Robert Garber v. Hickman et al, No. 2:2011cv09745 - Document 60 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 57 AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 33 . In addition, the SCHEDULING CONFERENCE set for May 13, 2013 is VACATED by Judge Dean D. Pregerson . (lc). Modified on 5/8/2013 (lc).
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Robert Garber v. Hickman et al Doc. 60 1 2 O 3 4 NO JS-6 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT GARBER, 12 13 14 15 Plaintiff, v. HICKMAN #30355, in her official capacity as a detective for the Los Angeles Police Department, 16 Defendant. 17 ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 11-09745 DDP (RNBx) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Dkt. Nos. 33 & 37 ] 18 19 Presently before the court are Plaintiff Robert Garber’s 20 Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants City of Los Angeles, Los 21 Angeles Police Department, Jennifer Hickman, Jill Niles, and 22 Frances Boateng’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 23 the parties’ submissions, the court adopts the following order. 24 I. Background 25 Having considered The following facts are not disputed.1 26 27 28 1 These facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment(Dkt. No. 52), pp. 11-20, which quotes Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Dkt. No. 37) and responds to each. Dockets.Justia.com 1 On January 6, 2011, in the evening, Los Angeles Police 2 Department officers Lee and Batista responded to a radio call at 3 Woodley Park in Los Angeles of “two men on Woodley bleeding from 4 the face, jumping into traffic.” 5 Woodley from Burbank Blvd and came across a rescue ambulance (LAFD 6 090) treating an unknown person. 7 being treated in the rescue ambulance by LA Fire Department 8 personnel. 9 that he had been flagged down by passing motorists. The officers responded northbound Officers encountered Mr. Garber Witness Hal Dejong arrived and stated to the officers Dejong 10 reported to Officer Batista that Mr. Garber explained to Dejong 11 that he heard a loud knock at his trailer, which was parked on 12 Woodley Ave. 13 and encountered a male, later identified as David Sandlin, outside 14 Plaintiff’s trailer. An altercation ensued between the two men. 15 Dejong reported to Officer Batista that Mr. Garber stated to Dejong 16 that Mr. Garber observed a weapon in the other person’s hand. 17 one point, Mr. Garber stated his shirt was pulled over his head, at 18 which he began to swing his knife towards the other male in many 19 directions. 20 other male ran off. 21 had serious stab wounds and injuries.2 22 detained in Officer Lee and Batista’s patrol car. 23 Scared, Mr. Garber exited his trailer with a knife At Dejong reported to Officer Batista that eventually the Dejong advised Officer Batista that Sandlin Mr. Garber was then LAPD Officers Robinson and Tomlin broadcasted that they 24 interviewed Sandlin at a different location, and that Sandlin 25 related to them that Mr. Garber came out of his motorhome 26 27 28 2 Mr. Garber disputes that the wounds were in fact serious, based on Sandlin’s departure from the hospital within one hour of arrival. 2 1 brandishing a large knife after Sandlin knocked on the motorhome as 2 a practical joke. 3 Sandlin reported Mr. Garber stabbed Sandlin with the knife and 4 Sandlin defended himself with a switchblade. 5 Sandlin’s account, asserting that Mr. Garber did not brandish a 6 knife when he came out of his motorhome (it was in his pocket) and 7 that he was attacked by Sandlin, not Sandlin who was attacked by 8 him. 9 Robinson and Tomlin advised Officer Batista that Mr. Garber contests Officers Lee and Batista transported Mr. Garber to West Valley 10 Police Station, where he spoke with Lt. Jill Niles, a watch 11 commander. 12 detective regarding the incident and provided them with the 13 evidence and facts of the event. 14 Detective Larry Alvarez. 15 Officers spoke to Lt. Niles and the night watch The night watch detective was Lt. Niles signed a Booking Approval form for Mr. Garber to be 16 booked for a violation of California Penal Code Section 245 17 (a)(1)(Assault with a Deadly Weapon). 18 of chest pains. 19 Hospital for treatment of the chest pains. 20 he waited over one hour for the ambulance, and Lt. Niles states 21 that the ambulance was requested immediately. 22 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Opposition ¶ 25; Niles 23 Decl. ¶ 9.) 24 determined that he would have to stay in the hospital. 25 report was completed. 26 advise that Garber refused any further treatment and he was going 27 to be released. Mr. Garber began to complain A rescue ambulance transported him to Northridge Mr. Garber states that (Plaintiff’s After an EKG was completed on Garber, it was A crime Northridge Hospital later called LAPD to Other LAPD officers responded back to the hospital 28 3 1 and placed him under arrest again. 2 Jail. 3 He was taken to the Van Nuys On January 7, 2011, LAPD Det. Hickman reviewed the reports and 4 booking recommendation for Mr. Garber. 5 the previous arrest or booking of Mr. Garber. 6 to witness Dejong on the telephone on January 7, 2011. 7 off-duty police officer, reported to Hickman an account of the 8 incident, according to which Sandlin told Dejong that Mr. Garber 9 had stabbed Sandlin and Dejong observed that Sandlin was bleeding. 10 Dejong told Hickman he observed Mr. Garber was armed with a knife. 11 Dejong told Det. Hickman that Sandlin told Dejong that Garber 12 “tried to kill” him. 13 of the incident is false, and that Sandlin attacked Mr. Garber. 