Oliver Laguron Matthews v. Amy Miller, No. 2:2013cv04878 - Document 9 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING PETITION by Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Wistrich. See document for details. (yb)
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Oliver Laguron Matthews v. Amy Miller Doc. 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION 10 11 OLIVER LAQURON MATTHEWS, Petitioner, 12 13 14 v. AMY MILLER, Warden, Respondent. 15 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 13-4878-AJW MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING PETITION 16 Background 17 18 At approximately 10:00 a.m. on August 6, 2008, Deputy Sheriff 19 Roland De La Maza and his partner Deputy Sheriff Jennifer Harris were 20 on patrol. When they stopped at an intersection, the officers ran the 21 license plate of the Nissan Altima stopped in front of them, using the 22 Mobile Digital Terminal (“MDT”) in their patrol car. 23 routinely checked the plate information of random vehicles on the MDT 24 system. 25 September 2008. The stickers on the license plate, however, indicated 26 that the registration expired at the end of August 2008. [Reporter’s De La Maza According to the MDT, the car’s registration expired in 27 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Transcript on Appeal (“RT”) B6-B11, B21-B24, 621-624].1 2 Although the license plate was assigned to the same type of car 3 – that is, a Nissan Altima – De La Maza believed that based upon the 4 discrepancy between the information in the MDT and the license plate 5 sticker, it was possible that either the sticker or the license plate 6 had 7 registration was current. 8 vehicles used license plates from other vehicles of the same type. De 9 La Maza believed that there was a problem with the license plate, and 10 a possible violation of section 5204(a) of the California Vehicle 11 Code. 12 Nissan, De La Maza and Harris conducted a traffic stop. 13 B21-B22, B24-B29, B35-B38]. been illegally switched to make it appear that car’s In addition, he knew that sometimes stolen In order to confirm that the license plate belonged to the [RT B11-B12, Petitioner, who was alone in the car, pulled over. 14 the 15 asked 16 insurance. 17 the car was properly registered. 18 the documents in the glove compartment. 19 that he was headed to the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) because 20 his license had been suspended. 21 a misdemeanor, so petitioner was subject to arrest. [RT B12-B14, B30- 22 B31, B36, B38, B48, 624, 630]. 23 petitioner for his license, registration, and De La Maza proof of He intended to use the registration to ascertain whether Petitioner began to “scramble” for Then he told the officers Driving with a suspended license is De La Maza asked petitioner to step out of the car. When 24 petitioner did so, De La Maza noticed a plastic baggie containing 25 small bindles of aluminum foil in petitioner’s left hand. It appeared 26 to De La Maza that petitioner was going to toss the baggie. Based 27 28 1 Some of the following facts are based upon the evidence presented during the hearing on petitioner’s motion to suppress. 2 1 upon the packaging, De La Maza suspected that the baggie contained 2 some kind of narcotic. 3 my friend’s for personal use.” 4 contained 39 bindles of rock cocaine, each wrapped in aluminum foil, 5 for a total of 19.7 grams of rock cocaine. [RT 625-630, 905-908].2 Petitioner spontaneously said, “That’s me and Upon further inspection, the baggie 6 After the officers confirmed that the car would be towed because 7 petitioner was driving with a suspended license, Harris conducted an 8 inventory search of the car. 9 telephones, and some aluminum foil. [RT B16-B17, B40-B42, B46, B62- 10 She found $620 in cash, two cellular B63, 639-641]. Kylie Roberson, the registered owner of the Nissan Altima, 11 12 testified 13 Subsequently, she received the license plate with expiration stickers 14 of August 2006. 15 however, stated that the registration period expired on September 2, 16 2006. 17 the registration disparity to the attention of the DMV, and she was 18 given a September sticker to replace the August one. 19 B60-B61]. 20 that she purchased the car new on August 31, 2005. The registration document she received from the DMV, After the incident with petitioner occurred, Roberson brought Petitioner testified in his own defense. [RT B53-B56, He said that the night 21 before he was arrested, he received a call from his friend, “Wolfie,” 22 who said that he could get an ounce of rock cocaine for $450 instead 23 of the usual amount of $900. 24 friend agreed. 25 friend, who got high every day after work. 26 he could smoke 10 of the rocks in one day, or about four grams a day Petitioner offered to pay $325, and his Petitioner bought the cocaine for himself and his Petitioner testified that 27 2 28 Detective Skikas testified that in his opinion that the 39 bindles were for sale. [RT 648-649]. 3 1 if each bindle was .4 grams.3 [RT 918-922]. 2 Petitioner explained that on the day he was arrested, he had used 3 his roommate’s car to go to the DMV to pay for a ticket in order to 4 get his license back. 5 was looking for the registration because he did not know where his 6 roommate kept it. 7 to the DMV to clear up a suspended license. 