-AGR Jose Cortez v. Leroy D Baca et al, No. 2:2011cv03274 - Document 68 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 34 by Judge Dean D Pregerson: The court hereby DENIES Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as to: 1) Plaintiffs excessive force claims against Deputies Castle and Br aden; and 2) Plaintiffs state law tort claims against the Deputies and the County. The court, however, GRANTS summary judgment for: 1) Defendant Baca on all of Plaintiffs claims; 2) the County on all of Plaintiffs federal claims; and 3) all Defendants on Plaintiffs § 1981 and First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment claims. (lc). Modified on 9/7/2012 (lc).
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
-AGR Jose Cortez v. Leroy D Baca et al Doc. 68 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSE CORTEZ, an individual, 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Plaintiff, v. LEROY D. BACA, SHERIFF OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal corporation; LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF CASTLE, BADGE NO. 515174, an individual; AND LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF BRADEN, BADGE NO. 405667, an individual, 20 Defendants. 21 22 ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 11-03274 DDP (AGRx) ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Docket No. 34] 23 24 Presently before the court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary 25 Judgment, or in the Alternative Summary Adjudication of Issues 26 (“Motion”). 27 oral argument, the court denies the Motion in part, grants the 28 Motion in part, and adopts the following Order. Having reviewed the parties’ moving papers and heard Dockets.Justia.com 1 I. 2 BACKGROUND Defendant Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Castle (“Deputy 3 Castle”) handcuffed Plaintiff Jose Cortez (“Cortez”) during a 4 traffic stop on April 23, 2010. 5 (“Deputy Braden”) was present at the time and acting as Deputy 6 Castle’s field training officer. Defendant Deputy Sheriff Braden 7 Cortez filed a First Amended Complaint on April 10, 2012, 8 alleging the following federal claims: 1) constitutional violations 9 of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; 2) 10 racial discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and 3) use 11 of excessive force, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 12 alleges state law claims for battery, false imprisonment, 13 intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. 14 Cortez also Defendants filed this Motion on June 4, 2012, arguing that 15 they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Cortez’s 16 claims. 17 II. 18 LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that 19 there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 20 is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 21 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). 22 In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed 23 in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all 24 justifiable inferences are drawn in its favor. 25 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Fed. R. Civ. P. Anderson v. Liberty 26 A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such that a 27 reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” 28 and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the 2 1 suit under the governing law.” 2 fact exists “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a 3 rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” 4 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 5 587 (1986). 6 Id. at 248. No genuine issue of It is not enough for a party opposing summary judgment to 7 “rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.” 8 477 U.S. at 259. 9 pleadings to designate specific facts showing that there is a Anderson, Instead, the nonmoving party must go beyond the 10 genuine issue for trial. 11 existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving 12 party’s claim is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. 13 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 14 weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences 15 from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge,” when he 16 or she is ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 17 III. DISCUSSION Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The “mere But “[c]redibility determinations, the Id. at 255. 18 A. 19 As an initial matter, Cortez concedes that Defendants are Undisputed Claims 20 entitled to summary judgment on his claims for constitutional 21 violations of the First, Fifth, and Eight Amendments, and all 22 claims against Defendant Sheriff Leroy D. Baca. 23 therefore grants Defendants’ Motion as to these claims. The court 24 B. 25 Defendants also argue that they are each entitled to summary Excessive Force Claims 26 judgment on Cortez’s excessive force claims under the Fourth and 27 Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 28 3 The court disagrees. 1 2 An excessive force claim turns on whether the officer’s “use 3 of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances,” 4 balancing the plaintiff’s liberty interest with the government 5 interests at stake. 6 2002) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). 7 “even where some force is justified, the amount actually used may 8 be excessive.” 9 almost always “requires a jury to sift through disputed factual Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. Santos, 287 F.3d at 853. Thus, Because this analysis 10 contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom,” summary judgment 11 “should be granted sparingly” in excessive force cases. 12 Id. Here, the parties dispute a number of facts regarding the 13 incident, such as whether a warrant check returned a felony or a 14 misdemeanor warrant for an individual who turned out to be a 15 different “Jose Cortez.” 16 factual question to resolve this Motion: whether Defendant Castle 17 used excessive force in his manner of handcuffing Cortez. 18 one hand, Defendants contend that Deputy Castle conducted a routine 19 and reasonable handcuffing of Cortez. 20 provided evidence to the contrary. 21 But the court only needs to address one On the Cortez, however, has According to Cortez’s own deposition, Deputy Castle first 22 “came up and shoved” Cortez into “the back of [his] truck.” 23 Castle then “kicked [Cortez’s] feet open” - kicking each foot “at 24 least three” times - and pulled both of Cortez’s arms back until 25 his “hands were crossed.” 26 [Cortez’s right hand] back three times,” pulling it “real hard” 27 each time. 28 indicated his pain by moaning “[a]t least two times,” loud enough Deputy In doing so, Deputy Castle “pulled Cortez felt pain in his shoulder with each pull and 4 1 for Deputy Castle to hear. 2 well, so that “anyone looking at [him] . . . would have known that 3 [he] was in pain.” 4 only on Cortez’s left wrist. 