14 also asserts that Dejong did not see Mr. Garber’s knife. Det. Hickman had no role in Det. Hickman spoke Dejong, an Mr. Garber asserts that Sandlin’s description He 15 Mr. Garber remained in custody until Monday, January 10, 2011. 16 No criminal charges were filed against Mr. Garber, who was 17 released. 18 II. Legal Standard 19 Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, 20 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 21 together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no 22 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 23 to judgment as a matter of law.” 24 seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the 25 court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions 26 of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the 27 absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. 28 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 4 A party Celotex Corp. v. All reasonable inferences from 1 the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 2 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986). 3 If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it 4 is entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there 5 is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” 6 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 7 See Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to 8 the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth 9 specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 10 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 11 party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 12 existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on 13 which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 14 477 U.S. at 322. 15 that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 16 party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome 17 of the suit under the governing law.” 18 There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a 19 whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non- 20 moving party.” 21 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 22 Summary judgment is warranted if a Celotex, A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 23 genuine issue of triable fact.” 24 1278 (9th Cir. 1996). Counsel has an obligation to lay out their 25 support clearly. 26 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). 27 file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d The court “need not examine the entire 28 5 1 evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate 2 references so that it could conveniently be found." 3 III. Discussion Id. 4 A. False Arrest Under Color of Law 5 Probable cause exists for a warrantless arrest where “under 6 the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the arresting 7 officer, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a 8 fair probability that the suspect had committed a crime.” 9 Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 10 11 U.S. v. marks omitted). Defendants present declarations indicating their basis for 12 concluding that “there was a fair probability that the suspect had 13 committed a crime.” 14 circumstances known to the officers in determining whether there is 15 probable cause for an arrest. . . . 16 the collective knowledge of officers at the scene of an arrest.” 17 United States v. Sandoval-Venegas, 292 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 18 2002)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 19 facts establishing probable cause from the officers’ declarations 20 include the following: 21 • 22 23 Id. “[C]ourts look to the totality of the probable cause may be based on Relevant a witness reported that Garber had a knife (Batista Decl. ¶ 2; Hickman Decl. ¶ 4.) • officers reported to Officer Batista that Garber admitted 24 he had a knife and used it during an altercation (Batista 25 Decl. ¶ 4; Niles Decl. ¶ 6.) 26 27 • officers reported to Officer Batista and Lt. Niles that Sandlin reported to them that Garber stabbed Sandlin with 28 6 1 the knife and he sustained injuries. 2 4; Niles Decl. ¶ 5.) 3 (Batista Decl. ¶ Plaintiff argues that a number of facts weigh against the 4 officers having had probable cause to arrest him. (Garber Mot. at 5 11.) 6 greater degree of culpability, such as Sandlin’s intoxication at 7 the time of the incident (Exh. 11), Sandlin being on probation for 8 another crime, Sandlin’s age (21) relative to Plaintiff’s (70), 9 Sandlin’s elopement from the hospital after being treated for his Most of the facts noted by Plaintiff pertain to Sandlin’s 10 injury (Exh. 12), Sandlin’s subsequent threatening gesture to 11 Plaintiff, etc. 12 (See Garber Mot. at 6 ff.) These facts do not address the question of whether Defendants 13 had probable cause to arrest Mr. Garber. 14 present evidence that Defendants had knowledge of those facts at 15 the time that Mr. Garber was arrested, but Plaintiff admitted at 16 his deposition that he did not hear Sandlin’s report of the crime 17 to any police officer. 18 Garber would have to demonstrate that these facts about Sandlin 19 negate the information Defendants had received concerning 20 Plaintiff’s role in the incident. 21 Defendants could not have had probable cause to arrest both Mr. 22 Garber and Sandlin. 23 Mr. Garber would have to (Garber Depo. 29:10-13.) Furthermore, Mr. There is no reason why Plaintiff also points to what he argues are falsehoods in 24 Defendants’ declarations. 25 that it is false that Sandlin had more serious injuries than 26 Garber, and that therefore Lt. Niles’ declaration contains a 27 falsehood. 