Paulie A. Monroe v. Michael J. Astrue, No. 2:2007cv08084 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Patrick J. Walsh. The Court concludes that the reasons the ALJ gave for discounting Plaintiffs testimony were specific, clear, and convincing. As such, his finding that she was not credible is affirme d. The Court further finds that the ALJ did not err in failing to conclude at step two that Plaintiffs ailments were severe or in failing to consider any limitations caused by these ailments in assessing Plaintiffs residual functional capacity. For all these reasons, the ALJs decision is affirmed. IT IS SO ORDERED. (rp)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 PAULIE A. MONROE, Plaintiff, 11 12 13 14 v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. 15 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 07-8084-PJW MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 16 17 Before the Court is Plaintiff s appeal of a decision by Defendant 18 Social Security Administration ( the Agency ), denying her application 19 for Disability Insurance Benefits ( DIB ) and Supplemental Security 20 Income ( SSI ). 21 ( ALJ ) erred in: 1) failing to consider her spinal impairments and 22 carpal tunnel syndrome in determining her residual functional 23 capacity; and 2) finding her not credible. 24 below, the Court concludes that the ALJ s decision that Plaintiff was 25 not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and is affirmed. 26 Plaintiff claims that the Administrative Law Judge For the reasons explained Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ erred by failing to take 27 into account the limitations caused by her spinal impairments and 28 carpal tunnel syndrome in formulating her residual functional 1 capacity. 2 complaining that the ALJ erred at step two in determining that these 3 impairments were not severe. 4 address the step-two issue first. 5 (Joint Stip. at 10.) It appears that Plaintiff is also (Joint Stip. at 10.) The Court will At step two of the five-step disability analysis, an ALJ is 6 tasked with identifying those impairments that have more than a 7 minimal effect on a claimant s ability to do basic work activities. 8 Powell v. Chater, 959 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 9 work activities include abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most Basic 10 jobs, including, for example, walking, standing, sitting, lifting, 11 pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or handling. 12 ยง 140.1521(b); Social Security Ruling ( SSR ) 85-28. 13 step two is intended to be a de minimis screening device to allow the 14 ALJ to dispose of groundless claims at an early stage. 15 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). 16 20 C.F.R. The inquiry at Smolen v. Plaintiff contends that her carpal tunnel syndrome prevents her 17 from prolonged writing or keyboarding and that her complaints are 18 supported by positive electrodiagnostic studies. 19 She argues that, as a result, the ALJ should have found at step two 20 that this was a severe impairment. 21 The Agency disagrees. (Joint Stip. at 11.) It points out that, even though the 22 electrodiagnostic studies were performed some time after Plaintiff 23 underwent carpal tunnel release surgery, the tests do not establish 24 that she suffered from any loss of function, which is the critical 25 issue at step two.1 (Joint Stip. at 13.) 26 27 28 1 The administrative record does not contain any medical records from Plaintiff s carpal tunnel surgery. Nor is it clear from the (continued...) 2 1 The resolution of this issue turns on an evaluation of the 2 evidence. 3 i.e., that she suffers from severe pain and limitations as a result of 4 her carpal tunnel syndrome, her condition would amount to a severe 5 impairment at step two. 6 interpretation of the evidence is accepted, i.e., that Plaintiff s 7 carpal tunnel syndrome, which was released with surgery, did not 8 limit her ability to perform basic work activities, then the ALJ did 9 not err. 10 If Plaintiff s interpretation of the evidence is accepted, If, on the other hand, the Agency s There is very little if any evidence that Plaintiff s carpal 11 tunnel syndrome had an impact on her ability to work in June 2007. 12 None of her doctors found that she was limited as a result of this 13 condition. 14 reviewed the medical records so conclude. 15 examined by an Agency orthopedic doctor in January 2006, she never 16 even mentioned her carpal tunnel syndrome and complained only about 17 her knee and her shoulder. 18 electrodiagnostic test performed in May 2006 showed some evidence of 19 abnormality in the radial nerve. 20 doctors translated that abnormal finding into a functional limitation 21 restricting Plaintiff s use of her hands. 22 evidence that Plaintiff s carpal tunnel syndrome impacted her ability Nor did any of the Agency doctors who examined her or (AR 170-74.) In fact, when she was Plaintiff points out that an (AR 112.) Nevertheless, none of the Thus, because there was no 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 (...continued) record when the surgery or surgeries took place. The ALJ found that in 2005 Plaintiff was status post carpal tunnel release, but did not say as of when. (AR 23.) Plaintiff testified that she was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in 1995 and, some time thereafter, received three surgeries in my right hand and two in my left. (AR 259). In May 2006, when she underwent the electodiagnostic testing, it was noted that the surgery was performed in 1997. (AR 111.) 3 1 to perform basic work activities, the ALJ did not err in failing to 2 find at step two that Plaintiff s carpal tunnel syndrome was not a 3 severe impairment. 4 Cir. 1989).2 5 See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th This same analysis applies to Plaintiff s complaint about the 6 ALJ s treatment of her back ailments. Plaintiff alleges that she has 7 thoracic and lumbar spine impairments that the ALJ completely 8 overlooked at step two. 9 record that reveal cord indentation at two levels of the thoracic She notes that there are MRI findings in the 10 spine, multi-level degenerative disc disease throughout the lumbar and 11 thoracic spine, and moderate bilateral facet joint hypertrophy at L3-4 12 and L4-5 . . .. 