Diane Depould v. Wells Fargo Bank NA et al

Filing 30

ORDER Granting Motion to Dismiss 16 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson: For the reasons stated above, Wells Fargo's Motion to Dismiss is Granted. (See Order for Details), (MD JS-6. Case Terminated). (sch)

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1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DIANE DePOULD, an individual, 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 16 WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., WACHOVIA MORTGAGE, WORLD SAVINGS BANK. F.S.B., NDEX WEST, LLC, 17 Defendants. 15 18 ___________________________ 19 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 11-01827 DDP (PJWx) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [Motion filed on 4/18/11] Presently before the court is Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 20 (“Wells Fargo”)’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint. 21 Having considered the submissions of the parties and heard oral 22 argument, the court grants the motion and adopts the following 23 order. 24 I. 25 Background In 2007, Plaintiff obtained a mortgage loan, secured by her 26 principal residence. 27 Wells Fargo later obtained the First Trust Deed on Plaintiff’s 28 property. (Id.) (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 10). 1 Plaintiff could not afford the loan, and her account became 2 delinquent. 3 contacted Wells Fargo and requested a loan modification. 4 16). 5 from Plaintiff so that Wells Fargo could evaluate Plaintiff under 6 the Making Homes Affordable Program (“HAMP”). 7 (FAC ¶¶ 11,15). On or about June 2010, Plaintiff (FAC ¶ On June 6, 2010, Wells Fargo requested additional information (FAC ¶ 17). Between June 11, 2010 and October 23, 2010, Plaintiff spoke 8 with Wells Fargo representatives over a dozen times. 9 35). (FAC ¶¶ 18- Wells Fargo repeatedly informed Plaintiff that Wells Fargo 10 required additional documentation, including IRS Form 4506-T. 11 ¶¶ 19, 22, 30). 12 2010. 13 Fargo’s request, on or about September 10, 2010. 14 Wells Fargo requested an updated Form 4506-T on September 16, 2010. 15 (FAC ¶ 25). 16 September 27, 2010. 17 informed Plaintiff that no additional documents were required at 18 that time. (FAC Plaintiff first provided Form 4506-T on August 24, (FAC ¶ 24). Plaintiff again provided Form 4506-T, at Wells (FAC ¶ 24). Plaintiff faxed the document to Wells Fargo on (FAC ¶ 31). On October 21, 2010, Wells Fargo (FAC ¶ 34). 19 Between November 1, 2010 and March 29, 2011, Wells Fargo 20 repeatedly informed Plaintiff that her modification request had not 21 been resolved because of problems with her Form 4506-T. 22 37). 23 for negligence and unfair business practices, alleging that she has 24 been harmed by Wells Fargo’s failure to act on her modification 25 request. 26 Amended Complaint. 27 II. (FAC ¶ On March 29, 2011, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC ¶ 44). Wells Fargo now moves to dismiss the First Legal Standard 28 2 1 A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it 2 "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 3 claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 4 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 5 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 6 motion, a court must "accept as true all allegations of material 7 fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 8 the plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 9 2000). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) Although a complaint need not include "detailed factual 10 allegations," it must offer "more than an unadorned, 11 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." 12 at 1949. 13 than a statement of a legal conclusion "are not entitled to the 14 assumption of truth." Id. at 1950. In other words, a pleading that 15 merely offers "labels and conclusions," a "formulaic recitation of 16 the elements," or "naked assertions" will not be sufficient to 17 state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 1949 18 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 19 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. Conclusory allegations or allegations that are no more "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should 20 assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly 21 give rise to an entitlement of relief." Id. at 1950. Plaintiffs 22 must allege "plausible grounds to infer" that their claims rise 23 "above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. 24 "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 25 relief" is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 26 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 27 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 28 III. Discussion 3 1 Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by 2 the Home Owners Loan Act (“HOLA”). 3 with its authority under HOLA, the Office of Thrift Supervision 4 promulgated a preemption regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 560.2. 5 560.2 explicitly “occupies the entire field of lending regulation 6 for federal savings associations.” 7 regulations do not, however, preempt “basic state laws” such as 8 uniform commercial codes, contract, or tort laws that “only 9 incidentally” affect lending operations. (Mot. at 6). In accordance Section 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a). Federal Harris v. Wachovia 10 Mortgage, FSB, 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1025-1026 (2010). 11 Ninth Circuit has explained, “[w]hen analyzing the status of state 12 laws under § 560.2, the first step will be to determine whether the 13 type of law in question is listed in paragraph (b). 14 analysis will end there; the law is preempted.” 15 Mortgage Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008). 16 As the If so, the Silvas v. E*Trade Here, Plaintiffs claims are based on Wells Fargo’s failure to 17 properly process her application for a loan modification. 18 claims fall squarely within paragraph (b) of Section 560.2. 19 Section 560.2(b)(4) applies to requirements regarding “[t]he terms 20 of credit, including amortization of loans and the deferral and 21 capitalization of interest and adjustments to the interest rate, 22 balance, payments due, or term to maturity of the loan . . . .” 23 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)(4). 24 the very adjustments listed in paragraph (b)(4). 25 Section 560.2(b)(10) references regulation of the “processing, 26 origination, or servicing” of mortgages. 27 Plaintiff’s claims regarding Wells Fargo’s improper processing of 28 her application for a modification of loan terms have more than an These 12 Plaintiff seeks a determination regarding 4 Furthermore, 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)(10). 1 “incidental effect” on lending operations, and are preempted by 12 2 C.F.R. § 560.2.1 3 1085660 (S.D. Cal. 2011)(dismissing claims based on loan 4 modification as preempted); c.f. Ahmed v. Wells Fargo Bank & Co., 5 2011 WL 1751415 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (distinguishing claims based on 6 fraudulent misrepresentation that a loan modification would be 7 approved from “processing, origination, and servicing” claims). 8 IV. 9 10 See also Zarif v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2011 WL Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 11 12 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 15 16 Dated: September 27, 2011 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Having concluded that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted, the court does not address the merits of Plaintiff’s negligence and unfair business practices claims. 5

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