Shalon E.Goodlow v. Michael J. Astrue, No. 2:2010cv06446 - Document 30 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym: IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Judgment shall be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits, and REMANDING the matter to the Commissioner for further administrative action consistent with this decision. (am)
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O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHALON E. GOODLOW, 12 13 14 15 Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 16 17 Defendant. ) Case No. CV 10-6446-SP ) ) ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ) ORDER ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 18 19 I. 20 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 21 On September 7, 2010, plaintiff Shalon E. Goodlow filed a complaint against 22 defendant Michael J. Astrue, seeking a review of a denial of disability insurance 23 benefits ( DIB ) and supplemental security income ( SSI ). Docket No. 3. 24 On March 10, 2011, defendant filed his answer, along with a certified copy of 25 the administrative record. Docket Nos. 12, 13. On April 15, 2011, this matter was transferred to the calender of the 26 27 undersigned Magistrate Judge. Docket No. 23. Both plaintiff and defendant 28 subsequently consented to proceed for all purposes before the Magistrate Judge 1 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Docket Nos. 26, 27. 2 Pursuant to a September 7, 2010 case management order, the parties 3 submitted a detailed, 17-page joint stipulation for decision on June 14, 2011. 4 Docket No. 29. The court deems the matter suitable for adjudication without oral 5 argument. 6 In sum, having carefully studied, inter alia, the parties joint stipulation and 7 the administrative record, the court concludes that, as detailed herein, the 8 Administrate Law Judge ( ALJ ) failed to make specific findings of the relation of 9 plaintiff s residual functional capacity to the physical and mental demands of her 10 past relevant work. Therefore, the court remands this matter to the Commissioner in 11 accordance with the principles and instructions enunciated in this Memorandum 12 Opinion and Order. 13 II. 14 PERTINENT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 15 Plaintiff, who was 43 years old on the date of her January 26, 2010 16 administrative hearing, has a high school education and vocational certification for 17 computer technology. See Administrative Record ( AR ) at 28, 32, 33, 98, 105, 18 123. Her past relevant work includes employment as a security guard. Id. at 35, 19 118, 147. 20 On June 17, 2008, plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging that 21 she has been disabled since August 23, 2007 due to back, neck, and knee problems. 22 See AR at 11, 56, 96-104, 105-07. Plaintiff s applications were denied initially and 23 upon reconsideration, after which she filed a request for a hearing. Id. at 52, 53, 54, 24 55, 56-60, 64-68, 69-70, 71-72. 25 On January 26, 2010, plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified 26 at a hearing before the ALJ. AR at 28-46, 50. The ALJ also heard testimony from 27 Randi Hetrick, a vocational expert ( VE ). Id. at 46-49. 28 On February 12, 2010, the ALJ denied plaintiff s request for benefits. AR at 2 1 11-17. Applying the well-known five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 2 found, at step one, that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 3 her alleged onset date of disability. Id. at 13. 4 At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff suffers from severe impairments 5 consisting of cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease. AR at 13 (bold 6 omitted). 7 At step three, the ALJ determined that the evidence does not demonstrate that 8 plaintiff s impairments, either individually or in combination, meet or medically 9 equal the severity of any listing set forth in the Social Security regulations.1/ AR at 10 13. The ALJ then assessed plaintiff s residual functional capacity2/ ( RFC ) and 11 12 determined that she can perform sedentary work with the following limitations: 13 lift/carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently; stand/walk 2 14 to 4 hours in an 8 hour day, 20 minutes at a time; sit about 6 hours in an 8 hour 15 workday, repositioning every 30 minutes; occasionally climb ramps/stairs, balance, 16 stoop, kneel, and crouch; never ladders/ropes or crawl; occasional handling and 17 fingering with left upper extremity and frequent handling and fingering with right 18 upper extremity; and avoid concentrated exposure to dangerous machinery and 19 unprotected heights. AR at 14 (bold omitted). 20 The ALJ found, at step four, that plaintiff is capable of performing past 21 relevant work as a security guard (Dictionary of Occupational Titles ( DOT ) No. 22 23 24 1/ See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. 2/ Residual functional capacity is what a claimant can still do despite existing 25 exertional and nonexertional limitations. