Vanessa Gonzalez v. Michael J. Astrue, No. 2:2010cv01808 - Document 17 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Patrick J. Walsh. For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the Agency's decision denying benefits is not supported by substantial evidence. The decision is, therefore, reversed and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of the Court's decision. IT IS SO ORDERED. **PLEASE REVIEW DOCUMENT FOR FULL AND COMPLETE DETAILS** (ca)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 VANESSA GONZALEZ, Plaintiff, 11 12 13 14 v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 15 Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. CV 10-1808 PJW MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 16 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Vanessa Gonzalez appeals a decision by Defendant Social 19 Security Administration ( the Agency ), denying her applications for 20 Disability Insurance Benefits ( DIB ) and Supplemental Security Income 21 ( SSI ). 22 when she determined that Plaintiff could perform light work and was 23 not credible. 24 below, the Court concludes that the ALJ erred and remands the case to 25 the Agency for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 26 27 28 She claims that the Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) erred (Joint Stip. at 3-6, 18-19.) II. For the reasons explained SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS In December 2006, Plaintiff applied for SSI and DIB, alleging that she had been disabled since October 31, 2006, due to pain, 1 fatigue, and weakness from injuries sustained when she was hit by a 2 tow truck. 3 denied her application initially and on reconsideration. 4 61-65.) 5 (AR 67-85.) 6 the hearing. 7 disability because she planned to return to work on a part-time basis. 8 (AR 32.) 9 vocational expert testified at the hearing. (Administrative Record ( AR ) 5, 86-92.) The Agency (AR 51-54, She then requested and was granted a hearing before an ALJ. On September 15, 2008, Plaintiff appeared with counsel at (AR 30.) Plaintiff requested a closed period of The ALJ denied this request. (AR 5.) Plaintiff and a (AR 35-40.) On December 10 31, 2008, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. (AR 5-13.) 11 Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied review. 12 1-3, 14-17.) (AR She then commenced the instant action. 13 III. ANALYSIS 14 A. The ALJ s Residual Functional Capacity Determination 15 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional 16 capacity to perform light work, with certain limitations.1 17 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in finding that she could perform 18 light work. 19 of her treating physician s opinions and improperly discounted another 20 in order to achieve this end. 21 following reasons, the Court agrees and remands the issue for further 22 consideration. 1. 23 (AR 9.) She argues that the ALJ failed to take into account one (Joint Stip. at 3-6.) For the Dr. Roth s Opinion 24 1 25 26 27 28 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could only occasionally use her dominant upper left and lower left extremities for pushing and pulling, occasional climbing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling, and the claimant is precluded from working at heights or near hazardous machinery because of her history of closed head injury with one grand mal seizure and mild residual weakness in the left upper and left lower extremities. (AR 9.) 2 1 2 According to the ALJ, Plaintiff is capable of performing light work. (AR 9.) Light work is defined in the regulations as: 3 [L]ifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent 4 lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even 5 though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this 6 category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, 7 or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing 8 or pulling of arm or leg controls. 9 of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must 10 have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. 11 12 To be considered capable 20 CFR ยงยง 404.1567(b), 416.967(b). The ALJ s finding that Plaintiff could perform this type of work 13 is inconsistent with the opinion of Plaintiff s treating doctor, 14 Bradley Roth, who concluded that Plaintiff was not capable of 15 performing light work. 16 Roth s opinion in reaching her decision, however. 17 explained below, the Court concludes that this was error. 18 (AR 462-65.) The ALJ did not mention Dr. For the reasons By rule, the [Agency] favors the opinion of a treating physician 19 over non-treating physicians. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th 20 Cir. 2007); see also Morgan v. Comm r, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 21 1999) (explaining that treating physician s opinion is given 22 deference because he is employed to cure and has a greater 23 opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual 24 (quoting Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987))). 25 this reason, a treating physician s opinion that is well-supported and 26 not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record will be 27 given controlling weight. 