James Bozajian v. County of Los Angeles et al, No. 2:2012cv00625 - Document 45 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS CONVERTED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 41 , MOTION TO DISMISS 34 , AND MOTION TO STRIKE 35 . Defendants shall file their answer to the Second Amended Complaint within 14 days of this order by Judge Otis D. Wright, II. (lc) . Modified on 1/29/2013 (lc).
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
James Bozajian v. County of Los Angeles et al Doc. 45 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 JAMES BOZAJIAN, 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 v. Plaintiff, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; STEVE COOLEY, individually and in his official capacity; CURTIS HAZELL, individually and in his official capacity; JOHN SPILLANE, individually and in his official capacity; JOHN ZAJEC, individually and in his official capacity; JACQUELYN LACEY, individually and in her official capacity; JANET MOORE, individually and in her official capacity; SHARON MATSUMOTO, individually and in her official capacity and DOES 1–10; Case No. 2:12-cv-00625-ODW(JCx) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ CONVERTED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [41], MOTION TO DISMISS [34], AND MOTION TO STRIKE [35] Defendants. 18 19 20 Defendants County of Los Angeles, Steve Cooley, Curtis Hazell, John Spillane, 21 John Zajec, Jacquelyn Lacey, Janet Moore, and Sharon Matsumoto filed three motions 22 with this Court. The first is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 34.) The 23 Court converted the Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment on the 24 sole issue of statute of limitations (i.e., the second motion). (ECF No. 41.) The third 25 motion is Defendants’ Motion to Strike. (ECF No. 35.) For the reasons explained 26 below, the three motions are DENIED.1 27 28 1 Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to these motions, the Court deems the matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. Dockets.Justia.com I. 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff James Bozajian has been employed since 1990 as a Deputy District 3 Attorney (“Deputy DA”) for the County of Los Angeles. (SAC ¶ 8.) Defendant Steve 4 Cooley was the District Attorney for the County of Los Angeles, and Defendants 5 Curtis Hazell, John Spillane, John Zajec, Jacquelyn Lacey, Janet Moore, and Sharon 6 Matsumoto were top ranking officials in the Cooley administration. (SAC ¶¶ 10–11.) 7 Bozajian alleges that Defendants illegally discriminated against him at work, in 8 matters pertaining to promotions, transfers, and discipline. (SAC ¶ 11.) Cooley and Bozajian used to be friends—but through the years, they parted 9 10 ways. (SAC ¶¶ 23–25.) Bozajian served on the Board of Directors for the 11 Association of Deputy District Attorneys (“ADDA”), an organization that Cooley 12 allegedly approved of at one time. (SAC ¶¶ 23–28.) After Cooley’s 2000 election 13 victory, Bozajian claims that Cooley changed—he became critical of the ADDA. 14 (SAC ¶¶ 29–32.) 15 ADDA Board of Directors, and admitted that Bozajian was one of his top political 16 enemies. (SAC ¶¶ 29–30, 33.) Cooley allegedly urged Bozajian to not seek reelection to the 17 Bozajian’s Second Amended Complaint recounts various incidents between 18 2001 and 2010 where Defendants discriminated against him for either (1) affiliating 19 with the ADDA, or (2) criticizing the Cooley administration. For instance, between 20 2001 and 2010, Bozajian’s duty assignments were changed annually, something 21 Bozajian claims is highly unusual for a Deputy DA of his seniority. (SAC ¶¶ 34–35.) 22 He also alleges that these transfers were punitive, and happened not only to him, but 23 to other top Deputy DAs that criticized Cooley. (SAC ¶¶ 36, 39–42, 88–99.) 24 Bozajian admits that he publically criticized some of Cooley’s actions, as well 25 as those of Cooley’s closest allies. For example, in 2005, Bozajian and the ADDA 26 criticized Cooley for: his lawsuit seeking to overturn voter-imposed term limits; his 27 political stance towards California’s Three Strikes law; and his derogatory comments 28 concerning a jury that acquitted Robert Blake of murder. (SAC ¶¶ 43–46.) Bozajian 2 1 also uncovered an instance of prosecutorial misconduct concerning a sexual- 2 relationship cover-up, openly opposed Cooley in his 2008 reelection, and criticized 3 Lacey in her 2009 efforts to become United States Attorney for the Central District of 4 California. (SAC ¶¶ 54–72, 100–104, 114–118.) 