Francesca Sebestyen v. Michael J. Astrue, No. 2:2010cv04595 - Document 15 (C.D. Cal. 2011)

Court Description: AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING this matter for further proceedings consistent with this decision. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties. (jy)

Download PDF

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 FRANCESCA SEBESTYEN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ) Commissioner of the Social ) Security Administration, ) ) Defendant. ) _______________________________) NO. CV 10-4595-SS AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION1 20 21 Francesca Sebestyen ( Plaintiff ) brings this action seeking to 22 overturn the decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security 23 Administration (hereinafter the Commissioner or the Agency ) denying 24 her application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental 25 Security Income ( SSI ). The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 26 27 1 28 This Amended Memorandum Decision and Order corrects formatting errors in the prior Memorandum Decision and Order, but does not change any analysis or the outcome. 1 § 636, to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate 2 Judge. 3 is REMANDED for further proceedings. For the reasons stated below, the decision of the Commissioner 4 5 II. 6 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 7 8 Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on September 27, 2006. 9 (Administrative Record ( AR ) at 236). 10 Plaintiff s claim on January 29, 2007. 11 Request for Hearing by Administrative Law Judge on February 23, 2007. 12 (AR 113). 13 E. Hesse conducted a hearing to review Plaintiff s claim. 14 The ALJ denied benefits on November 15, 2007. (AR 90-101). The Appeals 15 Council remanded her case on August 15, 2008. The Agency initially denied (AR 107). Plaintiff filed a On October 22, 2007, Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) Helen (AR 23-51). (AR 102-05). 16 17 The ALJ held a second hearing on December 8, 2008. (AR 52-87). 18 After these hearings, the ALJ again denied benefits on May 12, 2009. 19 (AR 5-17). 20 Appeals Council on May 28, 2009. 21 denied Plaintiff s request on April 23, 2010. (AR 1-4). Therefore, the 22 ALJ s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 23 Plaintiff commenced the instant action on June 22, 2010. 24 \\ 25 \\ 26 \\ 27 \\ 28 \\ Plaintiff again sought review of the ALJ s decision by the (AR 18-20). 2 The Appeals Council (AR 1). 1 III. 2 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3 4 Plaintiff was born on December 11, 1973. (AR 236). Plaintiff 5 graduated from high school in 1992. 6 dental assistant and medical terminology and hospital unit clerk in 7 1994. 8 receptionist. 9 (Id.). (Id.). (AR 260). Plaintiff trained as a Plaintiff worked as a hospital records technician and (AR 257, 270). Plaintiff last worked in September 2005. 10 11 A. Plaintiff s Medical History 12 13 Plaintiff alleges that her disability began on September 11, 2005. 14 (AR 256). Plaintiff said she fell into a depression after her son 15 passed away. (Id.). Plaintiff said that she was unable to communicate 16 and function to perform [her] daily duties. [She] ended [her] employment 17 due to [her] condition. (Id.). 18 19 Plaintiff reported suffering from asthma. (AR 30). Additionally, 20 she also has a history of suffering with gastritis and ulcers. 21 346). 22 emergency room to treat. 23 ulcers and relied on multiple inhalers for her asthma. (AR Plaintiff suffered from abdominal pain that she would visit the (AR 381). Plaintiff took medication for her (AR 300). 24 25 Plaintiff said she suffers from crippling depression which prevents 26 her from working. (AR 256). 27 son s drowning in 2005. 28 depression Plaintiff s depression stems from her (AR 36, 256). Plaintiff said that her prevents her from staying focused, going outside, and 3 1 communicating well with others. 2 she constantly cries. 3 around young children. (Id.). (AR 256). Plaintiff also claimed that Plaintiff said that she is unable to be (AR 40). 4 5 Plaintiff claimed that she is unable to function and remains at 6 home and inside most of the day. 7 she was able to take care of herself and her family by cleaning the 8 apartment, making meals, and doing laundry. 9 Plaintiff also stated that she did little cooking or cleaning at home. 10 (AR 278-79). Plaintiff reported that (AR 279-80). However, (AR 66-67). 11 12 Dr. Rolando Espinoza treated Plaintiff since 2005 for depression. 13 (AR 369, 409). Dr. Espinoza said that Plaintiff was suffering from 14 major depression. 15 Plaintiff continues to undergo Individual Psychotherapy treatment as 16 well as taking psychotropic medications . . . . (AR 369). Dr. Espinoza 17 found that Plaintiff had symptoms of agoraphobia which prevented her 18 from going out of the house. (AR 409). Dr. Espinoza also found, in 2007, that (Id.). 19 20 Dr. Jason H. Yang conducted a psychiatric evaluation on Plaintiff 21 on January 2, 2007. (AR 350-54). Dr. Yang noted that Plaintiff had 22 seen a therapist on a regular basis. 23 Plaintiff claimed to have severe limitations in functioning. 