Jose Rodriguez v. T Ochoa et al, No. 2:2012cv00765 - Document 13 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Jean P Rosenbluth, DENYING PETITION AND DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE. (See document for details.) (Attachments: # 1 part 2) (rla)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
1 examination about his failure to tell the police exactly what had 2 happened. 3 that r had been attacked in my house and that r defended myself," 4 and he did not answer further questions because he was "having a 5 heart attack." 6 Petitioner then testified, contrary to Officer Miranda's 7 testimony, that he was never read his Miranda rights. 8 1852-53.) Petitioner responded that he "just told [the officer] (Lodged Doc. 7, 4 Rep.'s Tr. at 1847-51.) (rd. at He reiterated that he told the officer he stabbed 9 Escobar in self-defense but didn't say anything more about the 10 incident because he was sick and needed to be taken to the 11 hospital. 12 taking pictures of Petitioner for evidence, he took Petitioner to 13 the hospital, where he was examined and given an EKG. 14 Doc. 7, 3 Rep.'s Tr. at 949, 956.} 15 (rd. at 1853.) Officer Miranda testified that after (Lodged The timing of Petitioner's arrest is unclear from the 16 evidence before the Court. 17 it appears that Petitioner arrived at the police station, spoke 18 to other officers, and then spoke to Officer Miranda, who read 19 him his Miranda rights and questioned him about the stabbing. 1 20 (Lodged Doc. 7, 3 Rep.'s Tr. at 948, 691-63.) 21 apparently told the police as soon as he arrived at the station 22 that he had stabbed someone. 23 46 (911 operator notes that "suspect" from assault at 24 Petitioner's address had arrived at station).} 25 apparently before Officer Miranda questioned him, Petitioner was Based on Officer Miranda's testimony, Petitioner (Lodged Doc. 8, Clerk's Tr. at 45- At some point, 26 27 28 lpetitioner testified, however, that no one ever read him his Miranda rights. (See Lodged Doc. 7, 4 Rep.'s Tr. at 1852-53.) 15 1 placed in the back of a patrol car and "detained." (rd. at 948, 2 3 4 custody" at the time he was placed in the patrol car and was free 5 to leave, although he earlier testified that Petitioner was being 6 "detained" at that time. 964, 968.) 949.) Petitioner then was taken to the hospital. (rd. at Officer Miranda testified that Petitioner was "not in (See id. at 948, 967.) The officer 7 acknowledged that Petitioner was in custody by the time they 8 arrived at the hospital. 9 appear to show exactly when Petitioner was formally arrested. 10 The prosecutor did not mention Petitioner's post-Miranda (rd. at 954.) The record does not 11 silence during his opening statement. 12 Rep.'s Tr. at 622-26.) 13 pointed out that Petitioner had not answered when the police (See Lodged Doc. 7, 2 During closing argument, the prosecutor 14 asked him about the details of the incident, and then argued: 15 [A]t trial he conveniently says, "well, that's because r 16 was having a heart attack." 17 pose 18 himself there. 19 at the police station. 20 sense is that it wasn't self-defense and he was just 21 trying to cook something up. for the pictures. But he was still able to He was still able to drive There is no medical treatment he receives Doesn't make sense. What makes 22 (rd. at 2155-56.) 23 stated that Petitioner's story was "completely bogus," 24 "unreasonable," and "made up," and that "[i]f it were true, he 25 would have told that to the police, and it would have made a heck 26 of a lot more sense when he was testifying on the stand." 27 at 2180.) 28 Later in his closing argument, the prosecutor The prosecutor also mentioned Petitioner's silence in 16 (rd. 1 rebuttal argument. 2 He reiterated that, had the stabbing occurred in the way Petitioner testified, he 3 would have gone to the police station, he would have told 4 the police what happened. 5 came at me this way. 6 and stabbed him. 7 knife, he was still coming at me and threatening me and 8 throwing punches at me. 9 again." He would have said, "Escobar That's why r pulled out the knife And then after r stabbed him with the And that's why r stabbed him 10 (rd. at 2214.) 