Deborah Potter v. Michael J Astrue, No. 2:2012cv01305 - Document 15 (C.D. Cal. 2012)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Paul L. Abrams: Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) plaintiffs request for remand is granted; (2) the decision of the Commissioner is reversed; and (3) this action is remanded to defendant for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.**See attached Order.** (es)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 WESTERN DIVISION 11 12 DEBORAH POTTER, 13 Plaintiff, 14 15 v. 16 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 17 Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. CV 12-1305-PLA MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 18 19 I. 20 PROCEEDINGS 21 Plaintiff filed this action on February 15, 2012, seeking review of the Commissioner s denial 22 of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits. The parties filed Consents to proceed before 23 the undersigned Magistrate Judge on March 28, 2012. Pursuant to the Court s Order, the parties 24 filed a Joint Stipulation on December 5, 2012, that addresses their positions concerning the 25 disputed issues in the case. The Court has taken the Joint Stipulation under submission without 26 oral argument. 27 / 28 / 1 II. 2 BACKGROUND 3 Plaintiff was born on April 6, 1957. [Administrative Record ( AR ) at 95.] She completed 4 two years of college, and has past relevant work experience as a telephone clerk and a debt 5 collector. [AR at 219, 224.] 6 On January 10, 2009, plaintiff filed her application for Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging 7 that she has been unable to work since July 4, 2008, due to migraine headaches, arthritis, acid 8 reflux, problems with her back (including stiffness, spasms, scoliosis, disc herniations, and 9 degenerative narrowing of her spinal canal), and problems with her knees, left foot, and right arm. 10 [AR at 95-96, 115-18, 197-98, 217-26.] After her application was denied initially and on 11 reconsideration, plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ). [AR 12 at 115-18, 120-35.] Following two continuances, a hearing was held on November 4, 2010, at 13 which time plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified on her own behalf. [AR at 53-94.] A 14 vocational expert also testified. [AR at 81-83.] A supplemental hearing was held on May 26, 15 2011, at which time plaintiff again appeared with counsel and testified on her own behalf. A 16 different vocational expert also testified. [AR at 27-52.] On July 29, 2011, the ALJ determined that 17 plaintiff was not disabled. [AR at 100-09.] On January 11, 2012, the Appeals Council denied 18 plaintiff s request for review. [AR at 1-5, 24.] This action followed. 19 20 III. 21 STANDARD OF REVIEW 22 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has authority to review the Commissioner s 23 decision to deny benefits. The decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 24 evidence or if it is based upon the application of improper legal standards. Moncada v. Chater, 25 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). 26 In this context, the term substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less 27 than a preponderance -- it is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as 28 adequate to support the conclusion. Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; see also Drouin, 966 F.2d at 2 1 1257. When determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner s 2 decision, the Court examines the administrative record as a whole, considering adverse as well 3 as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257; Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th 4 Cir. 1989). Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Court 5 must defer to the decision of the Commissioner. Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; Andrews v. Shalala, 6 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995); Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1258. 7 8 IV. 9 THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY 10 Persons are disabled for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable 11 to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is 12 expected to result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at 13 least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. 