28 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988). For Orn, 495 F.3d at 631; Embrey v. Bowen, 849 An ALJ may not reject the opinion of a 3 1 treating physician that is contradicted by another physician without 2 providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial 3 evidence in the record for so doing. 4 830 (9th Cir. 1995)(quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th 5 Cir. 1983)). 6 the treating physician s opinion. 7 1028, 1038 n.10 (9th Cir. 2007) ( Of course, an ALJ cannot avoid these 8 requirements simply by not mentioning the treating physician's opinion 9 and making findings contrary to it. ). 10 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, Nor can an ALJ avoid this requirement by simply ignoring Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d Here, the ALJ s decision denying benefits completely ignored Dr. 11 Roth s opinion. 12 1038 n.10; Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991). 13 The Agency argues that the error was harmless because: (1) Dr. Roth 14 did not provide ongoing care or perform objective testing of 15 Plaintiff s functional limitations; (2) Dr. Roth referred Plaintiff to 16 a neurologist for evaluation; (3) Dr. Roth s opinion was conclusory 17 and entitled to little weight; and (4) Dr. Roth s opinion would only 18 have established limitations through July 2007 and not the statutorily 19 required twelve-month period. 20 disagrees. 21 This was error. See, e.g., Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at (Joint Stip. at 13-15.) The Court To begin with, the harmless error standard proposed by the Agency 22 is not the proper standard. Where, as here, the ALJ has not provided 23 any reason for rejecting the treating doctor s opinion, her decision 24 cannot be affirmed unless the Court can confidently conclude that no 25 reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting [the evidence], could have 26 reached a different disability determination. 27 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006) (defining harmless error in social 28 security context) (emphasis added); see also Carmickle v. Comm r, 533 4 Stout v. Comm r, 454 1 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that, under Stout, 2 where ALJ provides no reason for rejecting evidence at issue, 3 reviewing court must consider whether ALJ would have made different 4 decision if he relied on the rejected evidence). 5 cannot adopt the Agency s post hoc justification for rejecting Dr. 6 Roth s opinion, determine that it is entitled to no weight, and then 7 uphold the ALJ s decision on that basis, as the Agency proposes. 8 e.g., Wallace v. Apfel, No. 00-0376, 2001 WL 253222, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 9 Mar. 2, 2001) (rejecting [Agency s] reasons justifying ALJ s failure 10 to discuss treating physician s opinion because ALJ did not rely on 11 them). 12 Roth s opinion is valid and determine whether, accepting it at face 13 value, no ALJ would conclude that Plaintiff was disabled. 14 this standard, the Court must conclude that an ALJ accepting the fact 15 that Plaintiff was unable to perform even sedentary work would not 16 conclude that she could perform light work. 17 Thus, the Court See, Rather, the Court must start with the proposition that Dr. Applying Further, even if the Agency s proposed standard governed, the 18 Court would still conclude that the error was not harmless. Dr. Roth 19 was one of Plaintiff s treating physicians. 20 regarding Plaintiff s limitations was entitled to great weight, absent 21 special circumstances. 22 knew as much about her condition and prognosis as any doctor in this 23 case. 24 not diminish the importance of his experience as her treating doctor. 25 The fact that his opinion was confined to a form is not controlling, 26 either. 27 asked for it. 28 was defective because it did not include an allegation that As such, his opinion Dr. Roth was Plaintiff s surgeon and likely The fact that Dr. Roth referred Plaintiff to a neurologist does If the ALJ wanted or needed more support, she could have Finally, the Agency s argument that Dr. Roth s opinion 5 1 Plaintiff s limitation would last for at least 12 months is simply 2 contrary to the evidence in the record. 3 form that he completed that Plaintiff s impairments lasted or can [] 4 be expected to last at least twelve months. 5 Dr. Roth indicated on the (AR 462.) In addition to all these reasons, the Court also notes that Dr. 6 Roth s opinion was corroborated by Plaintiff s other treating 7 physician, Dr. Fernandez. 8 both opinions. 9 similarity of [the two treating physicians ] conclusions provides 10 11 (AR 511-14.) This lends further support to See Lester, 81 F.3d at 832 (noting that the reason to credit the opinions of both. ) The vocational expert testified that an individual with the 12 limitations assessed by Dr. Roth could not perform any work. 13 As such, Dr. Roth s opinion, if credited, would necessitate a finding 14 of disabled. 15 not harmless and remand on this issue is required. 16 2. (AR 38.) Thus, the ALJ s failure to address Dr. Roth s opinion is Dr. Fernandez s Opinion 17 Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred by rejecting the 18 opinion of Plaintiff s other treating physician, Eric Fernandez. 19 (Joint Stip. at 4-5.) 