11 "anything at the police station that the defendant was having a 12 heart attack or, you know, whatever, he complained he was having 13 shortness of breath or anything like that" because "[i]t's made 14 up to dissuade you, to mislead you." 15 argued that "any reasonable person would have told the deputy 16 exactly what happened" and why the stabbing was self-defense, but 17 Petitioner did not do so. 18 He also argued that the jury never heard (rd. at 2217.)2 He also (rd. at 2219.) The court of appeal denied Petitioner's Doyle claim: 19 [Petitioner] asserts he invoked his right to remain 20 silent when he told Deputy Miranda that he was going to 21 say nothing more. 22 allowing 23 further and to comment on his post-arrest silence during 24 argument. the Thus, he argues, the court erred in prosecution The to Attorney question General Deputy Miranda responds that 25 26 27 28 2rn fact, Officer Miranda testified that he "took [Petitioner] to the hospital later on that evening [of the stabbing]" because "he was complaining of chest pain." (Lodged Doc. 7, 3 Rep.'s Tr. at 949.) 17 1 [Petitioner] did not clearly and unambiguously invoke his 2 right to remain silent and the prosecutor properly asked 3 the deputy whether 4 attacked him and precipitated the assault. 5 the overwhelming evidence of 6 need not resolve the dispute. [Petitioner] said that Escobar had In light of [Petitioner]' s guilt, we 7 [Petitioner]'s self-defense plea was rejected by the 8 jury due to the simple unassailable fact that Escobar 9 suffered 25 stabs or cuts, including a potentially life 10 threatening stab wound to his sternum, and [Petitioner] 11 escaped 12 explain how Escobar came to have so many wounds, and he 13 expressly denied 14 argues the case was close, as demonstrated by the jury 15 verdict acquitting him of attempted murder. 16 acquittal on the greater offense establishes that the 17 jury did not find [Petitioner] intended to kill Escobar, 18 not that 19 Doyle error, if any, could not have affected the jury's 20 verdict and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 21 People v. 22 error is subj ect to harmless error test set 23 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.].) 24 without a scratch. stabbing Escobar [Petitioner] Earp [Petitioner] (1999) in the could chest. Not so. not He The had legal cause to assault him. 20 Cal. 4th 826, 857-858 (See [Doyle forth in (Lodged Doc. 4 at 9.) 25 B. 26 The Fifth and Fourteenth amendments' prohibition against Applicable Law 27 compelled self-incrimination requires police to warn a suspect 28 before custodial interrogation that he has the right to remain 18 1 silent and to the presence of an attorney. 2 479. 3 interrogation must cease"; if he requests counsel, "the 4 interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." 5 474. 6 Miranda, 384 U.S. at If he indicates that he wishes to remain silent, "the rd. at Once a defendant waives his Miranda rights, he may 7 subsequently invoke his right to remain silent as to particular 8 questions. 9 "[I]t is enough" to invoke the right to silence for a suspect to 10 11 Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010). say "he does not want to answer that question." rd. at 1089. Under Doyle, a prosecutor cannot impeach a defendant with 12 his post-arrest silence following the issuance of Miranda 13 warnings. 14 may not comment on or refer to that silence in any way. 15 United States v. Lopez, 500 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2007) 16 (prosecutor's closing argument commenting on defendant's post- 17 Miranda silence violates Doyle). 18 "rests on the fundamental unfairness of implicitly assuring a 19 suspect that his silence will not be used against him and then 20 using his silence to impeach an explanation subsequently offered 21 at trial." 22 Ct. 634, 638, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986) 23 omitted) 24 silence during case-in-chief) . 25 See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618-19. Indeed, the prosecutor See The rationale for this rule Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291, 106 S. (internal quotation marks (holding that prosecution may not use defendant's Miranda protections are generally triggered "only where 26 there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to 27 render him in custody." 