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 26 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). Between steps three and four of the five-step evaluation, the ALJ must proceed to an intermediate step in which the ALJ assesses the claimant s 27 residual functional capacity. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1151 n.2 (9th Cir. 28 2007). 3 1 372.667-034). AR at 16. Thus, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not suffering 2 from a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. Id. at 11, 17. 3 Plaintiff filed a timely request for review of the ALJ s decision, which was 4 denied by the Appeals Council. AR at 1-3, 4-6. The ALJ s decision stands as the 5 final decision of the Commissioner. 6 III. 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW 8 This court is empowered to review decisions by the Commissioner to deny 9 benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The findings and decision of the Social Security 10 Administration must be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by 11 substantial evidence. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001). 12 But if the court determines that the ALJ s findings are based on legal error or are 13 not supported by substantial evidence in the record, the court may reject the findings 14 and set aside the decision to deny benefits. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 15 1035 (9th Cir. 2001); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001). 16 Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 17 preponderance. Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035. Substantial evidence is such relevant 18 evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 19 conclusion. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); Mayes, 276 20 F.3d at 459. To determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ s finding, 21 the reviewing court must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing 22 both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ s 23 conclusion. Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. The ALJ s decision cannot be affirmed 24 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Aukland, 257 F.3d 25 at 1035 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998)). If the 26 evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the ALJ s decision, 27 the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Id. 28 (quoting Matney ex rel. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992)). 4 1 IV. 2 ISSUE PRESENTED 3 A single disputed issue is presented for decision here: whether the ALJ s 4 determination at step four that plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant 5 work as a security guard is consistent with plaintiff s RFC and supported by 6 substantial evidence. Joint Stipulation ( JS ) at 3-11, 11-14, 14-15. 7 V. 8 DISCUSSION 9 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ s finding[, at step four,] that [plaintiff] can 10 return to her past relevant work as a security guard is without merit. See JS at 4. 11 Specifically, plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ s finding regarding her RFC (id.), 12 but instead argues that her past relevant work as it is generally performed and as 13 she performed it requires work-related activities precluded by her RFC. Id. at 7, 14 9, 15. 15 At step four of the sequential analysis, the claimant has the burden to prove 16 that he cannot perform his prior relevant work either as actually performed or as 17 generally performed in the national economy. Carmickle v. Comm r, 533 F.3d 18 1155, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Although the burden of proof lies 19 with the claimant at step four, the ALJ still has a duty to make the requisite factual 20 findings to support his conclusion. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th 21 Cir. 2001). The ALJ must make specific findings as to: (1) the claimant s residual 22 functional capacity ; (2) the physical and mental demands of the past relevant 23 work ; and (3) the relation of the residual functional capacity to the past work. 24 Id. at 845; Social Security Ruling ( SSR ) 82-62.3/ But the ALJ is not required to 25 3/ The Commissioner issues Social Security Rulings to clarify the Act s implementing regulations and the agency s policies. SSRs are binding on all 27 components of the SSA. SSRs do not have the force of law. However, because they 28 represent the Commissioner s interpretation of the agency s regulations, we give 26 5 1 make explicit findings at step four regarding a claimant s past relevant work both 2 as generally performed and as actually performed. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845. 