8 the cocaine was for personal use and that after he went to the DMV, he 9 intended to meet his friend Lance and share the drugs with him. When the deputies pulled him over, petitioner He did not tell De La Maza that he was on his way He told De La Maza that 10 Petitioner testified that he did not intend to sell the drugs. 11 a job in an in-home care facility that allowed him to support his 12 cocaine habit without selling drugs. 13 Petitioner was convicted of He had [RT 923-929, 938, 942]. transportation of a controlled 14 substance. In a separate proceeding, the trial court found true the 15 allegations that petitioner had suffered a prior “strike” conviction, 16 had suffered two prior felony convictions related to controlled 17 substances, had served five prior prison terms, and was on bail at the 18 time he committed the current offense. 19 state prison for a term of 16 years. [Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) 162- 20 166, 223-226; RT 2426-2427]. 21 Petitioner appealed to the Petitioner was sentenced to California Court of Appeal and 22 simultaneously filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in that 23 court. 24 conviction and summarily denied the habeas petition. [Lodged Documents 25 (“LDs”) 3, 6-8]. On June 28, 2012, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the On September 12, 2012, the California Supreme Court 26 3 27 28 Detective Skikas noted that people have different tolerances for cocaine base. He testified that it was possible for two people to consume six grams a day, or 18 grams over the course of three days. [RT 653-658]. 4 1 denied petitioner’s petitions for review. [LDs 9-12]. Petitioner’s contentions 2 3 Petitioner raises the following claims for relief: 4 1. The traffic stop violated petitioner’s Fourth Amendment 5 right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. [Petition at 5; 6 Memorandum 7 (“Petitioner’s Memorandum”) at 1-2]. 8 9 10 11 2. of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition The evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search and seizure “must be suppressed.” [Petition at 5; Petitioner’s Memorandum at 2]. 3. Petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of 12 counsel during the suppression hearing. [Petition at 5-6; Petitioner’s 13 Memorandum at 4-6]. Standard of Review 14 15 16 A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in state custody 17 with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 18 in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 19 claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 20 involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 21 Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 22 United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based 23 on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 24 the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 25 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 26 As used in section 2254(d), the phrase “clearly established 27 federal law” means “holdings of the Supreme Court at the time of the 28 state court decision.” Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 5 1 2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). Although 2 only Supreme Court law is binding, “circuit court precedent may be 3 persuasive in determining what law is clearly established and whether 4 a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 5 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)); see 6 Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S.Ct. 1446, 1450-1451 (2013) (per curiam) 7 (“Although an appellate panel may ... look to circuit precedent to 8 ascertain whether it has already held that the particular point in 9 issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent, ... it may 10 not canvass circuit decisions to determine whether a particular rule 11 of law is so widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, 12 if presented to this Court, be accepted as correct.”). 13 Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court's determination that a 14 claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 15 “fairminded jurists could disagree” about the correctness of the state 16 court's decision. 17 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 18 true even where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an 19 explanation. 20 no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 21 S.Ct. at 784. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011) This is In such cases, the petitioner must show that “there was 22 Under section 2254(d)(2), relief is warranted only when a state 23 court decision based on a factual determination is “objectively 24 unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court 25 proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 384 26 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 27 28 6 1 Finally, state court findings of fact – including a factual 2 summary included in a state appellate court opinion – are presumed to 3 be correct unless petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and 4 convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Slovik v. Yates, 556 5 F.3d 747, 749 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2009); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 6 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2009). Discussion 7 8 1. Grounds one and two are foreclosed by Stone v. Powell 9 Petitioner alleges that the traffic stop violated the Fourth 10 Amendment and that the evidence seized during the illegal search 11 should have been suppressed. [Petition at 5; Petitioner’s Memorandum 12 at 1-3]. 13 The Supreme Court has made clear that “where the state has 14 provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth 15 Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas 16 corpus 17 unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” 18 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). 19 California provided petitioner the opportunity for full and fair 20 litigation of his claim, federal habeas relief is unavailable. 21 Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining 22 that 23 opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim, not whether the 24 claim was decided correctly). 25 relief the on relevant the ground inquiry is that whether evidence the obtained in an Thus, so long as petitioner had See the At trial, petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to suppress the 26 evidence based upon an alleged Fourth Amendment violation. 27 30]. See Cal.Penal Code § 1538.5. The trial court conducted a hearing 28 on the motion, at which both De La Maza and Roberson testified, and 7 [CT 24- 1 the trial court heard argument on the motion. [RT B1-B71]. The trial 2 court found that De La Maza performed a routine random license plate 3 check, discovered a discrepancy between the tag on the car and the 4 expiration date from the computer records, and had a reasonable 5 suspicion of a violation of section 5204(a) of the California Vehicle 6 Code as well as the possibility of other crimes. 7 justified. 8 suspended license, De La Maza had justification to arrest petitioner 9 for a misdemeanor. Thus, the stop was Next, after petitioner stated that he was driving with a Thus, his request that petitioner step out of the 10 car was lawful. As the trial court determined, the aluminum foil 11 bindles, as well as petitioner’s attempt to discard the baggie 12 containing drugs, created further reasonable suspicion. 13 once the baggie was in plain view, its seizure was justified. 14 search of the car was justified as both an inventory search because 15 the car was to be towed and by petitioner’s arrest. 16 findings, the trial court concluded that the search and seizure were 17 lawful, and denied the motion to suppress. In addition, The Based upon these [RT B72-B 76]. 18 The California Court of Appeal also considered the merits of 19 petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim and denied it in a reasoned 20 opinion. [LD 6 at 4-8]. 21 court’s conclusion that the initial stop was authorized by the 22 discrepancy 23 registration information, and that the subsequent arrest and seizure 24 of the cocaine bindles was justified by petitioner’s revelation that 25 he 26 observation of the baggie when he asked petitioner to exit the car. 27 [LD 6 at 8]. was between driving with the a The appellate court agreed with the trial license suspended 28 8 plate tags license and and by the De computer La Maza’s 1 Because the state provided petitioner the opportunity for a full 2 and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim, federal habeas 3 relief is not available on that claim. 4 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If the state has provided a state 5 prisoner an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his Fourth 6 Amendment claim, we cannot grant federal habeas relief on the Fourth 7 Amendment issue.”) (citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 494), cert. denied, 548 8 U.S. 927 (2006); Villafeurte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 9 1997) (same), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1079 (1998). See Moormann v. Schriro, 426 10 2. Ineffective assistance of counsel 11 Petitioner alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of 12 counsel at the suppression hearing. [Petition at 5-6; Petitioner’s 13 Memorandum at 4-6]. The facts relevant to his claim are as follows. 14 During the suppression hearing, the prosecution relied upon a 15 two-page print-out reflecting information that may have been displayed 16 to the officers on the MDT in their patrol car in order to refresh De 17 La Maza’s recollection as to the time of the stop. 18 marked, “People’s Exhibit 1" for identification only, and was not 19 admitted as evidence. [RT B9-B10, B63]. The document was 20 As set forth above, De La Maza testified that the MDT information 21 stated that the registration was valid through September 2008. [B10]. 