Jantha Harris v. Lynwood Unified School District et al, No. 2:2007cv05058 - Document 98 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Motion for Summary Judgment 65 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. For the above reasons, Defendants motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs claims for racial discrimination under FEHA and Title IV. Defendants motion is GRANTED as to the remainder of Plaintiffs claims. (See Order for Details). (sch) Modified on 9/14/2009 (sch).
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Jantha Harris v. Lynwood Unified School District et al Doc. 98 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JANTHA HARRIS, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 16 17 v. LYNWOOD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, RACHEL CHAVEZ, MARTINA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA LOPEZ, JOSE LUIS SOLACHE, ALFONSO MORALES, GUADALUPE RODRIGUEZ, DHYAN LAL, ROBERTO CASAS, DIANE LUCAS; ANIM MENER, MALCOLM BUTLER, 18 19 Defendants. ___________________________ 20 I. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 07-05058 DDP (CTx) ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Motion filed on May 28, 2009] BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff Jantha Harris, who is African American, has been 22 employed by Defendant Lynwood Unified School District (the 23 “District”) since 1981 in various capacities. 24 6.) 25 Hosler Middle School. 26 demoted from assistant principal of Hosler Middle School to 27 assistant principal of Washington Elementary School (“Washington”). 28 (Id.) (Harris Decl. ¶¶ 2- In 1999, Plaintiff began work as an assistant principal at (Id. ¶ 6.) In July 2002, Plaintiff was The person who replaced Plaintiff at Hosler was a Caucasian Dockets.Justia.com 1 woman who had not received a “certificate of eligibility” to seek 2 an administrative position and had less time in the District than 3 Plaintiff. 4 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against the 5 District for discrimination, based on this demotion. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) 6 Two months later, in September 2003, Plaintiff was promoted to 7 principal of Will Rogers Elementary School (“Will Rogers”). 8 8.) 9 2004-05 school year. 10 (Id.) In July 2003, Plaintiff filed a claim with the (Id. ¶ Plaintiff was reappointed as principal of Will Rogers for the (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff states that after she was reappointed as principal 11 of Will Rogers, in Fall 2004, one of the teachers at Will Rogers 12 named Rex Lopez began a “systematic and sophisticated campaign of 13 racial harassment and intimidation against [her].” 14 Lopez “incited and solicited Latino parents to go to the [District] 15 Board,” because the Board was “specifically engaged in a racist 16 agenda against African-American employees.” 17 this time, Plaintiff states she suffered “intimidation and 18 harassment,” which she reported to the District’s assistant 19 superintendents and superintendent. 20 District took no action and ignored the “racially charged 21 situation.” (Id. ¶¶ 24-25.) 22 (Id. ¶ 18.) (Id. ¶ 21.) (Id. ¶ 22.) During However, the The District demoted Plaintiff on June 28, 2005 (two years 23 after her promotion) back to assistant principal of Washington, to 24 the same position that had caused her 2003 complaint to the EEOC. 25 (Id. ¶ 12.) 26 Butler (“Butler”), an African-American man. 27 of Uncontroverted Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 10.) 28 Butler had less experience than her and was hired from outside the Plaintiff was replaced at Will Rogers by Malcolm 2 (Id. ¶ 13; Statement According to Plaintiff, 1 District. (Harris Decl. ¶ 14.) 2 California Department of Fair Employment and Housing’s Equal 3 Employment Commission (“EEOC”) on July 28, 2005 in relation to her 4 demotion and the conduct of Lopez. 5 Plaintiff filed suit on June 2, 2006. 6 7 Plaintiff filed charges with the (Supp. Harris Decl. Ex. 1.) On March 25, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) bringing the following claims against the District: 8 1) wrongful demotion based on race in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code ¶ 12940(a); 2) wrongful demotion based on retaliation in violation of FEHA § 12940(h); 3) failure to prevent retaliation in violation of FEHA § 12940(h); 4) failure to prevent harassment in violation of FEHA § 12940(k); and 5) racial discrimination and general deprivation of rights under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. 9 10 11 12 13 14 (SAC 7-14.) Defendant moved for summary judgment on May 28, 2009. 15 This Court requested supplemental briefing on the issue of 16 exhaustion of administrative remedies on August 7, 2009, which the 17 parties have submitted. The Court now considers Defendant’s 18 motion. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the 21 discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show 22 that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 23 movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining a motion for summary 25 judgment, all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn 26 in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 27 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A genuine issue exists if “the evidence 28 3 1 is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 2 nonmoving party,” and material facts are those “that might affect 3 the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 4 U.S. at 248. 5 record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 6 find for the non-moving party.” 7 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 8 III. DISCUSSION1 9 10 A. Anderson, 477 However, no genuine issue of fact exists “[w]here the Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Administrative exhaustion is required before an employee can 11 bring a complaint under FEHA or Title VII. 12 Technical Operations Co., 36 Cal. App. 4th 1607, 1613 (Cal. Ct. 13 App. 1995); Jasch v. Potter, 302 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2002). 