Dolores Martinez v. Navy League of the United States, No. 2:2013cv05533 - Document 35 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 24 AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS PLEADINGS, STRIKE RECAST COMPLAINT, AND SERVE SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING 26 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II (lc) Modified on 11/26/2013 (lc).
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Dolores Martinez v. Navy League of the United States Doc. 35 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 DOLORES MARTINEZ, 11 v. 12 13 Case No. 2:13-cv-5533-ODW(FFMx) Plaintiff, NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES, 14 Defendant. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS [24] AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT’S PLEADINGS, STRIKE RECAST COMPLAINT, AND SERVE SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING [26] 15 I. 16 INTRODUCTION 17 Plaintiff Dolores Martinez, proceeding pro se, alleges in her First Amended 18 Complaint (“FAC”) that she had a “trip and fall” accident while attending an event 19 sponsored by Defendant Navy League of the United States (“Navy League”). (FAC 20 ¶ 7.) This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity under 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1332(a). On October 21, 2013, Navy League filed the present Motion to Dismiss 22 Martinez’s FAC under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b), or in the alternative, 23 under Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 24.) Subsequently, Martinez filed a Motion to Strike 24 Defendant’s Pleading, Strike Recast Complaint, and Serve Supplemental Pleading. 25 (ECF No. 26.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Navy League’s 26 Motion to Dismiss and DENIES Martinez’s Motion.1 27 28 1 After carefully considering the papers filed in connection with these Motions, the Court deems these matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. Dockets.Justia.com II. 1 BACKGROUND 2 Martinez is appearing pro se in this action. Her FAC lists one claim for 3 personal injury against Navy League. (FAC ¶ 17.) She asserts that she was injured as 4 a direct result of Navy League’s negligence in violation of section 39933 of the 5 California Government Code. 6 attendance at a Navy Week event at the Los Angeles Harbor on July 31, 2011, where 7 she had planned to take a tour of the USS Abraham Lincoln. (FAC ¶ 13.) Martinez 8 alleges that on her way to the aircraft carrier she was forced by the crowd to walk 9 along the perimeter of the path, against a fence. (FAC ¶ 15.) She then alleges that she 10 tripped over a bracket holding up the fence and sustained serious injuries. (FAC ¶ 20.) 11 Martinez filed her original Complaint on July 31, 2013. (ECF No. 1.) On 12 September 19, 2013, the Court granted with leave to amend Navy League’s Motion to 13 Dismiss Martinez’s original Complaint for non-opposition. (ECF No. 11.) (FAC ¶¶ 1–2.) This claim relates to Martinez’s 14 On October 3, 2013, Martinez filed her FAC, along with a “Request for Review 15 of Recast Complaint”. (ECF Nos. 16, 17.) The Court then struck as moot her 16 “Request for Review,” since it had no legal foundation. (ECF No. 19.) Navy League 17 filed the present Motion to Dismiss Martinez’s FAC on October 21, 2013. (ECF No. 18 24.) Martinez subsequently filed her own Motion on November 4, 2013. (ECF No. 19 26.) 20 complaint,” and (3) to allow her to “serve supplemental pleadings.” She filed no 21 formal opposition to Navy League’s Motion to Dismiss her FAC. 22 She asks the Court to (1) “strike Defendant’s pleading,” (2) “strike recast III. LEGAL STANDARD 23 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based on “the lack of a cognizable legal 24 theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 25 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A complaint 26 need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short 27 and plain statement—to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 28 Rule 12(b)(6). Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Civ. 2 1 P. 8(a)(2). For a complaint to sufficiently state a claim, its “[f]actual allegations must 2 be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 3 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While specific facts are not necessary so long as 4 the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which 5 the claim rests, a complaint must nevertheless “contain sufficient factual matter, 6 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 7 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 8 Iqbal’s plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 9 defendant has acted unlawfully,” but does not go so far as to impose a “probability 10 requirement.” Id. Rule 8 demands more than a complaint that is merely consistent 11 with a defendant’s liability—labels and conclusions, or formulaic recitals of the 12 elements of a cause of action do not suffice. Id. Instead, the complaint must allege 13 sufficient underlying facts to provide fair notice and enable the defendant to defend 14 itself effectively. 