22 The license plate sticker, however, indicated that the registration 23 expired “August of 2008.” [RT B10]. De La Maza answered affirmatively 24 to the prosecutor’s query whether “the information you had was the 25 vehicle 26 correct?” [RT B11]. registration was good until September of ‘08; is that 27 On cross-examination, De La Maza confirmed that he stopped the 28 car based upon “the fact that the return on the plate showed on my 9 1 computer as expiring in September of ‘08, and the tags displayed on 2 the vehicle license plate were showing expired as of August of ‘08.” 3 RT B24]. 4 the end of August.” [RT B23]. 5 De La Maza agreed that “an August tag doesn’t expire until Petitioner’s counsel called Roberson to testify at the 6 suppression hearing. She confirmed that the sticker on the license 7 plate was incorrect. Copies of her registration, which showed the 8 expiration date as September 2, 2008, were admitted into evidence. [RT 9 B53-B56, B60-B61]. 10 Petitioner argues that trial counsel should have admitted into 11 evidence the two-page print-out showing the September 2, 2008 date. 12 According to petitioner, the September 2, 2008 date was “exculpatory 13 evidence” that was “crucial to [petitioner’s] claim that the officer 14 did not have a reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred, or was 15 occurring, when he made the traffic stop.” 16 at 5]. 17 [Petitioner’s Memorandum The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a criminal defendant will not 18 be convicted without the effective assistance of counsel. 19 v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-686 (1984). 20 ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must identify the acts 21 or omissions of counsel that were not the result of reasonable 22 professional judgment, and he must show a reasonable probability that, 23 but for his counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have 24 been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 694; see also Knowles v. 25 Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 127 (2009). 26 is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 27 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Knowles, 556 U.S. at 127. 28 10 Strickland In order to establish “A reasonable probability 1 Where a state court has adjudicated an ineffective assistance of 2 counsel claim on the merits,4 a habeas court's review of a claim under 3 the Strickland standard is “doubly” deferential. 4 at 788; Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123. 5 whether a federal court believes the state court's determination under 6 the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that determination 7 was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold.” 8 U.S. at 123 (citations omitted). Richter, 131 S.Ct. The relevant question “is not Knowles, 556 9 Petitioner’s claim fails because he has not shown that admitting 10 the print-out into evidence would have rendered his motion to suppress 11 meritorious. 12 the admission of the print-out would have altered the trial court’s 13 analysis of the lawfulness of the traffic stop. As the trial court 14 explained, De La Maza’s decision to stop petitioner was based upon a 15 discrepancy between the MDT information – which he characterized as 16 indicating the registration was good “through September, 2008" – and 17 the 18 registration was good through August, 2008. 19 even if there was evidence that the registration expired on September 20 2, 2008. 21 violation of the vehicle code that the trial court concluded justified 22 the traffic stop. stickers Petitioner does not explain, and it is not clear, how on the license plate – which indicated that the This discrepancy exists Either way, De La Maza was presented with an apparent 23 Furthermore, the trial court was aware that the registration 24 expired on September 2, 2008, based upon evidence presented by 25 petitioner. [RT B54-B56, B60-B61]. Thus, the evidence which 26 27 28 4 The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claim without explanation. [LD 8]. That decision is deemed to be “on the merits.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-785. 11 1 petitioner complains that his trial counsel should have admitted was 2 cumulative. 3 Because petitioner has not shown that his motion to suppress 4 would have been meritorious if trial counsel had sought to admit 5 evidence of the two-page print-out, he has not demonstrated that his 6 trial counsel provided deficient performance in failing to do so. Nor 7 has 8 performance prejudiced the defense. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 9 (9th Cir.) (the failure to make a futile motion does not constitute 10 ineffective assistance of counsel), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 935 (1994). 11 Therefore, the Court cannot say that the state court’s determination 12 of petitioner’s claim was either contrary to, or an unreasonable 13 application of, federal law. petitioner shown trial counsel’s allegedly deficient Conclusion 14 15 that For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 16 corpus is denied. 17 It is so ordered. 18 19 Dated: November 14, 2013 20 ______________________________ Andrew J. Wistrich United States Magistrate Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12
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