Christian Ashton v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA et al
Filing
12
MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND REMANDING STATE CLAIMS TO LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT by Judge Jacqueline H. Nguyen: Case number BC461729 Case Terminated. Made JS-6 (Attachments: # 1 remand letter) (bp)
JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
2:11-cv-06275-JHN -AJWx
Title
Christian Ashton v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA et al
Present: The
Honorable
Date
September 19, 2011
JACQUELINE H. NGUYEN
Alicia Mamer
Not Reported
N/A
Deputy Clerk
Court Reporter / Recorder
Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:
Attorneys Present for Defendants:
Not present
Not present
Proceedings:
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
AND REMANDING STATE CLAIMS TO LOS ANGELES
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT (In Chambers)
The matter is before the Court on Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) and
California Reconveyance Company’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff Christian Ashton’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint (docket no. 5), filed on August 5,
2011. On September 7, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Opposition.1 (Docket no. 9.) On
September 12, 2011, Defendants filed a Reply. (Docket no. 11.) The Court has
considered these pleadings and deems this matter appropriate for decision without oral
argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Local Rule 7-15. Accordingly, the hearing set for
September 26, 2011, is vacated.
For the reasons herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion, DISMISSES Plaintiff’s
federal claims, and REMANDS the state claims to Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Los Angeles.2
I.
Background
1
Plaintiff’s opposition was filed 2 days late. See L.R. 7-9 (opposition must be filed
no later than 21 days before the date of the hearing). While the Motion could be granted
on this basis alone, the Court will nonetheless address the merits of the Motion.
2
Since the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal claims and remands the state claims,
the Court need not address Defendants’ alternative grounds for dismissal and need not
rule on Defendants’ request for judicial notice, on which this order does not rely.
CV-90 (06/04)
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Page 1 of 5
JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
2:11-cv-06275-JHN -AJWx
Title
Date
September 19, 2011
Christian Ashton v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA et al
On or about November 6, 2007, Plaintiff obtained a mortgage loan from Washington
Mutual Bank for a sum of $1,880,000.00. (FAC ¶ 1.) Plaintiff defaulted on the loan, and
on January 3, 2011, Chase purchased the Property at a trustee’s sale.
On May 16, 2011, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants in the Superior Court for
the County of Los Angeles. On July 6, 2011, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”). Defendants removed the action to this Court based on federal question
jurisdiction on July 29, 2011. (Docket no. 1.)
Plaintiff’s FAC asserts twenty-four causes of action, of which only two are alleged
violations of federal law: violation of Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601
et seq. (Claim 5), and violation of Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12
U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (Claim 6). The remaining claims assert violations of state law.
II.
Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to seek dismissal of a complaint that “fail[s] to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In evaluating a motion to
dismiss, courts generally cannot consider material outside the complaint, such as facts
presented in briefs, affidavits, or discovery materials, unless such material is alleged in
the complaint or judicially noticed. McCalip v. De Legarret, No. CV-08-2250, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 87870, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008); see Jacobson v. AEG Capital Corp.,
50 F.3d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir. 1995). Courts must accept as true all material factual
allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp., 380 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir.
2004). However, this tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Courts need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. Based on
judicial experience and common sense, courts must determine whether a complaint
plausibly states a claim for relief. Id. at 1950.
Part of the Court’s determination as to whether a claim plausibly states a claim for relief
involves an analysis of a pleading’s factual specificity. Asserting more than mere
conclusory statements, a complaint must provide a factual basis showing that a plaintiff is
CV-90 (06/04)
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Page 2 of 5
JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
2:11-cv-06275-JHN -AJWx
Title
Date
September 19, 2011
Christian Ashton v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA et al
entitled to relief and giving the defendant fair notice of claims and relief asserted. Id. at
1950–51; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Although a lengthy factual background is unnecessary, dismissal of a complaint is
warranted where the plaintiff fails to allege specific facts needed to support the
plausibility of a claim or provide fair notice to the opposing party. See id.
III.
Discussion
A.
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)
Plaintiff complains that Defendants violated TILA by “failing to provide Plaintiff with
accurate material disclosures” and failing to inform him “of the pros and cons of
adjustable rate mortgages.” (FAC ¶ 71.) Plaintiff also claims that he has a three year
right to cancel this loan. (Id. ¶ 78.)
