Jose Guzman v. John Marshall, No. 2:2009cv07173 - Document 20 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Christina A. Snyder: denying 19 Application to Stay. (See document for specifics) (mrgo)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Jose Guzman v. John Marshall Doc. 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSE GUZMAN, 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Petitioner, v. JOHN MARSHALL, Warden Respondent. ) Case No. CV 09-7173-CAS (OP) ) ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ) ORDER ) ) ) ) ) I. PROCEEDINGS On October 1, 2009, Jose Guzman (“Petitioner”), filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). Petitioner challenged the Board of Parole Hearings’ (“Board”) September 30, 2008, decision finding him unsuitable for release on parole. On October 29, 2010, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge (“Report and Recommendation”), recommending the granting of the Petition. (Dkt. No. 11.) The basis for the recommendation was the Court’s finding that: (a) the Board’s 2008 decision resulted in an arbitrary deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest in parole and violated due process; and (b) the State courts’ determination affirming the denial was based on an 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented and also 2 involved an unreasonable application of the “some evidence” standard. 3 On December 28, 2010, over Respondent’s Objections (Dkt. No. 13), the 4 District Judge issued an Order approving and adopting the Report and 5 Recommendation. (Dkt. No. 15.) On January 5, 2011, Judgment was entered 6 granting the writ of habeas corpus as follows: 7 (a) The Board shall hold a parole suitability hearing to be held within thirty 8 (30) days of the District Court’s entry of Judgment on this decision, in 9 accordance with due process of law and consistent with the decision of 10 this Court;ENDNOTE 1 11 ENDNOTE 1. The California Supreme Court recently held that 12 the proper remedy for California appellate courts granting relief is to 13 direct the Board to “conduct a new parole-suitability hearing in 14 accordance with due process of law and consistent with the decision of 15 the court.” In re Prather, 50 Cal. 4th 238, 244 (2010); see also Haggard 16 v. Curry, --- F.3d ---- , 2010 WL 4015006, at *5 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2010) 17 (pursuant to In re Prather, the California-created, but federally 18 enforceable, liberty interest in parole, gives the prisoner only the right to 19 a redetermination by the Board consistent with the state’s “some 20 evidence” requirement). However, such an order “does not entitle the 21 Board to ‘disregard a judicial determination regarding the sufficiency of 22 the evidence [of current dangerousness] and to simply repeat the same 23 decision on the same record.’” Id. at 258 (quoting In re Masoner, 172 24 Cal. App. 4th 1098, 1110 (2009)). 25 (b) Petitioner shall be granted parole unless new, relevant and reliable 26 evidence subsequent to the September 30, 2008, parole 27 consideration hearing is introduced that is sufficient (considered 28 alone or in conjunction with other evidence in the record, and not 2 1 already considered and rejected by this Court) to support a finding 2 that he currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society 3 if released on parole;ENDNOTE 2 4 ENDNOTE 2. “[A] judicial order granting habeas corpus relief 5 implicitly precludes the Board from again denying parole – unless some 6 additional evidence (considered alone or in conjunction with other 7 evidence in the record, and not already considered and rejected by the 8 reviewing court) supports a determination that the prisoner remains 9 currently dangerous.” In re Prather, 50 Cal. 4th at 258. 10 (c) In the absence of any such new, relevant and reliable evidence 11 showing Petitioner’s unsuitability for parole because of current 12 dangerousness, the Board shall calculate at the hearing a prison 13 term and release date for Petitioner in accordance with California 14 law. If the calculated release date lapsed more than five years 15 earlier, there shall be no term of parole imposed upon release 16 unless for good cause the Board determines Petitioner should be 17 retained on parole for a period pursuant to California Penal Code 18 section 3000.1(b); if the release date lapsed less than five years 19 earlier, the release terms may include only that period of the five- 20 year parole eligibility term that remains. Petitioner shall remain 21 subject to the discharge eligibility determination set forth in Penal 22 Code section 3000.1(b). 23 (Report and Recommendation at 21-22.) 24 On January 7, 2011, Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Ninth 25 Circuit Court of Appeals. On January 10, 2011, Respondent filed an Application 26 for a Stay of the Court’s Order Granting the Petition (“Application for Stay”), and 27 requested an expedited ruling by January 20, 2011. (Dkt. No. 19.) In the 28 alternative, Respondent requested a temporary stay to give Respondent the 3 1 opportunity to seek a stay in the Ninth Circuit before Petitioner’s Court ordered 2 parole hearing. (Id. at 2.) 3 For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Respondent’s Motion. 