14 The parties agree that Plaintiff filed her first charge with Okoli v. Lockheed 15 the EEOC in July 2003, and received a right-to-sue letter “soon 16 after.” 17 from her demotion and replacement at Hosler are time-barred by 18 statute. 19 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2007)(dismissing Title VII suit filed outside the 20 statute of limitations after notice of right to sue); Cal. Gov. 21 Code § 12960(b)(FEHA one-year statute of limitations). 22 (SUF ¶ 21.) Plaintiff concedes that any claims arising See Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. L.P., 495 F.3d 1119, Plaintiff’s current claims are based on alleged racial 23 harassment starting in Fall 2004 and discriminatory treatment based 24 on her transfer and demotion in June 2005. Plaintiff filed her 25 26 27 28 1 In her opposition, Plaintiff makes a number of objections to Defendant’s conduct during discovery. As described in this Court’s previous order of July 8, 2009, Plaintiff’s objections stem from her failure to diligently prosecute discovery in this matter, rather than Defendant’s conduct. 4 1 second EEOC charge on July 28, 2005 alleging racial discrimination 2 and retaliation. 3 claims should be limited to incidents in the 180 days before she 4 filed her charge. 5 after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred to file an 6 administrative charge under Title VII where a claimant "initially 7 institute[s] proceedings with a State or local agency with 8 authority to grant or seek relief from [an unlawful employment] 9 practice." 10 11 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII This is incorrect. A plaintiff has 300 days 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies with respect to her claims. 12 B. 13 Discrimination claims under FEHA and Title VII are both 14 analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas “three-stage burden-shifting 15 test.” Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354 (Cal. 16 2000). Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of 17 discrimination, which the employer may then rebut with evidence of 18 a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale. 19 employer satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must prove that the 20 employer’s reasons are pretextual. 21 must provide evidence showing that the employer’s intent or motive 22 was discriminatory; and the ultimate burden of persuasion remains 23 with the Plaintiff. 24 moves for summary judgment, as here, the framework is altered 25 slightly. 26 Plaintiff has not established an element of her FEHA claim, or that 27 Defendants have a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for any 28 adverse employment action. Racial Discrimination under FEHA and Title VII Id. Id. at 356, 383. Id. at 355-56. If the Accordingly, the plaintiff However, where a defendant Defendant has the initial burden of proving either that Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 5 1 165 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1247 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)(citing Kelly v. 2 Stamps.com Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 1088, 1098 (Cal. Ct. App. 3 2005)). 4 5 1. Prima Facie Case In order to present a prima facie case under FEHA, Plaintiff 6 must show that she is: 7 performing competently in the position she held; 3) suffered an 8 adverse employment action; and 4) that “some other circumstance 9 suggests discriminatory motive.” 10 11 1) a member of a protected class; 2) Kelly, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 1098 (citing Guz, 24 Cal. 4th 317). Defendant first argues that Plaintiff was not performing 12 competently in her position, because she did not visit classes 13 “every day” as she was “directed.” 14 support this argument, and instead supports Plaintiff’s argument 15 that she was not required to visit classrooms every day, but only 16 as necessary and appropriate. 17 provide no evidence that this did not occur. 18 19 (See SGI ¶ 6.) Defendants further Therefore, Defendants have not met their burden of proving that Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case. 20 21 Defendant’s evidence does not 2. Legitimate Business Rationale and Pretext Defendants next argue that there was a legitimate business 22 reason to transfer Plaintiff. A legitimate business rationale must 23 be “facially unrelated to [the] prohibited bias.” 24 at 358. 25 was not performing competently at Will Rogers. 26 two distinct bases for this assertion. 27 that test scores at Will Rogers dropped in Plaintiff’s first year 28 and failed to raise in her second year - which Plaintiff does not Guz, 24 Cal.4th Defendant argues that Plaintiff was demoted because she 6 Defendant provides First, Defendant argues 1 dispute. 2 and circulated a petition to voice their complaints against her. 3 As neither reason is related to bias, Defendant has satisfied its 4 burden to “articulate” legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for 5 Plaintiff’s transfer. 6 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002). 7 Defendant also argues that parents complained about her See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that 8 Defendants’ charge of incompetence was a pretext for discrimination 9 based on race. Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, 292 F.3d 10 654, 664 (9th Cir. 2002). 11 pretext: “(1) indirectly, by showing that the employer's proffered 12 explanation is unworthy of credence because it is internally 13 inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by 14 showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the 15 employer.” 16 (9th Cir. 2000)(internal quotation marks omitted). 17 approaches may be used in “combination.” 18 plaintiff alleging disparate treatment does not need to produce new 19 evidence to prove pretext beyond what he or she used to demonstrate 20 a prima facie case, as long as this evidence “raises a genuine 21 issue of material fact regarding the truth of the employer's 22 proffered reasons.” 