Justin J Channen v. Michael J Astrue, No. 2:2012cv04635 - Document 18 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Patrick J. Walsh. The Agency's decision is affirmed and the case is dismissed with prejudice. (See Order for complete details) (afe)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 JUSTIN J. CHANNEN, 11 Plaintiff, 12 13 14 v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 15 Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 12-4635-PJW MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 16 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff appeals a decision by Defendant Social Security 19 Administration ( the Agency ), denying his claims for Disability 20 Insurance Benefits ( DIB ) and Supplemental Security Income ( SSI ). 21 He claims that the Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) erred when he: 22 1) failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff s mental impairment; 23 2) rejected his treating doctor s opinion; and 3) found that he was 24 not credible. 25 that the ALJ did not err.1 For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes 26 27 28 1 Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for Michael J. Astrue as Defendant, pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 25(d). II. 1 SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS In August 2008, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging that 2 3 he had been unable to work since August 2005, due to paranoid 4 schizophrenia, depression, and a mood disorder. 5 Record ( AR ) 68, 73, 159-69.) 6 initially and on reconsideration. 7 requested and was granted a hearing before an ALJ. 8 October 25, 2010, he appeared with counsel and testified at the 9 hearing. (AR 27, 30-38.) (Administrative The Agency denied the applications (AR 62-65.) Plaintiff then (AR 80.) On On December 1, 2010, the ALJ issued a 10 decision denying the application for benefits. 11 appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied review. 12 This action followed.2 13 14 15 III. A. (AR 11-19.) Plaintiff (AR 1-5, 7.) ANALYSIS The Mental Impairment Finding Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his 16 mental impairment because he did not follow the special technique set 17 forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a and 416.920a. 18 ( JS ) at 4-5, 14.) 19 concludes that the ALJ did not err. 20 (Joint Stipulation For the reasons outlined below, the Court Agency regulations mandate that ALJs follow a special technique 21 when evaluating mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a and 22 416.1520a. 23 scale of how the claimant s mental impairment impacts four functional 24 areas: activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, This technique requires separate evaluations on a point 25 26 27 28 2 Plaintiff previously filed applications for DIB and SSI that were denied by an ALJ in a written decision dated April 21, 2008. (AR 51-57.) The ALJ in the case at bar declined to reopen those prior applications. (AR 11.) Plaintiff does not challenge this decision. 2 1 persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompensation. 2 §§ 404.1520a(c)(3)-(4) and 416.1520a(c)(3)-(4). 3 reconsideration levels, these steps must be documented in a 4 Psychiatric Review Technique Form ( PRTF ); at the ALJ hearing and 5 Appeals Council levels they must be documented in the decisions. 6 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(e) and 416.1520a(e). 7 Security Regulations require the ALJ to complete a PRTF and append it 8 to the decision, or to incorporate its mode of analysis into the ALJ s 9 findings and conclusions. 10 20 C.F.R. At the initial and 20 Moreover, the Social Keyser v. Comm r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, the ALJ did not err in his evaluation of Plaintiff s mental 11 12 impairment because it is clear from his decision that he incorporated 13 the special technique s mode of analysis into his findings and 14 conclusions. 15 psychotic disorder was severe but that it did not meet or equal any of 16 the listed impairments. 17 ALJ found a moderate impairment in attention and concentration, 18 limited Plaintiff to simple, repetitive tasks, and provided that 19 Plaintiff should work alone with only occasional public contact. 20 14.) 21 of examining physician Dr. Norma Aguilar that Plaintiff had no 22 limitations in his daily activities. 23 not make an explicit finding regarding episodes of decompensation, 24 there is no documentation of any episodes in the medical record and 25 Plaintiff does not argue that he suffered one.3 Specifically, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff s (AR 14.) In assessing Plaintiff s RFC, the (AR In analyzing the medical evidence, the ALJ adopted the opinion (AR 16, 283.) While the ALJ did As a result, any 26 27 28 3 The only indication in the record of any episodes of decompensation is contained in the opinion of Plaintiff s treating (continued...) 3 1 error by the ALJ in failing to explicitly note the absence of any 2 episodes of decompensation was harmless. 3 Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding error that 4 does not affect ultimate disability determination is harmless). 