’s 10 Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985). Where, as here, the ALJ 11 finds that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments 12 reasonably could be expected to cause some degree of the alleged 13 symptoms of which the claimant subjectively complains, any discounting 14 of the claimant’s complaints must be supported by specific, cogent 15 findings. 16 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995); but see Smolen v. 17 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282-84 (9th Cir. 1996) (indicating that ALJ 18 must offer “specific, clear and convincing” reasons to reject a 19 claimant’s testimony where there is no evidence of malingering).2 20 ALJ’s credibility findings “must be sufficiently specific to allow a 21 reviewing court to conclude the ALJ rejected the claimant’s testimony See Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010); 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 In the absence of an ALJ’s reliance on evidence of “malingering,” most recent Ninth Circuit cases have applied the “clear and convincing” standard. See, e.g., Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2014); Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 670, 672 n.10 (9th Cir. 2012); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Ballard v. Apfel, 2000 WL 1899797, at *2 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2000) (collecting earlier cases). In the present case, the ALJ’s findings are sufficient under either standard, so the distinction between the two standards (if any) is academic. 7 An 1 on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit the 2 claimant’s testimony.” 3 Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also 4 Social Security Ruling 96-7p. 5 sufficient reasons for deeming Plaintiff’s subjective complaints less 6 than fully credible. See Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th As discussed below, the ALJ stated 7 8 9 The ALJ stressed the “objective medical evidence” while evaluating Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms (A.R. 24). Although a 10 claimant’s credibility “cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it 11 is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical 12 evidence is still a relevant factor. . . .” 13 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). 14 from the medical evidence that Plaintiff’s problems on and before her 15 last insured date were not as profound as Plaintiff apparently now 16 alleges. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 Here, the ALJ properly could infer 17 18 The ALJ also accurately noted that “there is very little evidence 19 of treatment prior to September 30, 2009" and “the claimant was vague 20 regarding any symptoms or treatment prior to her date last insured 21 (September 30, 2009)” (A.R. 24; see also A.R. 25 (“Again, she was 22 vague regarding any treatment or symptoms prior to her date last 23 insured . . .”)). 24 discounting of Plaintiff’s credibility. 25 seek medical treatment consistently, or evidence of minimal medical 26 treatment, may discredit a claimant’s allegations of disabling 27 symptoms. 28 2005); Batson v. Commissioner, 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004); Both of these considerations support the ALJ’s An unexplained failure to See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 8 1 Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1999); Orteza v. 2 Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995); accord Bunnel v. Sullivan, 3 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603- 4 604 (9th Cir. 1989). 5 credibility based on the vagueness of the claimant’s testimony. 6 e.g., Catalano v. Astrue, 302 Fed. App’x 601, 602-03 (2008); 7 Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008). An ALJ properly may discount a claimant’s See, 8 9 The ALJ also contrasted Plaintiff’s claimed need for a Spanish 10 interpreter with Plaintiff’s admissions she had studied English and 11 had taken the United States citizenship test in English (A.R. 25). 12 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ thereby erred, citing Voong v. Astrue, 13 641 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1008 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 14 District of California found error where an ALJ relied on a claimant’s 15 ability to pass a citizenship test as evidence of the claimant’s 16 supposed English language proficiency. 17 claimant had testified she “memorized the answers to the citizenship 18 test,” thereby explaining the seeming inconsistency between passing 19 the test and claiming an inability to understand English. 20 in the present case offered no such explanation. In Voong, the Eastern In Voong, however, the Plaintiff 21 22 In any event, assuming arguendo the ALJ should not have 23 questioned Plaintiff’s claimed need for a Spanish interpreter, the 24 error was harmless. 25 stated reasons for discounting a claimant’s credibility, a court 26 properly may uphold the credibility determination where sufficient 27 valid reasons have been stated. 28 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008). Despite the invalidity of one or more of an ALJ’s See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 9 In the present case, the ALJ 1 stated sufficient valid reasons to allow this Court to conclude that 2 the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s credibility on permissible grounds. 3 See Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d at 885. 4 the ALJ’s credibility determination. 5 App’x 823, 825 (9th Cir. 2007) (court will defer to Administration’s 6 credibility determination when the proper process is used and proper 7 reasons for the decision are provided); accord Flaten v. Secretary of 8 Health & Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995).3 9 /// 10 /// 11 /// 12 /// 13 /// 14 /// 15 /// 16 /// 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// The Court therefore defers to See Lasich v. Astrue, 252 Fed. 24 25 26 27 28 3 The Court does not determine herein whether Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are credible. Some evidence suggests that those complaints may be credible. However, it is for the Administration, and not this Court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1989). 10 1 CONCLUSION 2 3 For all of the foregoing reasons,4 Plaintiff’s motion for summary 4 judgment is denied and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 5 granted. 6 7 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 8 9 DATED: July 22, 2016. 10 11 /S/ CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 The Court has considered and rejected each of Plaintiff’s arguments. Neither Plaintiff’s arguments nor the circumstances of this case show any “substantial likelihood of prejudice” resulting from any error allegedly committed by the Administration. See generally McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 887-88 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the standards applicable to evaluating prejudice). 11
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