Anthony L Tyler v. Domingo Uribe Jr., No. 2:2011cv01264 - Document 20 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS by Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Chooljian. The Petition is denied and this action is dismissed with prejudice. See memorandum for details. (hr)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ANTHONY L. TYLER, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) ) DOMINGO URIBE, JR., Warden, ) ) Respondent. ) ) I. Case No. CV 11-1264 JC MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE SUMMARY On February 10, 2011, Anthony L. Tyler ( petitioner ), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody ( Petition ) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner claims he is entitled to habeas relief because his conviction for second degree robbery was not supported by sufficient evidence of his intent to permanently deprive the victim of her property. (Petition at 5). On June 20, 2011, respondent filed a Return to the Petition and a supporting memorandum ( Return ).1 Petitioner did not file a Reply. 26 27 28 1 Respondent concurrently lodged multiple documents in support of the Return ( Lodged Doc. ), including the Clerk s Transcript ( CT ), the Supplemental Clerk s Transcript and the Reporter s Transcript ( RT ). 1 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, for the reasons discussed below, that the 2 Petition is denied and that this action is dismissed with prejudice.2 3 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 4 On July 22, 2008, a Los Angeles County Superior Court jury convicted 5 petitioner of committing simple assault and second degree robbery. (CT 192-93, 6 196-98; RT 2708-10). On November 18, 2008, the trial court sentenced petitioner 7 to a total of eleven years in state prison. (CT 227-32; RT 3027-31). 8 On March 3, 2010, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in 9 a reasoned decision. (Lodged Doc. 7). On May 12, 2010, the California Supreme 10 Court denied review without comment. (Lodged Doc. 9). 11 III. FACTS3 12 A. 13 On December 31, 2007, petitioner had a prearranged meeting with S.C., a The Prosecution Evidence 14 woman he had been dating since 2005. S.C. had just ended her relationship with 15 petitioner, and the two met to exchange their personal belongings. After meeting 16 S.C. at a parking lot in an industrial park, petitioner reached into S.C. s car and 17 took a padlock that belonged to her. When S.C. told him to return it, petitioner 18 responded, Give me my stuff first. She then walked over to petitioner and told 19 him, Give me my stuff so I can leave. 20 As S.C. walked back to her car, she accidently hit one of his tires and bent 21 down to inspect her toe. Petitioner accused S.C. of trying to slash his tires and 22 advanced on her. S.C. tried to enter her car, but petitioner pulled her out, punched 23 her multiple ties in her head and upper body, grabbed her cell phone out of her 24 hand, and tossed it onto a freeway off-ramp. S.C. ran to retrieve her cell phone 25 26 2 The parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned Magistrate Judge. 27 3 The facts set forth are drawn from the California Court of Appeal s decision on direct 28 appeal. (Lodged Doc. 7). Such factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 2 1 and attempted to dial 911. However, petitioner dragged her back to the parking 2 lot, hit her numerous times, and again took S.C. s cell phone from her. Petitioner 3 placed the cell phone in his pocket, returned to his car, and drove away. 4 Nine days later, petitioner contacted S.C. and apologized. The two 5 reconciled, and petitioner returned S.C. s cell phone to her. 6 B. 7 At trial, petitioner testified that on the day of the incident, S.C. sent him a The Defense Evidence 8 text message threatening to burn his belongings, followed him when he drove 9 away, blocked his car in a parking lot, slashed his back tire, and attacked him with 10 a knife. Petitioner testified he punched S.C. in order to defend himself and denied 11 ever seeing, throwing, or taking S.C. s cell phone. 12 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 13 This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 14 person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that 15 he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 16 States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal court may not grant an application for 17 writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in state custody with respect to any 18 claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the 19 adjudication of the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 20 involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 21 determined by the Supreme Court of the United States ; or (2) resulted in a 22 decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 23 the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).4 24 25 26 27 28 4 The California Supreme Court s denial of review without comment is generally presumed to constitute an adjudication on the merits of any federal claims, thereby subjecting such claims to review in federal habeas proceedings. See Harrington v. Richter ( Richter ), 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011) ( When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary. ); Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1992) (California Supreme Court s (continued...) 3 1 [C]learly established Federal law refers to the governing legal principle 2 or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its 3 decision. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). In the absence of a 4 Supreme Court decision that squarely addresses the issue in the case before the 5 state court, Wright v. Van Patten ( Van Patten ), 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008), or 6 establishes an applicable general principle that clearly extend[s] to the case 7 before a federal habeas court to the extent required by the Supreme Court in its 8 recent decisions, Van Patten, 552 U.S. at 123; see also Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 9 U.S. 930, 953 (2007); Carey v. Musladin ( Musladin ), 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006), a 10 federal habeas court cannot conclude that a state court s adjudication of that issue 11 resulted in a decision contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 12 established Supreme Court precedent. