William Williams v. Marshall, No. 2:2010cv01378 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. IT IS ORDERED that: (1) the Petition is DENIED; and (2) Judgment shall be entered dismissing this action with prejudice. (rp)
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William Williams v. Marshall Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM WILLIAMS, Petitioner, 12 v. 13 14 TERRI GONZALEZ, Acting Warden, 15 Respondent. 16 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) NO. CV 10-01378-SS MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 21 On February 24, 2010, William Williams (“Petitioner”), a California 22 state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 23 Corpus by a Person in State Custody (the “Petition”) pursuant to 28 24 U.S.C. § 2254. 25 Petition (the On June 14, 2010, Respondent1 filed an Answer to the “Answer”). Respondent lodged seven documents from 26 27 1 28 Terri Gonzalez, Acting Warden of the California Men’s Colony, where Petitioner is incarcerated, is substituted for her predecessor. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Dockets.Justia.com 1 Petitioner’s state proceedings. 2 Traverse 3 jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant 4 to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 5 is DENIED and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (the “Traverse”). On July 6, 2010, Petitioner filed a The parties have consented to the For the reasons discussed below, the Petition 6 7 II. 8 PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 9 10 On December 3, 1979, Petitioner pled guilty in the San Joaquin 11 County Superior Court to first degree murder in violation of California 12 Penal Code (“Penal Code”) section 187. 13 22, 1980, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to an indeterminate term 14 of twenty-five years to life in state prison. (Petition at 43).2 On January (Id. at 44). 15 16 On December 19, 2007, the Board of Parole Hearings (the “Board”) 17 held a Subsequent Parole Consideration Hearing in which they denied 18 Petitioner parole. 19 Consideration Hearing (“Lodgment 7”) at 1-68). 20 Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Joaquin 21 County Superior Court, which was denied on April 9, 2009, with a 22 reasoned opinion. 23 (“Lodgment 1”); Lodgment 2, San Joaquin County Superior Court Order 24 (“Lodgment 2”)). On June 17, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ 25 of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, which was denied on 26 June 18, 2009, without comment or citation to authority. (Lodgment 7, Transcript of Subsequent Parole On January 30, 2009, (Lodgment 1, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Lodgment 3, 27 2 28 The Court refers to the pages of the Petition as if they were consecutively paginated. 2 1 Petition 2 California Court of Appeal Order (“Lodgment 4”)). 3 Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 4 Supreme Court, which was denied on December 23, 2009, without comment 5 or citation to authority. 6 Corpus (“Lodgment 5”); Lodgment 6, California Supreme Court Order 7 (“Lodgment 6”)). 8 2010. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Lodgment 3”); Lodgment 4, On August 4, 2009, (Lodgment 5, Petition for Writ of Habeas Petitioner filed the instant Petition on February 24, III. 9 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 10 11 12 On December 19, 2007, the Board held a Subsequent Parole 13 Consideration Hearing with Presiding Commissioner Shelton and Deputy 14 Commissioner Mejia. 15 counsel at the hearing. 16 answered questions from the commissioners. 17 close of the hearing, the San Joaquin County District Attorney’s Office 18 opposed parole and a deputy district attorney presented argument to the 19 Board. 20 on Petitioner’s behalf. 21 presented argument, Petitioner spoke on his own behalf. (Id. at 53-55). 22 Finally, the victim’s sister spoke to the Board in opposition of parole. 23 (Id. at 56-60). (Lodgment 7 at 3). (Id. at 43-45). (Id. at 4). Petitioner was represented by During the hearing, Petitioner (Id. at 12-42). At the Next, Petitioner’s counsel presented argument (Id. at 46-53). After Petitioner counsel 24 25 After a recess for deliberations, the Board informed Petitioner of 26 their decision that he was “not suitable for parole and [he] would pose 27 an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety 28 if released from prison.” (Lodgment 7 at 61). 3 Presiding Commissioner 1 Shelton explained that the Board based its decision on Petitioner’s 2 inability to understand what caused him to commit the underlying 3 offense, the “cruel and callous manner” in which Petitioner committed 4 the underlying offense, Petitioner’s need to address his narcissism, and 5 the lack of letters to support Petitioner’s parole plans. 6 68). (Id. at 61- 7 8 IV. 9 PETITIONER’S CLAIM3 10 11 In the Petition, Petitioner raises only one claim for federal 12 habeas relief. Petitioner contends that the Board’s decision denying 13 parole was not supported by “some evidence” of current dangerousness. 14 (Petition at 5). 15 16 V. 17 STANDARD OF REVIEW 18 19 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 20 (“AEDPA”), which effected amendments to the federal habeas statutes, 21 applies to the instant Petition because Petitioner filed it after 22 AEDPA’s effective date of April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 In connection with his claim, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. (See Petition at 39). However, because the Court finds the current record sufficient to resolve Petitioner’s claim, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 1994) (“An evidentiary hearing is not required on allegations that are conclusory and wholly devoid of specifics. Nor is an evidentiary hearing required on issues that can be resolved by reference to the state court record.