Blanca E. Galvan v. Michael J. Astrue, No. 2:2011cv07260 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2012)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Chooljian. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See order for details. (hr)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BLANCA E. GALVAN, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 16 17 v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. _________________________ ) Case No. CV 11-7260 JC ) ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 18 19 I. On September 7, 2011, plaintiff Blanca E. Galvan ( plaintiff ) filed a 20 21 22 23 Complaint seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security s denial of plaintiff s application for benefits. The parties have consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge. This matter is before the Court on the parties cross motions for summary 24 25 26 27 28 SUMMARY judgment, respectively ( Plaintiff s Motion ) and ( Defendant s Motion ). The Court has taken both motions under submission without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15; Sep. 13, 2011 Case Management Order ¶ 5. /// 1 1 Based on the record as a whole and the applicable law, the decision of the 2 Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The findings of the Administrative Law Judge 3 ( ALJ ) are supported by substantial evidence and are free from material error.1 4 II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE 5 DECISION 6 In March 2009, plaintiff filed applications for Supplemental Security 7 Income and Disability Insurance Benefits. (Administrative Record ( AR ) 10, 8 146, 154). Plaintiff asserted that she became disabled on January 30, 2005, due to 9 epilepsy. (AR 190). The ALJ examined the medical record and heard testimony 10 from plaintiff (who was represented by counsel) and a vocational expert on June 11 16, 2010. (AR 29-83). 12 On July 30, 2010, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled 13 through the date of the decision. (AR 17). Specifically, the ALJ found: 14 (1) plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: history of seizure 15 disorder, obesity and hyperlipidemia (AR 13); (2) plaintiff s impairments, 16 considered singly or in combination, did not meet or medically equal a listed 17 impairment (AR 13); (3) plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to 18 perform medium work (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c), 416.967(c)), but with additional 19 limitations (i.e., plaintiff could not climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and could not 20 be exposed to heights or hazards) (AR 13); (4) plaintiff could not perform her past 21 relevant work (AR 15); (5) there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 22 national economy that plaintiff could perform, specifically housekeeper, cashier II, 23 and parking lot attendant (AR 16-17); and (6) plaintiff s allegations regarding her 24 25 1 The harmless error rule applies to the review of administrative decisions regarding 26 disability. See Batson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 27 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying harmless error standard); see also Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 454 F.3d 1050, 1054-56 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing contours of 28 application of harmless error standard in social security cases). 2 1 limitations were not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the ALJ s 2 residual functional capacity assessment (AR 14). 3 The Appeals Council denied plaintiff s application for review. (AR 1). 4 III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 5 A. 6 To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that the claimant is Sequential Evaluation Process 7 unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically 8 determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 9 death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at 10 least twelve months. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 11 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). The impairment must render the claimant incapable of 12 performing the work claimant previously performed and incapable of performing 13 any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 14 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. 15 § 423(d)(2)(A)). 16 In assessing whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is to follow a five-step 17 sequential evaluation process: 18 (1) 19 20 Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. (2) Is the claimant s alleged impairment sufficiently severe to limit 21 the claimant s ability to work? If not, the claimant is not 22 disabled. If so, proceed to step three. 23 (3) Does the claimant s impairment, or combination of 24 impairments, meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. 