28 declaration, however, is that she “was told that . . . Sandlin had (Id. at 5.) (Reply at 4-6.) For instance, he claims What Lt. Niles’ declaration says in her 7 1 more serious injuries than Garber.” 2 assuming that Plaintiff’s injuries were more severe than Sandlin’s, 3 this does not create an issue of fact as to Lt. Niles’ declaration, 4 since she is stating only what she heard, not the truth of what 5 happened.2 6 knife from Plaintiff is a report of the information she obtained 7 from other officers, which contributed to her belief that there was 8 probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. 9 (Niles Decl. ¶ 3.) Even Likewise, Lt. Niles’ statement that Dejong took the “[T]he term ‘probable cause means less than evidence which 10 would justify condemnation, and . . . a finding of ‘probable cause’ 11 may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal 12 trial. There is a large difference between the two things to be 13 proved (guilt and probable cause), as well as between the tribunals 14 which determine them, and therefore a like difference in the quanta 15 and modes of proof required to establish them.” 16 Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107-08 (1965). 17 the police had admissible evidence proving [the suspected crime] 18 beyond a reasonable doubt.” 19 (9th Cir. 2006). 20 United States v. “It is irrelevant whether Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1067 The court finds that Defendants have presented evidence of the 21 basis of their probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and Plaintiff 22 has not presented any evidence calling that basis into question. 23 Plaintiff purports to have evidence that the basis for Defendants’ 24 probable cause was inaccurate or false, but that is not the issue 25 in the probable cause inquiry. 26 “under the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the Here, the question is whether 27 2 28 This is also why the Officers’ depositions are not hearsay, contrary to Mr. Garber’s assertion. 8 1 arresting officer, a prudent person would have concluded that there 2 was a fair probability that the suspect had committed a crime.” 3 U.S. v. Struckman, 603 F.3d at 739. 4 officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and GRANTS summary 5 judgment on this cause of action in favor of Defendants. The court finds that the 6 B. Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights 7 “To establish liability for a conspiracy in a § 1983 case, a 8 plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of an agreement or meeting 9 of the minds to violate constitutional rights.” Crowe v. Cnty. of 10 San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th Cir. 2010)(internal citation and 11 quotation marks omitted). 12 Plaintiff alleges that there was a conspiracy among the 13 officers to arrest and jail him without probable cause. 14 60.) 15 arrested or properly investigated, that Sandlin was 20 and 16 Plaintiff was 70, and that Sandlin’s identity card from San 17 Francisco did not match his actual residence (“among the bushes 18 along Burbank Blvd., Encino). 19 (Compl. ¶ In support of this claim, he asserts that Sandlin was never (Id. ¶ 61.) Defendants Boateng and Hickman state in their declarations 20 that there was no conspiracy to violate Mr. Garber’s rights. 21 (Boateng Decl. ¶ 6, Hickman Decl. ¶ 12.) 22 Plaintiff’s evidence does not establish that there was a 23 meeting of the minds to violate his constitutional rights. 24 establish that Defendants also had probable cause to arrest 25 Sandlin, but that does not suffice to establish that there was an 26 agreement between Defendants to violate Plaintiff’s rights. 27 28 It may Defendants’ evidence that there was no conspiracy, in the form of their declarations, is uncontroverted. 9 The court finds that 1 there is no issue of material fact as to this cause of action and 2 GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 3 C. Unreasonable seizure under color of law 4 Under this cause of action, Mr. Garber alleges that he was 5 arrested without probable cause, there was probable cause to arrest 6 Sandlin, and witnesses were not interviewed. 7 All of these claims go to the issue of whether Defendants had 8 probable cause to arrest Mr. Garber. 9 Defendants have presented evidence of probable cause to arrest Mr. (Compl. ¶¶ 63-65.) As discussed above, 10 Garber, and Mr. Garber has not presented evidence that raises an 11 issue of material fact with respect to his own arrest, the court 12 finds that there is no disputed issue of fact as to probable cause. 13 Mr. Garber also may be alleging that he was detained without 14 being charged for an unreasonable period of time. 15 that Defendants claim that he was booked at on Friday, January 7, 16 2011, “due to his medical complaints” (Decl. Hickman ¶ 5), but that 17 another booking sheet indicates that he was arrested on Thursday, 18 January 6, 2011, at 6:40 p.m. (Exh. 13.) 19 arrested on Thursday at 6:40 p.m. or on Friday is immaterial to the 20 deadline for either charging or releasing him; either way 21 Defendants had, as Det. Hickman states, the full day of Monday, 22 January 10, 2011, to arrest or release him. 23 825 (“[T]he defendant shall in all cases be taken before the 24 magistrate without unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within 48 25 hours after his or her arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays. . . 26 . When the 48 hours . . . expire at a time when the court in which 27 the magistrate is sitting is not in session, that time shall be 28 10 He points out Whether Mr. Garber was See Cal. Penal Code § 1 extended to include the duration of the next court session on the 2 judicial day immediately following.”) 