Raymond Rodriguez v. Michael J Astrue, No. 2:2011cv01789 - Document 22 (C.D. Cal. 2011)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Jean P Rosenbluth. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that (1) the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED; (2) Plaintiffs request for remand is GRANTED; and (3) this action is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. (twdb)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 WESTERN DIVISION 11 12 RAYMOND RODRIGUEZ, 13 Plaintiff, 14 15 16 v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 17 Defendant. 18 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 11-01789 (JPR) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 19 20 21 I. PROCEEDINGS Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner s final decision 22 denying his application for Supplemental Security Income ( SSI ). 23 Pursuant to the Court s Case Management Order, the parties filed a 24 Joint Stipulation on October 12, 2011. 25 Stipulation under submission without oral argument. 26 stated below, the Commissioner s decision is remanded for further 27 proceedings. 28 The Court has taken the Joint For the reasons 1 2 II. BACKGROUND Plaintiff was born on September 8, 1968. (Administrative Record 3 ( AR ) 20.) He has an 11th-grade education and no past relevant work 4 experience. (AR 18-19.) 5 On December 31, 2007, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI, 6 alleging that he had been unable to work since February 1, 2004, 7 because of chronic low-back pain and scoliosis. 8 Plaintiff s application was denied by the Social Security 9 Administration, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative (AR 144.) After 10 Law Judge ( ALJ ). 11 at which time Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified on his own 12 behalf. (AR 28-50.) 13 44-48.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. 14 On January 20, 2011, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff s request 15 for review. 16 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 17 (AR 102.) A hearing was held on April 1, 2009, A vocational expert ( VE ) also testified. (AR 1 6.) (AR (AR 14.) This action followed. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 18 Commissioner s decision to deny benefits. 19 findings and decision should be upheld if they are free from legal 20 error and are supported by substantial evidence based on the record as 21 a whole. 22 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971); Parra v. Astrue, 23 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). 24 evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 25 conclusion. 26 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). 27 than a preponderance. 28 v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). The Commissioner s or ALJ s 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, Substantial evidence means such Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 It is more than a scintilla but less Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (citing Robbins 2 To determine 1 whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court 2 must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the 3 evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 4 Commissioner s conclusion. 5 Cir. 1996). 6 or reversing, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment 7 for that of the Commissioner. 8 IV. 9 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming Id. at 720-721. THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY People are disabled for purposes of receiving Social Security 10 benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful 11 activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is expected to 12 result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for a 13 continuous period of at least twelve months. 14 § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 15 1992). 42 U.S.C. 16 A. THE FIVE STEP EVALUATION PROCESS 17 The Commissioner (or ALJ) follows a five-step sequential 18 evaluation process in assessing whether a claimant is disabled. 19 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th 20 Cir. 1995) (as amended Apr. 9, 1996). 21 Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged 22 in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled 23 and the claim is denied. 24 claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second 25 step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a 26 severe impairment or combination of impairments significantly 27 limiting her ability to do basic work activities; if not, a finding of 28 nondisability is made and the claim is denied. In the first step, the 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). 3 20 If the 20 C.F.R. 1 § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a severe impairment or 2 combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner 3 to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments 4 meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments 5 ( Listing ) set forth at 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; 6 if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are awarded. 7 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). 8 combination of impairments does not meet or equal an impairment in the 9 Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine 10 whether the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity 11 ( RFC )1 to perform his past work; if so, the claimant is not disabled 12 and the claim is denied. 13 has the burden of proving that he is unable to perform past relevant 14 work. 15 prima facie case of disability is established. 16 or if the claimant has no past relevant work, the Commissioner then 17 bears the burden of establishing that the claimant is not disabled 18 because he can perform other substantial gainful work available in the 19 national economy. 20 of this issue comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential 21 analysis. 22 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant s impairment or 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. The claimant If the claimant meets this burden, a Id. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If that happens The determination 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n. 5; Drouin, 23 B. THE ALJ S APPLICATION OF THE FIVE STEP PROCESS 24 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in any 25 substantial gainful activity since December 31, 2007, the date of the 26 27 28 1 RFC is what a claimant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a); see Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). 