Robin G Brodie v. Board of Trustees of The California State University et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 24 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson: The Court notes that this Order only addresses good cause, not whether Plaintiffs new Complaint will survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court need not reach Plaintiffs tolling and administrative exhaustion arguments. (lc). Modified on 8/27/2013. (lc).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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ROBIN G. BRODIE,
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Plaintiff,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY,
TERRI HOPSON,
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Defendants.
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___________________________
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Case No. CV 12-07690 DDP (AGRx)
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
[Docket No. 24]
I. Background
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On September 7, 2013, Plaintiff Robin G. Brodie (“Plaintiff”)
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sued the Board of Trustees of the California State University
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(“CSU”) and Terri Hopson.
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On December 7, 2012, this Court dismissed CSU as a party.
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No. 18.)
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order that stated July 15, 2013 was the “last day to join other
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parties and to amend the pleadings.”
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July 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed her Motion for Leave to File Amended
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Complaint (“Motion”).
(See generally Compl., Docket No. 1.)
(Docket
On February 25, 2013, this Court issued a scheduling
(Docket No. 23 at 2.)
(Docket No. 24.)
On
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II. Legal Standard
After a scheduling order has been entered, pursuant to Federal
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Rule of Civil Procedure 16, it can be modified only for “good
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cause.”
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standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the
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amendment.”
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609 (9th Cir. 1992).
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schedule if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of
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the party seeking the extension.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).
“Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’
Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604,
“The district court may modify the pretrial
Id. (internal quotation marks
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and citations omitted).
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prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply
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additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is
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upon the moving party's reasons for seeking modification.”
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III. Analysis
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied
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because she failed to meet and confer before filing this Motion
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pursuant to Local Rule 7-3 and because she has not shown good
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cause.
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“Although the existence or degree of
Id.
The Court disagrees.
Local Rule 7-3 states: “[C]ounsel contemplating the filing of
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any motion shall first contact opposing counsel to discuss
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thoroughly, preferably in person, the substance of the contemplated
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motion and any potential resolution.
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place at least seven (7) days prior to the filing of the motion.”
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However, CSU does not argue that Plaintiff’s violation of Rule 7-3
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caused it prejudice.
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the court elects to consider the motion on the merits.”
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Sandstone Properties, L.P., No. CV 12-05021 MMM VBKX, 2013 WL
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1344912 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2013).
The conference shall take
Because CSU “suffered no real prejudice . . .
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Reed v.
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Regarding the merits of Plaintiff’s Motion, she has shown good
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cause to amend the scheduling order.
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declaration indicates that he did not timely file this Motion
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because he is the primary caregiver of a family member who has
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faced various serious health issues for the last several months.
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(See generally Hagan Decl.)
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long-term, serious health conditions impede a lawyer’s ability to
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timely file a motion.
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2:08-CV-45-WTL-WGH, 2010 WL 4318846 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 26, 2010).
Plaintiff’s counsel’s
Courts have found good cause when
See Armitage v. Apex Control Sys., Inc., No.
The
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result should be no different when the lawyer is the primary
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caregiver to an ill loved one, instead of ill himself.
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the Court’s leniency should not be taken as an open invitation by
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Plaintiff to neglect deadlines, the Court notes that the current
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scheduling order was filed at the onset of counsel’s family
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member’s condition, when he was less likely to know the amount of
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time he would need to allocate to caregiving in the long-term.
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Court will expect promptness in the future.
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Although
The
Finally, CSU argues that granting the Motion would cause it
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prejudice.
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to the Court’s decision under a Rule 16 analysis.
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F.2d 609.
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the party opposing leave has sufficient time for discovery. See
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Polo v. Shwiff, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60928, at *15-16.1
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discovery remains open, and Plaintiff’s reply brief indicates that
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she would not oppose extending discovery for CSU.
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¶ 28.)
However,
prejudice to CSU is not of primary importance
See Johnson, 975
Regardless, prejudice is generally seen as minimal if
Here,
(See Hagan Decl.
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Reopening discovery, by contrast, may be prejudicial. See
Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1295 (9th Cir. 2000).
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s
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Motion.
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not whether Plaintiff’s new Complaint will survive a motion to
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dismiss.
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and administrative exhaustion arguments.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Court notes that this Order only addresses good cause,
Accordingly, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s tolling
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Dated: August 27, 2013
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DEAN D. PREGERSON
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United States District Judge
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