Rafael Molina v. Michael J Astrue, No. 2:2011cv08165 - Document 17 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Jay C. Gandhi. IT IS ORDERED THAT judgment shall be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits. (See Order for details) 1 . (bem)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAFAEL MOLINA, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 v. 15 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 16 Defendant. 17 ) Case No. CV 11-8165 JCG ) ) ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ) ORDER ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 18 19 Rafael Molina ( Plaintiff ) challenges the Social Security Commissioner s 20 decision denying his application for disability benefits. In particular, Plaintiff takes 21 issue with (1) the ALJ s decision to utilize the Medical-Vocational Guidelines 22 ( Grids ) at step five, and (2) the ALJ s rejection of Plaintiff s credibility. The 23 Court addresses and rejects each argument in turn. 24 A. The ALJ s Reliance on the Grids at Step Five 25 Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ erred at step five by relying on the Grids 26 instead of testimony from a vocational expert ( VE ). (Joint Stip. at 5-6.) 27 Specifically, Plaintiff argues that reliance on the Grids is improper whenever, as 28 here, non-exertional limitations are present. (Id. at 6.) According to Plaintiff, non- 1 exertional limitations are not contemplated by the Grids, and thus the full range of 2 positions under the Grids may not actually be available to Plaintiff. (See id.) 3 Consequently, Plaintiff maintains that only VE testimony can determine disability. 4 However, as a matter of law, testimony from a VE is required only if a 5 claimant s non-exertional impairments are sufficiently severe so as to significantly 6 limit the range of work permitted by the claimant s exertional limitations. Hoopai 7 v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007). 8 In this case, Plaintiff s Residual Functional Capacity ( RFC ) restricted him 9 to medium exertion work with two non-exertional limitations:1/ (1) climbing 10 ladder[s], ropes, and scaffolds no more than occasionally, and (2) simple routine 11 tasks. (AR at 35.) Neither of these non-exertional limitations restrict the range of 12 medium work so significantly that VE testimony is required under Hoopai. 1. Occasional Climbing of Ladders, Ropes, and Scaffolds 13 With respect to the first limitation, the Social Security Rulings indicate that a 14 15 limitation in climbing and balancing would not ordinarily have a significant impact 16 on the broad world of work. Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 85-15, 1985 WL 17 56857, at *6. The climbing limitation in this case is even less restrictive. First, Plaintiff is 18 19 not entirely precluded from climbing, but rather may climb occasionally. Second, 20 the restriction is not absolute, but rather is limited only in relation to ladders, ropes, 21 22 1/ Plaintiff alleges the existence of two additional non-exertional impairments 23 based upon the ALJ s determination that Plaintiff s depression and degenerative disc 24 disease are severe. (Joint Stip. at 3-4.) This determination, however, was made at step two, not at step five. The step two and step five determinations require 25 different levels of severity of limitations such that the satisfaction of the 26 requirements at step two does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the claimant has satisfied the requirements at step five. Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1076. 27 Thus, to the extent that these severe impairments are not already reflected in 28 Plaintiff s RFC, they bear no weight on the appropriateness of the Grids at step five. 2 1 and scaffolds. Third, Plaintiff s limitation, unlike that under the SSR, does not even 2 touch upon balancing. 3 In light of these differences, it stands to reason that the present climbing 4 limitation, as under SSR 85-15, also does not significantly limit the range of work 5 permitted by Plaintiff s medium-exertion RFC. Thus, at least on this ground, 6 Hoopai is not violated. 7 2. Simple, Routine Tasks As for the second limitation, the Ninth Circuit has opined that mild to 8 9 moderate mental limitations are insufficiently severe to have a significant impact on 10 a claimant s base of work. See Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1077 (discussing mild to 11 moderate symptoms of depression). Here, the ALJ s discussion of the simple, routine tasks limitation, and the 12 13 underlying evidence of Plaintiff s depression suggest that the limitation is certainly 14 less than moderate. (See AR at 36-37.) Beginning in 2008, Plaintiff s depression appears to have improved 15 16 significantly. For instance, Dr. Gennady Musher, a psychiatrist for Plaintiff s 17 workers compensation claim, reported in March 2008 that Plaintiff has recuperated 18 from mental distress through the use of coping skills, and denies any clinically 19 significant mental health problems. (AR at 223.) In the same report, Plaintiff also 20 states that [m]edications helped me, I am calmer, not fighting with people, and I do 21 not [get] mad as before. (AR at 222.) Similarly, the ALJ cites a progress report by psychiatrist Gunilla Karlsson, 22 23 who found, in May 2008, that Plaintiff appeared emotionally more stabilized since 24 last month. 