24 However, Dr. Yang s did not agree with Plaintiff s asserted limitations. 25 (See id.). 26 her own needs. (AR 350-51). Dr. Yang found that (AR 353). Dr. Yang found that Plaintiff was capable of taking care of (Id.). Dr. Yang added: 27 28 4 1 This claimant is able to focus attention adequately. 2 able to follow one and two part instructions. 3 can adequately remember and complete simple and complex 4 tasks. 5 work environment, maintain regular attendances, and work 6 without supervision. 7 appropriately with myself and staff, and I imagine that she 8 would be able to interact appropriately with supervisors, 9 coworkers, and the public in the workplace. She is The claimant She is able to tolerate the stress inherent in the In addition, she was able to interact 10 11 (Id.). 12 she 13 adjustments. Dr. Yang concluded that Plaintiff s prognosis was fair and that was able to make simple social, occupational, and personal (Id.). 14 15 Dr. Frank Williams, a psychiatrist, also examined Plaintiff. 16 355-366). Dr. Williams diagnosed Plaintiff with a depressive disorder. 17 (AR 358). 18 created mild functional limitations. (AR 363). Dr. Williams also found 19 that 20 depression, there is very little mention or notes regarding therapy. 21 (AR 365). while (AR However, Dr. Williams noted that Plaintiff s condition only Plaintiff s medical records did refer to therapy for 22 Plaintiff produced records of her treatment for depression. 23 24 469-507). 25 group therapy. 26 group 27 therapist. 28 not appear for therapy sessions. and (AR Some of the sessions were one-on-one while others involved (See AR 486-87). one-on-one, Plaintiff However, in several sessions, both would spend (See AR 483-84, 490, 491, 502). minimal time a Plaintiff repeatedly did (AR 485, 488, 504, 505). 5 with Plaintiff 1 said that she did not attend some sessions because she was unable to 2 get out of bed. (AR 59). 3 4 Two medical experts also testified about Plaintiff s condition 5 after reviewing her medical records. 6 medical expert, Dr. Joseph Melancharvil, said that Plaintiff s records 7 did not show any type of substantial history of psychiatric treatment. 8 (AR 40). 9 for Plaintiff s recovery. (AR 38-47, 58-73). The first Dr. Melancharvil questioned the treating doctor s time table (AR 41-2). Dr. Melancharvil said that 10 Plaintiff was only moderately restricted in her ability to work. 11 43). Dr. Melancharvil said that Plaintiff should not perform fast-paced 12 work or safety operations. (AR (AR 44). 13 The other medical expert, Dr. Craig Rath2, also testified about 14 15 Plaintiff s condition. 16 of discrepanc[ies] in the record among various sources. (AR 64). Dr. 17 Rath 18 Plaintiff claimed to not know as a cause for conflict with Plaintiff s 19 testimony. 20 moderate functional limitations. 21 to performing work that included only moderately complex tasks with 22 moderate stress. 23 \\ 24 \\ particularly (AR 58-73). noticed (AR 62-63, 66). a third Dr. Rath noted that there are lots party testimony from a person Dr. Rath said that Plaintiff was only had (AR 64). Dr. Rath limited Plaintiff (AR 66). 25 26 27 28 2 The Court notes that Dr. Rath s name is spelled differently in the ALJ s opinion and in the hearing transcript. (Compare AR 14, with AR 58). For simplicity, the Court uses the spelling from the ALJ s opinion. 6 1 IV. 2 THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 3 4 To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that a 5 medically determinable physical or mental impairment prevents her from 6 engaging in substantial gainful activity3 and that the impairment is 7 expected to 8 least twelve months. 9 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). The impairment must render the 10 claimant incapable of performing the work he previously performed and 11 incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment that 12 exists in the national economy. 13 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). result in death or to last for a continuous period of at Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 14 15 To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ conducts 16 a five-step inquiry. 17 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The steps are as follows: 18 (1) 19 Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful 20 activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. 21 If not, proceed to step two. 22 (2) 23 Is the claimant s impairment 24 claimant is found not disabled. 25 severe? If not, the If so, proceed to step three. 26 27 28 3 Substantial gainful activity means work that involves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties and is done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1510, 416.910. 7 1 (3) Does the claimant s impairment meet or equal one of a 2 list of specific impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 3 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? 4 found disabled. If so, the claimant is If not, proceed to step four. 5 6 (4) Is the claimant capable of performing her past work? 7 so, the claimant is found not disabled. 8 If to step five. If not, proceed 9 10 (5) Is the claimant able to do any other work? 11 claimant is found disabled. 