28 322, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1528, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994) Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 19 (internal 1 quotation marks omitted). "[I]n custody" means "formal arrest or 2 3 4 5 6 7 would appear to apply any time a suspect has been read his 8 Miranda rights and receives the implicit assurance that his 9 silence won't be used against him at trial. restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1275 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). (per curiam) It is not at all clear, however, that a suspect must be in custody for Doyle to apply; it See Doyle, 426 U.S. 10 at 618-19 (reasoning that when suspect chooses to remain silent 11 after being assured by Miranda warning that he has right to 12 remain silent, assurance that his silence "will carry no penalty" 13 is "implicit" and thus "it would be fundamentally unfair and a 14 deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence 15 to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at 16 trial"); see also Kappos v. Hanks, 54 F.3d 365, 368-69 (7th Cir. 17 1995) 18 silence to impeach defendant who claimed that reason for not 19 continuing to answer police questions was that he was ill). 20 (finding Doyle violation in use of pre-arrest, post-Miranda But assuming someone must be in custody for Doyle to apply, 21 neither Miranda nor its Supreme Court progeny set down any 22 bright-line rule or specific test for determining when that has 23 taken place. 24 the circumstances of each case must be examined to determine 25 whether the suspect was in custody. 26 541 U.S. 652, 661-62, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2148, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938 27 (2004). 28 1) the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and 2) whether Instead, those cases suggest that the totality of See Yarborough v. Alvarado, The determination is based on an objective inquiry into 20 1 a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to end the 2 interrogation and leave, given those circumstances. 3 Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S. Ct. 457, 465, 133 L. Ed. 2d 383 4 (1995). 5 questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, 6 the presence or absence of physical restraints during the Thompson v. Relevant factors include "the location of the 7 questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the 8 questioning." 9 1189, 182 L. Ed. 2d 17 (2012) Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1181, (citations omitted). The 10 subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or 11 the person being questioned are irrelevant to the custody 12 determination; the test is an objective one, and "the ultimate 13 inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint 14 on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal 15 arrest." 16 and alteration omitted) . 17 Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322 (internal quotation marks When Doyle has been violated, a petitioner is not entitled 18 to habeas relief "unless the error 'had substantial and injurious 19 effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" 20 619 F.3d at 1089-90 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 21 622, 637-38, 113 S. ct. 1710, 1714, 1722, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 22 (1993)). 23 habeas court "attempts to determine not whether the jury would 24 have decided the same way even in the absence of the error, but 25 whether the error influenced the jury." 26 (internal quotation marks omitted). 27 considers "(1) the extent of the comments, 28 inference of guilt from silence was stressed to the jury, and (3) Hurd, In evaluating whether Doyle error was harmless, the 21 Hurd, 619 F.3d at 1090 In doing so, the court (2) whether an 1 the extent of other evidence suggesting the defendant's guilt." 2 3 4 5 6 7 Id. (alterations omitted). A federal habeas court applies the harmless-error standard enumerated in Brecht "without regard for the state court's harmlessness determination." Merolillo v. Yates, 663 F.3d 444, 455 (9th Cir. 2011). C. Analysis Respondent concedes that under Hurd, Petitioner's answers 8 were unambiguous and did invoke his right to silence (Mem. P & A 9 at 14-15) but argues that Doyle nonetheless does not apply 10 because Petitioner was not in custody when Officer Miranda read 11 him his Miranda rights and subsequently questioned him concerning 12 the incident (id. at 15). 13 testified that he was not read his Miranda rights at all. 14 (Lodged Doc. 7, 4 Rep.'s Tr. at 1852-53.) 15 Doyle would not apply unless he was in fact in custody at the 16 time of his silence. 17 905, 912 (9th Cir. 2001) 18 "regardless whether the Miranda warnings are actually given, 19 comment on the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent 20 is unconstitutional" 21 omitted)). Petitioner, on the other hand, In that circumstance, See United States v. Bushyhead, 270 F.3d (once a defendant is in custody, (alterations and internal quotation marks 22 The Court need not decide whether Doyle applies pre-arrest, 23 post-Miranda or whether Petitioner was in fact in custody or was 24 read his Miranda rights because, as the California Court of 25 Appeal found, any error was harmless. 