Julieta Alvarez v. Michael J Astrue, No. 2:2011cv07444 - Document 20 (C.D. Cal. 2012)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Victor B. Kenton. This matter is before the Court for review of the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's application for disability benefits. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ will be affirmed. The Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 (SEE ORDER FOR FURTHER DETAILS) (gr)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION 7 8 9 10 11 JULIETA ALVAREZ, 12 13 14 15 Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. CV 11-07444-VBK MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER (Social Security Case) 17 18 This matter is before the Court for review of the decision by the 19 Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff s application for 20 disability benefits. 21 consented that the case may be handled by the Magistrate Judge. 22 action arises under 42 U.S.C. §405(g), which authorizes the Court to 23 enter judgment upon the pleadings and transcript of the record before 24 the Commissioner. 25 ( JS ), and the Commissioner has filed the certified Administrative 26 Record ( AR ). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c), the parties have The The parties have filed the Joint Stipulation 27 Plaintiff raises the following issues: 28 1. Whether the Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) conducted a 1 2 full and fair hearing; 2. Whether the ALJ complied with the Memorandum Opinion and 3 4 Order of the District Court; 3. Whether the vocational expert s testimony has any value in 5 6 this case; and 4. Whether competent expert testimony supports a finding of 7 8 disability. (JS at 5.) 9 10 This Memorandum Opinion will constitute the Court s findings of 11 fact and conclusions of law. After reviewing the matter, the Court 12 concludes that the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed. 13 14 I 15 THE HEARING ON REMAND BEFORE THE ALJ DID NOT AMOUNT 16 TO A COGNIZABLE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS TO THE PLAINTIFF 17 In Plaintiff s first issue (JS at 1-19), she asserts that at the 18 hearing conducted by the ALJ following this Court s remand order (AR 19 742-758), the ALJ exhibited a level of bias and unfairness that denied 20 Plaintiff due process. 21 As the parties understand, the standard for the Court to find a 22 due process violation is very high. There must be a demonstration of 23 actual bias to result in disqualification of an Administrative Law 24 Judge. 25 An Administrative Law Judge shall not conduct a hearing if he or she 26 is prejudiced or partial with respect to any party or has any interest 27 in the matter pending for decision. (20 C.F.R. § 404.940.) 28 reflects Social Security Regulations articulate the requirement that, the same stringent requirements. 2 Most Case law recently, this 1 standard 2 Commissioner, 3 presumption that an ALJ is unbiased can be rebutted by showing 4 conflict of interest or specific reasons for disqualification other 5 than expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even 6 anger that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women 7 sometimes display, ... [Id. at 590, citing Rollins v. Massanari, 261 8 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001]). 9 was expressed 574 F.3d by the 685, Ninth 690 (9th Circuit Cir. in Valentine 2009)(holding v. that a As reflected in the JS, Plaintiff believes that the ALJ in this 10 case did express a bias which amounted to a due process violation. A 11 number of instances of such bias are cited by Plaintiff. 12 include the ALJ s asking Plaintiff about her citizenship or legal 13 resident status (AR 713); interrupting counsel for Plaintiff when 14 counsel attempted to pose questions to the vocational expert ( VE ) 15 (AR 731-733); questioning Plaintiff s work background (AR 714-715); 16 and offering an amended onset date which, if accepted, allegedly would 17 have led to a finding of disability commencing on the earlier onset 18 date (AR 734-735). These 19 After a close examination of the record, the Court cannot agree 20 with Plaintiff that her hearing was conducted in a manner which 21 deprived her of due process. 22 Plaintiff s green card status, this occurred during a very brief 23 interchange at the outset of the hearing, and, most importantly, there 24 is nothing in the decision which leads the Court to indicate that the 25 ALJ 26 decision. 