12 If not, the found not disabled. If so, the claimant is 13 14 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 15 416.920(a)(4); Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 16 2001) (citations omitted). 17 18 The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, and 19 the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. Bustamante, 262 20 F.3d at 953-54. 21 establishing an inability to perform past work, the Commissioner must 22 show that the claimant can perform some other work that exists in 23 significant numbers in the national economy, taking into account the 24 claimant s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 25 at 1098, 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 26 416.920(g)(1). 27 by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. 28 Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 (commonly known as the Grids ). If, at step four, the claimant meets his burden of Tackett, 180 F.3d The Commissioner may do so by the testimony of a VE or 8 1 Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). 2 claimant 3 limitations, the Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ must take the 4 testimony of a VE. has both exertional (strength-related) and When a nonexertional Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000). 5 6 VI. 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW 8 9 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 10 Commissioner s decision to deny benefits. The court may set aside the 11 Commissioner s decision when the ALJ s findings are based on legal error 12 or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 13 Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001); Smolen v. 14 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). 15 16 Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a 17 preponderance. 18 which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 19 conclusion. (Id.). To determine whether substantial evidence supports 20 a finding, the court must consider the record as a whole, weighing 21 both 22 [Commissioner s] conclusion. Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Penny 23 v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). 24 reasonably support either affirming or reversing that conclusion, the 25 court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. 26 Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21. 27 \\ 28 \\ evidence Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. that supports and evidence 9 It is relevant evidence that detracts from the If the evidence can 1 VII. 2 DISCUSSION 3 4 The 5 Supported 6 Treating Physician s Opinion ALJ Failed By To Provide Substantial Specific Evidence And For Legitimate Rejecting Reasons Plaintiff s 7 8 9 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ s rejection of the opinion of the treating physician, Dr. Espinoza, is not based on specific and 10 legitimate criteria. 11 Memo. ) at 11-14). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Espinoza s 12 opinion was not conclusory, that Plaintiff did not receive conservative 13 treatment, that Plaintiff s allegations of agoraphobia are consistent 14 with the record, and that Dr. Espinoza s medical opinion should not have 15 been rejected because he was unfamiliar with the legal definition of 16 a disability. (Id.). (Memorandum in Support of Complaint ( Complaint This Court agrees with Plaintiff s contentions. 17 18 Physicians with the most significant clinical relationship with 19 the claimant are generally entitled to more weight than those physicians 20 with lesser relationships. 21 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). 22 are entitled to special weight because the treating physician is hired 23 to cure and has a better opportunity to know and observe the claimant 24 as an individual. 25 2003); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2002); 26 Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 20 27 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). 28 contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for clear and Carmickle v. Comm r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 The opinions of treating physicians Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. Where the treating doctor s opinion is not 10 1 convincing reasons. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) 2 (as amended). 3 by another doctor, the ALJ may not reject this opinion without providing 4 specific, legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence in the 5 record. 6 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007); Ryan v. Comm r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 7 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). If a reason is not supported by the record, 8 it is not legitimate. 9 Cir. 1996) (holding that the ALJ erred because he neither explicitly 10 rejected the opinion of [the examining psychologist], nor set forth 11 specific, 12 psychologist] over [the examining psychologist]. ). Even if the treating physician s opinion is contradicted Id. at 830-31 (emphasis added); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 legitimate See Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th reasons for crediting [the non-examining 13 14 In her opinion affirming the agency s decision to deny Plaintiff 15 disability benefits, the ALJ provided four main rationales for rejecting 16 the findings of Dr. Espinoza. 