14 15 A. THE FIVE-STEP EVALUATION PROCESS 16 The Commissioner (or ALJ) follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in assessing 17 whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 18 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995, as amended April 9, 1996). In the first step, the Commissioner must 19 determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the 20 claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant is not currently engaged in 21 substantial gainful activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the 22 claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting her ability 23 to do basic work activities; if not, a finding of nondisability is made and the claim is denied. Id. 24 If the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires 25 the Commissioner to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or 26 equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments ( Listing ) set forth at 20 C.F.R., Part 404, 27 Subpart P, Appendix 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are awarded. Id. 28 If the claimant s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or equal an impairment 3 1 in the Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has 2 sufficient residual functional capacity to perform her past work; if so, the claimant is not disabled 3 and the claim is denied. Id. The claimant has the burden of proving that she is unable to 4 perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant meets this burden, a 5 prima facie case of disability is established. The Commissioner then bears the burden of 6 establishing that the claimant is not disabled, because she can perform other substantial gainful 7 work available in the national economy. The determination of this issue comprises the fifth and 8 final step in the sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 9 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. 10 11 B. THE ALJ S APPLICATION OF THE FIVE-STEP PROCESS 12 In this case, at step one, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff has not engaged in any substantial 13 gainful activity since her alleged disability onset date, July 4, 2008. [AR at 102.]1 At step two, the 14 ALJ concluded that plaintiff has the following impairments, which in combination are severe: 15 idiopathic scoliosis and degenerative disc disease (with spinal canal stenosis) of the lumbosacral 16 spine, scoliosis and degenerative arthritis of the thoracic spine, and a history of a comminuted 17 fracture of the right humerus (status post open reduction and internal fixation with three bone 18 screws on January 12, 1977); obesity beginning August 2009; and beginning December 2009, 19 residuals (arthritis) of anterior cruciate ligament tear (status post repair in 2000), arthritis of the left 20 knee, and recurrent urinary tract infections. [AR at 102-03.] At step three, the ALJ determined 21 that plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically 22 equals any of the impairments in the Listing. [AR at 104.] The ALJ further found that plaintiff 23 retained the residual functional capacity ( RFC )2 to perform the full range of sedentary work as 24 25 26 1 The ALJ concluded that plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2013. [AR at 102.] 27 2 28 RFC is what a claimant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. See Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). 4 1 defined as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).3 [Id.] At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff 2 is capable of performing her past relevant work as a collection clerk and a telephone answering 3 service operator. [AR at 108.] Accordingly, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not under a 4 disability from July 4, 2008, through July 29, 2011, the date of the decision. [AR at 108-09.] 5 6 V. 7 THE ALJ S DECISION 8 Plaintiff contends that: (1) her case should be remanded for proper consideration of 9 medical evidence submitted to the Appeals Council ; (2) in determining that plaintiff can perform 10 sedentary work, the ALJ failed to consider the combined impact of all impairments and side 11 effects of medications ; and (3) the ALJ improperly discounted plaintiff s credibility. 12 Stipulation ( JS ) at 3.] As set forth below, the Court agrees with plaintiff, in part, and remands the 13 matter for further proceedings. [Joint 14 15 PLAINTIFF S SUBJECTIVE SYMPTOM TESTIMONY 16 To determine whether a claimant s testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is 17 credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 18 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented 19 objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to 20 produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Id. (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.3d 341, 344 21 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). Second, if the claimant meets the first test, the ALJ may only reject the 22 claimant s testimony about the severity of her symptoms upon (1) finding evidence affirmatively 23 suggesting that the claimant was malingering, or (2) offering specific, clear and convincing reasons 24 for doing so. See Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Lingenfelter, 504 25 26 27 28 3 Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). 5 1 F.3d at 1036; Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). The factors to be 2 considered in weighing a claimant s credibility include: (1) the claimant s reputation for 3 truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies either in the claimant s testimony or between the claimant s 4 testimony and her conduct; (3) the claimant s daily activities; (4) the claimant s work record; and 5 (5) testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 6 symptoms of which the claimant complains. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th 7 Cir. 2002); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c). If properly supported, the ALJ s 8 credibility determination is entitled to great deference. See Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 532 9 (9th Cir. 1986). 10 Plaintiff made statements and gave testimony concerning the severity of her symptoms in 11 a February 2, 2009, Exertional Activities Questionnaire [AR at 245-48], in a May 10, 2009, 12 Function Report [AR at 259-66], at her November 4, 2010, hearing before the ALJ [AR at 53-85], 13 and at her May 26, 2011, supplemental hearing before the ALJ. [AR at 27-52.] Plaintiff stated that 14 [a]ll of [her] joint[s] ache and hurt. [AR at 248.] Specifically, she stated that she has a lot of 15 pain in her knees, spine, and the lower back portion of her spine; that her left foot hurts and at 16 times feels like it is ripping ; and that her [r]ight arm joint get[s] sore if used to[o] much. [AR at 17 32, 245, 248.] Plaintiff reported that she experiences numbness in her left foot and suffers from 18 a loss of balance. [AR at 245, 248.] She also reported that she has back spasms, as well as 19 stiffness in her back to the point where, on some days, it is so stiff [that she] can t get out of bed. 20 [AR at 245, 248.] Plaintiff testified that she sleep[s] a lot during the day because spasms in the 21 lower lumbar section of her back interfere with her sleep at night such that she must get up and 22 move every few hours. [AR at 67-68.] She stated that due to her problems with her left ankle, she 23 can only walk or stand for 10 minutes at a time, and can only walk half a block before needing to 24 rest for 10 minutes. [AR at 66, 264.] Plaintiff further testified that her back spasms prevent her 25 from sitting for more than 20 to 30 minutes, and stated that standing or sitting too long causes 26 cramping in her left leg. [AR at 72, 245.] 27 Plaintiff testified that [t]he pain is [her] biggest problem, and that even though she 28 sometimes does not feel well or becomes sleepy due to her medications, she [does not] want to 6 1 just sit in pain. [AR at 41.] She further testified that the epidurals she receives in her spine [do 2 not] stop the spine pain, but reduce the inflammation of the nerve that runs down [her] leg[s] to 3 prevent [her] feet ... from going numb so much. [AR at 42-43.] Plaintiff stated that her knee 4 injections [do not] stop all the pain either, and that the reason why [she] even [gets] the shots 5 is so that [she] can ... walk. [AR at 44.] Plaintiff also stated that the medication she takes for her 6 back spasms only reduces the spasms [a] little. [AR at 72.] 7 At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff s medically determinable impairments could 8 reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. [AR at 105.] Thus, at step two, as the 9 record contains no evidence of malingering by plaintiff,4 the ALJ was required to offer specific, 10 clear and convincing reasons for rejecting plaintiff s subjective symptom testimony. See 11 Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify 12 what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant s complaints. Reddick 13 v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 834); see also Dodrill, 12 14 F.3d at 918. 15 The ALJ discounted plaintiff s credibility because he found her statements concerning the 16 severity of her impairments to be inconsistent with: (1) her overall treatment history ; (2) her daily 17 activities; and (3) the objective medical evidence. [See AR at 105-07.] 18 First, the Court finds that the ALJ s reliance on plaintiff s overall treatment history was not 19 a convincing reason to discount plaintiff s credibility. Pointing out that plaintiff testified that her 20 medications make her groggy [see AR at 34], the ALJ stated: 21 However, if the side effect was so severe that it affected her tolerance for the use of the medications, I would expect that she would inform her doctor so that they would be ceased or changed. Notably, however, this complaint is not reflected in her doctor s progress notes. This tends to indicate that her condition was adequately managed with the prescribed treatment without significant side effects. 22 23 24 25 / 26 27 4 28 The ALJ made no finding that plaintiff was malingering, nor does the evidence suggest plaintiff was doing so. 7 1 [AR at 106 (citations omitted).] The ALJ s reasoning in this regard is unconvincing for two 2 reasons. First, plaintiff testified that her biggest problem is pain, not sleepiness, and that she 3 stopped working because of her pain. Thus, it is not reasonable to expect that plaintiff would ask 4 her doctors to cease or change her medications simply because they make her sleepy. In 5 addition, it is not apparent to the Court how the absence of such a request in plaintiff s doctor s 6 notes is at all relevant to whether her condition was adequately managed with the prescribed 7 treatment. Whether plaintiff ever requested to change medications due to the side effect of 8 grogginess has no bearing on whether those medications were effective in controlling her pain. 9 Next, the ALJ noted that when [plaintiff] received an epidural injection to her back [on September 10 23, 2010], three years had passed since her last one and she was given the shot despite 11 essentially normal findings on physical examination. [AR at 106 (citing AR at 832, 835).] 