20 Again, the Court agrees. On July 30, 2007, Dr. Fernandez completed a Physical Residual 21 Functional Capacity Questionnaire in which he noted Plaintiff s 22 chronic pain and fatigue and opined that Plaintiff was capable of 23 performing less than sedentary work. 24 indicated that Plaintiff s impairments would cause her to be absent 25 from work more than three times a month. 26 (AR 511-14.) Dr. Fernandez also (AR 512.) Because Dr. Fernandez was a treating physician, his opinion was 27 also entitled to special weight. Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421. 28 was empowered to discount it, but was required to provide specific and 6 The ALJ 1 legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for 2 doing so. 3 Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (quoting Murray, 722 F.2d at 502). The ALJ rejected Dr. Fernandez s opinion because: (1) it was not 4 accompanied by documents lending support for its extreme 5 limitations ; (2) it merely reiterated Plaintiff s subjective 6 allegations; (3) it was inconsistent with July 2007 X-rays, which 7 showed normal cervical and thoracic spine and normal bilateral 8 shoulders; (4) there was no evidence in the record supporting Dr. 9 Fernandez s extreme limitations and restrictions; and (5) Dr. 10 Fernandez s assessment was not compatible with the record as a 11 whole. 12 (AR 10-11.) The Court addresses each one in turn. That Dr. Fernandez s opinion was not accompanied by supporting 13 documents is a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting it. 14 Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). 15 this reason was supported by substantial evidence. 16 opinion was contained in a four-page form, which included minimal 17 information about clinical findings and no mention of objective 18 medical testing. 19 Fernandez s treatment notes and the results of diagnostic tests that 20 he ordered, neither provide specific, objective support for his 21 assessment of Plaintiff s functional limitations. 22 F.3d at 1149 (rejecting treating physician s opinion because it was 23 conclusory and brief and unsupported by clinical findings ); Crane v. 24 Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996) (ALJ may reject check-off 25 reports that [do] not contain any explanation of the bases of their 26 conclusions. ). (AR 511-14.) Further, Dr. Fernandez s While the record includes Dr. See Tonapetyan, 242 27 28 The ALJ also rejected Dr. Fernandez s opinion because it was 7 1 based in part on Plaintiff s subjective claims of pain and 2 limitations, which the ALJ found were not credible. 3 legitimate reason to discount a claimant s testimony. 4 Morgan, 169 F.3d at 602; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 5 1989). 6 ALJ s credibility finding and is remanding the case on that issue, 7 too. 8 reason for rejecting Dr. Fernandez s opinion. 9 This is a See, e.g., As explained below, however, the Court has questions about the Thus, it cannot agree at this time that this was a legitimate The ALJ also relied on the fact that Plaintiff s claims were 10 inconsistent with the medical records. 11 reject an opinion. 12 Cir. 2009); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). 13 Whether the record supports this reason is a closer question. 14 points only to Plaintiff s July 2007 X-rays. 15 Plaintiff s spine and shoulders are normal, it is not obvious to the 16 Court that normal X-rays are inconsistent with pain, weakness, and 17 fatigue. 18 they are. 19 one rational interpretation, the Court upholds the ALJ s conclusion in 20 this regard. 21 This is a legitimate reason to Valentine v. Comm r, 574 F.3d 685, 692-93 (9th The ALJ While they show that Nor does the ALJ explain the basis of her conclusion that However, because this evidence is susceptible to more than Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ also rejected Dr. Fernandez s opinion because there was 22 no objective evidence in the record to support it. This, too, can be 23 a valid reason for rejecting a doctor s opinion. 24 at 692-93; Tomasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 25 2008). 26 supported by substantial evidence. 27 revealed no significant abnormalities. 28 Plaintiff s medical records from Dr. Fernandez s office noted Valentine, 574 F.3d Moreover, the Court finds that, on balance, this reason was X-rays and an MRI taken in 2007 8 (AR 441-42, 477, 532-33.) 1 Plaintiff s clinical improvement and gradually diminishing reliance on 2 pain medication. 3 Barry Gordon Gwartz opined in September 2007 that Plaintiff had fewer 4 functional limitations than Dr. Fernandez had identified. 5 Similarly, the October 2007 report of non-examining consultant Leonard 6 Schwartz concluded that Plaintiff retained the capability for light 7 work. 8 was based on independent clinical findings, his opinion may itself 9 constitute substantial evidence. (AR 435-40, 443-45, 515-29.) (AR 481-85, 497-98.) (AR 475.) Moreover, because Dr. Gwartz s opinion Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 10 751 (9th Cir. 1989). 11 more than one rational interpretation. 12 substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. 13 Consultative examiner Thus, here, again, the evidence is subject to As such, the Court will not Burch, 400 F.3d at 679. The ALJ s fifth reason -that Dr. Fernandez s opinion was not 14 compatible with the record as a whole -is not specific or 15 legitimate. 16 sufficient objective findings or are contrary to the preponderant 17 conclusions mandated by the objective findings does not achieve the 18 level of specificity required. 