Darrell J Moore v. State of California et al, No. 2:2013cv02422 - Document 29 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS 10 , 11 .Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application for Extension of Time to File [ 23]) and Ex Parte Application for Leave to Amend the Complaint 24 are VACATED as moot by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (MD JS-6. Case Terminated). (lc) .Modified on 8/7/2013 (lc).
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Darrell J Moore v. State of California et al Doc. 29 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DARRELL MOORE, SR., 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 16 17 v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES; STATE OF CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT; THE STATE CHARTED AGENCY-THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES; STATE OF CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COMMISSION, et al., 18 19 Defendants. ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 13-02422 DDP (JCGx) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS [Dkt. Nos. 10 & 12] Presently before the court are Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss 20 21 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Having considered the 22 submissions of the parties, the court grants the Motions and adopts 23 the following order. 24 I. Background 25 Plaintiff, Darrell J. Moore, Sr., seeks a declaratory judgment 26 that the California Court of Appeal Order declaring him a vexatious 27 litigant is an “incorrect and wrongful application of the State 28 /// Dockets.Justia.com 1 Statute.” (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 59.) Plaintiff 2 further seeks to “enjoin the State of California from denying [his] 3 rights to due process,” and to “[reinstate] his appeals.” (Id.) 4 Plaintiff names the State of California, State of California 5 Superior Court Judges, the State Appellate Court, the State of 6 California Supreme Court, the State Chartered Agency the Housing 7 Authority of the City of Los Angeles (“HACLA”), the Commissioners 8 of the HACLA, and the State of California Judicial Commission as 9 Defendants. 10 Plaintiff has previously filed multiple lawsuits against 11 Defendants including his former employer, the HACLA. At the request 12 of the HACLA, the California Court of Appeal issued an order 13 declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant subject to the provisions 14 of the California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) Section 391. 15 (State’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exh. A.) In the 16 order, the California Court of Appeal stated, “in the preceding 17 seven years, in this District alone, [Plaintiff] has prosecuted at 18 least five appeals and writ petitions pro se which have been 19 finally determined adversely to him.” (Id. 20 court denied Plaintiff’s petition for rehearing. (State’s RJN, Exh. 21 B.) The California Supreme Court denied Plaintiff leave to file a 22 petition for writ of mandate. (State’s RJN, Exh. C.) at 2). The appellate 23 Plaintiff claims that the Court of Appeal illegally and 24 wrongfully used at least three non-final judgment interim matters 25 as litigations for purposes of declaring Plaintiff a vexatious 26 litigant. (FAC ¶¶ 21, 22.) Plaintiff further alleges that the HACLA 27 fraudulently led the court to miscalculate the required number of 28 /// 2 1 litigations needed to declare him a vexatious litigant. (Id.) 2 Plaintiff argues that the five cases that were used to determine 3 that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant (B205489, B208276, B208560, 4 B231379, and B333818) are “cases that were still pending, had not 5 been fully or finally determined, or were case numbers for writs 6 and or petitions born out of cases that ended in a final resolution 7 in favor of [Plaintiff].” (FAC ¶¶ 13, 18-21.) Plaintiff claims that 8 this miscalculation resulted in the violation of many 9 constitutional and statutory rights. (FAC ¶¶ 5, 44, 47-48). 10 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 11 under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 12 Specifically, the Defendants seek to dismiss on the grounds that 13 (1) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and (2) 14 federal jurisdiction to review and correct state court decisions is 15 barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 16 II. 17 Legal Standard A. 18 Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 19 The district court must dismiss an action if the court lacks 20 jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. 21 P. 12(b)(1). The party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction bears 22 the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. Scott v. 23 Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir.1986). A complaint will be 24 dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter 25 jurisdiction where a plaintiff's claim is barred by sovereign 26 immunity. See Porter ex rel. Porter v. Board of Trustees of 27 Manhatten Beach Unified School Dist., 123 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1194 28 /// 3 See Fed. R. Civ. 1 (C.D.Cal.2000)(reversed on other grounds); Wright, Miller & Cooper, 2 Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 1350 (3d ed.1998). 3 B. 4 Failure to State a Claim Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 5 The district court may grant dismissal when a complaint fails 6 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. 