27 Court s remand order based on a record which indicated that the ALJ 28 had relied upon Plaintiff s immigration status as a factor in the relied upon Plaintiff s Thus, while the ALJ did ask about immigration status in reaching his This is in contrast to the first hearing, which led to the 3 1 determination of her credibility. 2 With regard to questioning about Plaintiff s work background, the 3 Court again cannot find a due process violation, because a claimant s 4 work history is relevant under applicable regulations. 5 §§ 404.1574(a)(1), 416.974(a)(1). See 20 C.F.R. 6 A more serious allegation is that the ALJ thwarted Plaintiff s 7 counsel from asking appropriate and relevant questions to the VE. But 8 again, when examining the record, the Court finds no due process 9 infirmity. Essentially, several of the questions posed by Plaintiff s 10 counsel with regard to the extent of functional limitations of a 11 hypothetical individual were ambiguous, and the Court views the ALJ s 12 disallowance of such questions as part of his proper function to 13 regulate 14 Plaintiff s counsel believes that the VE s similar expression of 15 confusion as to some of the terms utilized by Plaintiff s counsel 16 indicates that the VE was mimicking the ALJ s assertedly disingenuous 17 confusion about these terms, the Court finds nothing in the record to 18 attribute 19 ultimately 20 functional limitations, the ALJ permitted it. the hearing, such and motivations posed a to to adduce the hypothetical relevant VE. When question evidence. Plaintiff s which While counsel contained clear 21 Finally, Plaintiff s belief that the ALJ would have offered an 22 earlier onset date for disability if Plaintiff would have amended her 23 onset date is a speculative conclusion. 24 record which indicates that an earlier onset date of disability was in 25 fact offered by the ALJ. 26 Plaintiff to be disabled as of February 15, 2011, based on the 27 evidence adduced before him. It would appear that if the ALJ believed 28 that Plaintiff s disability had an earlier onset date, he would have There is nothing in the In any event, on remand, the ALJ did find 4 1 2 3 so found. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff s hearing was not characterized by a lack of due process. 4 5 II 6 THE ALJ S DECISION IS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 7 Plaintiff frames her second issue as whether the ALJ complied 8 with the Memorandum Opinion and Order of the District Court which 9 remanded this matter for a new hearing. In actuality, the issue is 10 whether the final decision of the Commissioner is to be affirmed based 11 on an absence of legal error and support by substantial evidence. See 12 Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009)(stating that the 13 Commissioner has statutory authority to interpret and enforce the 14 Social 15 Commissioner s construction of the Social Security Act must be given 16 considerable weight ). 17 complied with the Appeal Council s remand order following this Court s 18 decision, judicial review must be limited to the question of whether 19 the ALJ s decision is supported by substantial evidence and reflects 20 the application of the correct legal standards. In order to make this 21 determination, the Court must examine the various sub-issues which are 22 contained within Plaintiff s Issue Two. Security Act under 42 U.S.C. § 405(a), and that the Regardless of whether or not the ALJ fully 23 24 A. Rejection of Treating Physician s Opinion. 25 Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Lustig. In the ALJ s initial 26 decision, he gave lesser weight to Dr. Lustig because he concluded 27 that Dr. Lustig based his opinion on Plaintiff s physical condition 28 rather than her mental impairment. 5 The Court found this to be an 1 inadequate reason for the ALJ to reject Dr. Lustig s opinion. (See AR 2 749, line 1-750, line 16.) 3 previously relied on the opinion of Dr. Maibaum, there was a failure 4 to evaluate the opinion of Dr. Tribble or to address inconsistencies 5 between these opinions. (Id.) 6 the ALJ must evaluate the mental health evidence and give sufficient 7 reasons to support a mental residual functional capacity ( RFC ) 8 assessment. (AR 751.) The Court also noted that while the ALJ Thus, the Court ordered that on remand 9 On remand, the ALJ concluded that because of Plaintiff s severe 10 impairment of depression, she had moderate limitations in maintaining 11 attention and concentration, moderate limitations in carrying out 12 detailed tasks, and moderate limitations in interacting with coworkers 13 and supervisors. (AR 687.) 14 than had been found in the original 2009 hearing decision. (AR 61.) 