3 4 The court therefore GRANTS summary judgment to Defendants on this issue. 5 D. Harassment/Retaliation Under Color of Law 6 In this cause of action, Mr. Garber asserts a violation of his 7 substantive due process rights. 8 he is purporting to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment 9 based on his allegations that Defendants falsely arrested him, Mr. 10 Garber has no substantive right under the Due Process Clause to be 11 free from criminal arrest or prosecution without probable cause. 12 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994). 13 brought under the Fourth Amendment, which “requires a judicial 14 determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to any extended 15 restraint on liberty following an arrest.” 16 citation omitted). 17 probable cause to arrest Mr. Garber. (Compl. ¶ 68.) To the extent that Such claims must be Id. at 274 (internal The court has already determined that there was 18 E. Discrimination under color of law 19 “[Section] 1983 claims based on Equal Protection violations 20 must plead intentional unlawful discrimination or allege facts that 21 are at least susceptible of an inference of discriminatory intent.” 22 Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th 23 Cir. 1998). 24 any inference that any Defendant intentionally discriminated 25 against him based on his membership in a protected class. 26 Garber alleges that he was discriminated against as an Israeli Mr. Garber has failed to set forth any facts to raise 27 28 11 Mr. 1 citizen, a Jewish person,3 and a homeless person. 2 78.) 3 Garber in any capacity. 4 Boateng Decl. ¶ 5.) 5 (Compl. ¶¶ 75- Defendants assert that they had no prior knowledge of Mr. (Niles Decl. ¶ 12; Hickman Decl. ¶ 12; Mr. Garber claims prior acquaintance with Det. Hickman and 6 Officer Lee. 7 Opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ¶ 39.) 8 However, although Mr. Garber presents testimony indicating his 9 prior acquaintance with Det. Hickman in his Deposition3 (Garber 10 Depo. 15:2-24:10.), he also stated that he did not recall if he 11 informed Det. Hickman of his nationality or religion (21:2-9). 12 did assert that “[t]hey – every police officer at the – at the West 13 Valley Police Station know that I’m an Israel citizen. . . . 14 Because my lawsuits and my statements to LAPD officers every time 15 that they detain me or arrest me.” 16 assertions of general knowledge of Mr. Garber’s religion and 17 nationality do not suffice to raise the inference of intentional 18 discrimination against him on those bases. 19 facts from which to draw the inference that he was intentionally 20 discriminated against because he is homeless; the court has already 21 found that Defendants had probable cause to arrest him. 22 23 24 (Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts in (20:19-21:1.) He However, these Nor does he present any The court finds that there is no issue of fact as to this cause of action and GRANTS summary judgment to Defendants. F. Malicious Prosecution 25 3 26 27 The court infers this from his Complaint, which states that Mr. Garber is “an alien with an israeli citizenship which makes for an additional protection based on religion.” (Compl. ¶ 75.) 3 28 The deposition does not appear to mention prior acquaintance with Officer Lee. 12 1 “In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim of malicious 2 prosecution, a plaintiff must show that the defendants prosecuted 3 [him] with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so 4 for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another 5 specific constitutional right.” 6 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004)(internal quotation marks and 7 citation omitted). 8 against him, but asserts that Defendants Hickman, Niles, and 9 Alvarez attempted to trick the District Attorney into filing 10 11 charges. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 Mr. Garber concedes that no charges were filed (Opp. at 9.) The parties agree that no charges were brought against Mr. 12 Garber. 13 probable cause to arrest Mr. Garber. 14 of fact as to this cause of action. 15 judgment in favor of defendants. 16 G. Personal Injury Under Color of Law 17 Additionally, the court has found that Defendants had There is therefore no issue The court GRANTS summary In this cause of action, Mr. Garber alleges that as a result 18 of his arrest and detention, and the concomitant impounding of his 19 dog, trailer, and van, he suffered severe mental trauma which 20 resulted in depression. 21 “constant surveillance and abuse” police officers have resulted in 22 “constant pressure and anxiety.” 23 an assertion of damages resulting from violations of his 24 constitutional rights. 25 failed to provide facts supporting an underlying constitutional 26 violation. 27 recover for any alleged injuries. (Compl. ¶ 86.) He also alleges that the (Id. ¶ 90.) This appears to be However, as discussed above, Mr. Garber has Without establishing such violation, Mr. Garber cannot 28 13 1 The court finds that there is no issue of fact as to this 2 cause of action and GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 3 IV. Conclusion 4 For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s 5 Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for 6 Summary Judgment. 7 In addition, the SCHEDULING CONFERENCE set for May 13, 2013 is 8 VACATED. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 11 12 Dated: May 8, 2013 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14
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