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 760 (9th 13 Cir. 2009) (citing Van Patten, 552 U.S. at 126). 14 Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or 15 theories supported, . . . or could have supported, the state court s decision; and 16 then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those 17 arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this 18 Court. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. This is the only question that matters under 19 § 2254(d)(1). Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). Habeas relief may 20 not issue unless there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the 21 state court s decision conflicts with [the United States Supreme Court s] 22 precedents. Id. at 786-87 ( As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a 23 federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court s ruling on the claim 24 being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an 25 26 27 28 4 (...continued) unexplained denial of habeas petition constitutes decision on the merits of federal claims subjecting such claims to review in federal habeas proceedings), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 887 (1993). 4 1 error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility 2 for fairminded disagreement. ). 3 In applying the foregoing standards, federal courts look to the last reasoned 4 state court decision. See Davis v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006) 5 (citation and quotations omitted). Where there has been one reasoned state 6 judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that 7 judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground. Ylst v. 8 Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991); see also Gill v. Ayers, 342 F.3d 911, 917 9 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) (federal courts look through unexplained rulings of higher 10 state courts to the last reasoned decision). 11 V. DISCUSSION 12 Petitioner claims he is entitled to federal habeas relief because his 13 conviction for second degree robbery is unsupported by sufficient evidence, 14 resulting in a violation of due process. (Petition at 5). In support of this claim, 15 petitioner asserts that his act of returning S.C. s cell phone nine days after taking it 16 from her demonstrates he lacked a specific intent to permanently deprive S.C. of 17 her property. (Petition at 5). The California Court of Appeal the last state court 18 to issue a reasoned decision addressing this claim rejected the claim on its 19 merits. (Lodged Doc. 7 at 3-5). After conducting an independent review of the 20 record,5 the Court concludes that petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief 21 on this claim. 22 A. 23 24 Standards Governing Review of Sufficiency of the Evidence Claims When reviewing a habeas petition, the Court s inquiry into the sufficiency 25 of evidence is limited. Evidence is sufficient unless the charge was so totally 26 27 28 5 The Court must conduct an independent review of the record when a habeas petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. See Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1997). 5 1 devoid of evidentiary support as to render [petitioner s] conviction 2 unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Fish v. Cardwell, 523 F.2d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1062 4 (1976) (citations and quotations omitted). The standard of review on a sufficiency 5 of the evidence claim has long been whether, after viewing the evidence in the 6 light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 7 the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. 8 Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Wright v. 9 West, 505 U.S. 277, 284 (1992); Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th 10 Cir. 2008); Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (each 11 discussing Jackson standard for sufficiency of evidence claims). The Court must 12 respect the province of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of witnesses, 13 resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by 14 assuming that the trier of fact resolved all conflicts in a manner that supports the 15 finding of guilt. Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation and 16 quotations omitted); see also United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th 17 Cir. 2007) (discussing deference owed to jury determinations). 18 On federal habeas review, relief may be afforded on a sufficiency of the 19 evidence claim only if the state court s adjudication of such claim involved an 20 unreasonable application of Jackson to the facts of the case. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 21 F.3d 1262, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 2005) (as amended), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1137 22 (2006). The California standard for determining the sufficiency of evidence to 23 support a conviction is identical to the federal standard enunciated by the United 24 States Supreme Court in Jackson. People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 576 (1980). 25 Sufficiency of the evidence claims are judged by the elements defined by 26 state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16. 27 /// 28 /// 6 Second Degree Robbery6 1 B. 2 Robbery is essentially larceny aggravated by use of force or fear to 3 facilitate the taking of property from the person or presence of the possessor. 4 Robbery requires the specific intent to deprive the victim of his or her property 5 permanently. The taking of the property of another is not theft absent this intent. 