Slep-Tone Entertainment Corporation v. Backstage Bar and Grill et al, No. 2:2011cv08305 - Document 118 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR CONTEMPT 105 , 108 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II: Plaintiff Slep-Tones Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED and Sugano and Taka-Os Motion for Contempt is also DENIED. Slep-Tone is hereby ORDERED to comply with the Courts January 15, 2013 Order by paying the $18,105 attorneys-fee award within 14 days of this Order. (lc). Modified on 3/25/2013. (lc).
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Slep-Tone Entertainment Corporation v. Backstage Bar and Grill et al Doc. 118 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 SLEP-TONE ENTERTAINMENT CORP., 11 v. 12 13 Plaintiff, BACKSTAGE BAR AND GRILL et al., Case No. 2:11-cv-8305-ODW(PLAx) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR CONTEMPT [105], [108] Defendants. 14 15 I. 16 INTRODUCTION 17 After Plaintiff Slep-Tone Entertainment Corp. failed to prosecute its suit against 18 the numerous Defendants, the Court dismissed the case with prejudice. (ECF No. 89.) 19 Afterwards, the Court granted Defendants Kelly Sugano and Taka-O’s unopposed 20 motion for attorney’s fees, finding that they were the prevailing parties in this 21 exceptional case under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). (ECF No. 104.) Slep-Tone failed to pay 22 the attorney’s-fee award and instead filed a Motion for Reconsideration under Federal 23 Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)(6). (ECF No. 105.) Defendants opposed the 24 Motion and moved for contempt and sanctions. (ECF No. 108.) After considering the 25 merits of both Motions, the Court DENIES Slep-Tone’s Motion for Reconsideration 26 and DENIES Sugano and Taka-O’s Motion for Contempt.1 27 1 28 Error! Main Document Only.Having carefully considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to these Motions, the Court deems the matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. Dockets.Justia.com II. 1 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a court to relieve a party of an 3 order for, among other reasons, “any other reason that justifies relief.” 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Under Ninth Circuit case law, a party may only seek relief 5 under this catchall provision when the party demonstrates “extraordinary 6 circumstances” warranting the court’s favorable exercise of discretion. Cmty. Dental 7 Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002). To satisfy its burden under this 8 lofty standard, a party must prove both (1) an injury and (2) circumstances beyond its 9 control. Id. Negligence by a party’s attorney does not constitute the requisite 10 extraordinary circumstances, unless the client can demonstrate gross negligence by its 11 attorney. Id. at 1168–69. 12 Under Rule 59(e), a party may move to alter or amend a judgment. But this 13 Rule can only be invoked to reconsider a decision on the merits; it cannot be used to 14 attack an attorney’s-fee award because “a request for attorney’s fees . . . raises legal 15 issues collateral to the main cause of action—issues to which Rule 59(e) was never 16 intended to apply.” White v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982). The Local Rules further elucidate the proper bases for which a party may seek 17 18 reconsideration: 19 (a) a material difference in fact or law from that presented to the Court 20 before such decision that in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not 21 have been known to the party moving for reconsideration at the time of 22 such decision, or (b) the emergence of new material facts or a change of 23 law occurring after the time of such decision, or (c) a manifest showing 24 of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before such 25 decision. L.R. 7-18. 26 Additionally, “[n]o motion for reconsideration shall in any manner repeat any oral or 27 written argument made in support of or in opposition to the original motion.” Id. 28 /// 2 1 Slep-Tone asks the Court to reconsider the January 15, 2013 Order awarding 2 $18,105 in attorney’s fees to Sugano and Taka-O, contending that Slep-Tone—and 3 not Sugano and Taka-O—was the prevailing party in this case. Notwithstanding the 4 procedural impropriety of Slep-Tone’s Motion and assuming Slep-Tone could 5 demonstrate the requisite extraordinary circumstances, the Court disagrees with Slep- 6 Tone’s assertion that it was the prevailing party. 7 The Lanham Act provides that a court “in exceptional cases may award 8 reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). While the 9 statute does not define who is a prevailing party, the Supreme Court has interpreted 10 the term several times in the context of federal fee-shifting statutes and has held that 11 the defining factor is whether there has been an “alteration in the legal relationship of 12 the parties.” See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health 13 & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001), superseded by statute, OPEN Government 14 Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 4, 121 Stat. 2524, 2525. Under this standard, 15 enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees suffice as the 16 basis for an attorney’s-fee award. Id. at 604. An involuntary dismissal “operates as an adjudication on the merits,” unless the 17 18 dismissal order states otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The Ninth Circuit has 19 recognized that “a defendant is a prevailing party following dismissal of a claim if the 20 plaintiff is judicially precluded from refiling the claim against the defendant in federal 21 court.” Cadkin v. Loose, 569 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2009) (interpreting § 505 of 22 the Copyright Act). Numerous other circuits have held that a dismissal with prejudice 23 renders a defendant the prevailing party.2 24 In Highway Equipment Co., on the eve of trial, both parties reciprocally agreed 25 to release all claims against each other. 