4 II. 5 DISCUSSION 6 A. Legal Standard for Stay. 7 Preliminarily, the Court has broad discretion in deciding whether to stay 8 proceedings in its own court. The Court agrees with Respondent that the standard 9 to be applied is set forth in Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 95 10 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1987). “A party seeking a stay of a lower court’s order bears a 11 difficult burden.” United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. Ass’n of 12 Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., 44 F.3d 1082, 1084 (2d Cir. 1995). 13 In Hilton, the Supreme Court held that the presumption of Rule 23(c) of the 14 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in favor of the release from custody of a 15 successful habeas petitioner pending appeal1 may be overcome if the following 16 traditional stay factors “tip the balance” against it: (1) whether the stay applicant 17 has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) whether 18 the stay applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay, (3) whether issuance of 19 the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding, and 20 (4) where the public interest lies. Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776-77. With respect to 21 irreparable injury, speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury. 22 Goldie’s Bookstore v. Super. Ct., 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984). In evaluating 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 23(c) provides that, during the appeal of the grant of a habeas corpus petition, “the prisoner must-unless the court or judge ordering the decision, or the court of appeals, or the Supreme Court, or a judge or justice of either court orders otherwise-be released on personal recognizance, with or without surety.” The United States Supreme Court held that Rule 23(c) “undoubtedly creates a presumption of release from custody in such cases.” Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776. 4 1 the harm that will occur depending upon whether the stay is granted, a court may 2 consider: “(1) the substantiality of the injury alleged; (2) the likelihood of its 3 occurrence; and (3) the adequacy of the proof provided.” Mich. Coalition of 4 Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991). 5 The Hilton court further observed that in determining whether to release a 6 petitioner from custody pending appeal a court could also take into consideration 7 “the possibility of flight,” whether the State has established “there is a risk that the 8 prisoner will pose a danger to the public if released,” and the “State’s interest in 9 continuing custody and rehabilitation pending a final determination of the case on 10 appeal.” Hilton, 481 U.S. at 777. The Hilton court also noted: 11 Where the State establishes that it has a strong likelihood of success on 12 appeal, or where, failing that, it can nonetheless demonstrate a 13 substantial case on the merits, continued custody is permissible if the 14 second and fourth factors in the traditional stay analysis militate against 15 release. 16 Id. at 778. 17 B. Analysis. 18 1. 19 20 Respondent Fails to Establish a Strong Likelihood of Success on the Merits. Here, the Court finds that Respondent has failed to establish “a strong 21 likelihood of success on appeal.” In the Application for Stay, Respondent 22 primarily reiterates contentions and other arguments that this Court already has 23 considered and rejected, and that the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected. For 24 example, the Court has already considered and rejected Respondent’s contentions 25 that no clearly established federal law requires a parole determination to be 26 supported by “some evidence.” (See App. for Stay at 3-4.) The Ninth Circuit 27 cases cited in the Report and Recommendation have held otherwise. Petitioner’s 28 related argument – that “some evidence” supported the Board’s denial of parole 5 1 (see id. at 4-5) – also was thoroughly addressed in the Court’s Report and 2 Recommendation. 3 Nor, in the Court’s view, has Respondent established “a strong likelihood of 4 success on appeal” with respect to his contention that the remedy ordered by the 5 Court is improper. Respondent first contends the Court’s remedy fails to comport 6 with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Haggard v. Curry, 623 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 7 2010), an opinion which has now been amended and superceded on denial of 8 rehearing en banc by Haggard v. Curry, --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 4978842 (9th Cir. 9 Dec. 9, 2010). 10 Specifically, Respondent argues that this Court’s remedy “improperly 11 restricted the Board’s authority and discretion upon remand by limiting its 12 assessment of Guzman’s suitability for parole to new evidence subsequent to the 13 challenged parole hearing.” (App. for Stay at 6.) This Court does not agree with 14 Respondent’s interpretation of the Court’s remedy, which did not provide any 15 greater remedy than that provided by the California Supreme Court in Prather. In 16 fact, in order to fully comport with the Prather court’s “further refinement . . . of 17 the scope of state prisoners’ liberty interest in parole,” the Court’s remedy quoted 18 directly from the Prather holding. (See Discussion supra Part I); see also Haggard, 19 2010 WL 4978842, at *5 (Prather corrected the Ninth Circuit’s “prior implicit 20 assumption that a federal habeas court could enforce California’s state-created 21 liberty interest by ordering the release of the prisoner”). 