Tyrone Smith v. Bimbo Bakeries USA Inc et al
Filing
93
MINUTES OF Motion Hearing held before Judge Christina A. Snyder: The Court GRANTS plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification 64 of the following class: All current and former Route Sales Representatives and/or Route Service Representati ves (i.e. RSRs and similarly titled employees) who, within three years preceding the date of their decision to opt in to this action, were employed by Bimbo Bakers USA Inc., in the state of California and who operate or operated, trucks weighing 10,0 00 lbs. or less. The Court also orders the distribution of Hoffmann-La Roche notices to members of the class. Defendant has requested that the parties meet and confer about the contents of any notice, as well as the procedures for distributing the no tice to the potential class members. As plaintiffs have indicated a willingness to meet and confer with defendant, the Court orders the parties to meet and confer and attempt to agree upon a joint proposed notice. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the parties may each submit a brief, not to exceed five pages, regarding the appropriate contents and distribution procedures of the notice. These briefs must be submitted by 8/26/2013. Court Reporter: Laura Elias. (gk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 12-1689-CAS (JWx)
Title
TYRONE SMITH, ET AL. V. BIMBO BAKERIES USA, INC.
Present: The Honorable
Date
August 19, 2013
CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
Catherine Jeang
Deputy Clerk
Laura Elias
Court Reporter / Recorder
N/A
Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:
Attorneys Present for Defendants
Kiley Grombacher
Stanley Saltzman
Michael Puma
Proceedings:
I.
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL
CERTIFICATION (filed May 31, 2013) [Dkt. No. 64]
INTRODUCTION
On February 28, 2012, plaintiff Tyrone Smith filed suit against defendant Bimbo
Bakeries USA, Inc. (“BBU”), on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. Dkt.
No. 1. Plaintiff filed the operative Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) on August 17,
2012, adding Greg Villaneuva and John Caudill as additional plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert
claims for violations of: (1) the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et
seq.; (2) California overtime provisions, Cal. Labor Code §§ 510, 1194(a), 1198; (3)
California minimum wage provisions, Cal. Labor Code §§ 1182.12, 1194.2(a), 1194.5;(4)
California meal period and rest break provisions, Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7; (5)
California recordkeeping provisions, §§ 1174, 1194.5; (6) itemized wage statement
provisions; (7) full and timely wage provisions, Cal. Labor Code §§ 201–204; (8) unfair
and unlawful business practices, §§ 17200 et seq.
On May 31, 2013, plaintiffs filed a motion for conditional certification of this case
as a collective action pursuant to the FLSA. Defendant opposed the motion on June 21,
2013, and plaintiffs replied on July 12, 2013. Plaintiffs’ motion is presently before the
Court.
II.
BACKGROUND
Defendant BBU is one of the largest bakery companies in the United States, with
over 70 bakeries across the country. Plaintiffs are bakery delivery drivers for BBU,
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 12-1689-CAS (JWx)
Date
August 19, 2013
Title
TYRONE SMITH, ET AL. V. BIMBO BAKERIES USA, INC.
otherwise known as Route Sales Representatives or Route Service Representatives
(“RSRs”). The parties contest the exact duties of the RSRs. Plaintiffs characterize RSRs
as deliverymen employed by for specific, well-defined tasks. See Mot. at 2-4.
Defendant, by contrast, portrays RSRs as independent salespeople, many of whom are
exempt from the provisions of the FLSA by reason of their sales duties. See Opp. at 2-5.
The terms and conditions of the RSRs’ employment with BBU are governed by a
set of collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”). Among other things, these agreements
specify how RSRs are paid. For purposes of this motion, the pertinent provisions of the
CBAs are that (1) RSRs only earn overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 45 hours a
week and (2) the overtime pay calculation does not include commissions. See, e.g., Decl.
of Kiley Lynn Grombacher, Ex. F, 22. Plaintiffs allege that both of these pay policies
violate the FLSA, and have filed this collective action on behalf of BBU’s California
RSRs.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
A.
The Fair Labor Standards Act
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 to establish nationwide minimum wage and
maximum hours standards. Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22, 25 (1993). Section 7
of the FLSA encourages compliance with maximum hours standards by providing that
employees generally must be paid on a time-and-one-half basis for all hours worked in
excess of forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).
B.