17 opinion to be quite conclusory because he provid[ed] very little 18 explanation of the evidence upon which he relied in forming his 19 opinion. 20 was not consistent with the nature and extent of the claimant s 21 treatment which . . . has been generally conservative, with medications 22 and supportive counseling. 23 she rejected Dr. Espinoza s opinion that Plaintiff showed symptoms of 24 agoraphobia because Plaintiff s sister, Aniko Sebestyen ( Sebestyen ), 25 cannot be considered a completely impartial witness based on her 26 relationship to the claimant and that her testimony is not consistent 27 with 28 professionals in this case. (AR 14). In making the determination that the (AR 14). First, the ALJ found Dr. Espinoza s Second, the ALJ found that Dr. Espinoza s opinion observations and (AR 14). opinions 11 Third, the ALJ also noted that of qualified mental health 1 Plaintiff can go places, the ALJ relied on the third party function 2 report of a friend and on the psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Jason Yang 3 ( Yang ) who noted that Plaintiff does household chores, errands, 4 shopping, and cooking and attends a Christian church. 5 69, 353). Finally, the ALJ found that [w]hile Dr. Espinoza stated that 6 the claimant was disabled, it is not clear that he was familiar with the 7 definition of disability contained by the Social Security Act and 8 regulations. (AR 14). (AR 11, 262- The Court will address each reason in turn. 9 10 1. The 11 ALJ Erred In Rejecting Dr. Espinoza s Findings As Conclusory 12 13 The ALJ s finding that Dr. Espinoza s medical opinion was 14 conclusory is not supported by the record. Dr. Espinoza supported his 15 opinion with extensive treatment notes. If his final opinion is 16 considered in combination with his treatment notes, then his final 17 opinion cannot be fairly characterized as conclusory. 18 15). 19 condition, his progress notes, and his assessment of her ability to 20 work. 21 treatment notes are, in part, difficult to read, the notes do lend 22 support to his final opinion regarding Plaintiff s condition from Dr. Espinoza offered his diagnosis (AR 393, 400-01, 404-07, 409, 411-15).4 of (See AR 411- Plaintiff s medical Although Dr. Espinoza s 23 24 25 4 26 27 28 The record contains numerous progress notes from Dr. Espinoza which indicate his observations and the status of Plaintiff s treatment on the following dates: 10/6/2005, 10/18/2005, 11/4/2005, 11/18/2005, 12/3/2005, 1/23/2006, 3/1/2006, 3/20/2006, 8/3/2006, 2/20/2007, 3/17/2007, 9/10/2007, and 10/19/2007. (See AR 411-15). 12 1 October 2005 until October 2007.5 2 Espinoza s opinion as conclusory, that reason is not supported by the 3 record. To the extent the ALJ rejected Dr. 4 5 2. 6 The ALJ Erred In Finding That Plaintiff Received Conservative Treatment 7 8 9 The ALJ erred in concluding that Plaintiff only conservative treatment for her psychiatric condition. received Plaintiff s 10 treatment consisted of medication and therapy, and Plaintiff testified 11 that she saw Dr. Espinoza twice a month for 45 minutes. 12 393, 409). 13 status of Plaintiff s treatment from 2005 until 2007 on thirteen 14 different occasions. 15 the record is unclear as to the number and frequency of all of the 16 medications prescribed to plaintiff, but the record reflects that she 17 took numerous prescription drugs. (AR 39, 369, Dr. Espinoza s notes describe his observations and the (See AR 411-15, supra n.3). The Court notes that (AR 45, 59, 447).6 Plaintiff also 18 19 20 21 22 23 5 Even if the ALJ found Dr. Espinoza s progress notes to be difficult to read or interpret, she had the option of conducting an appropriate inquiry to be able to specifically address the findings of the treating physician. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that [a]mbiguous evidence, or the ALJ s own finding that the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence, triggers the ALJ s duty to conduct an appropriate inquiry. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 24 6 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Carlos Pieroni, a Tri-City Mental Health staff psychiatrist on March 13, 2008, who diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive disorder ( MDD ) and prescribed Cymbalta, Paxil, Valium, and Rozerem. (AR 445-47). Plaintiff also reported taking Oxazepam and Paraxetine Hydrochloride for nervousness and brain imbalance. (AR 259). Plaintiff s family practitioner also prescribed Paxil and Restoril. (AR 45). 13 1 attended some therapy sessions, in both group and one-on-one sessions, 2 however Plaintiff spent minimal time with a therapist. 