15 determination whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a “context- 16 specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 17 common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The 18 When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court is generally limited to the 19 pleadings and must construe “[a]ll factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as 20 true and . . . in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].” Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 21 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and 22 unreasonable inferences need not be blindly accepted as true by the court. Sprewell v. 23 Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Yet, a complaint should be 24 dismissed only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts” 25 supporting plaintiff’s claim for relief. Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 26 1999). 27 In addition, pleadings of pro se litigants are held to less rigid standards than 28 those drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 US 519, 520 (1972). Yet, even pro 3 1 se pleadings “must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with 2 notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Navy, 66 3 F3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). IV. 4 DISCUSSION 5 Martinez argues in her Motion that the filing of her FAC was “inadvertent” and 6 that the Court should strike it. She also argues that Navy League’s Motion to Dismiss 7 is a “sham” and that the Court should allow her to re-file her FAC. (ECF No. 26 8 ¶¶ 1 3.) In the Motion to Dismiss, Navy League argues that the FAC should be 9 dismissed under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, or in the 10 alternative, under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 24.) 11 A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Pleadings, Strike Recast 12 Complaint, and Serve Supplemental Pleadings 13 While Martinez’s Motion was filed after Navy League’s Motion to Dismiss, the 14 Court finds it appropriate to address her Motion first. Martinez moves the court to (1) 15 strike Defendant’s pleadings, strike recast complaint, and serve supplemental 16 pleadings. Id. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the Motion and 17 instead interprets it as Martinez’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. 18 First, in Martinez’s Motion, she initially asks the Court to “strike Defendant’s 19 pleadings.” She refers to docket number 24 as the “pleading” she argues should be 20 stricken. 21 Dismiss not a pleading. Fed R. Civ. P. 7(a) (b). Because Navy League has yet to 22 plead anything in this case, Martinez’s Motion to Strike is flatly inapplicable at this 23 stage of litigation. Therefore, the Court is unable to grant the requested relief. (ECF No. 26, ¶ 1.) Docket number 24 is Navy League’s Motion to 24 Second, Martinez’s request that the Court strike her FAC cannot be granted. 25 On October 3, 2013, Martinez filed what she called a “Request for Review of Recast 26 Complaint.” (ECF No. 17.) Attached to that request was her FAC. (ECF No. 16.) 27 Martinez asserts that she did not intend these documents to be filed separately, but 28 instead wanted her FAC to be an attachment to the request for review. (ECF No. 26, 4 1 5.) 2 documents were detached, and her FAC was inadvertently filed upon the insistence of 3 the intake clerk. Id. The request for review was improper, and groundless. The Court 4 does not play the role of counsel, and will not review pleadings before they are 5 submitted. Further, Martinez’s FAC rather than a request for review needed to be 6 filed on or before October 3, 2013. The docket in this case reflects that Martinez’s 7 FAC was filed on time, despite her best efforts to the contrary. (ECF No. 16.) 8 Obliging her request for review would have rendered any subsequently filed “official” 9 FAC untimely. Consequently, the Court cannot grant Martinez’s request that her FAC 10 She claims she wanted the Court to review her FAC, but instead the two be stricken. 