19 do more than offer her conclusion, which is all that she did here. 20 such, this is not a legitimate reason to discredit Dr. Fernandez s 21 opinion. 22 own interpretation of the medical evidence and explain why it was more 23 correct than the treating physician s); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 24 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding ALJ s conclusion that 25 treating physician s report was entirely contrary to the clinical 26 findings in the record was too broad and vague a basis for 27 discrediting opinion). 28 To say that medical opinions are not supported by Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421. An ALJ must As See id. at 421-22 (noting ALJ was required to provide his Of the five reasons the ALJ relied on for rejecting Dr. 9 1 Fernandez s opinion, the Court finds that three are valid and 2 supported by the evidence and two are not. 3 unable to determine whether the ALJ would have discredited Dr. 4 Fernandez s opinion based solely on the three remaining reasons, the 5 Court remands the issue for the ALJ to make that determination in the 6 first instance. 7 consider the impact, if any, of Dr. Roth s opinion on Dr. Fernandez s 8 opinion, if she elects to accept it. 9 3. This will also give the ALJ the opportunity to The ALJ s Failure to Address The Consulting Doctor s Limitations 10 11 Because the Court is Plaintiff contends that the ALJ also erred by failing to address 12 all of the limitations found by examining consultant Barry Gordon 13 Gwartz. 14 Court agrees. 15 (Joint Stip. at 6.) For the reasons explained below, the In order to reject the opinion of an examining doctor, the ALJ 16 must give specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 17 substantial evidence in the record. 18 also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995); Social 19 Security Ruling 96-6p ( Administrative law judges and the Appeals 20 Council are not bound by findings made by State agency or other 21 program physicians and psychologists, but they may not ignore these 22 opinions and must explain the weight given to the opinions in their 23 decisions. ). 24 Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31; see On September 26, 2007, consultative examiner Barry Gordon Gwartz 25 reviewed Plaintiff s medical records, performed a physical and 26 neurological evaluation, and ordered diagnostic tests. 27 Based on this examination, Dr. Gwartz found: 28 (AR. 471-79.) [T]he claimant appears capable of lifting and/or carrying 20 10 1 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. 2 appears capable of standing and/or walking 6 hours in an 8- 3 hour workday, but only at her own pace and provided that she 4 can sit as needed for dizziness or fatigue. 5 able to sit 6 hours out of 8-hour workday alternating sitting 6 and standing every 2 hours to stretch 5-10 minutes for back 7 pain or stiffness. 8 upper and left lower extremity for push and pull maneuvers 9 with no limitations in the right upper and right lower 10 extremity. She is able to occasionally crouch, kneel, stoop, 11 and climb. There are no manipulative limitations. She should 12 be 13 machinery because of her history of a closed head injury with 14 one grand mal seizure and mild residual weakness in the left 15 upper and left lower extremities. 16 17 precluded from The claimant The claimant is She is able to occasionally use her left working at heights or near hazardous (AR 475 (emphasis added).) The ALJ relied, in part, on Dr. Gwartz s opinion in determining 18 Plaintiff s capabilities but failed to include Dr. Gwartz s 19 qualification that Plaintiff could walk and stand up to six hours in 20 an eight-hour day only at her own pace and provided she can sit as 21 needed for dizziness or fatigue. 22 not include this limitation, the Court assumes that she rejected it. 23 The ALJ failed, however, to provide specific and legitimate reasons 24 for doing so and this constitutes error. 25 material to the ALJ s determination that Plaintiff retained the 26 ability to perform light work. 27 Plaintiff s attorney, the vocational expert testified that Plaintiff 28 would not be able to perform the work of an office nurse or medical (AR 10, 475.) Because the ALJ did Moreover, this error was In response to questioning by 11 1 assistant if she needed to walk at her own pace and sit as needed for 2 dizziness and fatigue. 3 so that the ALJ can provide specific and legitimate reasons for 4 rejecting Dr. Gwartz s limitations or incorporate them into the 5 residual functional capacity determination. 6 F.2d at 422 ( Hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert 7 must set out all the [claimant s] limitations and restrictions. ); 8 Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043-44 (remanding case because ALJ s hypothetical 9 to vocational expert did not include functional limitations found by 10 (AR 37-38.) As such, this issue is remanded See, e.g. Embrey, 849 examining physician). 11 B. The ALJ s Credibility Determination 12 In her final claim of error, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ 13 erred by finding her not credible. (Joint Stip. at 18-19.) 14 For the following reasons, the Court agrees. 15 ALJs are tasked with judging the credibility of witnesses. 