3 The 4 appropriate for this type of psychiatric condition. Plaintiff s therapy 5 and thirteen visits with Dr. Espinoza, as well as her prescriptions for 6 at 7 conservative treatment. The ALJ s conclusion that Plaintiff received 8 only conservative treatment is not supported by the record. ALJ s least opinion seven did not indicate medications cannot what be (AR 469-507). further fairly treatment characterized was as 9 10 3. The 11 ALJ Erred In Rejecting Dr. Espinoza s Finding That Plaintiff Suffers From The Symptoms of Agoraphobia 12 13 The ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons to reject 14 Dr. Espinoza s conclusion that Plaintiff suffers from Agoraphobia. (See 15 AR 14). 16 [a]goraphobia, which often times prevents her from going out of her 17 house. 18 of people or young kids and that [i]t s hard for [Plaintiff] to be 19 around mothers that have a small child. 20 expressed her fear of be[ing] in the general public. 21 Sebestyen testified that [Plaintiff] doesn t do anything . . . [s]he 22 stays 23 activities at all. Dr. Espinoza found that the Plaintiff presents symptoms of (AR 369). at home Plaintiff testified that she can t handle groups and that she does not (AR 69). participate Plaintiff also in (AR 40). any social (AR 81, 84). 24 25 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff s testimony contradicted a third 26 party function report by a friend, 27 contradiction. Furthermore, medical expert Melancharvil testified that 28 although he doubt[ed] that Plaintiff suffered from agoraphobia, he 14 but did not specify the 1 noted that [t]heoretically it is possible. 2 ALJ found Sebestyen s testimony unreliable and rejected the opinion of 3 Dr. Espinoza and the testimony of Plaintiff because Plaintiff attends 4 church, runs errands, and goes shopping. 5 that Plaintiff may feel comfortable enough to occasionally attend church 6 or complete basic errands does not overcome the medical evidence and 7 testimony demonstrating that her agoraphobia would interfere with her 8 ability 9 Plaintiff s testimony, as well as that of Sebestyen, provide substantial 10 evidence for Dr. Espinoza s opinion that Plaintiff suffers from the 11 symptoms 12 legitimate reasons for crediting [the non-examining psychologist] over 13 Dr. Espinoza. 14 ground for rejecting the treating physician s opinion does not qualify 15 as a specific and legitimate reason. to interact of in agoraphobia. the workplace. The ALJ did (AR 14, 46, 262-69). (AR 14). (See not However, the fact AR set See Van Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1464. The 11, forth 14, 353). specific, Accordingly, this 16 17 4. The ALJ Erred By Rejecting Dr. Espinoza s Medical Opinion On 18 The Grounds That The Doctor Was Not Familiar With The Legal 19 Definition Of Disability 20 21 The ALJ s finding that Dr. Espinoza may have been unfamiliar with 22 the legal definition of a disability is not a proper reason to discount 23 or reject his medical opinion as to Plaintiff s alleged disability. 24 (See AR 14). 25 claimant is disabled is reserved to the Commissioner, Dr. Espinoza s 26 opinion on her medical condition should be given the weight and 27 authority required for treating physicians. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e); 28 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). While the ultimate legal determination of whether a As noted above, physicians with the most 15 1 significant clinical relationship with the claimant are generally 2 entitled 3 relationships. 4 physician, Dr. Espinoza s findings and treatment notes should have been 5 given the greatest weight by the ALJ. 6 rejected or discounted Dr. Espinoza s medical opinion on the grounds 7 that the doctor was unaware of the legal definition of a disability used 8 by the agency, this reason is not specific and legitimate because the 9 doctor is not required to give an opinion on the ultimate issue of 10 to more weight than Carmickle, 533 those F.3d at physicians with 1164. the As lesser treating To the extent that the ALJ disability. 11 12 The Court does not reach the remaining issues because they are not 13 necessary to the resolution of the action. Remand for further 14 proceedings is appropriate where additional proceedings could remedy 15 defects in the Commissioner s decision. 16 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2000); Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th 17 Cir. 1984). 18 reasons for rejecting the treating physician s opinion, or, instead, to 19 fully credit the opinion, the case must be remanded to remedy this 20 defect. 21 legitimate reasons to reject Dr. Espinoza s opinion or incorporate the 22 limitations 23 determination. 24 \\ 25 \\ 26 \\ 27 \\ 28 \\ See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d Because the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate Upon remand, provided the by ALJ Dr. must either Espinoza s 16 provide opinion specific into the and RFC 1 VIII. 2 CONCLUSION 3 4 Consistent with the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that judgment be 5 entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING this 6 matter for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 7 FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this Order 8 and the Judgment on counsel for both parties. IT IS 9 10 DATED: June 3, 2011. ________/S/___________________ SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 17

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.