11 Martinez also moves the Court to “serve supplemental pleadings.” Her request 12 is unintelligible. She quotes the entire text of Rule 15(d), and then inexplicably makes 13 reference to ongoing settlement negotiations with Navy League. 14 settlement negotiations have no bearing on Martinez’s statement of a claim. See Fed. 15 R. Civ. P. 15(d). The Court further notes that references to settlement negotiations are 16 utterly inappropriate and inadmissible as evidence of liability under Federal Rule of 17 Evidence 408. The Court is unable discern what it is Martinez wants, and thus cannot 18 grant Martinez’s request. References to 19 In light of the discussion above, the Court instead construes Martinez’s Motion 20 as an opposition to Navy League’s Motion to Dismiss. The caption to her Motion 21 reads “L.R. 7-9 Opposing Papers.” Also, the filing makes multiple references to Navy 22 League’s Motion to Dismiss. Although Martinez’s Motion did not address any of the 23 merits of Navy League’s arguments, it seemed at times to be attacking the procedural 24 validity of Navy League’s Motion to dismiss. 25 Martinez intended her noticed Motion to actually be an opposition to Navy League’s 26 Motion to Dismiss. In so far as an actual noticed motion has been filed, the Court 27 DENIES that Motion. With this in mind, the Court now turns to the substance of 28 Navy League’s Motion to Dismiss. 5 Therefore, the Court finds that 1 B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 2 Navy League moves to dismiss on two grounds. First, Navy League argues that 3 Martinez’s FAC should be dismissed under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with a 4 court order. Second, Navy League contends that the FAC fails to state a claim and 5 should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). 6 1. 7 Navy League first argues that Martinez’s FAC should be dismissed under Rule 8 41(b) because she failed to correct the deficiencies identified in Navy League’s prior 9 Motion to Dismiss, as ordered by this Court, and she failed to timely file her FAC. 10 Rule 41(b): Failure to Comply With Court Order (Def.’s Mot. 10.) As discussed below, the Court finds these arguments unavailing. 11 A defendant may move to dismiss an action or any claim against it, if a plaintiff 12 fails to comply with a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). However, dismissal on these 13 grounds rests in the court’s sound discretion. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 US 626, 14 633 (1962). In addition, courts are strongly inclined to reach decisions on the merits. 15 Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). 16 Martinez’s failure to correct the deficiencies identified in Navy League’s 17 original Motion to Dismiss does not warrant dismissal. On September 19, 2013, this 18 Court granted Navy League’s Motion to Dismiss the original Complaint with 14 days 19 leave to amend. 20 Complaint without addressing the deficiencies raised in Navy League’s Motion to 21 Dismiss may result in dismissal of this case.” Id. at 3. Although the Court alluded to 22 the deficiencies in her original Complaint, those issues were not specifically addressed 23 by the Court, and the ultimate grounds for dismissal were procedural, in that she failed 24 to oppose Navy League’s Motion to Dismiss. Absent an express order from the Court 25 regarding the particular defects in Martinez’s Complaint, dismissal under this 26 argument is unwarranted. (ECF No. 11.) The Court warned that “refiling the original 27 Additionally, Martinez’s timely submission of her FAC is not at issue, and 28 cannot serve as grounds for dismissal under the instant Motion. Under the Court’s 6 1 Order, Martinez was required to file an FAC no later than October 3, 2013. (ECF No. 2 11.) 3 Martinez tried to file what she called a “Request to Review Recast Complaint” and 4 attached to that request her FAC. (ECF Nos. 16, 17.) Yet the docket reflects her FAC 5 was filed on time, notwithstanding Martinez’s intention to merely submit a draft. 6 (ECF No. 16.) The Court considers the FAC timely. As discussed above, rather than intending to file an amended complaint, 7 While Martinez’s original Complaint was dismissed on procedural grounds, 8 the Court this time around chooses to reach the merits of Martinez’s FAC. Yourish, 9 191 F.3d at 990. The Court thus finds dismissal under 41(b) unfitting. 