26 27 call, under the three-factor test set out in Hurd, any Doyle error likely did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or 28 influence" on the jury's verdict and was therefore harmless. 22 Although it is a close 1 As in Hurd, the prosecutor "repeatedly stressed 2 3 4 provide an alternative explanation for his silence; here, in 5 contrast, the jury had the option to believe that Petitioner's 6 silence was, as he testified (Lodged Doc. 7, 4 Rep.'s Tr. at 7 1847-53), a result of his suffering a "heart attack" or other 8 illness rather than because he was conscious of his guilt. 9 Indeed, Officer Miranda testified that Petitioner was taken to 10 the hospital that evening and given an EKG because of his chest 11 pains. 12 impact on the jury than in Hurd. 13 (holding that Doyle error was harmless when petitioner "later 14 testified at trial and provided his own explanation for his 15 silence and for his actions"). 16 which little evidence of the petitioner's guilt existed and some 17 physical evidence corroborated his trial testimony, see 619 F.3d 18 at 1090, here ample other evidence of Petitioner's guilt existed 19 and his story was belied by the physical evidence. 20 of appeal pointed out, Petitioner's theory of self-defense was 21 incredible given the undisputed fact that Petitioner stabbed the 22 victim 25 times yet "escaped without a scratch." 23 at 9.) 24 that fact alone. 25 harmless when ample other physical and forensic evidence cast 26 doubt on petitioner's story that shooting of victim was 27 accidental). 28 Petitioner had apparently already admitted to officers, before he [Petitioner's] silence to the jury as evidence of his guilt[.]" 619 F.3d at 1090. In that case, however, the petitioner did not Accordingly, the prosecutor's comments likely had less Accord Kappos, 54 F.3d at 369 Moreover, unlike in Hurd, in As the court (Lodged Doc. 4 The jury could have, and likely did, base its verdict on Accord Brecht, 507 U.S. at 639 (Doyle error Finally, the error was also harmless because 23 1 was Mirandized and subsequently refused to answer some questions, 2 3 4 5 6 7 that he had stabbed someone in self-defense. Thus, any Doyle error the trial court committed in allowing evidence and argument concerning Petitioner's post-Miranda silence was harmless in light of the alternative explanation offered for Petitioner's silence and the strong evidence against him, and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 8 II. The court of appeal reasonably held that the trial court did 9 not err in refusing to allow Munoz's testimony that Escobar 10 assaulted and threatened her during trial 11 Petitioner's second ground for relief alleges that the trial 12 court violated his rights to due process and to present a defense 13 when it excluded evidence of Munoz's claim, in the midst of 14 trial, that Escobar had recently assaulted her and threatened to 15 harm her and her children if she testified. (Pet. at 7.) 16 During trial, the court allowed Petitioner to attack 17 Escobar's credibility by introducing evidence that he had one 18 misdemeanor and two felony convictions and used an alias, a 19 "phony" identification card, and a "fake" green card. 20 Doc. 7, 2 Rep.'s Tr. at 601-03, 607-13; 3 Rep.'s Tr. at 920-24.) 21 The defense also put on seven witnesses, including Munoz, who 22 testified that Escobar had a violent character. 23 3 Rep.'s Tr. at 1216-94; 4 Rep.'s Tr. at 1545, 1547-49.) 24 specifically testified that on another occasion, Escobar had 25 threatened to harm her if she testified against him at trial. 26 (Lodged Doc. 7, 4 Rep.'s Tr. at 1545, 1547-49.) 27 evidence had been presented, the defense sought to introduce 28 evidence that Escobar had assaulted Munoz during a weekend break 24 (Lodged (Lodged Doc. 7, Munoz After that 1 in the trial and threatened to hurt her and her children if she 2 testified. 3 evidence under California Evidence Code section 352, finding that 4 it was cumulative in light of the ample other evidence the jury 5 6 7 8 9 had already heard regarding Escobar's violent character; the (Id. at 1508-10.) The trial court excluded the court noted that the evidence would also be unduly timeconsuming. (Id. at 1521, 1543, 1567-68.) The court of appeal rejected Petitioner's claim that the exclusion of the evidence violated his constitutional rights: 10 As he did in the trial court, [Petitioner] urges the 11 victim's character for violence was relevant to support 12 his 13 [Petitioner] ignores the fact that he presented a number 14 of witnesses who testified to the victim's aggressive ยท15 self-defense nature. claim. Although he is correct, Sandra Munoz, her three children, Leonel Guizar, 16 Maria Ruelas, and Sotelo Garcia testified that the victim 17 was 18 threatened to kill [Petitioner]. 