Planet Goalie, Inc. v. Monkeysports, Inc.
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: 1) The motion to dismiss, or in the alternative to transfer venue (Doc.3), is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part as follows:a) the motion to dismiss 3 is DENIED.b) the motion request to transfer venue is GRANTED. The Clerkof Court is directed to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California.2) The motion for discovery 17 is deemed MOOT. Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 09/01/11 (ma, ) [Transferred from Pennsylvania Middle on 9/2/2011.]
<![CDATA[
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PLANET GOALIE, INC.,
Plaintiff
v.
MONKEYSPORTS, INC.,
Defendant
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Civ. No. 1:10-CV-2629
The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
MEMORANDUM
Before the court are two pending motions. First, is Defendant
Monkeysports, Inc.’s (“Monkeysports”) motion to dismiss, or in the alternative
change venue, for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 3.) Second, is Plaintiff Planet
Goalie, Inc.’s (“Planet Goalie”) motion for discovery. (Doc. 17.) For the reasons
that follow, Defendant’s motion to change venue will be granted and this case will be
transferred to the Central District of California and Plaintiff’s motion for discovery
will be deemed moot.
I.
Background
A.
Parties
Plaintiff Planet Goalie is a company that deals in the sale of hockey
equipment at the retail level. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff is incorporated in Nevada with
a principle place of business in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 1.) Defendant
Monkeysports is one of the largest retailers of hockey and other sports equipment
and is incorporated in California with a principle place of business in Corona,
California. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 8.) Plaintiff claims this court has both general and specific
jurisdiction over Defendant. (Id. ¶ 4.) For the reasons that follow, the court
disagrees.
B.
Factual Background
The complaint alleges that while Plaintiff was at a hockey show in Las
Vegas, Nevada, the owners of Plaintiff met with representatives from two of the
largest manufacturers of ice hockey goalie equipment in the United States: Vaughn
Custom Sports (“Vaughn”) and Reebok/CCM (“Reebok”). (Id. ¶¶ 7-9.) During that
meeting, Plaintiff claims that a contract was entered into with Vaughn, and a
potential contract was negotiated with Reebok. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 30-32.) Subsequently,
Plaintiff claims that representatives from Monkeysports threatened to decrease
business with Vaughn and Reebok if they entered into contracts with Planet Goalie.
(Id. ¶¶ 16, 39.) Therefore, Plaintiff claims Defendant engaged in tortious
interference with both existing and prospective contractual relations. (Id. Counts I &
II.)
Defendant claims that this court lacks both specific and general personal
jurisdiction over Defendant, and that the case should therefore be dismissed. In the
alternative, Defendant suggests that venue is improper and this case should be
transferred to the Central District of California where Defendant is incorporated and
has its principle place of business. (Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. 3.) The court agrees that
venue here is improper and will transfer this case to the Central District of
California.
C.
Procedural History
On March 7, 2011, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction and brief in support. (Docs. 3, 4.) On April 11, 2011, Plaintiff
2
filed a brief in opposition (Doc. 12), to which Defendant replied on April 21, 2011
(Doc. 13).
While this motion was pending, on May 28, 2011, Plaintiff filed a
motion for discovery. (Doc. 17.) A brief in support was filed on June 15, 2011.
(Doc. 19.) Defendant filed a response on June 23, 2011. (Doc. 20.) Both motions
are now ripe for disposition.
II.
Legal Standard: 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction
“Once [a court's jurisdiction] is challenged, the burden rests upon the
plaintiff to establish personal jurisdiction.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz Ag., 270 F.3d
144, 150 (3d Cir.2001) (citing Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat’l. Ass’n v. Farino, 960
F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir.1992)). A plaintiff may meet this burden by “establishing
with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum
state.” Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1223 (quoting Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Assoc., 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d. Cir.1987)). “A court must take ‘specific
analytical steps’ when determining whether it can assert personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant.” Accuweather, Inc., v. Total Weather, Inc., 223 F .Supp. 2d
612, 613 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (quoting Pennzoil Prod. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., Inc., 149
F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir.1998)).
Personal jurisdiction analysis is more difficult when a defendant’s
conduct with the forum state is based on internet contacts. “The internet allows
businesses and customers to communicate with each other from anywhere in the
world. Customers can also place orders from anywhere in the world. Because the
internet has no boundaries, a court must consider whether the electronic contacts
3
between the remote party and the party in the forum state are sufficient to satisfy the
‘minimum contacts’ element of the personal jurisdiction analysis. Hershey Co. v.