Defendants assert that the TILA claim fails because it is time-barred. TILA generally
provides for a one-year statute of limitations or, where rescission is sought, a three-year
statute of limitations. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(e), 1635(f). Generally, the statute of limitations
commences at the loan’s origination. King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir.
1986) (“[A]s a general rule the limitations period starts at the consummation of the
transaction.”).
In this case, the loans originated on or about November 6, 2007. Because Plaintiff filed
this action on May 16, 2011, more than three years after the alleged violation, Plaintiff’s
claim for monetary damages under the TILA is time-barred, unless equitable tolling
applies. See King, 784 F. 2d at 915 (equitable tolling of civil damages brought under
TILA may, in the appropriate circumstances, suspend the limitations period until the
borrower discovers or had reasonable opportunity to discover the fraud or nondisclosures
that form the basis of the TILA action). “Equitable tolling is generally applied in
situations ‘where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a
defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been
induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to
pass.’” O’Donnell v. Vencor, Inc., 465 F. 3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Irwin v.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,96, 111 S. Ct. 453, 112 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1990)).
Plaintiffs’ TILA claim for damages is clearly time-barred. Although Plaintiff claims that
he was never given a complete loan package and therefore did not have the “tools
necessary to . . . discover the TILA violations,” this bare allegation does not suffice to
CV-90 (06/04)
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Page 3 of 5
JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
2:11-cv-06275-JHN -AJWx
Title
Date
September 19, 2011
Christian Ashton v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA et al
trigger equitable tolling. Information regarding the “pros and cons” of adjustable rates are
widely available to the public, and there is no indication that Defendants interfered with
Plaintiff’s right to pursue judicial remedies in any way. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ Motion and dismisses Plaintiff’s TILA claim with prejudice.3
B.
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)
Plaintiff’s second federal claim alleges violations of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (“RESPA”). Plaintiff claims that Chase was paid “unearned fees . . . in
the form of a Yield Spread Premium which increased the interest rate . . . resulting in
Chase receiving a windfall of ‘buy back fees’ over the life of the loan.” (FAC ¶ 83.)
Even if Plaintiff’s claim was cognizable under RESPA, it is time-barred by the statute of
limitations. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614; see also Patague v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1003460, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124980, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2010) (“The statute
of limitations for a RESPA claim is three years for violations of 12 U.S.C. § 2605 and
one year for violations of § 2607 or 2608 ‘from the date of the occurrence of the
violation[.]’”). In this case, the loan transaction took place on November 6, 2007. This
complaint was not filed until May 16, 2011. Therefore, any violation related to the
“closing on the sale” would be time-barred. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff’s claim for violations of RESPA. The Court finds that
no amendment could save this claim, and it is dismissed with prejudice.
C.
Remaining Claims—Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and federal district courts have original
jurisdiction over claims raising federal questions or involving parties with diverse
citizenship. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005).
3
It appears that Plaintiff also alleges a claim for TILA rescission in the FAC. (See
FAC ¶ 78.) However, this claim is likewise time-barred as the three-year statute of
limitations has run. Further, unlike a TILA damages claim, equitable tolling is not
available for a rescission claim under TILA. Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410,
412 (1998); King, 784 F.2d at 914. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff asserts a claim for
TILA recission, that claim is also dismissed.
CV-90 (06/04)
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Page 4 of 5
JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
2:11-cv-06275-JHN -AJWx
Date
Title
September 19, 2011
Christian Ashton v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA et al
“[O]nce a court has original jurisdiction over some claims in the action, it may exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims that are part of the same case or
controversy.” Id. However, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state-law claims under various circumstances, including if the state-law
claims “substantially predominate[] over the claim or claims over which the district court
has original jurisdiction” or the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Here, other than the TILA and RESPA claims, Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action are
all based on state law. The Court therefore has only supplemental jurisdiction over these
claims. However, because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal TILA and RESPA
claims, the Court must decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s statelaw claims.
IV.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff’s TILA and
RESPA claims, and dismisses those claims with prejudice. (Docket no. 5.) The Court
declines supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and hereby
REMANDS the remaining claims to the Superior Court of the State of California, County
of Los Angeles.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
:
Initials of Preparer
CV-90 (06/04)
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
N/A
AM
Page 5 of 5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?