15 In making these findings, the 16 Lustig in August 2006 for a psychiatric evaluation in connection with 17 her workers compensation claim. (AR 689; 276-89.) 18 assessment of Plaintiff s mental functioning. (AR 276-89.) 19 was also seen in December 2006 by Dr. Riahinejad for a consultative 20 examination in connection with her Social Security applications. (AR 21 688-89, 206-210.) 22 to moderate difficulty in understanding, remembering and carrying out 23 complex and detailed instructions, but was capable of relating to 24 people and accepting supervision. Plaintiff was seen in February 2007 25 by Dr. Nehorayan, a colleague of Dr. Lustig, who also made mental 26 impairment assessments. (AR 272-274.) This was a more restrictive mental RFC ALJ noted that Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Dr. Lustig made an Plaintiff Dr. Riahinejad concluded Plaintiff would have mild 27 The ALJ noted that Dr. Tribble saw Plaintiff between July 2006 28 and October 2006 in connection with her workers compensation claim and 6 1 made various mental impairment assessments. (AR 692, 472-81, 606-21, 2 622-56.) 3 In October 2006, as the ALJ noted, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. 4 Maibaum, also in connection with a workers compensation case. While 5 Dr. Maibaum did not make a psychiatric diagnosis, he indicated 6 Plaintiff could be referred for psychotherapy and that her condition 7 was moderate. (Ar 692, 599-607.) 8 Plaintiff saw Dr. Charuvastra between June 2006 and April 2007. 9 The treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff was depressed, had short 10 concentration, intact memory with difficulty in immediate and recent 11 memory due to depression, a somewhat tenuous impulse control and 12 irritability, and, finally, that her psychiatric illness was a product 13 of her chronic pain. (AR 695, 262-64.) 14 seeing a psychiatrist in 2006, but there is no such notation for 2007. 15 Dr. Charuvastra indicated he began Plaintiff on the antidepressant 16 Prozac and the sleep-aid Halcyon, but these prescriptions are absent 17 from later treatment notes. (AR 236, 239, 242, 248, 251, 254.) He noted that Plaintiff was 18 As the ALJ noted, between May 2007 and May 2008, Plaintiff was 19 treated for depression and was prescribed medications, including one 20 for anti-seizure and one for anti-anxiety. (AR 698, 564-87.) 21 The ALJ noted that in March 2007, a State Agency reviewing 22 physician (Dr. Mallare) found that Plaintiff had an affective disorder 23 which 24 functioning. (AR 693, 211-224.) 25 adopted Dr. Mallare s assessment in July 2007. (AR 300.) 26 would The ALJ cause also mild limitations summarized in various areas of mental A reviewing physician, Dr. Carlson, Plaintiff s testimony, including a 27 statement that she no longer saw Dr. Charuvastra. Plaintiff testified 28 she was seeing another doctor for anxiety and depression and that she 7 1 2 received medications from this physician, Dr. Lopez. (AR 720-21.) Plaintiff ceased medical treatment in 2008 and there is no 3 evidence of further orthopedic and psychiatric 4 consultative examinations until after the remand. (AR 695.) 5 In a February 2011 consultative examination, Plaintiff indicated 6 she was prescribed an antidepressant from her primary care physician 7 and that she had never seen a psychiatrist. 8 Plaintiff had no functional limitations from a psychiatric standpoint 9 and there was no evidence that Plaintiff in fact was prescribed an 10 Dr. Levin indicated that antidepressant until 2011. (AR 799, 695.) 11 The ALJ noted that Drs. Lustig, Nehorayan, Tribble and Maibaum 12 evaluated Plaintiff for purposes of her workers compensation claim, 13 but failed to provide treatment, and therefore he would give their 14 opinions lesser weight. (AR 695.) 15 Based on all of this evidence, the ALJ concluded that before 16 Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Levin in February 2011, her mental 17 impairment caused only moderate limitations in certain areas of mental 18 functioning. (AR 694.) 19 The ALJ s assessment that the workers compensation physicians 20 were entitled to lesser credibility because they were not treating 21 physicians is an accepted basis of evaluation in Social Security 22 cases. 23 Evaluating all of the evidence in the record regarding 24 Plaintiff s mental impairment and any functional restrictions caused 25 by it, the ALJ effectively balanced some of the competing or at least 26 inconsistent findings of the various physicians in formulating a 27 mental RFC. 28 Maibaum were compared by the ALJ with more restrictive assessments of The restrictions assessed by Dr. Riahinejad and Dr. 8 1 Drs. Tribble, Lustig and Nehorayan. Ultimately, the ALJ made a 2 rational and supportable determination among competing evidence. 