25 Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, the claimant is 26 disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 27 /// 28 /// 3 1 (4) Does the claimant possess the residual functional capacity to 2 perform claimant s past relevant work? If so, the claimant is 3 not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 4 (5) Does the claimant s residual functional capacity, when 5 considered with the claimant s age, education, and work 6 experience, allow the claimant to adjust to other work that 7 exists in significant numbers in the national economy? If so, 8 the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 9 Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th 10 Cir. 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920). 11 The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the 12 Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 13 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098); see also 14 Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 (claimant carries initial burden of proving disability). 15 B. 16 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), a court may set aside a denial of Standard of Review 17 benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal 18 error. Robbins v. Social Security Administration, 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 19 2006) (citing Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 20 (9th Cir. 1995)). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 21 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 22 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations and quotations omitted). It is more than a 23 mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citing 24 Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990)). 25 To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, a court must 26 consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and 27 evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner s] conclusion. Aukland v. 28 Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 4 1 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming 2 or reversing the ALJ s conclusion, a court may not substitute its judgment for that 3 of the ALJ. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citing Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457). 4 IV. DISCUSSION 5 A. 6 7 The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Evidence 1. Pertinent Law In Social Security cases, courts employ a hierarchy of deference to medical 8 opinions depending on the nature of the services provided. Courts distinguish 9 among the opinions of three types of physicians: those who treat the claimant 10 ( treating physicians ) and two categories of nontreating physicians, namely 11 those who examine but do not treat the claimant ( examining physicians ) and 12 those who neither examine nor treat the claimant ( nonexamining physicians ). 13 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (footnote reference omitted). A 14 treating physician s opinion is entitled to more weight than an examining 15 physician s opinion, and an examining physician s opinion is entitled to more 16 weight than a nonexamining physician s opinion.2 See id. In general, the opinion 17 of a treating physician is entitled to greater weight than that of a non-treating 18 physician because the treating physician is employed to cure and has a greater 19 opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Morgan v. 20 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 21 1999) (citing Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987)). 22 The treating physician s opinion is not, however, necessarily conclusive as 23 to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability. Magallanes v. 24 Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 25 26 27 28 2 Cf. Le v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1200, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2008) (not necessary or practical to draw bright line distinguishing treating physicians from non-treating physicians; relationship is better viewed as series of points on a continuum reflecting the duration of the treatment relationship and frequency and nature of the contact) (citation omitted). 5 1 759, 761-62 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1989)). Where a treating physician s opinion is not 2 contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for clear and convincing 3 reasons. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal 4 quotations omitted). The ALJ can reject the opinion of a treating physician in 5 favor of another conflicting medical opinion, if the ALJ makes findings setting 6 forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial 7 evidence in the record. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted); Thomas v. 8 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (ALJ can meet burden by setting out 9 detailed and thorough summary of facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating 10 his interpretation thereof, and making findings) (citations and quotations omitted); 11 Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751, 755 (same; ALJ need not recite magic words to 12 reject a treating physician opinion court may draw specific and legitimate 13 inferences from ALJ s opinion). 