Pagosa Candy Co., Civ. No. 1:07-1364, 2008 WL 1730538, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2008)
(referencing G. PETER ALBERT, JR., ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN
CYBERSPACE 2006 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 14-5 (2006)). Courts have addressed
this issue, but first, the traditional personal jurisdiction framework will be discussed.
III.
Discussion
A.
Personal Jurisdiction
A federal district court sitting in Pennsylvania has jurisdiction over nonresident parties to the extent provided by Pennsylvania law. See FED.R.CIV.P. 4(e);
see also Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1221. Pennsylvania's long-arm statute allows a
court to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant “to the fullest extent
allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may be based upon the most
minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the
United States.” See 42 PA. CONS.STAT. § 5322(b); see also Time Share Vacation
Club v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir.1984). Accordingly, the reach
of Pennsylvania's long-arm statute is “coextensive with the due process clause of the
United States Constitution.” Time Share, 735 F.2d at 63. The due process clause of
the United States Constitution requires a non-resident defendant to have certain
minimum contacts with the forum state in order for a court in that forum to properly
exercise personal jurisdiction. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 291 (1980) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
General jurisdiction may be exercised over a non-resident defendant when the
4
defendant has “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state. Int’l Shoe,
326 U.S. at 318. Notably however, “the size of the percentage of defendant’s total
business represented by its contacts with the forum and the substantiality of the
absolute dollar amount involved in the contacts with the forum state are generally
irrelevant.” Asanov, et al., v. Gholson, Hicks & Nichols, P.A., et al., Civ. No. 1:052098, 2006 WL 1289308, at *8 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (citing Provident Nat. Bank v. Ca.
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 437-38 (3d Cir. 1987).
However, even if the defendant does not have continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum state, the defendant may still be subject to
specific jurisdiction in the forum state. Deutz Ag, 270 F.3d at 150 (citing
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984)).
Three elements must be established in order to warrant specific jurisdiction. Zippo
Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F.Supp. 1119, 1122-23 (W.D. Pa. 1997). First, the
cause of action must “arise[ ] out of the defendant's contacts with the forum.”
Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414 n. 8. Second, the defendant must have
“purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum.” Burger King v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). Finally,
the exercise of personal jurisdiction must be reasonable, and must not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 292 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
To establish the minimum contacts necessary to assert specific
jurisdiction the defendant must have “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Ca., 480
5
U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475). “Defendants who
‘reach out beyond one state’ and create continuing relationships and obligations with
the citizens of another state are subject to regulation and sanctions in the other state
for the consequences of their actions.” Zippo, 952 F.Supp. at 1123 (quoting Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 473). Specific jurisdiction is established when “the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
However, specific jurisdiction is not established if the non-resident defendant's
conduct in the forum state is “random, isolated or fortuitous.” Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984). In addition, mere knowledge that an
allegedly harmed plaintiff is located in the forum state will not be sufficient to
establish specific jurisdiction. Metallic Ceramic Coatings, Inc., v. Precision Prod.,
Inc., Civ. No. 00-4941, 2001 WL 122227, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
B. Internet Contacts as a Basis for Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction becomes more complicated when a defendant’s
contact with the forum state is primarily done through internet contacts. This court
in Hershey, went through an in-depth analysis of the recent history of the progression
of personal jurisdiction based on internet contacts in this Circuit. 2008 WL 1730538,
at *4-6.
This court first outlined the sliding-scale developed in Zippo, where a
defendant’s internet activity was held to be “directly proportion[al] to the nature and
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the internet.” Hershey,
2008 WL 1730538, at *4 (citing Zippo, 952 F. Supp. 1124) (internal citations
omitted). This court further explained the Zippo sliding scales as follows:
6
At one end . . . personal jurisdiction is properly exercised
over defendants who actively conduct business from a
commercial web site. If the defendant’s web site allows it
to “enter into contracts with residents of a foreign
jurisdiction . . . involving the knowing and repeated
transmission of computer files over the internet,” then the
site falls into the “commercial” category. Defendants who
maintain a “commercial” web site may be expected to
submit to the personal jurisdiction of courts within the
forum state. At the other end of the scale are operators of
passive web sites that simply make information available to
any viewer who may be interested. Operators of these
“passive” web sites have not engaged in conduct sufficient
to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them.