5 also asked Deputy Castle if he could use the bathroom. 6 Castle did not respond and Cortez eventually urinated on himself, 7 while he was still in handcuffs. 8 Supp. of Mot. (“Sargoy Decl.”) ¶ 3, Ex. A.) 9 Cortez made gestures with his face as Deputy Castle ultimately placed the handcuffs While he was being handcuffed, Cortez Deputy (Decl. of Kenneth J. Sargoy in Cortez went to the hospital two days later, where he told 10 doctors that he was injured by the handcuffing. 11 Cortez with a “right proximal biceps tendon rupture” and provided 12 prescription pain medicine. 13 since recommended arthroscopic surgery, noting a “tear of the long 14 head of the biceps tendon” and a “[p]artial thickness rotator cuff 15 tear.” 16 (Id. ¶ 8, Ex. F.) A doctor diagnosed An orthopedist has (Id. ¶ 12, Ex. J.) A passenger riding with Cortez at the time of the incident 17 also testified at deposition. 18 Castle “moved . . . Cortez’s feet” using a “drastic[]” amount of 19 force. 20 “not gentl[y],” although not “violent[ly].” 21 According to the passenger, Deputy Deputy Castle also pulled Cortez’s arm back “harshly” and (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) Finally, Deputy Braden testified at deposition that he was 22 Deputy Castle’s “field training officer” and “supervisor” at the 23 time of the incident. 24 feet from” Deputy Castle and Cortez, while “Deputy Castle applied 25 [the] handcuffs.” 26 He also stated that he was “[s]tanding two (Id. ¶ 5, Ex. C at 2-3, 14-15.) In short, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 27 Cortez, Deputy Castle used the following force against “a 28 cooperative, non-resisting 66-year old man,” during a traffic stop 5 1 for a “minor vehicle code violation”: 1) he pushed Cortez into the 2 back of Cortez’s truck; and 2) kicked Cortez’s legs multiple times 3 in a harsh manner; then 3) yanked Cortez’s right arm back multiple 4 times, hard enough to cause serious injury to Cortez’s shoulder and 5 biceps; while 4) Cortez moaned and made facial gestures to indicate 6 his pain to Deputy Castle, each time that Deputy Castle pulled his 7 arm. 8 to handcuff Cortez in the first place - based on the misdemeanor or 9 felony warrant information - a reasonable jury could find that (Opp’n at 8.) Whether or not the Deputies had a valid reason 10 Deputy Castle used excessive force in how he went about handcuffing 11 Cortez. 12 In addition, Deputy Braden could be liable for Deputy Castle’s 13 alleged conduct - as Deputy’s Castle’s immediate supervisor, 14 standing two feet away during the incident, but taking no steps to 15 intervene. 16 Cir. 1989) (explaining that, although there is no respondeat 17 superior liability under § 1983, a supervisor can be “liable for 18 constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor . . 19 . knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them”). 20 See, e.g., Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Finally, the court finds that neither Deputy is entitled to 21 qualified immunity on Cortez’s excessive force claims. 22 discussed, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to 23 Cortez, the Deputies violated his constitutional rights by using 24 excessive force during the handcuffing. 25 particular circumstances, a reasonable officer would have known 26 that force sufficient to cause a tendon rupture was 27 unconstitutional. 28 not dispute - that pulling an individual’s arm multiple times and As Also, under these It is clearly established - and Defendants do 6 1 forcefully enough to cause serious injury while the individual 2 expresses pain, without any apparent justification for doing so, is 3 unconstitutional. 4 unconstitutional for a supervisor to fail to act to prevent such 5 obvious constitutional violations, when the supervisor is present 6 and directly observing the violation. 7 8 9 10 It is also clearly established that it is For all of these reasons, Deputies Castle and Braden are not entitled to summary judgment on Cortez’s excessive force claims. C. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claim As Defendants correctly explain, however, Cortez has provided 11 no evidence that Defendants’ alleged actions were racially 12 motivated. 13 the Deputies knew of Cortez’s Hispanic ancestry; and 2) they used 14 excessive force against him. 15 circumstantial or otherwise - that the Deputies’ alleged excessive 16 force was connected to their awareness of Cortez’s race. 17 Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Cortez’s § 18 1981 claim. In arguing to the contrary, Cortez notes only that: 1) What is missing is any evidence - 19 D. 20 Similarly, Cortez has not provided any evidence of a County of Monell Liability 21 Los Angeles (“County”) custom or policy from which a reasonable 22 trier of fact could find Monell liability against the County on his 23 federal claims. 24 Deputy Braden’s “single egregious act” of “deliberate indifference 25 to the rights of” Cortez is “sufficient to render the County liable 26 under Monell.” 27 involving very different circumstances. 28 Monell liability cannot be inferred solely from the single incident Cortez’s only argument for such liability is that Cortez provides one case cite for this proposition, 7 The court finds that 1 at issue here. The County is therefore entitled to summary 2 judgment on all of Cortez’s federal claims. 3 E. State Law Claims 4 Finally, Defendants argue that the County is entitled to 5 summary judgment on Cortez’s state law tort claims, because “public 6 entities do not face common law liability.” 7 cites to the Ninth Circuit’s decision addressing similar claims in 8 Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002). 9 the Circuit explained: under California law, a county’s immunity to In response, Cortez As 10 such tort claims turns on whether the individual officers are 11 immune; and California denies immunity to officers who use 12 excessive force. 13 County are entitled to summary judgment on Cortez’s state law tort 14 claims here. 15 IV. 16 See id. Thus, neither the Deputies nor the CONCLUSION For all of these reasons, the court hereby DENIES Defendants’ 17 Motion for Summary Judgment as to: 1) Plaintiff’s excessive force 18 claims against Deputies Castle and Braden; and 2) Plaintiff’s state 19 law tort claims against the Deputies and the County. 20 however, GRANTS summary judgment for: 1) Defendant Baca on all of 21 Plaintiff’s claims; 2) the County on all of Plaintiff’s federal 22 claims; and 3) all Defendants on Plaintiff’s § 1981 and First, 23 Fifth, and Eighth Amendment claims. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. The court, 25 26 Dated: September 7, 2012 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 27 28 8
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
