Mufazzal Ghulam Fazal v. Michael J Astrue, No. 2:2012cv00221 - Document 18 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Patrick J. Walsh. (ca)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 MUFAZZAL GHULAM FAZAL, Plaintiff, 11 12 13 14 v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. 15 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 12-221-PJW MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 16 17 I. 18 INTRODUCTION 19 Before the Court is Plaintiff s appeal of a decision by Defendant 20 Social Security Administration ( the Agency ), denying his application 21 for disability insurance benefits ( DIB ). 22 Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) erred when she: 1) rejected the 23 examining psychiatrist s opinion that he suffered from a severe 24 psychological impairment; and 2) determined that he could perform his 25 past work. 26 the ALJ did not err. 27 28 Plaintiff claims that the For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that 1 II. 2 SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 3 Plaintiff applied for DIB in October 2005, alleging that he had 4 been unable to work since November 2003, due to carpal tunnel syndrome 5 and back, knee, and neck pain. 6 The Agency denied his application initially. 7 requested and was granted a hearing before an ALJ. 8 Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified at the hearing. 9 106.) 10 (Administrative Record ( AR ) 206-07.) (AR 124-29.) He then (AR 130, 133.) (AR 77- The ALJ subsequently issued a decision denying benefits. (AR 108-17.) 11 Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, which remanded the 12 case to the ALJ to, among other things, determine whether Plaintiff 13 suffered from a mental impairment. 14 second hearing and thereafter issued a second decision, finding that 15 Plaintiff did not suffer from a severe mental impairment and could 16 perform his past work as a quality assistance coordinator. 17 40-76.) Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied 18 review. He then commenced this action. 19 20 III. A. (AR 120-22.) The ALJ held a (AR 19-35, ANALYSIS The ALJ s Rejection of the Examining Psychiatrist s Opinion 21 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred when she rejected examining 22 psychiatrist Christopher Ho s opinion that he suffered from adjustment 23 disorder and would have difficulty performing complex tasks. 24 Stip. at 3-6, 16-18.) 25 the ALJ did not err. 26 (Joint For the following reasons, the Court finds that The starting -and ultimately ending--point for the Court s 27 analysis of the ALJ s treatment of Dr. Ho s opinion is the ALJ s 28 finding that Plaintiff was not credible. 2 (AR 29-32.) Plaintiff has 1 not challenged that finding, which the Court accepts as true and 2 reviews the ALJ s decision in that light. 3 Dr. Ho s opinion that Plaintiff had a psychological impairment 4 that precluded the performance of complex tasks was based almost 5 entirely on Plaintiff s statements to him during the examination. 6 Ho makes that clear at the outset of his report: The source of 7 information for this evaluation was the patient . . . . 8 He reiterates this in the Functional Assessment section of the 9 report wherein he explains that his opinion is based on Plaintiff s Dr. (AR 467.) 10 history, presentation and mental status exam, . . . . 11 The mental status exams that Dr. Ho refers to were entirely within 12 Plaintiff s control. 13 names of three objects and asked him five minutes later to recall the 14 objects. 15 one of them. 16 whether Plaintiff was telling the truth and based his assessment on 17 the assumption that Plaintiff was. 18 (AR 469.) (AR 470.) For example, Dr. Ho provided Plaintiff with the Plaintiff reported that he could only remember (AR 469.) Obviously, Dr. Ho had no way of knowing Where, as here, Dr. Ho s opinion was based almost exclusively on 19 Plaintiff s representations and Plaintiff was found to be not 20 credible, the ALJ was empowered to reject Dr. Ho s opinion on that 21 basis alone. 22 (9th Cir. 1999) (approving ALJ s rejection of psychiatrists opinions 23 based, in part, on the fact that they were premised on claimant s 24 subjective complaints, which the ALJ found to be incredible); Fair v. 25 Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding ALJ s rejection of 26 treating doctor s opinion that was based solely on discredited 27 statements claimant made to treating doctor). See Morgan v. Comm r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 602 28 3 1 The ALJ also rejected Dr. Ho s opinion for other reasons, 2 including the fact that, [i]n the composite, Dr. Ho s examination 3 does not support his assessment that the claimant would have 4 difficulty with complex tasks. 5 to this finding and others like it and argues that they are too 6 general. 7 disagrees. 8 rejecting Dr. Ho s opinion were wrong, the fact that Dr. Ho s opinion 9 was premised on Plaintiff s representations and these representations 10 were untrue justifies the ALJ s decision to reject Dr. Ho s opinion. 11 As such, Plaintiff s objections here do not warrant remand or 12 reversal.1 13 (AR 27.) Plaintiff takes exception He contends that this error mandates reversal. The Court Even assuming that all of the ALJ s other reasons for This same analysis applies to the ALJ s treatment of the other 14 doctors opinions. Those opinions were also based in large measure on 15 what Plaintiff told the doctors he was feeling and experiencing. 16 clearly, Plaintiff was, at the very least, grossly exaggerating his 17 condition. 18 his right hand and 50 in his left hand in November 2003, when 19 examining orthopedist Richard Siebold tested him. And, For example, Plaintiff exhibited grip strength of 60 in (AR 406.) Without 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 The ALJ also relied on the fact that Plaintiff had never undergone psychiatric treatment. (AR 27.) This was supported by the record and is a valid reason for questioning Dr. Ho s findings. In addition, the ALJ considered the fact that Dr. Ho diagnosed Plaintiff with adjustment disorder, which, according to the medical expert who testified at the hearing, is, by definition, a temporary condition, lasting no more than six months. (AR 44.) As the ALJ concluded, even if Plaintiff had this disorder, it would not satisfy the minimum 12month duration requirement for disability under the law. Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining disability under Social Security law requires showing that impairment precludes claimant from working for continuous period of not less than 12 months). 4 1 explanation, Plaintiff s grip strength in subsequent tests by other 2 doctors purportedly continued to decline, at one point reaching O. 3 (AR 481.) 4 unexplained loss of grip strength to magnification or voluntary 5 inhibition of effort, meaning Plaintiff was faking. 6 ALJ was empowered to reject the doctors opinions that were based on 7 Plaintiff s subjective claims--which were found to be untrue -which 8 she did. 9 the allegations from the claimant that are inconsistent with objective Examining orthopedist Frank Cunningham attributed this (AR 574.) The (AR 31 ( Hence [the doctors ] opinions, when dependent upon 10 diagnostic fact, are correspondingly unreliable, are consequently of 11 little probative value, and are therefore afforded little weight by 12 the undersigned. ).) 13 The bottom line is that Plaintiff s obvious exaggerations 14 throughout this case supported the ALJ s finding that he was not 15 credible. 16 that Plaintiff was impaired because the doctors relied on Plaintiff s 17 representations in formulating their opinions. 18 claimed limitations, there was essentially no evidence to support the 19 doctors opinions. 20 was for a specific and legitimate reason and was based on substantial 21 evidence. 22 B. 23 This credibility finding undermined the doctors opinions Absent Plaintiff s Thus, the ALJ s rejection of the doctors opinions Therefore, it will not be disturbed. The ALJ s Residual Functional Capacity Finding The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional 24 capacity to perform his past work as a quality assurance coordinator. 25 (AR 34.) 26 handle. 27 that he could perform this job because, according to the ALJ, he was This position requires the ability to frequently finger and (AR 71.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in concluding 28 5 1 only capable of occasional fingering and handling. 2 19-22, 24-26.) 3 (Joint Stip. at For the following reasons, the Court disagrees. The ALJ s decision is internally inconsistent. In the heading of 4 the section on residual functional capacity, she states that Plaintiff 5 is capable of frequently fingering and handling. 6 later, in discussing the bases for her residual functional capacity 7 findings, she states that Plaintiff is only capable of occasional 8 fingering and handling. 9 statement accurately captures the ALJ s finding; the Agency argues (AR 33.) 10 that the first statement does. 11 (AR 29.) Four pages Plaintiff argues that the second Court sides with the Agency. 12 For the reasons explained below, the The ALJ made clear in her decision that her findings regarding 13 Plaintiff s physical capabilities were based on reviewing physician F. 14 W. Wilson s opinion. 15 Plaintiff s residual functional capacity, which mirrored Dr. Wilson s. 16 (AR 33, 471-78.) 17 lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, and the ALJ 18 adopted this finding. 19 could stand/walk for two to four hours a day, and so did the ALJ. 20 33, 472.) 21 more than 20 feet, and so did the ALJ. 22 clear that, when it came to fingering and handling, which the ALJ 23 included in this same paragraph, she was intending to adopt Dr. 24 Wilson s finding that Plaintiff could frequently finger and handle. 25 (AR 474.) 26 of a series of functions that she, like Dr. Wilson, had limited to 27 occasional was obviously in error. 28 that she was deviating from Dr. Wilson s findings or explain why. (AR 33.) She then listed her findings regarding For example, Dr. Wilson found that Plaintiff could (AR 33, 472.) Dr. Wilson found that Plaintiff (AR Dr. Wilson found that Plaintiff would need a cane to walk (AR 33, 472.) Thus, it is Her appending the words fingering and handling to the end 6 (AR 33.) Nowhere did she report For 1 this reason, the Court is convinced that the ALJ erred the second time 2 when she stated that Plaintiff was limited to occasional fingering and 3 handling. 4 capable of performing his past work as a quality assurance 5 coordinator, which required frequent fingering and handling, will not 6 be overturned. 7 As such, the ALJ s subsequent finding that Plaintiff was Plaintiff argues that the ALJ also erred when she concluded that 8 he could perform his past work as a quality assurance coordinator 9 because that job is performed at a light level and Plaintiff is only 10 capable of sedentary work. 11 mistaken. 12 ALJ was allowed to assess his ability to perform this job by taking 13 into account the way he performed it in the past. 14 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining ALJ charged with 15 determining whether claimant can perform job as actually performed by 16 claimant in the past or as generally performed in the economy). 17 the ALJ did not err here. 18 (Joint Stip. at 25-26.) Plaintiff is He performed this job at a sedentary level (AR 67) and the Pinto v. Massanari, Thus, Finally, Plaintiff complains that the ALJ failed to include all 19 of his claimed limitations in the hypothetical question to the 20 vocational expert. 21 without merit. 22 claimed limitations in the hypothetical question. 23 required to include those limitations that she found to be supported 24 by the evidence, see Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 (9th 25 Cir. 2001) ( It is, however, proper for an ALJ to limit a hypothetical 26 to those impairments that are supported by substantial evidence in the 27 record. ), which is what she did. 28 that she did not include--which Plaintiff argued at the administrative (Joint Stip. at 26-27, 28.) This argument is The ALJ was not required to include all of Plaintiff s (AR 68-69, 73.) 7 She was only The limitations 1 level and argues here limit his ability to work--are not supported by 2 the record. 3 hypothetical question to the vocational expert. 4 at 1164-65. As such, the ALJ was not required to include them in the Osenbrock, 240 F.3d 5 IV. 6 CONCLUSION 7 For these reasons, the Agency s decision denying Plaintiff s 8 application for DIB is affirmed and the case is dismissed with 9 prejudice. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 DATED: November 15, 2012. 12 13 14 PATRICK J. WALSH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 S:\PJW\Cases-CLOSED\Closed-Soc Sec\FAZAL, 221\Memo Opinion and Order.wpd 8
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