7 P. 12(b)(6). A well-pleaded complaint must provide “enough facts to 8 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 9 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544(2007). When considering a 10 motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must presume all 11 well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint to be true. 12 Syverson v. IBM Corp., 472 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.2007). 13 However, the court need not presume as true allegations of law that 14 are conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 15 inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 16 988(9th Cir. 2001). 17 III. Discussion 18 A. 19 Plaintiff’s Claims against the State of California 1. 20 Eleventh Amendment Bars Plaintiffs Claims against the State of California 21 The Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from suits brought by 22 their citizens in federal court without their consent. Hans v. 23 Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1(1890); U.S. Const. amend. XI. Waiver of 24 Eleventh Amendment immunity by a state will be found “only where 25 stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming 26 implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other 27 reasonable construction.” Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanion, 473 28 /// 4 1 U.S. 34, 239-40(quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673(1974)) 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 3 The present case is a classic example of a state’s Eleventh 4 Amendment immunity. Plaintiff, a citizen of California, is bringing 5 suit against the State of California. The State of California does 6 not purport to waive its immunity. (State of California Motion to 7 Dismiss (“Cal. Motion”) at 3.) Nor does Plaintiff claim that the 8 State has waived its immunity. (Plaintiffs Opposition to State of 9 California’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (“Cal. 10 Opposition”) at 5). Plaintiff has failed to show why this Court has 11 jurisdiction over his claims against the State of California. Thus, 12 this court must dismiss all claims against the State of California 13 for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 14 2. 15 The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars Plaintiff’s Claims against the State of California 16 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, jurisdiction to review 17 final state court judgments rests with the United States Supreme 18 Court. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); 19 Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). 20 do not have jurisdiction “over challenges to state court 21 decisions.” Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 22 462, 486(1983); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257. 23 plaintiff in state court seeks to set aside the judgment of the 24 state court in a federal district court, “the federal suit is a 25 forbidden de facto appeal.” Noel 341 F.3d at 1156; see also Carmona 26 v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 27 Rooker-Feldman bars suits by state-court losers “complaining of 28 /// 5 District courts When a non-prevailing 1 injuries caused by state-court judgments”). “To reverse or modify 2 the judgment of the state court because of such errors ‘would be an 3 exercise of appellate jurisdiction’ possessed only by the Supreme 4 Court.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416). 5 In the present case, Plaintiff asserts that the California 6 state court decision to declare him a vexatious litigant is a legal 7 wrong and is seeking to set aside the state court judgment. 8 Plaintiff also asks the federal district court to reverse the 9 California Supreme Court’s decision to deny Plaintiff leave to file 10 a petition for a writ of mandate. Plaintiff, a state-court loser, 11 discontented with the state-court judgments, is “seeking district 12 court review and rejection of those judgments.” Carmona, at 1050. 13 In Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that 14 Rooker-Feldman does not bar federal jurisdiction over claims 15 asserting that state-court judgments had been obtained by extrinsic 16 fraud upon the court. 359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004). Rooker-Feldman 17 applies “only when the plaintiff both asserts as her injury legal 18 error or errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy relief 19 from the state court judgment.” Id. at 1140. However, if a 20 plaintiff “asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or 21 omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar 22 jurisdiction.” Noel, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). 23 Thus, if Plaintiff can state a claim for fraud on the court, 24 such claims are not barred by Rooker-Feldman. “A plaintiff alleging 25 extrinsic fraud on a state court is not alleging a legal error by 26 the state court; rather, he or she is alleging a wrongful act by 27 the adverse party.” Kougasian, at 1140-41. Plaintiff is asserting a 28 /// 6 1 wrongful act, fraud upon the court, by an adverse party, the HACLA. 2 Thus, the district court is not deprived of subject matter 3 jurisdiction as to Plaintiffs claims against HACLA. 4 2. 5 Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Fraud on the Court 6 A state court judgment may be set aside for fraud on the 7 court. Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128, 1130 (9th 8 Cir. 1995). 9 narrowly, in the interest of preserving the finality of judgments.” However, a claim of fraud on the court “should be read 10 Toscano v. Comm'r, 441 F.2d 930, 934 (9th Cir.1971). Plaintiffs 11 seeking relief from a judgment based on fraud on the court face a 12 high burden and must establish fraud upon the court by clear and 13 convincing evidence. Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 14 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff must establish that the 15 alleged fraud involved “an unconscionable plan or scheme which is 16 designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.” Abatti 17 v. Commissioner, 859 F.2d 115, 118 (9th Cir.1988). See also England 18 v. Doyle, 281 F.2d 304, 309-10 (9th Cir. 1960) (to set aside a 19 judgment arising out of fraud on the court “it is necessary to show 20 an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly 21 influence the court in its decision.”). Fraud “connected with the 22 presentation of a case to a court” does not necessarily improperly 23 influence the judicial process. United States v. Estate of 24 Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 444 (9th Cir. 2011). Also, non-disclosure 25 by itself or a failure to produce evidence do not necessarily 26 constitute fraud on the court. See In re Levander, 180 F.3d 1114, 27 1119 (9th Cir. 1999); Doyle, 281 F.2d at 310 (9th Cir.1960). 28 /// 7 1 Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the alleged 2 misconduct of the HACLA “affected the integrity of the judicial 3 process,” either because the court itself was defrauded or because 4 the misconduct was perpetrated by officers of the court. 5 v. Robertson, 882 F.2d 421, 424. See also 6 Am., Inc., 926 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1991). 7 must show that the fraud “harms the integrity of the judicial 8 process, regardless of whether [Plaintiff] is prejudiced.” Dixon v. 9 C.I.R., 316 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Alexander In re Intermagnetics Moreover, Plaintiff 10 Intermagnetics Am., Inc., 926 F.2d at 916 (9th Cir. 11 1991)(determining fraud on the court is focused not “in terms of 12 whether the alleged fraud prejudiced the opposing party but more in 13 terms of whether the alleged fraud harms the integrity of the 14 judicial process”). 15 Here, Plaintiff fails to establish that the allege fraud 16 involved an ‘unconscionable plan or scheme’ to improperly influence 17 the court. 18 person must have “commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria 19 persona at least five litigations …that have been (i) finally 20 determined adversely to the person” in the immediately preceding 21 seven-year period. CCP §391(b)(1). The ‘fraud’ plaintiff alleges is 22 the HACLA’s presentation to the California Court of Appeal of 23 interim matters and writs that were not finally determined 24 adversely to him as the litigations to declare Plaintiff a 25 vexatious litigant. Plaintiff claims that the HACLA intentionally 26 used these cases to confuse the Court of Appeal into miscalculating 27 /// 28 /// To be declared a vexatious litigant under CCP § 391, a 8 1 the required number of litigations needed to declare a plaintiff a 2 vexatious litigant. 3 However, fraud connected with the presentation of a case to a 4 court does not necessarily harm the judicial process. Estate of 5 Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 444. Non-disclosure of a case and non- 6 disclosure of the fact that a case may have been an interim case or 7 a case without final judgment does not constitute fraud on the 8 court. See In re Levander at 1119; Doyle, 281 F.2d at 310. The 9 records and case numbers are all a matter of public record easily 10 accessible by the state court, Plaintiff, and Defendant. Regardless 11 of what the HACLA presented to the court, a unanimous panel of the 12 California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court 13 determined that declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant was 14 warranted. It is clear that the HACLA did not contrive an 15 unconscionable plan in attempt to improperly obtain a favorable 16 ruling from the state court. No material fact was concealed from 17 the state court and the HACLA disclosed all that was necessary for 18 its motion to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant. 19 A claim of fraud upon the court must also show how the alleged 20 fraud harms the integrity of the judicial process. 21 at 146. Plaintiff fails to show that the alleged fraud harms the 22 integrity of the judicial process; rather, he focuses on how the 23 alleged fraud prejudices him. Throughout his complaint, Plaintiff 24 claims that Defendants’ actions were done with intent to injure him 25 and to prevent him from asserting his legal rights. 26 51, 52, 55, 56.) 27 /// 28 /// Dixon, 316 F.3d (FAC ¶ 47, 48, Plaintiff alleges no facts to show that the HACLA 9 1 defiled, or attempted to defile, the state court so that it could 2 not perform in its usual manner. Alexander,882 F.2d at 424. 3 Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a 4 claim for fraud upon the court and that no relevant exception to 5 the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies. 6 barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as improperly challenging a 7 state court judgment in federal court. 8 IV. 9 The action is therefore Conclusion For these reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. 10 Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for Extension of Time to File 11 (Dckt. No. 23) and Ex Parte Application for Leave to Amend the 12 Complaint (Dckt. No. 24) are VACATED as moot. 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: August 7, 2013 16 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10
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