Isabel A Chavez v. Michael J Astrue, No. 2:2011cv06388 - Document 20 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Marc L. Goldman: For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioners decision is reversed, and this action is remanded for further proceedings. (See document for details.) (rla)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 WESTERN DIVISION 8 9 ISABEL A. CHAVEZ, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 13 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 14 Defendant. 15 Case No. CV 11-06388-MLG MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 16 17 Plaintiff Isabel Chavez seeks judicial review of the 18 Commissioner s denial of her application for disability insurance 19 benefits ( DIB ) and supplemental security income benefits ( SSI ). 20 For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner s decision is 21 reversed, and this action is remanded for further proceedings. 22 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff was born on August 20, 1977. (AR at 63). She filed 25 an 26 disability beginning December 1, 2006 due to lower back and neck 27 pain, depression, and Asperger s Disorder. (AR at 59, 67, 126). The 28 Social application Security for DIB and SSI Administration in denied 1 November 2007, Plaintiff s alleging application 1 initially on April 17, 2008. (AR at 59, 67-71). 2 A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) 3 Robert S. Eisman on December 7, 2009. (AR at 30). Plaintiff, who 4 was represented by counsel, testified at the hearing, as did a 5 vocational expert ( VE ). (AR at 21). On December 17, the ALJ 6 issued a decision denying Plaintiff s application. (AR at 21-30). 7 The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from a mood disorder, not 8 otherwise specified, and a history of back pain, but that she 9 retains the residual functional capacity ( RFC ) to perform medium 10 work limited to simple routine and repetitive tasks performed in a 11 low stress setting, and which does not require more than occasional 12 interaction with the public or co-workers. (AR at 24-25). The ALJ 13 concluded that while Plaintiff is unable to perform any past 14 relevant 15 significant numbers in the national economy and therefore is not 16 disabled. (AR at 28-29). The Appeals Council denied review on June 17 30, 2011 (AR at 2-4). 18 work, Plaintiff she is commenced able this to perform action for jobs that judicial exist review in on 19 September 21, 2011. The parties filed a joint statement of disputed 20 issues ( Joint Stip. ) on April 3, 2012. Plaintiff contends that 21 the ALJ gave insufficient weight to the opinion of Rick Williamson, 22 Ph.D., Plaintiff s treating psychologist. (Joint Stip. at 4). 23 Plaintiff seeks reversal and payment of benefits, or alternatively, 24 remand for further administrative proceedings. (Joint Stip. at 23). 25 Defendant requests that the ALJ s decision be affirmed or, if the 26 Court finds that the ALJ committed reversible error, that the Court 27 remand for further administrative proceedings. (Joint Stip. at 23). 28 // 2 1 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 3 Commissioner s decision to deny benefits. The Commissioner s or 4 ALJ s decision must be upheld unless the ALJ s findings are based 5 on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the 6 record as a whole. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 7 1990); 8 Substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable person 9 might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. 10 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 11 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). It is more than a scintilla, but less 12 than a preponderance. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 13 882 (9th Cir. 2006). To determine whether substantial evidence 14 supports 15 administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that 16 supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner s 17 conclusion. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1996). 18 If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing the 19 ALJ s conclusion, the reviewing court may not substitute its 20 judgment for that of the ALJ. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882. Parra a v. Astrue, finding, 481 the F.3d 742, reviewing 746 court (9th must Cir. 2007). review the 21 22 III. 23 A. The ALJ Failed to Give Appropriate Weight to the Treating 24 Physician s Opinion 25 Plaintiff DISCUSSION contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the 26 opinion of her treating psychologist, Dr. Williamson. (Joint Stip. 27 at 4-15). Dr. Williamson began treating Plaintiff for various 28 mental health issues in 2003. (AR at 311). In a Mental Health 3 1 Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire completed on February 5, 2 2009 (the Questionnaire ), Dr. Williamson diagnosed Plaintiff as 3 having Asperger s Disorder, major depression, and attention deficit 4 hyperactivity disorder, with a Global Assessment of Functioning 5 ( GAF ) score of 50. (AR at 311). He found that Plaintiff had 6 extreme and marked limitations in multiple areas of work-related 7 functions, 8 concentration and persistence, and social interaction. (AR at 314- 9 315). In contrast to Dr. Williamson s findings of extreme and 10 marked limitations, examining psychiatrist Jobst Singer, MD, who 11 evaluated Plaintiff on March 19, 2008, concluded that Plaintiff 12 does not suffer from significant impairments. (AR at 281-82). 13 including understanding and memory, sustained The Commissioner is directed to weigh medical opinions based 14 in 15 treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. 16 Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, more weight 17 is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a 18 greater 19 individual, than the opinion of a non-treating professional. See 20 id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). part on their opportunity source, to specifically, know and observe whether the proffered patient as by an 21 The Commissioner must also consider whether a medical opinion 22 is supported by clinical findings and is contradicted by other 23 medical evidence of record. If the opinion of a treating or 24 examining medical professional is uncontradicted, the Commissioner 25 may reject it only for clear and convincing reasons supported by 26 substantial evidence in the record. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. If 27 the 28 Commissioner may reject it for specific and legitimate reasons opinion is contradicted by 4 another medical source, the 1 supported by substantial evidence. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. When a 2 treating professional s opinion is contradicted by an examining 3 professional s opinion, which is supported by different independent 4 clinical findings, the Commissioner may resolve the conflict by 5 relying on the latter. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 6 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th 7 Cir. 2007) (ALJ may reject opinion of treating physician in favor 8 of examining physician whose opinion rests of independent clinical 9 findings). 10 The ALJ rejected Dr. Williamson s opinion, but failed to state 11 adequate reasons for doing so. (AR at 25). Most seriously, the ALJ 12 rejected Dr. Williamson s conclusion that Plaintiff suffers from 13 Aperger s Disorder, explaining that there was no diagnosis that 14 Plaintiff suffered from the disorder during the relevant time 15 period.(AR at 28, 311). However, while the objective testing 16 verifying 17 completed in 2006, prior to the alleged onset of disability, (AR at 18 315), this fact is irrelevant as according to both the National 19 Institute of Health and the Mayo Clinic, Asperger s Disorder is not 20 a curable mental condition.1 Moreover, Asperger s Disorder is 21 repeatedly mentioned in Plaintiff s treatment records throughout 22 the relevant time period. (AR at 336, 337, 343, 344, 348, 361, 23 375). The ALJ also observed that a discharge summary completed 24 September 19, 2008, did not refer to Asperger s Disorder, which 25 indicates that it was ruled out. (AR at 27). Yet while the Plaintiff s diagnosis of Asperger s disorder was 26 27 28 1 http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/asperger/asperger.htm; http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/aspergers-syndrome/DS00551/DSECT ION=treatments-and-drugs 5 1 diagnosis section of the summary does not include Asperger s 2 Disorder, the same page explains that in her final appointment 3 before discharge, a plan had been developed to have interventions 4 centered on client s Asperger s disorder. (AR at 344). Therefore, 5 the summary does indeed refer to Asperger s. To the extent the ALJ 6 thought there was some ambiguity given its absence from the 7 diagnosis section of the summary, he should have contacted Dr. 8 Williamson for clarification. See Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 9 687 (9th Cir. 2005) ( The ALJ's duty to supplement a claimant's 10 record is triggered by ambiguous evidence, the ALJ's own finding 11 that