Collective Actions
A “collective action” differs from a class action. McElmurry v. U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n, 495 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007). “In a class action, once the district court
certifies a class under Rule 23, all class members are bound by the judgment unless they
opt out of the suit. By contrast, in a collective action each plaintiff must opt into the suit
by ‘giv[ing] his consent in writing.’” Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). As a result, “unlike
a class action, only those plaintiffs who expressly join the collective action are bound by
its results.” Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 256). Section 216(b) does not require district courts
to approve or authorize notice to potential plaintiffs, but it is “within the discretion of a
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 12-1689-CAS (JWx)
Date
August 19, 2013
Title
TYRONE SMITH, ET AL. V. BIMBO BAKERIES USA, INC.
district court” to authorize such notice. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S.
165, 173 (1989).
The majority of courts follow a two-step approach for determining whether
certification of a § 216(b) collective action is appropriate. See, e.g., Reed v. County of
Orange, 266 F.R.D. 446, 449 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Edwards v. City of Long Beach, 467 F.
Supp. 2d 986, 990 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Leuthold v. Destination Am., Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462,
466 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Under the two-step approach, the court must first decide, “based
primarily on the pleadings and any affidavits submitted by the parties, whether the
potential class should be given notice of the action.” Leuthold, 224 F.R.D. at 467. This
determination is usually made “under a fairly lenient standard and typically results in
conditional class certification.” Id. at 467.
In the second stage, which is reached once discovery is complete and the case is
ready to be tried, the party opposing class certification may move to decertify the class.
Reed, 266 F.R.D. at 449. The court then must make a factual determination regarding the
propriety and scope of the class and must consider the following factors: (1) the disparate
factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses
available to the defendants with respect to the individual plaintiffs; and (3) fairness and
procedural considerations. Pfohl v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 2004 WL 554834, *2-3 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 1, 2004) (citing Thiessen v. General Electric Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1103
(10th Cir. 2001)). Should the court determine on the basis of the complete factual record
that the plaintiffs are not similarly situated, then the court may decertify the class and
dismiss the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice. Leuthold, 224 F.R.D. at 467.
IV.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek to certify this case as a collective action under § 216(b) of the
FLSA. If the court certifies the case, plaintiffs ask the Court to authorize the distribution
of Hoffmann-La Roche notices informing members of the class of their right to opt-in to
this action. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 493 U.S. at 173. Defendants object to (1)
certifying the collective action at all and (2) if the action is certified, the scope of the
proposed class.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 12-1689-CAS (JWx)
Title
TYRONE SMITH, ET AL. V. BIMBO BAKERIES USA, INC.
A.
Date
August 19, 2013
Certification under the FLSA
The parties first disagree about the proper standard for determining whether the
class should be certified. Plaintiffs ask the Court to apply the usual “two-step approach”
to conditional certification, which would involve an “initial notice to prospective
plaintiffs followed by a final evaluation whether such plaintiffs are similarly situated.”
Leuthold, 224 F.R.D. at 466. Under this approach, the Court would evaluate this firststage conditional certification motion “under a fairly lenient standard”—a standard which
“typically results in conditional class certification.” Id. at 467.
Defendant, by contrast, contends that the Court should bypass the “two-step
approach” and skip directly to a “final evaluation” of whether the potential plaintiffs are
similarly situated. Pointing to the thorough discovery already conducted in this case,
defendant maintains that there is no need for the lengthy two-step certification process.
The Court finds that the traditional two-step method is appropriate here. While is
true that some cases can proceed directly to the second, more rigorous stage of the
analysis, see, e.g., Ugas v. H & R Block Enterprises, LLC, 2011 WL 3439219, at *12
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011), this is not one of those cases. While it is true that there has
already been substantial discovery in this case, much of that discovery was confined to
the preemption issues decided in this Court’s earlier ruling on defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. See Dkt No. 39 (limiting discovery for 90 days from December 10,
2012). Moreover, the question of whether the potential plaintiffs are similarly situated
will turn almost entirely on the job duties of the RSRs involved in the collective action.
See Mot. at 12-15; Opp’n at 11-21; Reply at 14-16. Given this, “[t]he number and type
of plaintiffs who choose to opt into the class may affect the court's second tier inquiry
regarding the disparate factual and employment situations of the opt-in plaintiffs . . . .”
Leuthold, 224 F.R.D. at 468.