5 In addition to the punitive assignment transfers, Bozajian alleges that 6 Defendants retaliated against his constitutionally protected activities by: unfairly 7 denying him a promotion; improperly lowering his performance review; suspending 8 him; and ransacking his office. (SAC ¶¶ 47–49, 51–53, 73–75, 102–104, 119–131.) 9 Ultimately, Bozajian received a 30-day suspension, which began on January 25, 10 2010. In response, Bozajian filed a complaint on January 26, 2010, with the Los 11 Angeles County Civil Service Commission (“LACCSC”). 12 Bozajian subsequently filed this federal suit and withdrew his complaint with the 13 LACCSC. (SAC ¶ 135.) (SAC ¶ 132–133.) 14 Defendants now seek to dismiss Bozajian’s claims, contending that he: (1) is 15 barred under the statute of limitations; (2) fails to allege with sufficient specificity 16 what individual defendants have done; and (3) fails to state a Monell claim against the 17 County. (ECF No. 34.) The Court converted the Motion to Dismiss, as to the statute 18 of limitations issue, into a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 19 Procedure 12(d). (ECF Nos. 40, 41.) Defendants also filed a Motion to Strike 20 portions of Bozajian’s Second Amended Complaint, alleging those portions are 21 immaterial, impertinent, and scandalous. (ECF No. 35.) The Court first turns to the 22 statute of limitations issue. II. 23 24 A. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Legal standard 25 Summary judgment should be granted if there are no genuine issues of material 26 fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. 27 P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a 28 genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). 3 1 Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the 2 pleadings and identify specific facts through admissible evidence that show a genuine 3 issue for trial. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Conclusory or speculative testimony in 4 affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat 5 summary judgment. Thornhill’s Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th 6 Cir. 1979). 7 A genuine issue of material fact must be more than a scintilla of evidence, or 8 evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative. Addisu v. Fred 9 Meyer, 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). A disputed fact is “material” where the 10 resolution of that fact might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. 11 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1968). An issue is “genuine” if 12 the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving 13 party. Id. Where the moving and nonmoving parties’ versions of events differ, courts 14 are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most 15 favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). 16 B. Bozajian’s conduct suffices to invoke equitable tolling 17 Defendants assert that the two-year statute of limitations has run for Bozajian’s 18 civil rights claims. (Mot. Summ. J. at 3.) On October 19, 2009, Bozajian received a 19 letter titled “Notice of Intent to Suspend.” (SAC ¶ 119.) On January 6, 2010, he 20 received a “Notice of Suspension” letter. (SAC ¶ 129.) He then filed a complaint 21 with the LACCSC on January 26, 2010, to contest his suspension. (SAC ¶ 132.) 22 About two years later on January 24, 2012, he initiated this federal suit. 23 The controlling statute of limitations for a claim arising under the Civil Rights 24 Acts of 1866 and 1871 is the most appropriate one provided by state law. Donoghue 25 v. County of Orange, 848 F.2d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 1987). The parties do not dispute 26 that Bozajian’s claims are governed by the two-year statute of limitations under 27 California Code of Civil Procedure section 351.1. And depending on the date of 28 accrual for Bozajian’s claims, he may have run out of time. 4 1 Assuming that the two-year statute of limitations has expired, Bozajian raises 2 the defense of equitable tolling. Along with the limitations period, federal courts 3 borrow a state’s equitable tolling rules for cases under the Civil Rights Acts, absent a 4 reason not to do so. Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 486–87 (1980). 5 California’s equitable tolling doctrine has three requirements: (1) timely notice to the 6 defendant in filing the first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to defendant in gathering 7 evidence against the second claim; and (3) good faith and reasonable conduct by the 8 plaintiff. Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1137–38 (9th 9 Cir. 2001). Defendants only attack the good faith and reasonable conduct 10 requirement. The Court finds no evidence suggesting that the first two requirements 11 are not satisfied. 