3 4 B. Consideration of Physical Health Evidence. 5 As Plaintiff correctly points out, in its previous decision in 6 this case, the Court found that the ALJ had not provided any reason to 7 reject the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Larsen. (AR 756- 8 757.) 9 discussed Dr. Larsen in her own testimony (AR 688). On remand, however, the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had In his decision, 10 he summarized in detail Dr. Larsen s findings. (AR 690.) The ALJ also 11 discussed treating records from Dr. Larsen and summarized them. (Id.) 12 The ALJ discussed evidence that conflicted with Dr. Larsen s opinion, 13 which led him to give less weight to the latter. 14 November 2004 workers compensation examination by Dr. Rosco (AR 690, 15 366-373) and a November 2005 orthopedic examination by Dr. Rosenberg 16 (AR 691, 432-41). 17 valid and consistent with that of Dr. Rosco. (AR 691.) 18 records were cited by the ALJ in support of this conclusion, including 19 July 2006 medical records of Dr. Valdez (AR 691, 468-71), and July 20 2007 medical records from Dr. Brourman (AR 692, 491-500). 21 also medical records from 2007 from Dr. Linder (AR 692, 507-24, 657- 22 76). The ALJ found, for example, that Dr. Linder concluded that there 23 were no abnormal findings from a neurological examination, thus 24 contradicting Dr. Larsen s conclusion that Plaintiff suffered from 25 carpal tunnel syndrome. (AR 695.) This included a The ALJ found Dr. Rosenberg s opinion to be more Other medical There were 26 All in all, the Court must find that the ALJ took to heart its 27 remand, including its instruction that Dr. Larsen s opinion must be 28 evaluated both in and of itself, and in conjunction with other medical 9 1 opinions. This in fact occurred, and the Court cannot find that the 2 ALJ committed reversible error in making these evaluations. 3 4 C. Plaintiff s Subjective Testimony. 5 In the Court s remand order, it found that the ALJ s analysis of 6 Plaintiff s 7 therefore ordered the ALJ to reevaluate her credibility. (AR 756.) 8 This time around, the ALJ did not rely upon Plaintiff s immigration 9 status as an improper basis to depreciate her credibility, and did not a subjective finding of symptoms was malingering deficient with regard (AR to 752-56), 10 make Dr. 11 assessment of symptom magnification. (AR 691.) 12 and Rosenberg s accepted and standard techniques of credibility assessment. Rather, the ALJ used 13 After reviewing Plaintiff s testimony at the resumed hearing, the 14 ALJ determined to give her subjective complaints limited weight 15 because there was a lack of support in treatment records for the 16 extent of her complaints. This is one obviously permissible factor of 17 credibility assessment, although it cannot be the only one. 18 also found that Plaintiff had received inconsistent treatment for her 19 depression, noting that she had told Dr. Levin she had never seen a 20 psychiatrist, and that she was primarily treated with anti-seizure 21 medications and anti-anxiety medications rather than antidepressants. 22 In 23 medication other than an isolated prescription for Vicodin in November 24 2007. 25 which may be compared with the extent of complaints in formulating a 26 credibility assessment. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 27 (9th Cir. 2008). 28 addition, Plaintiff had not been prescribed The ALJ narcotic pain Other than that, Plaintiff utilized conservative treatment Further, the ALJ noted that in spite of her complaints of pain 10 1 and history of surgeries, she continued working for three to four 2 years 3 permissible in the process of evaluating Plaintiff s credibility. See 4 Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2001). after her surgery. (AR 688, 695-96.) This factor was 5 Finally, the ALJ noted an absence of any treatment after 2008 6 other than medication refills which also constitutes (as failure to 7 seek treatment or failure to follow prescribed treatment) a proper 8 credibility assessment factor. 9 (9th Cir. 2007). 10 11 See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 638 The Court finds that on remand the ALJ s credibility assessment is supported by substantial evidence. 12 13 III 14 THE TESTIMONY OF THE VOCATIONAL EXPERT WAS PROPERLY RELIED UPON 15 A. The Vocational Expert Was Properly Qualified to Testify. 