“Interactive” web sites allow the exchange of information
between a user and the host computer, and depending on
the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of the
exchange of information, personal jurisdiction may be
proper.
Id. Although helpful as an organizational tool to establish the types of internet web
sites in existence, the Zippo scale is, unfortunately, not terribly useful when it comes
to the practical application of personal jurisdiction, as most web sites would appear
to fall into the “interactive” category. As such, courts in the past few years have
attempted to expand and clarify under what circumstances a defendant may be
subject to personal jurisdiction based on internet contacts. Although there is no
bright-line rule, a few key developments have been made.
First, “something more” than simply having a website accessible to
individuals in the forum state must be shown. See Accuweather, Inc. v. Total
Weather, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 612, 616 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (citing to S. Morantz, Inc.
v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540-41 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(holding that web site and toll-free number were not sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania).) Something more can be established if a plaintiff can
show a defendant had “non-internet contacts [with the forum state], advertis[ed] in
7
local publications, [or had] business records of sales in the state.” Morilla v. Laser
Spine Inst., LLC, Civ. No. 2:10-1882, 2010 WL 3258312, at *4 (D.N.J. 2010). “A
website that has only information and a generic contact information input form falls
at the passive end of the Zippo scale.” Id. at *5. Furthermore, for web sites in the
“interactive” category, it must be shown “a web site targets a particular remote
jurisdiction . . .” Hershey, 2008 WL 1730538, at *5. For example, the Third Circuit
held in Toys “R” Us, that a website which was technically “commercial and
interactive on the Zippo scale” did not establish personal jurisdiction because the
web site was completely written in Spanish, prices were in Spanish currency, the
web site only shipped to Spain, not to the United States. See id. at *6 (discussing
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 2003).
As for general jurisdiction, the court in Koczkodon v. Grand Versailles,
LLC, et al., 2010 WL 3656037 (E.D. Pa. 2010), held that a “high standard” was
needed “to establish the sort of continuing and systematic contacts required for
general jurisdiction.”1 Id. at *2.
Although internet contacts muddy the water a bit when establishing
personal jurisdiction, the court finds that the website in this case was “interactive” in
nature and that Plaintiff has simply failed to establish the “something more” needed
for specific jurisdiction and has, likewise, not met the heightened burden needed for
general jurisdiction.
C.
The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant
1
The court had already established that specific personal jurisdiction did not exist
because Plaintiff was bringing personal tort claims based on activity which took place in New Jersey.
Id. at *1.
8
Planet Goalie has failed to meet its burden of showing that
Monkeysports has sufficient “minimum contacts” with this forum or that
Monkeysports engages in “systematic and continuous” activities in Pennsylvania.
The complaint alleges that the contact between representatives from
Planet Goalie and both Vaughn and Reebok took place in Nevada. The complaint
fails to state where the alleged contact between Monkeysports and either Vaughn or
Reebok occurred. Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss states that
Monkeysports averaged around nine-percent of its goalie equipment sales to
Pennsylvania. In addition, Planet Goalie claims that Monkeysports NJ makes
significant sales to Pennsylvania and that the Monkeysports NJ store allows people
to add their email to a mailing list. Planet Goalie claims that sales to Pennsylvania
dramatically increased after the Monkeysports NJ store was opened.2 Planet Goalie
also claims Monkeysports directly advertised and solicited business in Pennsylvania
because it has an “ongoing arrangement” with a company called Pro Ambitions
Hockey, Inc. (“Pro Ambitions”) and Pro Ambitions holds hockey camps in
Pennsylvania, as well as various other states and Canada. Pro Ambitions apparently
uses the Monkeysports logo on their hockey camp jerseys.
When Monkeysports NJ opened, it is argued that Monkeysports sent
emails to customers advising them of the opening and announcing that the New
Jersey store would be hiring. It is further argued that some of these customers reside
2
Plaintiff does not say whether sales to Pennsylvania increased due to orders from
Monkeysports or Monkeysports NJ, which is significant as Defendant states that they are separate legal
entities and do not share a corporation-shareholder or parent-subsidiary relationship. (Def.’s Br. in Opp.
to Pl.’s Request for Jurisdictional Discovery, Doc. 20, at 11.)