14 15 2. Analysis Plaintiff essentially contends that the ALJ (1) failed adequately to evaluate 16 the medical evidence with respect to plaintiff s seizure disorder; (2) improperly 17 rejected the findings of two MRI examinations of plaintiff; and (3) failed properly 18 to develop the record by not calling an expert in neurology to testify at the hearing 19 as to the severity of plaintiff s impairments. (Plaintiff s Motion at 3-4). A remand 20 or reversal is not warranted on any of these grounds. 21 First, the ALJ s residual functional capacity determination accounted for all 22 significant probative evidence of plaintiff s limitations related to her severe 23 seizure disorder. The ALJ stated that he carefully considered the entire record 24 in accordance with administration regulations. (AR 11-14). The ALJ noted that in 25 2003 plaintiff s treating doctor indicated that plaintiff s seizure disorder was 26 controlled by medication. (AR 14) (citing Exhibit 1F at 9 [AR 240]). In January 27 2008, plaintiff reported to her doctor that she was not having seizures, and on 28 examination her doctor determined that plaintiff had a 5/5 on motor strength in all 6 1 of her extremities with no neurological or sensory problems. (AR 14) (citing 2 Exhibit 1F at 26 [AR 257]). In August 2008, plaintiff was diagnosed with seizure 3 disorder, but on examination she had a normal gait and 5/5 motor strength 4 globally. (AR 14) (citing Exhibit 8F at 12 [AR 331]). The ALJ also noted 5 objective testing which reflected that (1) in September 2004 plaintiff had a 6 normal electroencephalogram (EEG), with no epileptiform potentials seen ; (2) in 7 February 2008, an MRI of plaintiffs brain only showed bilateral foci of white 8 matter hyperintensity most prominent in the subcortical regions, but no evidence 9 of mesiotemporal sclerosis, hypoplastic maxillary sinuses with maxillary, ethmoid, 10 or left frontal sinus disease ; and (3) an August 2008 MRI only showed mild 11 periventricular deep white matter disease likely microvascular ischemic changes, 12 as well as a two-millimeter right coronal radiate lacune. (AR 14) (citing Exhibits 13 1F at 51 [AR 282]; 8F at 62, 65 [AR 381, 384]). 14 In addition, although treatment notes reflect that in April 2009 plaintiff s 15 seizures were uncontrolled, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff s seizures had 16 subsequently been brought under control in light of plaintiff s testimony that 17 (1) the seizures had decreased from three/four each week a year prior to only one 18 per week during the two months before the hearing; and (2) she had started taking 19 Depakote in the past year in addition to her prescription of Phenobarbital. (AR 20 14) (citing AR 58-63; Exhibits 8F at 28 [AR 347]; 9E at 4 [AR 217]). The ALJ 21 also found that plaintiff was being . . . treated conservatively . . . only with 22 medication, and concluded that to warrant finding additional physical 23 restrictions, [one] would expect to see more treatment, additional objective clinical 24 findings of significance, and observations of more restrictions by [plaintiff s] 25 examining doctors. (AR 14). In light of the foregoing evidence, it was 26 reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that any physical limitations from plaintiff s 27 seizure disorder were adequately accounted for in the ALJ s residual functional 28 capacity assessment which, among other things, precluded plaintiff from climbing 7 1 ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and working around heights or other hazards. (AR 14). 2 While plaintiff suggests that the record shows otherwise (Plaintiff s Motion at 4), 3 this Court will not second-guess the ALJ s reasonable interpretation of the medical 4 evidence, even if such evidence could give rise to inferences more favorable to 5 plaintiff. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citation omitted). 6 Second, the Court rejects plaintiff s contention that a reversal or remand is 7 warranted based on the ALJ s evaluation of reports from MRI examinations of 8 plaintiff s brain on February 5 and August 13, 2008 (collectively MRIs ). In 9 short, plaintiff merely disputes the ALJ s reasonable interpretation of the objective 10 medical evidence, which is, nonetheless, solely within the purview of the ALJ. 11 Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes, 12 881 F.2d at 750). Even assuming, as plaintiff argues, that the ALJ improperly 13 minimized the findings in the MRI reports without the benefit of a supporting 14 medical opinion (Plaintiff s Motion at 4), the Court finds no material error, 15 particularly when the ALJ s evaluation of the MRIs is viewed in the context of the 16 other substantial evidence noted above which supports the ALJ s residual 17 functional capacity assessment. Moreover, plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the 18 functional limitations assertedly called for the MRIs were not already accounted 19 for in plaintiff s residual functional capacity assessment. 20 Finally, the Court rejects plaintiff s contention that the ALJ failed properly 21 to develop the record by not calling a medical expert in the field of neurology to 22 testify as to the severity of plaintiff s impairments. (Plaintiff s Motion at 3). 23 Although plaintiff bears the burden of proving disability, the ALJ has an 24 affirmative duty to assist a claimant in developing the record when there is 25 ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper 26 evaluation of the evidence. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 27 2001) (citation omitted); Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 954; see also Webb v. Barnhart, 28 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ has special duty fully and fairly to develop 8 1 record and to assure that claimant s interests are considered). Where it is 2 necessary to enable the ALJ to resolve an issue of disability, the duty to develop 3 the record may require consulting a medical expert or ordering a consultative 4 examination. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519a, 416.919a; Reed v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 5 838, 842 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1517-1519t, 416.917-919t); 6 Carrillo Marin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 758 F.2d 14, 17 (1st 7 Cir. 1985) ( [I]f the Secretary is doubtful as to the severity of [a claimant s] 8 disorder the appropriate course is to request a consultative evaluation. . . . ); see 9 also Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 128 (5th Cir. 1991) (decision to order 10 consultative examination rests within ALJ s discretion) (citation omitted). 11 Here, as plaintiff concedes (Plaintiff s Motion at 3), the ALJ did not state 12 that the medical evidence was ambiguous or that the record was otherwise 13 inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of plaintiff s disability. Consistently, as 14 discussed above, substantial evidence (including records from plaintiff s treating 15 physicians) supported the ALJ s disability determination. Moreover, at the 16 hearing, plaintiff s attorney argued, in effect, that the current medical record was 17 sufficient to reach a disability determination.3 (AR 82). Plaintiff s conclusory 18 assertion that the record was incomplete is inadequate to trigger the ALJ s duty 19 to develop the record. See Reed, 270 F.3d at 842 ( The government is not 20 required to bear the expense of [a consultative] examination for every claimant. ) 21 (citations omitted). 22 Accordingly, a remand or reversal on this basis is not warranted. 23 /// 24 25 3 Although, as plaintiff points out, plaintiff s attorney complained at the hearing that a 26 doctor had not reviewed the record medical evidence (Plaintiff s Motion at 3) (citing AR 82), the 27 attorney did not argue that this fact precluded the ALJ from reaching a disability determination. (AR 80-82). To the contrary, counsel suggest just the opposite by arguing [w]e believe that the 28 evidence supports a finding that [plaintiff] is disabled. (AR 82). 9 1 B. 2 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ inadequately evaluated the credibility of her The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff s Credibility 3 subjective complaints. (Plaintiff s Motion at 5-6). The Court disagrees. 4 5 1. Pertinent Law Questions of credibility and resolutions of conflicts in the testimony are 6 functions solely of the Commissioner. Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th 7 Cir. 2006). If the ALJ s interpretation of the claimant s testimony is reasonable 8 and is supported by substantial evidence, it is not the court s role to second9 guess it. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). 10 An ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain or other 11 non-exertional impairment. Orn, 495 F.3d at 635 (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 12 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). If the record establishes the existence of a medically 13 determinable impairment that could reasonably give rise to symptoms assertedly 14 suffered by a claimant, an ALJ must make a finding as to the credibility of the 15 claimant s statements about the symptoms and their functional effect. Robbins, 16 466 F.3d 880 at 883 (citations omitted). Where the record includes objective 17 medical evidence that the claimant suffers from an impairment that could 18 reasonably produce the symptoms of which the claimant complains, an adverse 19 credibility finding must be based on clear and convincing reasons. Carmickle v. 20 Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 21 2008) (citations omitted). The only time this standard does not apply is when 22 there is affirmative evidence of malingering. Id. The ALJ s credibility findings 23 must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the ALJ 24 rejected the claimant s testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily 25 discredit the claimant s testimony. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th 26 Cir. 2004). 27 To find the claimant not credible, an ALJ must rely either on reasons 28 unrelated to the subjective testimony (e.g., reputation for dishonesty), internal 10 1 contradictions in the testimony, or conflicts between the claimant s testimony and 2 the claimant s conduct (e.g., daily activities, work record, unexplained or 3 inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow prescribed course of 4 treatment). Orn, 495 F.3d at 636; Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883; Burch, 400 F.3d at 5 680-81; SSR 96-7p. Although an ALJ may not disregard such claimant s 6 testimony solely because it is not substantiated affirmatively by objective medical 7 evidence, the lack of medical evidence is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his 8 credibility assessment. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. 9 10 2. Analysis First, an ALJ may properly consider a plaintiff s failure to follow a 11 prescribed course of treatment in assessing her credibility. See Smolen v. Chater, 12 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, as the ALJ noted, treatment records 13 reflect plaintiff s poor compliance with taking prescribed medication. (AR 15) 14 (citing Exhibit 8F at 28 [AR 347] [plaintiff not been compliant with Depakote 15 and decreased dose on her own ]; Exhibit 8F at 45 [AR 364] [plaintiff afraid to 16 increase dose of prescribed medication; poor compliance ]). While an ALJ may 17 not reject symptom testimony where a claimant provides evidence of a good 18 reason for not taking medication, Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (citations omitted), 19 plaintiff has not presented such a sufficient reason. 20 Second, the ALJ properly discredited plaintiff s subjective complaints in 21 part because they were inconsistent with plaintiff s daily activities. See Thomas, 22 278 F.3d at 958-59 (inconsistency between the claimant s testimony and the 23 claimant s conduct supported rejection of the claimant s credibility); Verduzco v. 24 Apfel,188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (inconsistencies between claimant s 25 testimony and actions cited as a clear and convincing reason for rejecting the 26 claimant s testimony). For example, the ALJ noted that plaintiff stated she goes 27 /// 28 /// 11 1 grocery shopping, cleans the house, lifts a trash can, and washes dishes.4 (AR 15) 2 (citing Exhibit 6E [AR 205-07]). The ALJ stated that such activities suggest 3 plaintiff has a greater [functional] capacity . . . than [she] alleges. (AR 15). 4 While plaintiff argues that her daily activities do not equate[] with the ability to 5 perform work on a sustained basis, this Court will not second-guess the ALJ s 6 reasonable interpretation that they do, even if such evidence could give rise to 7 inferences more favorable to plaintiff. 8 Finally, the ALJ properly discredited plaintiff s subjective symptom 9 testimony due, in part, to the absence of supporting objective medical evidence. 10 Burch, 400 F.3d at 681; Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 ( While subjective pain 11 testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by 12 objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in 13 determining the severity of the claimant s pain and its disabling effects. ) (citing 14 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)). Here, as discussed above, the ALJ essentially found 15 that (1) plaintiff had been receiving only conservative treatment (i.e., medication 16 only) for her seizure disorder; (2) plaintiff s seizures were controlled when 17 plaintiff was compliant with her prescribed medication; and (3) the record does not 18 reflect additional objective clinical findings of significance or observations of 19 more restrictions by [plaintiff s] examining doctors, or that plaintiff sought 20 additional treatment at least some of which would be expected in light of 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 In the decision, the ALJ stated that [plaintiff] reported that she goes grocery shopping, cleans the house, lifts a trash can, and . . . washes dishes. (AR 15) (citing Exhibit 6E [AR 20507]). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ mischaracterized her daily activities, because plaintiff s exertional questionnaire purportedly shows that the plaintiff does not do her own grocery shopping, nor clean her home without the assistance of her husband. (Plaintiff s Motion at 6) (citing AR 206). Nonetheless, although plaintiff stated in her exertional questionnaire that she would go with someone to the store, and that her husband would help clean the house, plaintiff also stated that she personally was able to vacuum, wash dishes, and carry groceries. (AR 20506). Accordingly, the Court finds any error in the ALJ s characterization of plaintiff s daily activities to be immaterial. 12 1 plaintiff s alleged disabling symptoms. (AR 14); see Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 2 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (In assessing credibility, the ALJ may 3 properly rely on plaintiff s unexplained failure to request treatment consistent with 4 the alleged severity of her symptoms.); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th 5 Cir. 1999); see also Fair, 885 F.2d at 604 (ALJ permissibly considered 6 discrepancies between claimant s allegations of persistent and increasingly severe 7 pain and the nature and extent of treatment obtained). 8 Accordingly, a remand or reversal on this basis is not warranted. 9 V. CONCLUSION 10 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner of Social 11 Security is affirmed. 12 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 13 DATED: March 21, 2012 14 15 16 ______________/s/___________________ Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13

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