16 In her third issue, Plaintiff asserts that the VE was not 17 properly qualified; that her testimony deviated from the Dictionary of 18 Occupational Titles ( DOT ) without any explanation of the deviation; 19 and that she gave testimony too uncertain to be of any value. 20 Court rejects these contentions for the following reasons. The 21 As to the qualifications of the VE, she testified that she has 22 been a VE for over 30 years, has a master s degree in psychology, has 23 been an expert witness on the panel [for Social Security hearings] for 24 over ten years, and has a certificate of alcohol and drug abuse from 25 UCLA. (AR 724.) 26 indicated that she is doing vocational counseling with about ten 27 people, that she does not have a degree in vocational rehabilitation. 28 (Id.) She is In answer to questions from Plaintiff s counsel, she a member of the 11 International Association of 1 Rehabilitation Professionals. (Id.) 2 3 The ALJ overruled the objections of Plaintiff s counsel to the lack of qualifications of the VE. 4 As Plaintiff s counsel correctly concedes, there is no definition 5 of a VE in the Social Security Act. 6 a 7 qualifications required by the Commissioner ... Plaintiff also cites 8 a document called a Vocational Expert Handbook and also the DOT 9 itself. vocational expert is a 20 C.F.R. § 404.5 provides that vocational professional who has the As to the Vocational Expert Handbook, Plaintiff claims that 10 the VE failed the requirement therein at p. 11, which is that 11 vocational experts must possess up-to-date knowledge with regard to 12 industrial and occupational trends and local labor conditions. 13 the DOT, Plaintiff has found titles for the occupation Vocational 14 Counselor, which are summarized in the JS. (See, Id. at 45-46.) As to 15 Initially, the Court notes that the applicable regulation, 20 16 C.F.R. § 405.5, defines a VE as a vocational professional who has the 17 qualifications required by the Commissioner. 18 not allow the Commissioner to qualify a hod carrier as a VE, but 19 nothing like that extreme example is provided by this case. 20 Commissioner is guided by the Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law 21 Manual (known as HALLEX ) which provides that vocational experts are 22 vocational professionals who provide impartial expert opinion during 23 the hearings process ... 24 VE testified that she has acted as a vocational expert for over 30 25 years and has been on the expert witness panel for over ten years. 26 She has provided vocational counseling for about ten people, has 27 advanced degrees and some certificates in relevant areas. Simply put, 28 the Court cannot find that the VE in this case was unqualified, in Certainly, that would The Pursuant to that internal regulation, the 12 1 part based on the fact that there are no strict qualifications in any 2 of the applicable regulations which this VE failed to meet. 3 regard to Plaintiff s argument that the Court should use analogous DOT 4 occupational descriptions, the Court cannot find any legal precedent 5 which would allow that type of analysis. Moreover, the Court declines 6 Plaintiff s 7 vocational rehabilitation counselors. 8 to the record in this case. invitation to review various websites With concerning The Court will confine itself 9 Finally, while Plaintiff claims there were inconsistencies in the 10 VE s testimony between the requirements of her past relevant work and 11 the requirements of the DOT occupation, these are not specified, and 12 the Court will not speculate. 13 14 For the foregoing reasons, the Court determines that Plaintiff s third issue is without merit. 15 16 IV 17 THE VOCATIONAL EXPERT S TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY RELIED UPON 18 TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF NON-DISABILITY AT STEP FOUR 19 Plaintiff s final issue is that, for various reasons, the ALJ 20 should and could not rely upon the testimony of the VE in finding at 21 Step Four of the sequential evaluation process that Plaintiff could 22 perform her past relevant work. 23 combines a number of separate contentions, including the following: 24 that the hypothetical questions posed to the VE were inadequate or 25 incomplete; 26 Plaintiff s subjective pain complaints as reflected in her testimony; 27 and that the hypothetical questions improperly excluded limitations 28 assessed by Plaintiff s psychiatrist and her orthopedist. that the In making this argument, Plaintiff hypothetical 13 questions improperly excluded 1 Addressing the first sub-issue, the Court concludes that the 2 hypothetical questions posed to the VE properly incorporated 3 Plaintiff s functional limitations as determined by the ALJ in his 4 decision. 