3 Here, the ALJ failed to make specific findings as to the relation of plaintiff s 4 RFC to her past work. The ALJ s finding at step four that plaintiff is able to 5 perform [her past relevant work] as actually and generally performed (AR at 17) 6 was terse, conclusory, and devoid of any explanation for his finding. See id. at 167 17; see also Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1167 ( the ALJ always has a duty to make the 8 requisite factual findings to support his conclusion at step four (internal quotation 9 marks and citation omitted)). Further, to the extent the ALJ did give any hint of the 10 basis for his findings, they appear contradictory. 11 As noted above, in assessing plaintiff s RFC, the ALJ found that plaintiff 12 could perform sedentary level work with various limitations. The ALJ then 13 proceeded to find plaintiff capable of performing past relevant work as a security 14 guard (372.667-034) SVP 3, light, both as actually and generally performed. AR 15 at 16-17. The parties agree, and this court finds, that the DOT description of 16 security guard work as generally performed is light work (JS at 5-6, 12), and 17 defendant concedes that the ALJ s RFC assessment of plaintiff would be 18 inconsistent with the requirements of the [security guard] position as it is generally 19 performed in the economy. Id. at 12. Yet the ALJ determined plaintiff capable of 20 working as a security guard as generally performed, and cited to the relevant DOT 21 section, without including any findings or explanation for how he determined that a 22 plaintiff he found limited to performing sedentary work was nonetheless capable of 23 performing the light work generally required of a security guard. 24 Defendant argues that the record supports the ALJ s finding that plaintiff is 25 26 them some deference. We will not defer to SSRs if they are inconsistent with the statute or regulations. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1203 n.1 (9th Cir. 28 2001) (internal citations omitted). 27 6 1 capable of performing her past work as she actually performed it. This court 2 disagrees. The ALJ made no specific findings regarding the physical and mental 3 demands of plaintiff s past work as she actually performed it, nor did he make 4 specific findings regarding the relation of plaintiff s RFC to her past work as she 5 actually performed it. See AR at 16-17. The ALJ simply referenced the VE s 6 testimony in a conclusory fashion to find plaintiff could perform this work. Id. at 7 17. Under these circumstances, the court has no basis on which to review the 8 agency s decision that plaintiff could perform her past relevant work. Carmickle, 9 533 F.3d at 1167; see also Pinto, 249 F.3d at 847 ( Requiring the ALJ to make 10 specific findings on the record at each phase of the step four analysis provides for 11 meaningful judicial review. (citation omitted)). Accordingly, reversal and remand 12 for further administrative proceedings is appropriate. 13 VI. 14 REMAND IS APPROPRIATE 15 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or reverse and award 16 benefits is within the discretion of the district court. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 17 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). Where no useful purpose would be served by further 18 proceedings, or where the record has been fully developed, it is appropriate to 19 exercise this discretion to direct an immediate award of benefits. See Benecke v. 20 Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 21 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2000) (decision whether to remand for further proceedings turns 22 upon their likely utility). But where there are outstanding issues that must be 23 resolved before a determination can be made, and it is not clear from the record that 24 the ALJ would be required to find plaintiff disabled if all the evidence were 25 properly evaluated, remand is appropriate. See Benecke, 379 F.3d at 595-96; 26 Harman, 211 F.3d at 1179-80. 27 Here, as set out above, remand is appropriate because the ALJ erred in failing 28 to make specific findings as to the relation of plaintiff s RFC to her past work, as 7 1 generally or actually performed. In short, the record has not been fully developed. 2 On remand, the ALJ shall reevaluate the physical and mental demands of plaintiff s 3 past work as generally performed, as actually performed, or both and either find 4 them consistent or inconsistent with plaintiff s RFC. In either case, the ALJ shall 5 provide an explanation for this finding with references to the usual sources of 6 evidence as to the physical and mental demands of plaintiff s past work. In 7 addition, if necessary, the ALJ shall proceed to step five to determine if plaintiff can 8 perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. 9 VII. 10 CONCLUSION 11 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Judgment shall be entered 12 REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits, and 13 REMANDING the matter to the Commissioner for further administrative action 14 consistent with this decision. 15 16 DATED: August 9, 2011 17 ____________________________________ 18 HON. SHERI PYM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8
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