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 4 1 320, 336, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1997). Under AEDPA, a 2 federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court adjudication: 3 4 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 5 involved 6 clearly established Federal law, as determined 7 by the Supreme Court of the United States; or an unreasonable application of, 8 9 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 10 unreasonable determination of the facts in 11 light of the evidence presented in the State 12 court proceeding. 13 14 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). 15 16 “[A] decision by a state court is ‘contrary to’ [the] clearly 17 established law [of the Supreme Court] if it ‘applies a rule that 18 contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.’” 19 Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 734 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting 20 Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640, 123 S. Ct. 1848, 155 L. Ed. 2d 877 21 (2003)). 22 case law “if it applie[s] the controlling authority to a case involving 23 facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but 24 nonetheless reaches a different result.” 25 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 26 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000)). 27 ‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if ‘the state court identifies 28 the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies It is also “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court 5 Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d “A decision involves an 1 that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” 2 Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). Id. (quoting 3 4 Pursuant to AEDPA’s “unreasonable application” clause, “a federal 5 habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes 6 in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied 7 [Supreme Court precedent] incorrectly. 8 applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied [Supreme Court 9 precedent] to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable Rather, it is the habeas 10 manner.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 11 154 L. Ed. 2d 279 (2002) (per curiam) (citations omitted). 12 standard requires more than a finding that the state court committed 13 “clear error.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 14 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). 15 the application of federal law was “objectively unreasonable” in order 16 to 17 characterized AEDPA’s standard of review as a “highly deferential 18 standard for evaluating state-court rulings,” Lindh, 521 U.S. at 334 19 n.7, and has opined that this standard “demands that state-court 20 decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” 21 24. 22 federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on 23 the correctness of the state court’s decision.” 24 __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011) (internal 25 quotation marks omitted). 26 \\ 27 \\ warrant habeas 24-25, 123 S. Ct. 357, This Instead, the reviewing court must find that relief. Id. at 76. The Supreme Court has Visciotti, 537 U.S. at “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes 28 6 Harrington v. Richter, 1 AEDPA limits the scope of clearly established federal law to the 2 holdings of the United States Supreme Court as of the time of the state 3 court decision under review. 4 529 U.S. at 412). 5 opinion of the San Joaquin County Superior Court on habeas review. 6 (Lodgment 2). The California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme 7 Court denied Petitioner’s habeas petitions without comment or citation 8 to authority. 9 court “looks through” the unexplained decisions to the last reasoned Andrade, 538 U.S. at 71 (citing Williams, Here, the applicable state court decision is the (Lodgments 4 & 6). In these circumstances, a district 10 decision as the basis for the state court’s judgment. Shackleford v. 11 Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Ylst v. 12 Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 115 L. Ed. 2d 706 13 (1991)). To the extent that Petitioner’s federal habeas claims were not 14 addressed in any reasoned state court decision, however, this Court 15 conducts an independent review of the record. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 16 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 17 petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable 18 basis for the state court to deny relief.” In such circumstances, “the habeas Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 19 20 VI. 21 DISCUSSION 22 23 Petitioner 24 Suitability Claim Is Not Entitled To Habeas Relief On His Parole 25 26 In Petitioner’s only claim for relief, Petitioner challenges the 27 Board’s December 19, 2007 determination that he is unsuitable for 28 parole. (Petition at 5; Traverse 5-8). 7 Specifically, Petitioner 1 contends that the Board’s decision denying parole was not supported by 2 “some evidence” of current dangerousness. 