19 to two other incidents when the victim threatened her. 20 There 21 concerning a third such incident was cumulative. 22 other side of the scale, the court was aware that there 23 were other witnesses who would be called if Munoz was 24 allowed to give her version of events. 25 there was a neighbor who observed the incident and the 26 prosecutor stated there were two deputies who interviewed 27 Munoz on the night in question and took pictures. 28 the aggressive. can be cumulative Some little nature witnesses Munoz's 25 that he had Indeed, Munoz testified question of stated that her testimony On the [Petitioner] said testimony Given and the 1 consumption of time that would have been expended on the 2 matter, 3 4 testimony was not arbitrary or capricious. 5 6 the trial court's decision to exclude the We discern no error. (Lodged Doc. 4 at 11.) Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to present 7 relevant evidence in their own defense. 8 9 South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1731, 164 L. 10 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process 11 or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution 12 guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to 13 present a complete defense." 14 "However, a defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not 15 unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions, such 16 as evidentiary and procedural rules." Moses v. Payne, .555 F.3d 17 742, 757 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 18 and brackets omitted). 19 have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules 20 excluding evidence from criminal trials." 21 324 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Moses, 555 F.3d 22 at 757 ("[T]he Supreme Court has indicated its approval of 23 well-established rules of evidence that permit trial judges to 24 exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain 25 other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 26 27 or potential to mislead the jury." (internal quotation marks and 28 Ed. 2d 503 (2006) See, e.g., Holmes v. ("Whether rooted directly in the Due Process (internal quotation marks omitted)). (as amended) Indeed, "[s]tate and federal rulemakers Holmes, 547 U.S. at brackets omitted)). The exclusion of evidence pursuant to a state evidentiary 26 1 rule is unconstitutional only if it "significantly undermined 2 3 fundamental elements of the defendant's defense." v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1267-68, 140 L. 4 Ed. 2d 413 (1998); see also Moses, 555 F.3d at 757 ("Evidentiary 5 6 7 rules do not violate a defendant's constitutional rights unless United States they infringe upon a weighty interest of the accused and are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed 8 to serve." (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). 9 In sum, it takes "unusually compelling circumstances to outweigh the 10 strong state interest in administration of its trials." 11 555 F.3d at 757 (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted) . 12 The court of appeal's rejection of this claim was not Moses, 13 objectively unreasonable. 14 allowed to put on ample evidence to impeach Escobar's credibility 15 and to show that he had a violent character. 16 evidence was not only cumulative, it was also somewhat suspect 17 given Munoz's delay in reporting the alleged incident to the 18 police (see Lodged Doc. 7, 4 Rep.'s Tr. at 1501-07) and her 19 relationship with Petitioner and desire to see him acquitted (id. 20 at 1513-14). 21 evidence would have been time-consuming to put on, given that 22 there were several other witnesses to the incident who would 23 likely have been called to testify and cross-examined. 24 of appeal's ruling that the trial court reasonably exercised its 25 discretion to exclude cumulative and unduly time-consuming 26 evidence was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of 27 clearly established federal law. 28 habeas relief on this claim. As that court noted, Petitioner was The additional Moreover, as the court of appeal noted, the 27 The court Petitioner is not entitled to 1 III. Petitioner's instructional-error claim is not cognizable on 2 habeas review; in any event, any error was harmless 3 Petitioner'S third ground for relief alleges that the trial 4 court erred in giving a flight instruction to the jury because 5 Petitioner did not flee the scene of the crime to evade police 6 but instead drove directly to the police station. 