12 Nevertheless, the doctor who examined plaintiff on that date found that plaintiff had moderate 13 restriction in flexion and ... extension in her lumbar range of motion; diagnosed her with [l]ow 14 back and right leg pain suggestive of lumbar radiculitis[,] L4-5 spinal stenosis[,] [and] L4-5 and L5- 15 S1 spondylosis ; and scheduled a lumbar epidural steroid injection for plaintiff. [AR at 832-35.] 16 To the extent the ALJ concluded that plaintiff s back symptoms did not warrant an epidural steroid 17 injection because of the doctor s other findings on that date, such a conclusion conflicts with the 18 doctor s determination that plaintiff had low back ... pain that did warrant an epidural injection. 19 An ALJ cannot arbitrarily substitute his own judgment for competent medical opinion[s]. Balsamo 20 v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Day 21 v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (the ALJ should not have gone outside the 22 record to medical textbooks for the purpose of making his own exploration and assessment as to 23 the claimant s physical condition). Finally, the ALJ found that plaintiff s overall treatment history 24 was inconsistent with her subjective symptom testimony because her treatment in 2011 has 25 consisted mostly of routine care. [AR at 106 (citing AR at 987-92).] However, by focusing on six 26 pages of medical records reflecting three doctor visits over a two-month period -- out of hundreds 27 of pages of records reflecting scores of visits between plaintiff s alleged disability onset date and 28 the date of the ALJ s decision -- the ALJ ignored competent evidence in the record, which was 8 1 improper. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722-23 (it is impermissible for the ALJ to develop an 2 evidentiary basis by not fully accounting for the context of materials or all parts of the testimony 3 and reports ); see also Day, 522 F.2d at 1156 (an ALJ is not permitted to reach a conclusion 4 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence ). Indeed, the following treatment 5 reflected in the record does not support the ALJ s characterization that plaintiff received only 6 routine care during the relevant period: plaintiff saw her doctors for leg and foot pain at least once 7 or twice a month between July 2008 and January 2009, including for the application of a short leg 8 cast from just below plaintiff s left knee to her toes [see AR at 565, 572-86, 590-93, 598-99]; saw 9 her doctors monthly between September 2009 and January 2010 for knee problems, including for 10 four injections to address her knee pain [see AR at 518-19, 526-28, 530-34, 540-41]; and reported 11 taking hydrocodone5 in May and June 2009, as well as April 2010, and testified at her May 26, 12 2011, hearing that she takes hydrocodone regularly. [See AR at 33, 502, 554, 556.] 13 Next, the ALJ s characterization of plaintiff s daily activities mischaracterizes her statements 14 about what she is able to do. The ALJ stated that plaintiff reported ... that she was generally able 15 to tend to her personal care needs and do light household chores. [AR at 106-07.] On the 16 contrary, plaintiff stated that she has difficulty putting on her shoes and her foot brace; that she 17 bathes by sitting in the shower and using a handheld showerhead; that sometimes it hurts to raise 18 [her] hands over [her] head to care for her hair; and that she uses an elevated toilet seat, but 19 ha[s] difficulty wiping [her]self due to bending. [AR at 260.] Moreover, while plaintiff reported 20 that she can do the dishes, sweep the kitchen floor, and fold clothes a few times a week [AR at 21 246, 261], engaging in some household chores or activities is not necessarily inconsistent with a 22 finding of disability. See Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (benefits awarded 23 on appeal to a claimant experiencing constant leg and back pain, despite the claimant s ability to 24 cook and wash dishes); see also Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that 25 the ability to assist with some household tasks was not determinative of disability) (citing Smith 26 27 5 28 Hydrocodone is in a class of medications called opiate (narcotic) analgesics. http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a601006.html. 9 1 v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 971 (3d Cir. 1981) (disability claimant need not vegetate in a dark room 2 excluded from all forms of human and social activity )). The ALJ did not mention in his decision 3 that plaintiff stated she can no longer cook, mop, vacuum, make the bed, or change the sheets 4 on the bed [see AR at 260], and therefore improperly ignored evidence that does not support his 5 conclusion. See Whitney