As such, the Court will analyze conditional certification using the lenient standard
appropriate at this stage of the certification process. Under this standard, plaintiffs must
“make substantial allegations that the putative class members were subject to a single
illegal policy, plan or decision.” Adams v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc., 242 F.R.D. 530, 536
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (citation omitted).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 12-1689-CAS (JWx)
Date
August 19, 2013
Title
TYRONE SMITH, ET AL. V. BIMBO BAKERIES USA, INC.
To meet this burden, plaintiffs offer two pieces of evidence.1 First, they point to
the CBAs, which set forth the allegedly illegal pay policies. See Decl. of Kiley Lynn
Grombacher, Exs. F–L. These agreements—which all share the premium pay and
commission pay policies at issue in this case—are the “single illegal policy, plan or
decision” that allegedly harm all of the potential plaintiffs.
Second, plaintiffs provide multiple, nearly identical declarations from RSRs, all
claiming that RSRs throughout California have similar duties on the job. Plaintiff Gerard
Carrillo, for instance, outlines how he is responsible for inventorying and loading product
at BBU depots, and then providing that product and other services to customers. Decl. of
Gerard Carrillo 2-3. Plaintiff Tyrone Smith’s declaration describes essentially identical
job duties. Decl. of Gerard Carrillo 2-3. Plaintiffs argue that these common
responsibilities, together with the identical pay policies set forth in the CBAs,
demonstrate that the RSRs are “similarly situated.”
Defendant counters with its own group of declarations which together emphasize
how RSR duties vary widely. See Opp’n 14-21 (summarizing different job duties of
RSRs as described by defendant’s declerations). However, the Court need not resolve
these factual disputes at this time. “A detailed analysis of such issues as differing job
functions is more properly made” at the second step of the certification process. Mitchell
v. Acosta Sales, LLC, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2011). This is all the more
true here where the extent of the differences between RSRs’ job duties will depend in
large part on which RSRs choose to opt-in to this action.
And even if this were not so, all of the potential class members are still governed
by pay policies that are, for purposes of this litigation, identical. This alone is a
“substantial allegation[] that the putative class members were subject to a single illegal
1
In connection with their briefing, both parties lodged dozens of largely boilerplate
evidentiary objections to the factual support offered by their opponents. Setting aside for
the moment the merit–if any–of these objections, the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve
these evidentiary questions at this early, “lenient” stage. Cf. Leuthold, 224 F.R.D. at 466
(“Because none of plaintiffs' objections would change the outcome of the court's decision
on the pending motions, the court need not rule on any of them at this stage of the
litigation.”).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 12-1689-CAS (JWx)
Date
August 19, 2013
Title
TYRONE SMITH, ET AL. V. BIMBO BAKERIES USA, INC.
policy, plan or decision.” Adams v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc., 242 F.R.D. at 536. In
particular, there seems to be no dispute that substantially identical pay policies apply to
every member of the prospective class. Thus, this is not a case resting on only
“unsupported assertions of widespread violations.” Edwards, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 990. As
such, based on the allegedly unlawful policies that are common to all members of the
prospective class, the Court finds that—at least for purposes of conditional
certification—the RSRs in the proposed class are “similarly situated.”
Defendant’s arguments to the contrary do not change this conclusion. These
arguments fall into three categories. First, defendant points out that its pay policies are
only illegal if plaintiffs are not exempt under the FLSA. Defendant then relies upon two
Ninth Circuit cases to argue that a shared improper exemption is not enough to show that
plaintiffs are similarly situated.2 The Court finds this argument unpersuasive: what
makes plaintiffs similarly situated is not their status as exempt or non-exempt, but rather
that they are all paid as set forth in the CBAs.
Second, defendant argues that, because plaintiffs only submitted declarations from
RSRs working in Southern California, they cannot demonstrate that the potential
members of the class—which would include RSRs from all over California—are
similarly situated. However, plaintiffs “need not show that [their] position is or was
identical to the putative class members' positions; a class may be certified under the
FLSA if [they] can show that [their] position was or is similar to those of the absent class
members.” Edwards, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 990. Here, plaintiffs have provided evidence
that RSRs statewide are governed by substantially identical CBAs. See Decl. of Kiley
Lynn Grombacher, Exs. F–L. Because BBU has introduced no evidence showing that
RSRs outside Southern California are paid differently than RSRs in Southern California,
the California-wide CBAs provide a sufficient basis to find that the potential class
members are similarly situated.
2
In re Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Overtime Pay Litig., 571 F.3d 953, 955 (9th
Cir. 2009); Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 2009).