12 allegations in his LACCSC complaint, there is no prejudice to them in gathering 13 evidence for this federal case. And because Defendants have been on notice of Bozajian’s 14 The good faith and reasonable conduct requirement is not satisfied where a 15 plaintiff “simply allowed the statute on his second claim nearly to run or deliberately 16 misled the defendant into believing the second claim would not be filed.” Id. at 1138. 17 But equitable tolling can still apply where a plaintiff voluntarily terminated an 18 alternate proceeding. McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88, 19 111–12 (2008). 20 Defendants allege that the good faith and reasonable conduct requirement is not 21 met because Bozajian strategically dropped his LACCSC complaint. (Mot. Summ. 22 J. 5.) In response, Bozajian explained that: 23 An attorney provided by the American Federation of State, County, and 24 Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”) represented Bozajian in his 25 LACCSC complaint. (Bozajian Decl. ¶ 3.) 26 After about a year, in January 2011, Bozajian’s attorney had to withdraw 27 because AFSCME withdrew funding—and so, Bozajian continued pro se 28 in his case because he could not afford an attorney. (Id. ¶¶ 14–18.) 5 1 Despite lasting another five months, Bozajian decided to drop his 2 LACCSC complaint due to his workload and inexperience with civil 3 cases. (Id. ¶¶ 17–20.) 4 5 Bozajian then obtained an attorney on contingency to take up his cause, and filed this federal suit on January 24, 2012. (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.) 6 Given this evidence, the Court concludes that Bozajian acted reasonably and in 7 good faith under the circumstances. The fact that he dropped his other proceeding 8 does not show that he acted in bad faith. Other than this fact, Defendants cite no other 9 evidence of bad faith. 10 Defendants also claim that equitable tolling should not apply because Bozajian 11 is now pursuing different remedies than those in his LACCSC complaint. (Mot. 12 Summ. J. 4.) Yet the purpose of equitable tolling is to allow a plaintiff, when 13 possessing several potential remedies as to one wrong, to pursue only one remedy as 14 to that wrong and not lose the possibility of pursuing other remedies down the road. 15 Daviton, 241 F.3d at 1141. 16 LACCSC complaint and this federal suit is that of discrimination and retaliation for 17 exercising his First Amendment rights. The remedies, however, are different—but 18 this does not preclude Bozajian from seeking redress in this lawsuit given the similar 19 underlying facts between his two cases. 20 21 Here, the wrong that Bozajian alleges in both his Thus, the Court finds that Bozajian is entitled to equitable tolling. III. MOTION TO DISMISS 22 Bozajian’s Second Amended Complaint asserts four causes of action: 23 (1) violation of the First Amendment (freedom of speech) against all individual 24 Defendants; (2) violation of the First Amendment (freedom of speech) against the 25 County; (3) violation of the First Amendment (freedom of association) against all 26 individual Defendants; and (4) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (equal 27 protection) against all individual Defendants. 28 addresses two overarching problems with the Second Amended Complaint—that it: 6 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 1 fails to adequately allege what the individual Defendants have done; and fails to state 2 a Monell claim against the County. The Court addresses these two arguments in turn. 3 A. Legal standard 4 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based on “the lack of a cognizable legal 5 theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 6 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A complaint 7 need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short 8 and plain statement—to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 9 Rule 12(b)(6). Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 8(a)(2). For a complaint to sufficiently state a claim, its “[f]actual allegations must be 11 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 12 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While specific facts are not necessary so long as 13 the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which 14 the claim rests, a complaint must nevertheless “contain sufficient factual matter, 15 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 16 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 17 Iqbal’s plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 18 defendant has acted unlawfully,” but does not go so far as to impose a “probability 19 requirement.” Id. Rule 8 demands more than a complaint that is merely consistent 20 with a defendant’s liability—labels and conclusions, or formulaic recitals of the 21 elements of a cause of action do not suffice. Id. Instead, the complaint must allege 22 sufficient underlying facts to provide fair notice and enable the defendant to defend 23 itself effectively. 