16 Where, as here, a claimant has produced objective medical evidence of 17 an impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the 18 symptoms alleged, the ALJ may not discredit the claimant s testimony 19 as to subjective symptoms merely because they are unsupported by 20 objective evidence. 21 03. 22 the claimant s testimony for specific, clear, and convincing 23 reasons. 24 These reasons must be supported by substantial evidence in the record. 25 Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. 26 ALJ is free to consider many factors, including ordinary techniques 27 of credibility evaluation[,]. . . prior inconsistent statements . . . 28 unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Fair, 885 F.2d at 601- If there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may only reject Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). In evaluating a claimant s credibility, an 12 1 follow a prescribed course of treatment, . . . and the claimant s 2 daily activities. 3 insufficient; rather the ALJ must identify what testimony is not 4 credible and what evidence undermines the claimant s complaints. 5 Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. 6 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. General findings are Plaintiff testified that she experienced pain, fatigue, and 7 weakness that prevented her from working before the summer of 2008. 8 (AR 33-34.) 9 the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms not 10 credible because they were inconsistent with the medical evidence, 11 which shows that [Plaintiff s] health and residual functional capacity 12 had substantially improved [] within twelve months of the motor 13 vehicle [accident] in October 2006 (Exhibits 1F through 14F). 14 10.) 15 rejecting her testimony. 16 The ALJ found Plaintiff s statements concerning (AR This does not constitute a clear and convincing reason for While a lack of medical evidence corroborating the alleged 17 severity of symptoms is a factor that the ALJ may consider in 18 assessing a claimant s credibility, it cannot form the sole basis for 19 discounting pain testimony. 20 278 F.3d at 959 (noting that ALJ may not reject claimant s testimony 21 solely because the objective medical evidence does not support the 22 severity of her impairment ); Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1147-48 ( ALJ 23 may not reject the claimant s statements regarding her limitations 24 merely because they are not supported by the objective evidence 25 because the claimant s subjective statements may tell of greater 26 limitations than can medical evidence alone. ). Burch, 400 F.3d at 681; see also Thomas, 27 28 Moreover, even if this were a legitimate basis for the ALJ s 13 1 adverse credibility determination, the ALJ s blanket statement was 2 insufficiently specific to support such a finding. 3 v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883-85 (9th Cir. 2006) (ALJ s 4 conclusion that claimant s testimony was not consistent with or 5 supported by the overall medical evidence of record did not 6 constitute a meaningful explanation for the court to assess); 7 Embrey, 849 F.2d at 423 (ALJ s finding that the totality of the 8 evidence of record does not substantiate the claimant s allegations 9 does not achieve the level of specificity required to disregard See, e.g., Robbins 10 claimant s excess pain testimony); Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 11 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (ALJ must provide a specific, cogent reason for 12 disbelieving claimant). 13 discrediting Plaintiff s allegations, the Court cannot uphold her 14 adverse credibility determination. 15 further consideration of Plaintiff s credibility.2 Because the ALJ gave no other reasons for As such, the issue is remanded for 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 2 The Agency s reliance on Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2007) and Batson v. Commissioner, 359 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2004), to support the ALJ s determination is misplaced. (Joint Stip. at 20.) In both cases the ALJ gave several reasons for discrediting the claimant, only one of which was a lack of supportive medical evidence. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161-62; Batson, 359 F.3d at 1196-97. 28 14 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the 3 Agency s decision denying benefits is not supported by substantial 4 evidence. 5 remanded for further consideration in light of the Court s decision.3 The decision is, therefore, reversed and the case is 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: July 5, 2011 8 9 PATRICK J. WALSH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 S:\PJW\Cases-Soc Sec\GONZALEZ, V 1808\Memo_Opinion.wpd 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 Plaintiff has requested that the Court reverse the Agency s decision and remand the case for an award of benefits. (Joint Stip. at 23.) The Court recognizes that it has the authority to grant such relief but finds that the issues outlined above require further development before it will be clear whether Plaintiff is entitled to benefits. See, e.g., Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the decision whether to remand or simply award benefits is within discretion of court). 15
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