4 1 application. (AR 19.) At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff 2 has the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the 3 lumbosacral spine and scoliosis. 4 determined that Plaintiff s impairments do not meet or equal any of 5 the impairments in the Listing. 6 Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform a range of sedentary work. 2 7 (AR 19); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a). 8 Plaintiff could lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 9 10 pounds frequently; he could stand and walk for approximately two 10 hours in an eight-hour workday but would need a cane for prolonged 11 walking; he could sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday but would 12 need to change positions every 30 minutes; he could occasionally climb 13 ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch but could not 14 crawl or climb ladders or ropes; he could not work at unprotected 15 heights or around dangerous moving machinery; and was limited to 16 simple, repetitive tasks. 17 Plaintiff had mild restrictions of activities of daily living, mild 18 difficulties in maintaining social functioning, moderate difficulties 19 in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace but did not have 20 any episodes of decompensation of extended duration. 21 step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have any past 22 relevant work. 23 vocational expert s testimony and the application of the 24 Medical Vocational Guidelines, that jobs existed in significant (AR 19.) (AR 19.) (AR 19.) At step three, the ALJ The ALJ further found that Specifically, the ALJ found that (AR 17, 19.) The ALJ further found that (AR 18-19.) At At step five, the ALJ found, based on the 25 26 27 28 2 Sedentary work is defined as work involving lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a). Sedentary work involves sitting most of the time but may involve occasional walking or standing for brief periods of time. Id. 5 1 numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. 2 20.) 3 (AR 20.) 4 V. 5 (AR Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. DISCUSSION Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of one 6 of his physicians at Harbor UCLA Medical Center, Dr. Valentin Antoa. 7 (Joint Stipulation at 4-9, 13-14). 8 9 Generally, the opinions of treating physicians are afforded more weight than the opinions of nontreating physicians because treating 10 physicians are employed to cure and have a greater opportunity to know 11 and observe the claimant. 12 Cir. 1996). 13 on whether it was supported by sufficient medical data and was 14 consistent with other evidence in the record. 15 416.927(d)(2). 16 by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques 17 and was not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the 18 record, it should be given controlling weight and should be rejected 19 only for clear and convincing reasons. 20 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). 21 conflicts with other medical evidence, the ALJ must provide specific 22 and legitimate reasons for discounting the treating opinion. 23 81 F.3d at 830; Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). 24 Factors relevant to the evaluation of a treating physician s opinion 25 include the [l]ength of the treatment relationship and the frequency 26 of examination by the treating physician as well as the nature and 27 extent of the treatment relationship between the patient and the 28 physician. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th The weight given a treating physician s opinion depends See 20 C.F.R. § If a treating physician s opinion was well-supported See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; When a treating physician s opinion 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)(i)-(ii). 6 Lester, 1 Plaintiff began receiving treatment at Harbor UCLA Medical Center 2 in July 2007. (AR 216, 270, 478-79, 564-66.) Notes from his initial 3 examination reveal that Plaintiff had been suffering from chronic low- 4 back pain since 1988, when a bullet nicked his spine. 5 478-79, 564-66.) 6 numbness in his right leg. 7 Plaintiff s lumbar spine indicated that Plaintiff was suffering from 8 degenerative disc disease and dextroscoliosis of the lumbar spine. 9 (AR 219-20.) (AR 216, 270, Plaintiff also complained of intermittent pain and (AR 216, 270, 564-65.) An MRI of Over the next several months, Plaintiff was treated with 10 pain medication and physical therapy. 11 468, 471, 520, 567-68, 570-72, 574.) 12 (AR 212, 214, 264, 267, 441, On September 29, 2008, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Tiberi in 13 the adult orthopedic surgery department of Harbor UCLA Medical Center. 14 (AR 257, 445, 464, 521, 575, 578.) 15 back pain increased with walking. 16 tender along the iliac spine at L4-L5 and was walking with a limp. 17 (AR 257, 445, 464, 521, 575.) 18 257, 259, 445, 464, 466, 521, 575.) 19 Plaintiff complained that his low(AR 257, 445, 464.) Plaintiff was Physical therapy was prescribed. (AR On September 29, 2008, Dr. Antoa completed a residual functional 20 capacity assessment form and a physical capacities evaluation form for 21 Plaintiff.3 22 treated Plaintiff on one occasion for severe degenerative disc 23 disease, low back pain, and radiculopathy. 24 recommended physical therapy and pain management, but Plaintiff s 25 prognosis was unknown. (AR 439-40, 559-60.) Dr. Antoa reported that he had (AR 439, 559.) (AR 439, 559.) He With respect to Plaintiff s 26 27 28 3 The physical capacities evaluation form was not signed or dated, but both the ALJ and the Commissioner assert that Dr. Antoa completed the form in September 2008. (AR 17, 438, 558; Joint Stipulation at 11.) 7 1 work-related limitations, Dr. Antoa opined that Plaintiff could not 2 sit for more than one hour at a time or more than three hours in an 3 eight-hour workday; stand for more than one hour in an eight-hour 4 workday; walk for any period of time; lift or carry more than five 5 pounds occasionally; use his hands for repetitive fine manipulation; 6 push and pull leg controls repetitively with the right foot or both 7 feet at the same time; bend, squat, or climb; crawl or reach more than 8 occasionally; or perform any work involving unprotected heights, 9 moving machinery, or driving automotive equipment. (AR 438, 558.) The ALJ rejected Dr. Antoa s opinion because it was not 10 11 consistent with the objective findings or the record as a whole. (AR 12 17.) 