24 determination whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a “context- 25 specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 26 common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The 27 When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court is generally limited to the 28 pleadings and must construe “[a]ll factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as 7 1 true and . . . in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].” Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 2 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and 3 unreasonable inferences need not be blindly accepted as true by the court. Sprewell v. 4 Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Yet, a complaint should be 5 dismissed only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts” 6 supporting plaintiff’s claim for relief. Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 7 1999). 8 B. 9 Bozajian states sufficient facts to raise a right to relief Defendants argue that the claims against them are overly broad and fail to 10 “provide any insight as to the conduct of the individual defendants.” (Mot. 11 Dismiss 7–8.) Defendants contend that Bozajian’s vague allegations, spanning over a 12 ten-year period, lack sufficient details to state a claim for relief, provide insufficient 13 notice to give Defendants an opportunity to defend, and improperly meld all 14 Defendants together as tortfeasors. 15 The Court notes that Bozajian primarily directs his allegations towards Cooley. 16 For instance, Bozajian alleges that: Cooley told him not to seek re-election to the 17 ADDA Board of Directors (SAC ¶ 29); Cooley ordered punitive transfers for Bozajian 18 (SAC ¶ 38); and Cooley stated that Bozajian was one of his top political enemies 19 (SAC ¶ 33). Bozajian then asserts that the remaining individual Defendants—Hazell, 20 Spillane, Zajec, Lacey, Moore, and Matsumoto—are top ranking Cooley- 21 administration officials that carried out Cooley’s discrimination campaign against 22 him. (SAC ¶¶ 11–14.) 23 Yet there are few specific allegations against these other Defendants. For 24 example, the only allegation specifically against Moore is that she signed the “Notice 25 and Intent to Suspend” letter. (SAC ¶¶ 119–120.) Similarly, the only allegation 26 specifically against Matsumoto is that she wrote and signed the “Notice of 27 Suspension” letter. (SAC ¶ 130.) But Bozajian also alleges that both these acts— 28 along with others—were performed under orders from Cooley and his staff. (SAC 8 1 ¶¶ 123–128.) Unlike in Iqbal, these facts are sufficient to state a cause of action 2 against each of the individual Defendants. 3 In Iqbal, the plaintiff pleaded that his jailers “kicked him in the stomach, 4 punched him in the face, and dragged him across his cell without justification.” 556 5 U.S. at 668. Then, plaintiff concluded that defendants Ashcroft and Mueller “knew 6 of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject him to harsh conditions 7 of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of his religion, race, and/or 8 national origin.” Id. at 680–81. The Supreme Court ruled that while these alleged 9 acts may give rise to a claim of relief against individual jailers (who were not named 10 as defendants), these facts do not suffice for a claim against Ashcroft and Mueller 11 because the pleaded facts do not suggest that the top U.S. law-enforcement officers 12 adopted “a policy of classifying post-September-11 detainees as of high interest 13 because of their race, religion, or national origin.” Id. at 682–84. 14 In contrast, Bozajian alleges specific acts committed against him by top 15 officials in the Cooley administration. He also alleges specific acts committed against 16 him by Cooley. Bozajian then concludes that because of the individual Defendants’ 17 rank and close relationship with Cooley, they all had knowledge of the wrongdoing 18 and were responsible. This contrasts with Iqbal, where the allegedly wrongful acts 19 were committed by low-level employees—many pay grades below that of Ashcroft 20 and Mueller—and presumably committed without express orders from them. But 21 here, Bozajian’s allegations plausibly suggest that the individual Defendants—all top 22 ranking Cooley-administration officials—carried out Cooley’s order and thus, each 23 had a hand in violating his constitutional rights. Thus, the Court finds that the Second 24 Amended Complaint states sufficient facts for relief against the individual Defendants. 