These cases are, in any event, inapposite. Not only were they decided under Rule 23
rather than the FLSA, but they were specifically decided under Rule 23(b)(3). Rule
23(b)(3) requires that common questions “predominate”—a far stricter standard than
FLSA’s requirement that plaintiffs be “similarly situated.”
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 12-1689-CAS (JWx)
Date
August 19, 2013
Title
TYRONE SMITH, ET AL. V. BIMBO BAKERIES USA, INC.
Lastly, defendant advances a set of arguments aimed at showing that any collective
adjudication will be dominated by individualized factual questions. It contends that
determining the membership in the class, exempt status under the FLSA and damages of
each RSR will require a separate “mini-trial,” thus undermining the purpose of a
collective action.
These arguments are premature. At this stage, the only issue before the Court is
whether to certify the class conditionally and distribute Hoffmann-La Roche notices to
potential members of that class. This Court will undoubtedly revisit whether plaintiffs
are similarly situated: “[o]nce discovery is complete and the case is ready to be tried, the
party opposing class certification may move to decertify the class.” Leuthold, 224 F.R.D.
at 467. At that time, the Court will reconsider defendant’s arguments. “Should the court
determine on the basis of the complete factual record that the plaintiffs are not similarly
situated, then the court may decertify the class and dismiss the opt-in plaintiffs without
prejudice.” Id.
Accordingly, the court finds that conditional certification is appropriate at this
stage of the proceedings.
B.
Scope of the Class
Plaintiffs propose the following class definition:
All current and former Route Sales Representatives and/or Route Service
Representatives (i.e. RSRs and similarly titled employees) who, within the
applicable limitations period, which is three years preceding the filing of the
original Complaint herein plus such additional time as may be provided
pursuant to equitable tolling, were employed by Bimbo Bakers USA Inc., in the
state of California and who operate or operated, trucks weighing 10,000 lbs. or
less.3
3
Although this class definition requests equitable tolling of the limitations period,
plaintiffs have not provided any justification for this request. As “[e]quitable tolling is
extended sparingly and only where claimants exercise diligence in preserving their legal
rights,” the Court sees no reason why the limitations period should be equitably tolled.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 12-1689-CAS (JWx)
Date
August 19, 2013
Title
TYRONE SMITH, ET AL. V. BIMBO BAKERIES USA, INC.
Defendant objects to this proposed definition as both temporally and
geographically overbroad. Temporally, defendant asks the court to limit the class period
to two years on the grounds that this is the normal FLSA limitations period. 29 U.S.C. §
255. By contrast, the three year limitations period requested by plaintiffs is only
available for “willful” violations. Id. While the Court agrees that plaintiffs have not yet
shown willfulness, “[g]iven the lenient standard that Plaintiffs face at this stage and the
difficulty of establishing, by affidavits, Defendant's willful behavior, the Court finds that
. . . for the purpose of conditional certification, the three-year statute of limitations
applie[s].” Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc., 235 F.R.D. 474, 484 (E.D. Cal.
2006).
Defendant also contests the geographic scope of the class definition. It asks that
the Court confine the class to the BBU depots where the lead plaintiffs work. As
discussed above, however, plaintiffs need not provide a representative from each depot to
prove that potential class members are similarly situated. Instead, the allegedly illegal
pay policies in the CBAs make the requisite showing at this stage. As such, the court
concludes that certification is appropriate for a three-year class covering all of California.
V.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion for
conditional certification of the following class:
All current and former Route Sales Representatives and/or Route Service
Representatives (i.e. RSRs and similarly titled employees) who, within three
years preceding the date of their decision to opt in to this action, were employed
by Bimbo Bakers USA Inc., in the state of California and who operate or
operated, trucks weighing 10,000 lbs. or less.
The Court also orders the distribution of Hoffmann-La Roche notices to members
of the class. Defendant has requested that the parties meet and confer about the contents
of any notice, as well as the procedures for distributing the notice to the potential class
Adams, 242 F.R.D. at 542.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 12-1689-CAS (JWx)
Date
August 19, 2013
Title
TYRONE SMITH, ET AL. V. BIMBO BAKERIES USA, INC.
members. As plaintiffs have indicated a willingness to meet and confer with defendant,
the Court orders the parties to meet and confer and attempt to agree upon a joint proposed
notice. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the parties may each submit a
brief, not to exceed five pages, regarding the appropriate contents and distribution
procedures of the notice. These briefs must be submitted by August 26, 2013.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00
Initials of Preparer
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:
18
CMJ
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