469 F.3d at 1030. The plaintiff moved for a 26 2 27 28 Green Aviation Mgmt. Co. v. F.A.A., 676 F.3d 200, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Highway Equip. Co. v. FECO, Ltd., 469 F.3d 1027, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 2005); Reich v. Walter W. King Plumbing & Heating Contractor, Inc., 98 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1996). 3 1 voluntary dismissal, and the court dismissed the case with prejudice. Id. The 2 defendant then moved for attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, claiming it was the 3 “prevailing party.” Id. at 1031. The district court agreed. On appeal, the Federal 4 Circuit affirmed, holding that, “the dismissal with prejudice, based on the covenant 5 . . . [had] the necessary judicial imprimatur to constitute a judicially sanctioned change 6 in the legal relationship of the parties.” Id. at 1035. 7 In this case, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Although Sugano 8 and Taka-O paid $5,000 under the settlement agreement, Slep-Tone failed to move to 9 dismiss them from this case. (Opp’n 6.) The Court later dismissed the entire case 10 with prejudice because of Slep-Tone’s lack of prosecution. (ECF No. 89.) Sugano 11 and Taka-O are the prevailing parties under § 1117(a) of the Lanham Act because of 12 this dismissal with prejudice. Even if Slep-Tone moved to dismiss Sugano and Taka- 13 O under the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement, Sugano and Taka-O would 14 still be considered the prevailing parties. Highway Equipment Co., 469 F.3d at 1031. 15 Contrary to Slep-Tone’s argument, the settlement agreement did not render it 16 the prevailing party over Sugano and Taka-O. There was never a court-ordered 17 consent decree sufficient to establish “the necessary judicial imprimatur” on the 18 alteration of the parties’ legal relationship. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605. Indeed, 19 Slep-Tone ever lived up to its end of the bargain since it never moved for dismissal or 20 even notified the Court of the settlement. 21 The Court therefore DENIES Slep-Tone’s Motion for Reconsideration. 22 III. MOTION FOR CONTEMPT 23 Since Slep-Tone has defied the Court’s January 15, 2013 Order awarding 24 attorney’s fees, Sugano and Taka-O move for an order of contempt and sanctions 25 against Slep-Tone. 26 A district court has inherent authority to punish both criminal and civil 27 contempt. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812). Criminal contempt 28 seeks to vindicate the court’s authority and punish the contemnor for impugning the 4 1 court’s integrity. United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 627 (9th Cir. 1980). An 2 individual criminally contemns when “(1) there is a clear and definite order, and the 3 contemnor knows of the order” and “(2) the contemnor willfully disobeys the order.” 4 Chapman v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 613 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1979); see also 18 5 U.S.C. § 401. 6 In contrast, civil contempt “is designed to enforce compliance with a court 7 order.” Powers, 629 F.2d at 627. A district court may imprison or otherwise sanction 8 the contemnor until that person complies with the court’s order. Int’l Union, United 9 Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994). 10 Sugano and Taka-O argue that Slep-Tone should be found in contempt because 11 it has failed to pay the $18,105 in attorney’s fees the Court awarded on January 15, 12 2013. 13 multiple occasions. But to date, Slep-Tone has paid nothing. Sugano and Taka-O’s attorney requested the money from Slep-Tone on 14 On the other hand, Slep-Tone contends that the Order is not definite enough for 15 a contempt finding, because the Order did not include a deadline by which Slep-Tone 16 must pay the attorney’s-fee award. 17 Slep-Tone misunderstands this Court’s order when it insists that “there is no 18 mandatory language in the Order at all.” (Opp’n 3.) Federal courts do not write 19 advisory opinions. When this Court issued the January 15, 2013 Order awarding 20 Sugano and Taka-O $18,105 in attorney’s fees, the Order was not a mere 21 suggestion—Slep-Tone was ordered to pay the attorney’s-fee award. 22 But because the Order did not include a date by which Slep-Tone had to pay, 23 the Court declines to exercise its contempt authority at this time, except to order Slep- 24 Tone to comply with the Order by paying Sugano and Taka-O $18,105 within 14 days 25 of this Order. The Court also declines Sugano and Taka-O’s request for additional 26 attorney’s fees for having to file this Motion and to oppose Slep-Tone’s Motion for 27 Reconsideration. 28 /// 5 IV. 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed above, Slep-Tone’s Motion for Reconsideration is 3 DENIED and Sugano and Taka-O’s Motion for Contempt is also DENIED. (ECF 4 Nos. 105, 108.) Slep-Tone is hereby ORDERED to comply with the Court’s January 5 15, 2013 Order by paying the $18,105 attorney’s-fee award within 14 days of this 6 Order. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 March 25, 2013 9 10 11 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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