25 C. Bozajian states sufficient facts for a Monell claim 26 Municipalities can be held liable under section 1983 actions in three 27 circumstances: (1) the employee acted according to an expressly adopted official 28 policy; (2) the employee acted as a final policymaker; or (3) the employee acted 9 1 according to a longstanding practice or custom. Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1164 2 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to establish liability under a custom or practice, the plaintiff 3 must show that the pattern of activity is persistent, widespread, and well-settled 4 policy. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). 5 Bozajian alleges, as discussed above, retaliatory acts designed to punish him for 6 exercising his first amendment rights, including punitive transfers, denial of 7 promotion, poor performance reviews, and suspension. Although Bozajian only seeks 8 redress for the suspension commencing on January 25, 2010, these other wrongful acts 9 committed against him suggest that the Cooley administration had an informal 10 practice of discriminating against those who affiliated with the ADDA or are critical 11 of the Cooley administration. Further, Bozajian includes additional examples of this 12 discriminatory practice applied to other Deputy DAs, such as the punitive transfers of 13 Steve Ipsen and Marc Debbaudt. (SAC ¶¶ 39–42, 88–99.) Finally, by alleging these 14 wrongful acts in light of his seniority and Cooley’s direct remarks against him and the 15 ADDA, Bozajian presents sufficient evidence to suggest that these retaliatory acts 16 carried out by Cooley’s staff, were done under direct orders from Cooley himself—the 17 final policymaker at the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office. In short, 18 assuming all of the allegations are true, the Court finds that the events complained 19 about by Bozajian were plausibly performed under Cooley’s orders in retaliation 20 against Bozajian’s criticism and his association with the ADDA. And thus, this is 21 sufficient to support a Monell claim against the County. 22 IV. MOTION TO STRIKE 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) states that “[t]he court may strike from a 24 pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 25 scandalous matter.” 26 expenditure of time and money in litigating spurious issues by disposing of them prior 27 to trial. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993). 28 /// The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the 10 1 As to Defendants’ request to strike punitive damages, Bozajian properly seeks 2 punitive damages against the individual Defendants, not in their official capacities, but 3 in their individual capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). And as to 4 Bozajian’s allegations of retaliatory acts committed by the individual Defendants 5 towards other Deputy DAs under the Cooley administration, these incidents are 6 relevant to demonstrate a custom or practice, through which Bozajian may establish 7 Monell liability against the County. The Court finds no reason to strike these portions 8 of the Second Amended Complaint. 9 Further, the Court also finds no reason to strike the portions of the Second 10 Amended Complaint that narrate Defendant Hazell’s affair with a death penalty 11 witness or refer to Cooley’s use of investigators to gag media coverage. The Hazell 12 affair supports Bozajian’s claims that Cooley retaliated against him for exposing this 13 incident. And the gagging account is another example of Cooley’s discrimination 14 against the ADDA and those involved with the organization. Moreover, the Court 15 does not find any of these allegations to be scandalous or offensive. Therefore, 16 Defendants’ Motion to Strike is DENIED. V. 17 18 CONCLUSION For the above reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary 19 Judgment, Motion to Dismiss, and Motion to Strike. 20 Defendants shall file their answer to the Second Amended Complaint within 14 days 21 of this order. 22 23 (ECF Nos. 34, 35, 41.) IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: January 28, 2013 24 25 26 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28 11
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