v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 784, 788 (7th Cir. 1982) ( [A]n ALJ must weigh 6 all the evidence and may not ignore evidence that suggests an opposite conclusion. ) (citation 7 omitted). In addition, the ALJ pointed out that plaintiff can shop[] in stores, handle money, and 8 drive[] twice a week, and concluded that plaintiff is able to spend a substantial part of the day 9 in activities involving the performance of functions readily transferable to competitive work. [AR 10 at 107.] However, plaintiff stated that she goes to the store maybe once a month [AR at 262], 11 and that she drives when she ha[s] to, but prefers not to because she does not feel comfortable 12 doing so while taking her medications. [AR at 47.] Moreover, plaintiff reported that her daily 13 routine consists of waking up, taking her medications, sit[ting] quietly for about [half an hour to 14 wait] for the pain to subside, eating breakfast, dressing, doing back exercises while lying on the 15 floor, taking a mid-morning nap, eating lunch, taking more medications, put[ting] up [the] mail, 16 eating a snack, doing back exercises again, eating dinner, taking a shower, and going to bed; and 17 also reported that she needs several rest periods or naps during the day. [AR at 247, 259.] As 18 such, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ s conclusion that plaintiff can sustain gainful 19 employment because she can handle money, occasionally wash dishes, fold clothing a few times 20 a week, drive when she must, and go to the store once a month, since the ability to do these 21 limited activities does not necessarily translate into an ability to do activities that are transferable 22 to a work setting. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that a claimant 23 is not required to be utterly incapacitated in order to be disabled and that many home activities 24 are not easily transferable to what may be the more grueling environment of the workplace, where 25 it might be impossible to periodically rest or take medication ); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 26 1273,1284 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons, based 27 upon plaintiff s daily activities, to discredit her subjective symptom testimony. 28 10 1 Finally, while an ALJ may consider whether a lack of objective medical evidence supports 2 the degree of limitation, this cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony. Burch 3 v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). The rationale for this restriction is that pain 4 testimony may establish greater limitations than can medical evidence alone. Id. at 680 (citing 5 Social Security Ruling6 96-7p). Thus, even assuming the ALJ s characterization of the medical 6 evidence is supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ may rely upon this rationale only if his 7 other reasons for discounting plaintiff s credibility are proper. As discussed supra, they are not. 8 The ALJ did not offer a legally adequate reason for discounting plaintiff s credibility. 9 Remand is warranted.7 10 / 11 / 12 / 13 / 14 / 15 / 16 / 17 / 18 / 19 / 20 / 21 / 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 Social Security Rulings do not have the force of law. Nevertheless, they constitute Social Security Administration interpretations of the statute it administers and of its own regulations, and are given deference unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the Act or regulations. Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1989). 7 The Court exercises its discretion not to address plaintiff s first and second contentions of error. Nevertheless, as the Court herein remands the case to defendant to properly evaluate plaintiff s credibility, the ALJ on remand should also consider the additional evidence plaintiff submitted to the Appeals Council after the ALJ s July 29, 2011, decision. [See AR at 5, 993-1017; JS at 3-6, 8-9.] 11 1 VI. 2 REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 3 As a general rule, remand is warranted where additional administrative proceedings could 4 remedy defects in the Commissioner s decision. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th 5 Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1038 (2000); Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984). 6 In this case, remand is appropriate to properly evaluate plaintiff s subjective symptom testimony. 7 The ALJ is instructed to take whatever further action is deemed appropriate and consistent with 8 this decision. 9 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) plaintiff s request for remand is granted; 10 (2) the decision of the Commissioner is reversed; and (3) this action is remanded to defendant 11 for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. 12 13 This Memorandum Opinion and Order is not intended for publication, nor is it intended to be included in or submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis. 14 15 DATED: December 17, 2012 PAUL L. ABRAMS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12

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