5 in 6 limitations and restrictions of the particular claimant. 7 v. Bowen, 849 F.3d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988). 8 identified Plaintiff s past relevant work in relation to the DOT as 9 overlock sewing machine operator, DOT 786.682-194. (AR 726.) Of course, it is hornbook law that the limitations posited hypothetical questions See Embrey In this case, the VE 13 restrictions 14 limitations conformed to the DOT descriptions of Plaintiff s past 15 relevant work. in the hypothetical such, AR at 728-29), The by As (see found 12 694.) VE the particular the first question, correlated well with the RFC assessed 687, the of 11 (AR to all hypothetical ALJ. posed incorporate 10 the questions must the ALJ found question as to that in the Plaintiff s 16 In formulating the RFC, the ALJ relied upon an orthopedic 17 consultative examination ( CE ) performed by Dr. Pollis (AR 694, 803- 18 13). 19 from the Appeals Council. 20 Plaintiff did not receive any medical treatment in 2008 or thereafter, 21 (other than medicine refills), until she was seen in 2011 for the CE 22 (both orthopedic and psychiatric). 23 which was accorded considerable weight (AR 696), the ALJ determined 24 that Plaintiff s RFC had changed from the RFC assessed in the previous 25 decision. (See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a).) This CE was triggered by the Court s remand and instructions As the ALJ noted, it appeared that Based on this new evidence, to 26 Plaintiff argues that the exertional requirements of the DOT as 27 to her past relevant work include a temperaments category which, she 28 argues, were not incorporated into the ALJ s hypotheticals, and in 14 1 particular, did not utilize restrictions imposed by Dr. Lustig. 2 as the Court has already discussed, the ALJ rejected Dr. Lustig s 3 opinions, and as such, they were not required to be included with the 4 hypothetical questions. 5 that Plaintiff would have moderate restrictions in maintaining 6 concentration, persistence, and pace and in carrying out detailed 7 tasks, and also in interacting with coworkers and supervisors. (AR 8 687, 9 hypotheticals. 726.) The But, Further, the hypothetical questions assumed Court finds no error in this portion of the Further, the VE testified that the only possible 10 ambiguity with regard to Plaintiff s performance of her past relevant 11 work was whether she performed it at the medium exertional level, as 12 against the light exertional level, and was not because of any mental 13 restrictions. 14 Plaintiff also incorporates in her fourth issue a failure by the 15 ALJ to include restrictions imposed by other medical sources, such as 16 Dr. 17 assessment and rejection of some of Dr. Larsen s opinions. Larsen. Again, the Court has already addressed the ALJ s 18 With regard to Plaintiff s own testimony regarding functional 19 limitations, the ALJ did not include them, after making credibility 20 findings. (AR 695.) 21 doubt, it would appear that she is raising a challenge to these 22 credibility findings. (See JS at 56-57.) 23 challenge, in that the ALJ provided sufficient and substantive reasons 24 in the decision (see AR at 693-94) to reject Plaintiff s credibility: 25 a lack of narcotic pain medication in the face of complaints of severe 26 pain; a cessation of medical treatment in 2008; no evidence of 27 psychiatric 28 Plaintiff s report to a consultative psychiatric examiner as to the Giving Plaintiff s counsel the benefit of the treatment after 2007; 15 and The Court rejects this contradictions concerning 1 fact that she had never seen a psychiatrist. (See, Id.) Based on 2 this, the ALJ properly gave limited weight to her testimony and 3 statements. 4 Finally, Plaintiff appears to argue that she should be found to 5 be disabled under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, known as the 6 Grids. (See 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Rule 7 202.09.) 8 perform 9 evaluation process. But in this case, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could her past relevant work at Step Four of the sequential The Grids are used at Step Five only where there 10 is a determination that a claimant cannot do past relevant work. 11 that reason, Plaintiff s argument is unavailing. 12 13 14 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ will be affirmed. The Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 16 17 For DATED: August 1, 2012 /s/ VICTOR B. KENTON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16

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