13 is no evidence of functional limitations stemming from these ailments 14 and, therefore, they were not severe. 15 (Joint Stip. at 12.) The Agency argues that there The Court sides with the Agency here. None of the doctors has 16 opined that Plaintiff s back problems limit her ability to perform 17 basic work activities. 18 failing to conclude at step two that Plaintiff s back condition was a 19 severe impairment. 20 Absent such evidence, the ALJ did not err in Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when he failed to consider 21 the impact of these impairments on her residual functional capacity. 22 There is no merit to this argument. 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Plaintiff testified at the hearing that her carpal tunnel syndrome made it really difficult to hold a pen, to write, or to work on a keyboard for eight hours at a time. (AR 259, 260.) She also testified, however, that the limitations in the use of her arms was caused by a tumor near a nerve in her arm, not carpal tunnel syndrome. (AR 255, 260-62, 265-66.) Regardless, the ALJ found that she was not credible and, therefore, the Court does not find this evidence persuasive. 4 1 Despite the fact that the ALJ did not find Plaintiff s carpal 2 tunnel syndrome and her back ailments severe impairments at step two, 3 he was still required to consider the impact, if any, of those 4 conditions on her residual functional capacity. 5 assessing [residual functional capacity], the adjudicator must 6 consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an 7 individual s impairments, even those that are not severe. )(emphasis 8 added)). 9 caused by these non-severe impairments in assessing her residual See SSR 96-8p (( In In Plaintiff s view, the ALJ overlooked the limitations 10 functional capacity. 11 above, these ailments did not cause any functional limitations that 12 would have affected Plaintiff s residual functional capacity. 13 such, the ALJ did not err in not taking them into account in 14 formulating Plaintiff s residual functional capacity. 15 This contention is rejected. As discussed As In her second claim, Plaintiff complains that the ALJ erred in 16 finding her not credible. 17 ALJ for discounting her testimony -no treating doctor had opined that 18 her condition was disabling, her treatment had been conservative, and 19 an examining doctor found that Plaintiff s knee was within normal 20 limits -were insufficient as a matter of law. 21 reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err. She argues that the reasons provided by the For the following 22 ALJ s are tasked with judging the credibility of witnesses. 23 making a credibility determination, an ALJ may take into account 24 ordinary credibility evaluation techniques. 25 Where, as here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff s medically 26 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce some 27 28 5 In Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 1 of the symptoms alleged and did not find that she was malingering, (AR 2 23), he could only reject her testimony for specific, clear, and 3 convincing reasons. 4 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84. The first reason proffered by the ALJ for rejecting Plaintiff s 5 testimony was that no treating doctor had pronounced that she was 6 disabled, which was contrary to Plaintiff s claim that she was. 7 23.) 8 her credibility. 9 1993) (upholding ALJ s rejection of claimant s allegations of pain (AR This is a specific, clear, and convincing reason for rejecting See Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 10 based on fact that claimant s treating doctor found them to be 11 amplified ). 12 record in that none of Plaintiff s doctors found her to be disabled. 13 Further, it is supported by substantial evidence in the Plaintiff takes exception to this finding. Though she concedes 14 that none of her doctors opined that she was disabled, she notes that 15 they were never asked to make such a determination. 16 true, it does not mean that the ALJ was precluded from taking this 17 fact into account in assessing Plaintiff s credibility. 18 could have asked her doctors to render an opinion regarding her 19 disability, but chose not to. 20 treating doctors records, as the Agency doctors did, that they would 21 not have opined that Plaintiff was disabled in June 2007, had they 22 been asked. Though this is Plaintiff Further, it is clear from reviewing the 23 The ALJ s second reason for rejecting Plaintiff s testimony, 24 i.e., that Plaintiff had received conservative treatment, (AR 23), is 25 also a legitimate reason for rejecting a claimant s credibility, 26 Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005), and is supported 27 by the record. 28 various ailments was debilitating, her doctors did not recommend nor see Though Plaintiff claimed that her pain from her 6 1 did she initiate an aggressive course of treatment. 2 treated her conditions, if at all, with non-narcotic pain killers. 3 (AR 77.) 4 treatment, causing her to be dropped as a patient. 5 note dropping Plaintiff as patient at orthopedic clinic because she 6 missed 3 or more app[ointmen]ts ).) 7 Rather, she And she repeatedly failed to appear for orthopedic (AR 244 (chart Finally, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff s testimony because he 8 found that her knee impairment was less severe than she claimed. 9 23.) (AR Again, this is a valid reason for discounting a claimant s 10 testimony, Matthews, 10 F.3d at 680, and is supported by the record. 11 (AR 173-74.) 12 In the end, the Court concludes that the reasons the ALJ gave for 13 discounting Plaintiff s testimony were specific, clear, and 14 convincing. 15 affirmed. 16 to conclude at step two that Plaintiff s ailments were severe or in 17 failing to consider any limitations caused by these ailments in 18 assessing Plaintiff s residual functional capacity. 19 reasons, the ALJ s decision is affirmed. As such, his finding that she was not credible is The Court further finds that the ALJ did not err in failing 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 For all these DATED: September 30, 2009 22 23 PATRICK J. WALSH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 S:\PJW\Cases-Soc Sec\MONROE, P 8084\memorandum opinion.wpd 28 7
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