the record is inadequate or the ALJ's reliance on an expert's 12 conclusion that the evidence is ambiguous ). Thus, the ALJ s 13 rejection of Dr. Williamson s finding that Plaintiff suffers from 14 Asperger s Disorder was not supported by substantial evidence in 15 the record. As such, Dr. Williamson s diagnosis of Asperger s 16 disorder 17 rejecting his opinion as to Plaintiff s RFC. does not itself constitute a legitimate basis for 18 The ALJ also explained he was giving little weight to Dr. 19 Williamson s RFC assessment because it is so extreme as to lack 20 credibility 21 treatment history. (AR at 28). The ALJ did not explicitly state 22 which aspects of the treatment history were inconsistent with Dr. 23 Williamsons finding, but earlier in the opinion he gave multiple 24 reasons for rejecting Plaintiff s subjective complaints centered on 25 the treatment history. (AR at 26-27). These reasons include that an 26 initial assessment from May 2008 gave Plaintiff a GAF score of 58, 27 that Plaintiff has not been taking any prescription psychotropic 28 medications in that since it 2005, is inconsistent has not 6 with required the any claimant s psychiatric 1 hospitalizations, exquisite therapies, or any other extraordinary 2 treatments, and has been seeing a pyschologist only once a month. 3 (AR at 27). However, it is difficult to determine whether the ALJ s 4 conclusion that the treatment record did not match Dr. Williamson s 5 opinion can be separated from the ALJ s unsupported finding that 6 Plaintiff does not suffer from Asperger s Disorder. For example, it 7 is not clear that the treatment the ALJ found to be lacking is 8 appropriate for a claimant with Asperger s. See, e.g, National 9 Institutes Health, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/ 10 asperger/asperger.htm#Is_there_any_treatment. It 11 responsibility 12 supported 13 physician s opinion. Here, where the ALJ s stated reason, that the 14 treating history does not support Dr. Williamson s opinion, is 15 premised on an unreasonable rejection of one of Plaintiff s key 16 diagnosis, the Court cannot find that the reason is supported by 17 substantial evidence. 18 of by to provide substantial Moreover, to the specific evidence extent and for the is the legitimate rejecting ALJ s a rejection ALJ s reasons treating of Dr. 19 Williamson s opinion was based on Dr. Singer s opinion, this 20 reliance was improper because Dr. Singer was not provided with 21 Plaintiff s medical records to review. (AR at 279). The regulations 22 require 23 background information about the plaintiff's condition. 20 C.F.R. 24 § 25 consultative exams are utilized to try to resolve a conflict or 26 ambiguity if one exists. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519a(a)(2). Because Dr. 27 Singer evaluated Plaintiff without a complete access to her medical 28 records, Dr. Singer's opinion does not constitute substantial that 404.1517. a consultative Background examiner information 7 be is given any essential necessary because 1 evidence justifying rejection 2 treating physician. See, 3 S 10 2401, 2012 WL 639304, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012) (finding 4 that the ALJ had erred in assigning significant weight to [the 5 examining physician s] opinion because this physician was not 6 provided plaintiff's available medical records as required by 20 7 C.F.R. §§ 404.1517, 416.917); Pruitt v. Astrue, 2010 WL 1330164, at 8 *4-5 (C.D. Cal., March 31, 2010) (requiring remand where the ALJ 9 relied 10 on consultative of e.g., the opinion Jackson v. psychologist's of Plaintiff's Astrue, opinion who No. did CIV not completely review plaintiff's medical records). 11 Accordingly, none of the ALJ s stated reasons for rejecting 12 Dr. Williamson s opinion are supported by substantial evidence in 13 the record. 14 15 16 IV. Conclusion As a general rule, remand is warranted where additional 17 administrative proceedings could remedy defects in the 18 Commissioner's decision. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1179 19 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, remand is appropriate to properly 20 consider Dr. Williamson s opinion in light of Plaintiff s diagnosis 21 of Asperger s disorder, and to fully develop the record. 22 Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and 23 this action is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 24 this Memorandum Opinion. 25 Dated: April 11, 2012 26 ______________________________ Marc L. Goldman United States Magistrate Judge 27 28 8
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