6 The specific intent with which an act is performed is a question of fact. In re 7 Albert A., 47 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1007-08 (1996) (citations omitted); Cal. Penal 8 Code § 211. 9 The intent to permanently deprive an owner of property may be inferred 10 from the circumstances of the case. People v. Hall, 253 Cal. App. 2d 1051, 1054 11 (1967) (citations omitted). Included in this determination is whether the defendant 12 sought to destroy the subject property. People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 57 (1980), 13 abrogated on other grounds by People v. Martinez, 20 Cal. 4th 225, 234-38 14 (1999). In determining whether a defendant possessed the intent to permanently 15 deprive the owner of his or her property, the relevant inquiry is whether the 16 defendant had such an intent at the time of the taking, irrespective of what the 17 defendant subsequently does with the property. See People v. Carroll, 1 Cal. 3d 18 581, 584 (1970) ( [T]he taking of [the victim s] wallet constituted a robbery even 19 though defendant discarded it as soon as he discovered it was empty. It may 20 reasonably be inferred that at the time defendant demanded and received the wallet 21 it was his intention to deprive the owner of it permanently. ). [T]he return of 22 property previously taken does not compel the conclusion that a defendant 23 intended only to temporarily deprive the owner of the property. In re Albert A., 24 47 Cal. App. 4th at 1008 (citation omitted). Indeed, once there has been a 25 taking, it is no defense that the property taken was restored, even though this 26 occurs almost immediately. People v. Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800, 852 (1998). 27 28 6 Robberies are classified as being in the second degree absent circumstances not present in this case. Cal. Penal Code § 212.5(c). 7 1 C. 2 Petitioner contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he Analysis 3 intended to permanently deprive S.C. of her cell phone. He does not otherwise 4 challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on his robbery conviction. As the 5 evidence presented was sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact that petitioner 6 intended permanently to deprive S.C. of her cell phone at the time of the robbery, 7 and as the California courts adjudication of petitioner s claim did not involve an 8 unreasonable application of governing federal law to the facts of this case, 9 petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. 10 In the present case, petitioner struck S.C. multiple times, grabbed her cell 11 phone from her hand, and threw it onto a freeway off-ramp. (RT 980-81). When 12 S.C. managed to retrieve her cell phone, petitioner hit her again, grabbed the cell 13 phone from her, and placed it in his pocket. (RT 980-85). Petitioner then left the 14 area alone and kept the cell phone for nine days. (RT 987, 1204-05, 1208-10). 15 Whether or not petitioner intended to permanently deprive S.C. of her 16 property at the time of the theft was a question of fact for the jury. In re Albert A., 17 47 Cal. App. 4th at 1008; People v. DeLeon, 138 Cal. App. 3d 602, 606 (1982). In 18 light of the evidence, the jury could reasonably have concluded that at the time 19 petitioner took S.C. s cell phone, he intended to permanently deprive her of it 20 based on his attempt destroy the cell phone and his decision to place it in his 21 pocket before leaving the scene. Petitioner s subsequent restoration of the cell 22 phone to S.C. does not negate the rational inference that he intended to 23 permanently deprive S.C. of her cell phone when he originally stole it. See In re 24 Albert A., 47 Cal. App. 4th at 1008-09 (robber s stated intent to return the victim s 25 bicycle upon the victim s return of the robber s property did not compel the 26 conclusion that the robber only temporarily intended to keep the bicycle); DeLeon, 27 138 Cal. App. 3d at 606 (robbers abandonment of stolen property did not mean 28 they intended only to deprive the owner of it temporarily); People v. Kranhouse, 8 1 265 Cal. App. 2d 440, 450 (1968) ( The fact that the property, or some of it, was 2 returned is no defense to the charge of grand theft. ); Hall, 253 Cal. App. 2d at 3 1054 (robber s return of wallet immediately after searching through it did not 4 absolve him of committing robbery). 5 By finding petitioner guilty, the jury necessarily resolved the question of 6 petitioner s intent against him by rejecting his testimony that he did not see or take 7 S.C. s cell phone. Implicit in the verdict is the jury s assessment that S.C. s 8 account of petitioner s attack and robbery was credible and that petitioner s 9 actions evinced an intent to permanently dispossess S.C. of her property at the 10 time of the robbery, thus resolving any evidentiary conflicts in favor of the 11 prosecution. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. at 296-97. On federal habeas review, 12 it is not the province of this Court to reweigh the evidence, redetermine witness 13 credibility, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. See Jones, 114 F.3d at 1008. 14 Given the facts of this case, the California Court of Appeal s rejection of 15 petitioner s sufficiency of the evidence claim was a reasonable construction of the 16 evidence and was not contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of 17 clearly established federal law. Accordingly, petitioner fails to establish his 18 entitlement to habeas relief. 19 VI. ORDERS 20 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Petition is denied and that this 21 action is dismissed with prejudice. 22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judgment be entered denying the Petition 23 and dismissing this action with prejudice. 24 DATED: July 27, 2011 25 26 _______________/s/___________________ 27 Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28 9
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