22 Respondent further argues that the remedy requiring the Board to consider 23 Petitioner’s discharge from his lifetime parole period before he has served five 24 years on parole also is improper. This Court fully addressed the reasoning behind 25 its analysis regarding Petitioner’s discharge from lifetime parole in its Report and 26 Recommendation (see Report and Recommendation at 23 n.3), and will not repeat 27 its analysis. Respondent’s arguments on this issue, previously raised by 28 Respondent in his Objections (see Objections at 10-11), were considered by this 6 1 Court at that time and do not persuade the Court otherwise. 2 While the Court finds that Respondent has failed to make a strong showing 3 that he is likely to succeed on the merits, the Court nevertheless finds that even if 4 Respondent has demonstrated a substantial case on the merits, a stay of the Court’s 5 Order and Judgment pending appeal still is not warranted under Hilton because 6 Respondent has not convinced the Court (a) that Respondent will be irreparably 7 injured if a stay is not granted (i.e., the second Hilton factor), and (b) that a stay of 8 the Court’s Order and Judgment pending appeal is in the public interest (i.e., the 9 fourth Hilton factor). 10 11 12 2. Enforcement of the Judgment Will Not Result in Irreparable Injury to Respondent and May Result in Injury to Petitioner. Respondent does not present any significant argument that he or the State 13 will be irreparably injured absent a stay. In fact, Respondent merely reiterates his 14 argument, rejected above, that the Court’s remedy “directing the Board to set a 15 release date unless new evidence since Guzman’s 2008 parole hearing is 16 introduced improperly usurps the Board’s legislatively mandated functions.” 17 (App. for Stay at 8.) The Court has rejected this argument. 18 Nor is the Court persuaded by Respondent’s argument that the State’s 19 interest in public safety “will be irreparably injured” absent a stay because “the 20 Board is required to determine whether a prisoner’s release on parole would pose 21 an unreasonable risk to public safety” and the Board “should be given the 22 opportunity to consider Guzman’s suitability for parole in accordance with state 23 law.” (Id. at 8.) This is exactly what the Court’s remedy orders the Board to do. 24 Respondent’s speculative claims of irreparable injury absent a stay are insufficient 25 to justify a stay. 26 Nor has Respondent sufficiently shown that Petitioner will not be harmed. 27 Respondent argues that a stay does not preclude the Board from holding regularly 28 scheduled parole consideration hearings, and that the appeal “can be resolved 7 1 expeditiously.” (Id. at 8-9.) While these statements may be true in whole or in 2 part, delaying vindication of Petitioner’s constitutional rights after a successful 3 habeas petition would not only constitute a substantial injury to Petitioner, but also 4 would extend the constitutional violation Petitioner has suffered. See, e.g., 5 Mezhbein v. Salazar, 2008 WL 1908533, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2008) (stating, 6 “[a] stay pending appeal will substantially harm Petitioner . . . if the stay is granted 7 Petitioner will face a prolonged period of continued incarceration when the Court 8 has already determined that the denial of parole was not supported by the evidence. 9 There can be no doubt that a stay will substantially injure Petitioner”). 10 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds no evidence of potential irreparable 11 injury to Respondent, and affirmatively finds a risk of harm to Petitioner. 12 3. 13 The Court also finds unpersuasive Respondent’s contention that a stay is A Stay Is Not in the Public Interest. 14 necessary because “the public has an interest in the Board’s decision and the state 15 court decisions remaining undisturbed until Respondent has had an opportunity to 16 pursue a meaningful appeal of the Court’s decision.” (App. for Stay at 9.) 17 Preliminarily, the Court notes that its rationale for finding that Petitioner’s 18 constitutional rights were violated was that there was no reliable evidence before 19 the Board to support its conclusion that Petitioner’s release posed an unreasonable 20 risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety. In fact, the evidence before 21 the Board was all to the contrary. Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit noted in Biggs v. 22 Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916-17 (9th Cir. 2003), “the public has an interest in 23 rewarding an inmate’s rehabilitation and positive conduct.” As evidenced by this 24 Court’s finding that Petitioner does not presently constitute a danger to society, it 25 appears that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation has done its job well 26 and successfully rehabilitated Petitioner. Thus, the Court finds that Respondent 27 has not sufficiently shown that the public interest clearly lies in favor of a stay. 28 III. 8 1 2 CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Respondent’s Application for a 3 Stay of the Court’s December 28, 2010, Order. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 DATED: January 20, 2011 8 HONORABLE CHRISTINA A. SNYDER United States District Judge 9 Presented by: 10 11 HONORABLE OSWALD PARADA United States Magistrate Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