13 of specificity required to reject the opinion of a treating physician. 14 See Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988) ( To say that 15 medical opinions are not supported by sufficient objective findings or 16 are contrary to the preponderant conclusions mandated by the objective 17 findings does not achieve the level of specificity our prior cases 18 have required, even when the objective factors are listed seriatim. ). 19 The ALJ had an obligation to set forth his own interpretations of the 20 medical evidence and to explain why they, rather than Dr. Antoa s 21 findings, were correct. 22 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that rejection of treating 23 physician s opinion on ground that it was contrary to clinical 24 findings in record did not specify why the ALJ felt the treating 25 physician s opinion was flawed ); see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 26 (explaining that ALJ can meet requisite standard for rejecting 27 treating physician s opinion deemed inconsistent with or unsupported 28 by medical evidence by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of This reason was not sufficient, as it does not reach the level Id.; see McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 8 1 the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 2 interpretation thereof, and making findings ). The Commissioner contends the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. 3 4 Antoa s assessment because the consultative examiner, Ibrahim 5 Yashruti, M.D., identified no abnormal findings on examination and 6 concluded that Plaintiff could perform a range of light work.4 7 Stipulation at 9-12; AR 17, 238-43.) 8 asserts that Dr. Antoa s opinion should be discounted to the extent it 9 relied on Plaintiff s subjective symptoms, as Plaintiff was found not (Joint In addition, the Commissioner 10 credible by the ALJ. 11 however, did not articulate either of these reasons as a basis for 12 rejecting Dr. Antoa s findings. 13 Yashruti s opinion, he declined to rely on it in assessing Plaintiff s 14 RFC. 15 determination, he did not assert that Dr. Antoa s opinion was premised 16 on Plaintiff s subjective complaints. 17 ALJ s decision on grounds that the ALJ did not invoke in making his 18 decision.5 19 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 1577, (AR 17.) (Joint Stipulation at 12; AR 17-18.) The ALJ, Indeed, while the ALJ mentioned Dr. Likewise, while the ALJ made an adverse credibility This Court may not affirm the See Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001) 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 Light work is defined as work involving lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). Light work may require a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. Id. 5 Immediately after making his finding that Dr. Antoa s assessment was not consistent with the record as a whole, the ALJ recounted all the reasons why he found that Plaintiff s testimony was not credible. (AR 17-18.) One might reasonably infer, therefore, that the proximity of the two findings demonstrated that one flowed from the other. The Commissioner has not made this argument, however, so the Court declines to consider it. 9 1 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947)). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ erred by rejecting 2 3 Dr. Antoa s opinion without providing specific, legitimate reasons for 4 doing so. 5 VI. 6 CONCLUSION When there exists error in an administrative determination, the 7 proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the 8 agency for additional investigation or explanation. INS v. Ventura, 9 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S. Ct. 353, 355, 154 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2002) 10 (citations and quotations omitted); Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 11 886 (9th Cir. 2004). 12 if enhancement of the record would be useful. 13 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004); see Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 14 1179 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the decision whether to remand 15 for further proceedings turns upon the likely utility of such 16 proceedings ). 17 no useful purpose would be served by further administrative 18 proceedings and the record has been fully developed, Lester, 81 F.3d 19 at 834, or when remand would unnecessarily delay the receipt of 20 benefits, Bilby v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 1985). 21 Remand for further proceedings is appropriate Benecke v. Barnhart, Remand for the payment of benefits is appropriate when Courts may credit as true the opinions of treating physicians 22 when (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 23 rejecting such evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must 24 be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and (3) 25 it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the 26 claimant disabled were such evidence credited. 27 1178 (citations and quotations omitted); see Benecke, 379 F.3d at 594; 28 Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing 10 Harman, 211 F.3d at 1 that courts have some flexibility in applying the credit as true 2 rule). 3 Here, the record is not adequately developed to credit Dr. 4 Antoa s opinion as true. 5 he had one visit with Plaintiff, it is not clear whether any of his 6 examination notes are included in the record. 7 noted above, the physical capacities evaluation form was neither 8 signed nor dated by Dr. Antoa. 9 most recent MRI was taken after Dr. Antoa wrote his evaluation of (AR 17.) In particular, while Dr. Antoa reported that (AR 438, 558.) (AR 439.) And, as Finally, Plaintiff s 10 Plaintiff. Under these circumstances, the Court concludes 11 that there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a 12 determination of disability can be made. ORDER 13 14 Harman, 211 F.3d at 1178. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that (1) the decision of the 15 Commissioner is REVERSED; (2) Plaintiff s request for remand is 16 GRANTED; and (3) this action is REMANDED for further proceedings 17 consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. 18 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this Order and the Judgment herein on all parties or their counsel. 20 21 22 23 DATED: November 22, 2011 ______________________________ JEAN P. ROSENBLUTH U.S. Magistrate Judge 24 25 26 27 28 11

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.