3 no merit to this claim. (Petition at 5). There is 4 5 6 On habeas review, the San Joaquin County Superior Court rejected Petitioner’s claim in relevant part as follows: 7 8 Here, the Board plainly stated their concerns and why they had such concerns. 9 Petitioner’s presentation did not 10 convince the Panel that he has overcome the characteristics 11 which 12 understanding seem clinical. led to the offense because his language and 13 Accordingly, there is some evidence which supports the 14 15 Board of Prison Hearings’ decision. 16 29 C.4th 616, 657-658. In re Rosenkrantz (2002) In re Lawrence (2008) 44 C.4th 1181. 17 18 (Lodgment 2 at 3). 19 20 Petitioner’s claim is now foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s opinion 21 in Swarthout v. Cooke, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 859, 178 L. Ed. 2d 732 22 (2011) (per curiam). In Swarthout, the Supreme Court held that “[t]here 23 is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released 24 before the expiration of a valid sentence, and the States are under no 25 duty to offer parole to their prisoners.” Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. at 862. 26 While the Supreme Court recognized that California law creates a liberty 27 interest in parole, the Court held that the Due Process Clause requires 28 only “minimal” procedures to vindicate 8 that interest. Id. 1 Specifically, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner’s state-law liberty 2 interest 3 Constitution as long as the prisoner is “allowed an opportunity to be 4 heard and [is] provided a statement of the reasons why parole [is] 5 denied.” 6 Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16, 99, S. Ct. 2100, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1979)); see 7 also Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16 (“The Nebraska procedure affords an 8 opportunity to be heard, and when parole is denied it informs the inmate 9 in what respects he falls short of qualifying for parole; this affords in parole is sufficiently protected under the Federal Id. (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. 10 the process that is due under these circumstances. 11 does not require more.”). The Constitution 12 13 In Swarthout, the Supreme Court rejected the claims of two habeas 14 petitioners challenging their denials of parole because they “received 15 at least [the] amount of process” required by the Federal Constitution. 16 Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. at 862. 17 allowed to speak at their parole hearings and to contest evidence 18 against them, were afforded access to their records in advance, and were 19 notified as to the reasons why parole was denied.” 20 habeas court has ensured that a petitioner received the amount of 21 process 22 explained that this is “the beginning and the end of the federal habeas 23 court’s inquiry.” 24 is that the responsibility for assuring that the constitutionally 25 adequate procedures governing California’s parole system are properly 26 applied rests with California courts, and is no part of the [federal 27 courts’] business.”). 28 \\ required by the Specifically, the petitioners “were Federal Constitution, Id. the Once a federal Supreme Court Id.; see also id. at 863 (“The short of the matter 9 1 Here, Petitioner received more than the “minimal” procedures 2 required by the Federal Constitution. 3 As set forth above, see supra Part III, the Board held a hearing 4 regarding Petitioner’s parole status. (Lodgment 7 at 1-68). Petitioner 5 was represented by counsel at the hearing who presented argument on 6 Petitioner’s behalf. 7 from the commissioners, (id. at 12-42), and presented a closing argument 8 on his own behalf. (Id. at 46-53). Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. at 862. Petitioner answered questions (Id. at 53-55). 9 10 After a recess for deliberations, the Board informed Petitioner of 11 their decision that he was “not suitable for parole and [he] would pose 12 an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety 13 if released from prison.” 14 Shelton explained that the Board based its decision on Petitioner’s 15 inability to understand what caused him to commit the underlying 16 offense, the “cruel and callous manner” in which Petitioner committed 17 the underlying offense, Petitioner’s need to address his narcissism, and 18 the lack of letters to support Petitioner’s parole plans. 19 61-68). 20 provided him with a reasoned decision. (Lodgment 7 at 61). Presiding Commissioner (Id. at Thus, the Board gave Petitioner an opportunity to be heard and 21 22 Because Petitioner has received “at least [the] amount of process” 23 required by the Federal Constitution, this is “the beginning and the end 24 of the [Court’s] inquiry.” 25 Court concludes that the state courts’ denial of Petitioner’s claim was 26 not contrary to nor did it involve an unreasonable application of 27 clearly established federal law as determined by the United States 28 Supreme Court, nor was it an unreasonable determination of the facts. Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. at 862. 10 Thus, the 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to 2 habeas relief on this claim. 3 4 VII. 5 CONCLUSION 6 7 8 IT IS ORDERED that: (1) the Petition is DENIED; and (2) Judgment shall be entered dismissing this action with prejudice. 9 10 11 12 DATED: February 17, 2011 /S/ ______________________________ SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11
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