2/ (AR at 36; see AR at 312.) In contrast, Plaintiff produced no treating records since 2008. (See AR at 36.) 25 26 27 2/ The ALJ, however, mischaracterizes this citation as simply stating that Plaintiff 28 was described as stable emotionally. (AR at 36.) 3 1 As a result, the ALJ discredited the severity of Plaintiff s complaints of depression. 2 Only after making these findings did the ALJ give Plaintiff considerable benefit of 3 the doubt and find[] he is limited to simple routine work. (AR at 37.) 4 In all, the above evidence suggests that Plaintiff s depression has improved 5 and perhaps even ceased to exist after 2008. Further, as is also clear, the ALJ 6 restricted Plaintiff to simple, routine tasks as a measure of caution, not because the 7 underlying impairment was deemed severe. The Court, therefore, finds that 8 Plaintiff s limitation is well below moderate, and thus insufficiently severe under 9 Hoopai. 10 Accordingly, the ALJ s step-five determination did not improperly rely on the 11 Grids, and is, therefore, supported by substantial evidence. See Mayes v. Massanari, 12 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 B. The ALJ s Rejection of Plaintiff s Credibility 14 As a separate matter, Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ improperly 15 disregarded his subjective complaints of severe back pain and depression, and thus 16 failed to properly assess his credibility. (Joint Stip. at 8-12.) The Court disagrees, 17 and finds the ALJ permissibly determined Plaintiff s complaints to be inconsistent 18 with both the conservative treatment plan he pursued and the objective medical 19 evidence. 20 An ALJ can reject a claimant s subjective complaints by expressing clear and 21 convincing reasons for doing so. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 22 2003). 23 First, the ALJ properly discounted the alleged severity of Plaintiff s symptoms 24 as inconsistent with a conservative treatment plan. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 25 604 (9th Cir. 1989) (ALJ permissibly considered discrepancies between claimant s 26 allegations of persistent and increasingly severe pain, and the nature and extent of 27 treatment obtained). As noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff despite complaining of severe 28 back pain now controls pain with an over-the-counter analgesic and does not have 4 1 to use analgesics on a daily basis. (AR at 36.) Additionally, in March 2008, he was 2 not taking any psychiatric medications, nor was he in therapy. (Id.) To treat such 3 disabling conditions, one would expect stronger medications or more frequent 4 dosages, but neither were present here. 5 Second, the ALJ was also correct in finding that the objective medical 6 evidence does not support Plaintiff s alleged degree of disability. See Rollins v. 7 Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2001) (lack of objective evidence, when 8 combined with other factors, is a valid reason for rejecting Plaintiff s testimony). 9 Specifically, the ALJ stated, [Plaintiff s] credibility regarding the severity of 10 depression and degenerative disc disease is reduced by the lack of treating records 11 since 2008. (AR at 36.) According to the ALJ, no such records were offered 12 despite Plaintiff testifying to taking medication. (Id.) Additionally, the ALJ 13 faulted Dr. Karllson s progress notes for being uninformative and not 14 describ[ing] the alleged counseling in any detail. (Id.) 15 Further, and in contrast, Plaintiff s two consultative examinations indicate that 16 Plaintiff is only minimally impaired. The ALJ highlighted numerous portions from 17 both exams, including evidence that Plaintiff s [g]ait and balance were 18 unimpaired, that [t]he lumbar x-ray was normal, and that Plaintiff did not 19 require assistive devices and sat comfortably in a chair. (AR at 36; see AR at 34420 48, 573-83.) Notably, both physicians offered the same physical RFC of medium21 exertion work. (AR at 36; see AR at 347, 577.) 22 Thus, the ALJ presented several clear and convincing reasons to discredit 23 Plaintiff s subjective complaints.3/ Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ s 24 determination of Plaintiff s credibility is supported by substantial evidence. See 25 3/ The Court, therefore, need not address Plaintiff s contention that the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff s financial situation when discrediting him for failing to seek 27 treatment. (See Joint Stip. at 10-11.) Such an error, even if true, would be harmless. 28 See Batson v. Comm r of Soc. Sec., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). 26 5 1 Mayes, 276 F.3d at 458-59. 2 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT judgment shall be entered 3 AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits. 4 5 Dated: August 23, 2012 6 7 ____________________________________ Hon. Jay C. Gandhi 8 9 United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