9
in Pennsylvania. In addition, Plaintiff contends that Monkeysports NJ employs
Pennsylvania residents and that both stores ship to customers in Pennsylvania.
Not withstanding these arguments, Planet Goalie has failed to show
Defendant’s contact with Pennsylvania is more than “fortuitous.” See Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. at 774 (1984) (contact with forum state must not be
“random, isolated, or fortuitous.”) Defendant has limited sales in Pennsylvania and
does not directly and specifically target Pennsylvania. In addition, the percentage of
sales in a forum state are generally considered irrelevant. See Asanov, et al., v.
Gholson, Hicks & Nichols, P.A., et al., Civ. No. 1:05-2098, 2006 WL 1289308, at *8
(M.D. Pa. 2006). Even assuming that Plaintiff has met its burden of demonstrating
that nine-percent of all Defendant’s sales occurred in Pennsylvania — a contention
that Defendant refutes, arguing a lower percentage of sales — such a showing does
not suggest that the website specifically targeted Pennsylvania residents as opposed
to just generally providing information about sports equipment and allowing
customers some interaction. See Morantz, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 542. Nothing on the
record or on the website (as viewed by the court) suggests that Pennsylvania
residents were targeted in any way. Thus, no evidence of purposeful availment
which would establish specific jurisdiction.
Nor is the court convinced that Defendant’s advertising at a national
hockey camp that operates in Pennsylvania, along with most other states, satisfies the
“high standard” needed to establish “continuous and systematic contacts” in
Pennsylvania needed for general jurisdiction. See Koczkodon, 2010 WL 3656037, at
* 1. Indeed, to hold that these activities — a website and hockey camp advertising
— were sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania would also mean
10
that nearly every other state would have personal jurisdiction. These non-specific
and non-targeted contacts are precisely the type of “fortuitous” contacts that fail to
establish personal jurisdiction. Because Plaintiff has failed to show “something
more” needed to establish specific jurisdiction over an interactive website.
The alleged tortious conduct in this case occurred either: in Nevada, at
the trade show convention; in New Jersey, by way of a potentially-related store; or,
in some unknown location, when Monkeysports representatives allegedly contacted
both Vaughn and Reebok. Furthermore, the court cannot hold that Monkeysports
alleged contacts with Pennsylvania gave rise to Planet Goalie’s causes of action. The
fact that Monkeysports has a website which is accessible to Pennsylvania residents,
and advertising on a team jersey of a hockey camp that operates in a majority of U.S.
states and Canada,3 is not sufficient to show that Monkeysports targeted
Pennsylvania in any active way. Furthermore, the fact that Planet Goalie technically
would have felt the impact of Monkeysports alleged conduct is unpersuasive. Planet
Goalie solicited sales at a convention in Nevada, conceivably, Planet Goalie could
have been a Monkeysports competitor in any state and Monkeysports did not
actively target this forum.
For these same reasons, this court does not have general personal
jurisdiction over Defendant because Plaintiff has failed to show Defendant’s contact
was “continuous and systematic.” Koczkodon, supra, at *2. This is a “high
standard” for Plaintiff to establish, see id., and Plaintiff has failed to do so here. A
small majority of sales and advertising on a jersey that is potentially used by a
hockey camp across the U.S. and Canada do not show the continuous and systematic
3
See http://www.proambitions.com/campschedule.htm.
11
sort of contact needed for the heightened standard required for general personal
jurisdiction.
B.
Jurisdictional Discovery
Plaintiff has filed a motion to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery
requesting the following: emails between Monkeysports and Monkeysports NJ to
third parties concerning Planet Goalie, and, “all internal e-mails, memoranda and/or
any other writings within Monkeysports and/or Monkeysports NJ, Inc. (including
any of the principals thereof) concerning the fact that Planet Goalie was doing and/or
was going to do business in Pennsylvania. (Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Leave to
Take Discovery and to File a Supp. Memo. of Law, Doc. 19, at 7.) However, the
court fails to see how any of this requested information would establish that this
court has proper jurisdiction. Conceivably, Plaintiff might be attempting to establish
that Monkeysports NJ is so intertwined with Monkeysports that Monkeysports NJ’s
contacts with Pennsylvania should somehow be attributed to Monkeysports in
California.