7 The jury was instructed under CALCRIM No. 372 as follows: (Pet. at 8.) 8 If [Petitioner] fled or tried to flee immediately after 9 the crime was committed, that conduct may show that he 10 was 11 [Petitioner] fled, it is up to you to decide the meaning 12 and importance of that conduct. 13 [Petitioner] fled or tried to flee cannot prove guilt by 14 itself. aware of his guilt. If you conclude that However, evidence that 15 (Lodged Doc. 7, 5 Rep.'s Tr. at 2132; see also Lodged Doc. 8, 16 Clerk's Tr. at 87.) 17 The court of appeal observed, "It is difficult to conclude 18 that [Petitioner] was attempting to flee when he went directly to 19 the police station and was subsequently arrested." 20 4 at 11-12.) 21 giving the flight instruction, but the error was harmless in 22 light of the "wealth of evidence demonstrating [Petitioner]'s 23 guilt." 24 (Lodged Doc. It therefore held that the trial court erred in (Id.) Claims of error in state jury instructions are generally 25 matters of state law only. 26 343, 113 S. Ct. 2112, 2118, 124 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1993); see also 27 Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1480-81 (9th Cir. 1995). 28 state-law instructional error "does not alone raise a ground See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 28 A 1 cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding." 2 3 4 Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988) petitioner demonstrates that "[an] ailing instruction by itself 5 so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 6 violates due process." marks omitted). 7 s. Dunckhurst v. (internal quotation Habeas relief is available only when a Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 Ct. 475, 482, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991) (internal quotation 8 marks omitted). 9 the context of other instructions and the trial record as a A challenged instruction must be evaluated in 10 whole, not in artificial isolation. 11 456 U.S. 152, 169, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 12 (1982). Id.; united States v. Frady, 13 Petitioner does not claim that the giving of the flight 14 instruction violated his federal constitutional rights; his claim 15 is thus not cognizable on habeas review. See Mitchell v. 16 Goldsmith, 878 F. 2d 319, 324 (9th Cir. 1989) (when petitioner 17 "does not contend that the instruction violated federal J 18 constitutional standards . . . no relief can be granted even if 19 the instruction given might not have been correct as a matter of 20 state law") . 21 Even if this claim did present a federal constitutional 22 question, any error was harmless. 23 correctly admonished the jurors not to base a finding of guilt on 24 Petitioner's flight alone. 25 no evidence existed that he improperly fled the scene of the 26 crime, the instruction by its very terms would have played no 27 role in the jury's deliberations. 28 followed the instructions as given. The wording of the instruction Moreover, if, as Petitioner contends, 29 The jury is presumed to have See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 ~ 1 U.S. 225, 234, 120 S. Ct. 727, 733, 145 L. Ed. 2d 727 (2000). 2 Thus, the jury's decision to convict Petitioner could not have 3 been derived in meaningful part from its assessment of 4 Petitioner's flight. 5 guilty because he admitted to stabbing Escobar numerous times - 6 the evidence showed that there were 25 different injuries - and 7 8 sustained no injuries himself, rendering his claim of selfdefense incredible. 9 (9th Cir. 2003) Rather, the jury likely found Petitioner See Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159, 1172 ("The evidence was so overwhelming that the 10 constitutional error cannot be said to have had an effect upon 11 the verdict in the case at hand.") 12 Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 13 14 15 For all these reasons, ORDER IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered denying the Petition and dismissing this action with prejudice. 16 17 18 DATED: May 29, 2012 JEAN ROSENBLUTH U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 30
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