5 short, the ALJ s analysis of Plaintiff s mental impairment complied 6 with 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a and 416.1520a. 7 B. 8 9 See Stout v. Comm'r, Soc. In The Treating Physician s Opinion Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinion of his treating psychiatrist, Dr. A.C. Blakes, in favor of the opinions 10 of the examining psychiatrist, Dr. Aguilar, and the State agency 11 reviewing physicians. 12 discussed below, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err. 13 (JS at 15-18, 21-22.) For the reasons By rule, the [Agency] favors the opinion of a treating physician 14 over non-treating physicians. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th 15 Cir. 2007); see also Morgan v. Comm r, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 16 1999) (explaining that a treating physician s opinion is given 17 deference because he is employed to cure and has a greater 18 opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual 19 (quoting Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987))). 20 this reason, a treating doctor s opinion that is well-supported and 21 consistent with other substantial evidence in the record will be given 22 controlling weight. 23 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988). 24 doctor s opinion that is contradicted by another doctor s opinion for 25 specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence For Orn, 495 F.3d at 631; Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d An ALJ may, however, reject a treating 26 27 28 3 (...continued) physician but, as discussed below, this opinion was based solely on Plaintiff s report to the doctor and was properly rejected by the ALJ. 4 1 in the record. 2 (quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). 3 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) Plaintiff was seen only once by Dr. Blakes, his treating 4 psychiatrist, on November 24, 2009. 5 Questionnaire dated January 13, 2010, Dr. Blakes opined that Plaintiff 6 had marked difficulties in social functioning; frequent deficiencies 7 in concentration, persistence, or pace; repeated episodes of 8 decompensation; and would have to miss work more than three times a 9 month. (AR 364-67.) (AR 364.) In a Mental Impairment He also indicated that Plaintiff s symptoms 10 included sleep disturbance; personality change; mood disturbance; 11 emotional lability; delusions or hallucinations; oddities of thought, 12 perception, speech, or behavior; social withdrawal or isolation; 13 blunt, flat, or inappropriate affect; manic syndrome; obsessions or 14 compulsions; paranoia or inappropriate suspiciousness; and difficulty 15 thinking or concentrating. 16 that Plaintiff s prognosis was fair-to-good with regular treatment and 17 follow-up. 18 (AR 364-65.) Dr. Blakes further opined (AR 366.) Dr. Aguilar examined Plaintiff on October 2, 2008, and opined 19 that he was only mildly limited in his ability to respond to changes 20 in a routine work setting and to respond to work pressure in a usual 21 setting. 22 Preston Davis, completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity 23 Assessment on October 22, 2008, and opined that Plaintiff should be 24 limited to simple, repetitive tasks. 25 was confirmed by another State agency physician, Dr. R.E. Brooks, on 26 February 24, 2009. 27 28 (AR 280-84.) A State agency reviewing physician, Dr. (297-99.) Dr. Davis opinion (AR 332.) The ALJ rejected Dr. Blakes opinion in favor of the opinions of Drs. Aguilar, Davis, and Brooks on the grounds that: (1) it was 5 1 inconsistent with the records from Plaintiff s mental health treatment 2 facility; (2) Dr. Blakes saw Plaintiff only once and the notes from 3 this visit did not support the limitations expressed in his opinion; 4 and (3) his opinion was internally inconsistent because he indicated 5 extreme limitations but assessed a Global Assessment of Functioning 6 or GAF score of 60, indicating moderate, bordering on mild, 7 symptomatology and/or impairment. 4 8 legitimate reasons for questioning a doctor s opinion, see Rollins v. 9 Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding ALJ s (AR 17.) These are specific and 10 rejection of treating doctor s opinion that was internally 11 inconsistent); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 33 (9th Cir. 12 1995) (affirming rejection of treating doctor s opinion expressed in 13 letter that was inconsistent with doctor s own findings); and 14 Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-54 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding 15 ALJ s rejection of treating doctor s opinion that was contradicted by 16 evidence in the record), and they are supported by the record. 17 is no indication in any of the treatment notes that Plaintiff was as 18 limited as Dr. Blakes opined. 19 was largely asymptomatic with only mild paranoia that had been 20 adequately controlled with medication. 21 Further, the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Blakes opinion of Plaintiff s There Rather, the notes show that Plaintiff (AR 270-79, 369-78, 380-99.) 22 23 4 24 25 26 27 A GAF score is the clinician s judgment of the individual s overall level of functioning. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (2005) ( DSM IV TR ) at 32 33. A GAF score of 51 60 indicates [m]oderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers). DSM IV TR at 34. 28 6 1 extreme limitations because it was unsupported by the chart note from 2 his one visit with Plaintiff where the doctor reported that Plaintiff 3 had adequate sleep, good mood for most of the day, and only mild 4 paranoia. 5 that Dr. Blakes opinion was internally inconsistent because, while he 6 found Plaintiff suffered from extreme limitations, he assessed a GAF 7 score of 60, indicating only moderate to mild symptoms. 8 ALJ s rejection of Dr. Blakes opinion is supported by substantial 9 evidence and will not be disturbed. 10 C. (AR 370.) Finally, the record supports the ALJ s finding In short, the Credibility Finding Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when he found that Plaintiff 11 12 was not credible. 13 Court disagrees. 14 (JS at 22-26, 31.) For the following reasons, the ALJs are tasked with judging the credibility of witnesses. In 15 making these credibility determinations, they may employ ordinary 16 credibility evaluation techniques. 17 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). 18 objective medical evidence of an impairment which could reasonably be 19 expected to produce the symptoms alleged and there is no evidence of 20 malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant s testimony for 21 specific, clear, and convincing reasons, id. at 1283-84, which are 22 supported by substantial evidence in the record. 23 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002). Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, However, where a claimant has produced Thomas v. Barnhart, Plaintiff testified that he was unable to work due to his 24 25 inability to concentrate and his paranoia. (AR 30-32.) He explained 26 that he was hospitalized for mental health treatment when he was 27 younger but had not been hospitalized in the last three years. 28 32.) (AR He also explained that medication helped a little with his 7 1 paranoia. 2 in the past but had stopped using it in June 2008. 3 Plaintiff testified that he lived with his girlfriend and did not help 4 around the house with chores. 5 that he attended group therapy for six months but stopped attending 6 because he was told that he had to stop going. 7 (AR 32.) Plaintiff reported that he had smoked marijuana (AR 33.) (AR 33.) Finally, Plaintiff reported (AR 35.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff s testimony was out of proportion 8 to the objective findings and inconsistent with the treatment 9 Plaintiff received. (AR 18.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff s 10 psychiatric condition has been well maintained with medication and 11 that [i]t is reasonable to assume that if [Plaintiff] were 12 experiencing the disabling problems alleged, he would have received 13 more aggressive treatment. 14 Plaintiff s testimony was inconsistent with his report to Dr. Aguilar 15 that he was able to run errands, shop, manage his own money, watch 16 television and exercise. 17 while Plaintiff alleged paranoia, he admits going out with his 18 girlfriend as well as going to group therapy. 19 (AR 18.) (AR 18.) The ALJ also found that Finally, the ALJ concluded that, (AR 18.) These are valid reasons for questioning a claimant s testimony. 20 See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding lack 21 of objective medical evidence to support claims is a factor ALJ can 22 consider in evaluating claimant s testimony); Batson v. Comm r, 359 23 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding ALJ s finding that claimant 24 was not credible where he contended that he could not work because of 25 pain but was able to tend to his animals, walk outdoors, go out for 26 coffee, and visit with neighbor); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 27 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding inconsistency between allegations of severe 28 pain and conservative treatment was proper basis for discounting 8 1 credibility). Furthermore, these reasons are supported by substantial 2 evidence in the record. 3 paranoia and depression to various doctors and clinicians, the 4 treatment notes indicate that his symptoms were adequately controlled 5 with medication. 6 medication and group therapy -also suggested that he was not as 7 impaired as he claimed. 8 psychiatric symptoms were inconsistent with his ability to run 9 errands, shop, watch television, exercise, and manage his own funds. Though Plaintiff had reported bouts of Moreover, Plaintiff s conservative treatment -i.e., Finally, his claims of debilitating 10 In sum, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons that were 11 supported by substantial evidence for discounting Plaintiff s 12 credibility. As a result, this finding is affirmed. 13 14 15 IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Agency s decision is affirmed and the case is dismissed with prejudice. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 DATED: July____, 2013. 24 18 19 PATRICK J. WALSH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 S:\PJW\Cases-Social Security\CHANNEN, 4635\Memorandum Opinion and Order.wpd 9
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