None of the requested discovery, including emails and other
correspondence, would change the simple fact that Monkeysports and Monkeysports
NJ are separately incorporated and, therefore, separate legal entities. Furthermore,
Monkeysports NJ is not a party to this action and the court is unwilling to require it
to disclose its corporate records, and other potentially confidential material, when it
has yet to even be sued. Nothing in the record, or in the requested jurisdictional
discovery, convinces this court that Pennsylvania is somehow the correct legal forum
for this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion will be deemed moot.
12
C.
Venue Transfer
The applicable statute for change of venue is 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Section 1404(a) provides: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought.” This statute provides district courts
with discretion to transfer a civil action “if the transfer is warranted by the
convenience of parties and witnesses and promotes the interests of justice.” Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964). Stated differently, “the purpose of [§
1404(a)] is to prevent the waste of time, energy, and money and to protect litigants,
witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted). Although the court has discretion to transfer venue, “a
motion to transfer is not to be liberally granted.” Measurement Specialties, Inc. v.
Stayhealthy.com, 275 F. Supp. 2d 638, 640 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
As a threshold question, the court must determine whether the action
“might have been brought” in the proposed transferee district. Van Dusen, 376 U.S.
at 616-17. If this limitation is met, the court must then weigh a list of factors. While
there is no definitive list of factors, courts generally consider the following interests :
(1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the defendant’s preference; (3) where the
claim arose; (4) the convenience of the parties; (4) the convenience of the witnesses,
but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one
of the fora; (5) the location of books and records, similarly limited to the extent that
the files could not be produced in the alternative forum; (6) the enforceability of the
judgment; (7) practical considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or
inexpensive; (8) the relative court congestion in the competing courts; (9) the local
13
interest in deciding local controversies at home; (10) the public policies of the fora;
(11) and the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law. Jumara v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1995). The burden of showing
that these factors warrant transfer rests with the moving party. Id. at 879. However,
the moving party “is not required to show ‘truly compelling circumstances for . . .
change . . . [of venue, but rather that] all relevant things considered, the case would
be better off transferred to another district.’ ” In re United States, 273 F.3d 380, 388
(3d Cir. 2001) (quoting In re Balsimo, 68 F.3d 185, 187 (7th Cir. 1995)) (alterations
in original).
In the alternative to dismissal, Defendant has requested that this case be
transferred to the United States District Court for the Central District of California
under 28 U.S.C. 1406(a), as this is where Defendant is a resident. Plaintiff has asked
that, should jurisdiction be found to be lacking in this court, the case be transferred to
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The only connection
this case has to New Jersey is Monkeysports NJ; however, as previously discussed,
Monkeysports NJ is a separate legal entity and not a party to this action. Although a
plaintiff’s choice of forum is a factor to be considered, the other factors weigh
against Plaintiff’s request. The allegedly tortious conduct “arose” in Nevada or some
unknown location. Although possibly closer for Planet Goalie, the court cannot say
that New Jersey is more convenient for the parties, or the potential witnesses, or the
court. Neither party has a truly vested interest in having this case transferred to New
Jersey, and as the only suggested alternative has been the Central District of
California, the case will be transferred there. Because Plaintiff is incorporated in
neighboring Nevada and many of the underlying facts allegedly occurred there, the
14
court finds that the majority of factors weigh in favor of the Central District of
California over the Middle District of Pennsylvania or the District of New Jersey.
Accordingly, the case will be transferred there.
IV.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, the court finds that it lacks both
specific and general jurisdiction to hear this case. However, the case will not be
dismissed but will instead be transferred to the United States District Court for the
Central District of California. An appropriate order will issue.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: September 1, 2011.
15
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PLANET GOALIE, INC.,
Plaintiff
v.
MONKEYSPORTS, INC.,
Defendant
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Civ. No. 1:10-CV-2629
The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum of law, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT :
1) The motion to dismiss, or in the alternative to transfer venue (Doc.
3), is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part as follows:
a) the motion to dismiss (Doc. 3) is DENIED.
b) the motion request to transfer venue is GRANTED. The Clerk
of Court is directed to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the
Central District of California.
2) The motion for discovery (Doc. 17) is deemed MOOT.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: September 1, 2011.
16
]]>
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?