10 2. Rule 12(b)(6): Failure to State a Claim 11 Navy League’s second ground for dismissal is more availing. Navy League 12 next argues that the Court should dismiss Martinez’s FAC because it fails to state a 13 claim for relief. (Def.’s Mot 12.) In her FAC, Martinez refers generally to her “cause 14 of action” as a “personal injury” claim, and the facts alleged in her FAC could be 15 construed as an attempt to plead a general negligence claim. (FAC ¶ 48.) She further 16 cites violation of section 39933 of the California Government Code as her basis of 17 Navy League’s duty under what looks to be negligence per se. Id at 2. As grounds 18 for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) Navy League contends that (1) section 39933 is 19 inapposite in the instant case, and (2) Martinez fails to sufficiently plead general 20 negligence in her FAC. (Def.’s Mot. 13 14.) 21 Under California law, where a negligence action is predicated on a defendant's 22 violation of a statute, plaintiffs may be entitled to the benefit of the negligence per se 23 doctrine in establishing their prima facie case. Cal. Evid. Code § 669(a); Quiroz v. 24 Seventh Ave. Ctr., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 222, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). This evidentiary 25 doctrine presumes defendant's duty and breach, and the only issue left for plaintiff to 26 prove is whether the violation proximately caused the injury. Id. 27 Here, Martinez predicates her negligence claim on a violation of section 39933 28 titled “Public Access to Navigable Waters, Water Fronts, And Streets.” Martinez’s 7 1 reliance on this statute is misplaced. Section 39933 addresses the public trust doctrine 2 in California, essentially the state’s power to control, regulate and utilize its navigable 3 waterways and the lands lying beneath them. 4 Supervisors, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). Martinez’s claim has 5 no relation to the public trust doctrine, and the Court finds no authority for section 6 39933’s appropriate application under these circumstances. Moreover, Martinez’s 7 FAC does not provide the Court with any support and the Court finds none for the 8 assertion that Martinez’s alleged injury was of a “nature which [section 39933] was 9 designed to prevent.” Cal. Evid. Code § 669(a)(3). Accordingly, section 39933 10 Pers. Watercraft Coal. v. Bd. of cannot avail Martinez of the benefit of the negligence per se doctrine. 11 As stated above, the facts alleged in Martinez’s FAC could also be construed as 12 an attempt to plead a general negligence claim. (FAC ¶ 16.) The first element of any 13 negligence claim is the existence of a duty, and where there is no duty, there can be no 14 negligence. Toomer v. U.S., 615 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 2010). Furthermore, the 15 existence of a duty of care is a separate issue from the question of whether a defendant 16 breached that duty of care. Kockelman v. Segal, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 552, 556 (Cal. Ct. 17 App. 1998). Here, Martinez merely pleads that she was injured at a Navy League 18 sponsored event, and as such Navy League owed her a duty, yet she provides no 19 further facts to support that claim. Martinez fails to assert that Navy League was the 20 owner of the premises, or that it was in possession of the premises where she was 21 injured. Cody F. v. Falletti, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593, 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). She also 22 fails to allege that Navy League had reason to anticipate the probability of an injury, 23 or that it had an opportunity to prevent the injury or warn of the peril. Id. Not only 24 has Martinez failed to establish a duty owed to her by Navy League, she fails to plead 25 facts relevant to whether any breach of such a duty constitutes actionable negligence. 26 Id. In other words, Martinez has failed to plead how Navy League failed to act 27 reasonably. Legal labels and conclusions, or formulaic recitals of the elements of a 28 8 1 cause of action do not suffice when stating a claim. 2 Therefore, the FAC fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 3 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Navy League’s Motion to Dismiss. V. 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the above reasons, the Court construes Martinez’s Motion as her opposition, 6 and in so far as an actual noticed motion has been filed, the Court DENIES that 7 Motion. (ECF No. 26.) Also, the Court GRANTS Navy League’s Motion to Dismiss 8 with LEAVE TO AMEND. (ECF No. 24.) Martinez may file a Second Amended 9 Complaint within 14 days of this order. However, she is warned that filing another 10 Complaint without addressing the deficiencies raised in this Order will result in 11 dismissal of this case with prejudice. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 November 25, 2013 14 15 16 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9
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