23 a genuine issue as to whether discrimination “actually played a 24 role in the employer's decisionmaking process and had a 25 determinative influence on the outcome.” 26 Missile Sys. Co., 362 F.3d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 2004)(internal 27 quotation marks and brackets omitted). There are two ways a plaintiff can prove Chuang v. University of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1127 Id. Id. These two Additionally, a Ultimately, however, Plaintiff must raise 28 7 Hernandez v. Hughes 1 Plaintiff first points to the facts surrounding her demotion 2 in 2002 and the District’s response to her EEOC charge in 2003. 3 Although these circumstances are outside the statute of 4 limitations, they may be used to establish motive and provide a 5 context for her present allegations. 6 Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 2003). 7 Defendant does not dispute any of these facts.2 8 was demoted from assistant principal of Hosler Middle School to 9 assistant principal of Washington Elementary School. Carpinteria Valley Farms, In 2002, Plaintiff Her 10 replacement at Hosler was a Caucasian woman, Theresa Neilson, who 11 had not received a certificate of eligibility to seek an 12 administrative position, and who had previously been promoted to 13 assistant principal without any credentials for that position. 14 year later, only two months after Plaintiff filed a charge for 15 racial discrimination with the EEOC, she was promoted to principal 16 of Will Rogers. 17 Lynwood Board to discuss racism within the district and 18 specifically discrimination in its hiring practices. 19 Decl. Ex. 3 at 103.) 20 facts, which circumstantially suggest discriminatory motive. One In 2003, the NAACP also appeared before the (Shoemaker Again, Defendant does not dispute these 21 Regarding Defendant’s allegations that parents complained 22 about her, Plaintiff provides the declaration of former Will Rogers 23 teacher Jess Gatzek. 24 essentially contrived and caused by Rex Lopez. Gatzek states that these complaints were (Gatzek Decl. ¶ 9, 25 26 27 28 2 Defendant objects to this evidence on the grounds of relevancy. Plaintiff’s evidence is relevant to her current claims for discrimination, because (for the purposes of this motion) it provides a background for those claims and implies discriminatory intent. 8 1 13.) 2 against her with the goal of “promoting a racist agenda” and to 3 harass her and destroy her reputation. 4 Plaintiff states that District Assistant Superintendent Yvonne 5 Contreras informed her that the District was aware the parents’ 6 complaints were based on his encouragement. 7 Plaintiff also states that these complaints were unrelated to her 8 performance as a principal, and instead designed to provoke the 9 District’s Board against her. According to Plaintiff, Lopez organized Latino parents (Harris Decl. ¶ 20.) (Id. ¶ 21, 23.) (Harris Decl. ¶ 20, 24.) In 10 addition, Lopez conceded that he used the phrase “money, lawyers, 11 and guns,” which was directed at Harris as a threat, and considered 12 inappropriate by his union. 13 Decl. ¶ 13.) 14 response to this comment. 15 granting Plaintiff all reasonable inferences, the Court finds that 16 there is a genuine issue as to whether Defendant’s stated rationale 17 regarding complaints against Plaintiff were a pretext for race- 18 based discrimination. 19 complaints were contrived and racially motivated, Defendant’s 20 willingness to use these as a basis for termination raises an 21 inference of race-based discrimination - particularly in light of 22 Defendant’s other circumstantial evidence and her background 23 treatment within the District. 24 (Shoemaker Decl. Ex. 5 at 88; Gatzek Lopez was later transferred from Will Rogers, in (Gatzek Decl. ¶ 13.) Accordingly, Because Defendant may have realized these The Court also finds that Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue 25 regarding discrimination as to Defendant’s alternative reason for 26 her demotion, which is that student test scores decreased in the 27 two years she was principal. 28 scores decreased or that test scores raised the year after she was Plaintiff does not dispute these 9 1 replaced. She also does not dispute that the person who replaced 2 her, Malcolm Butler, was African American. 3 argues that Butler was not qualified to replace her. 4 that Butler did not have the same credentials that she did, had 5 less time as an employee in the District, and had been fired from 6 his previous position. 7 the district is also relatively rare. 8 the overall turnover of principals within the District was 14.5%. 9 (Id. ¶ 27.) (Id. ¶ 14.) Instead, Plaintiff She states Turnover of principals within For example, in 200 and 2001 Plaintiff also points to the above evidence regarding 10 the Board’s use of contrived parental complaints, which raise an 11 inference of discrimination, as well as statistical evidence 12 showing a general decrease in African-American employees in the 13 District. 14 district show that there has been a 28.7% decrease in African- 15 American administrators such as Plaintiff and an 8.7% increase of 16 Hispanic administrators, as well as an increase of 144 Hispanic 17 teachers with a decrease of 2 African-American teachers. 18 of the District’s Board could not explain these statistics or why 19 these trends had occurred.3 20 From 2001 to 2008, the hiring patterns within the A member Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s declaration is her only 21 evidence, that it is "uncorroborated and self-serving," and 22 therefore this cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact. 23 Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1061. 24 above, Plaintiff provides a background of conduct from 2002 and This is inaccurate. As described 25 26 27 28 3 Plaintiff also argues that discriminatory intent is shown by the use of a racial pejorative by one member of the District Board in public in 2001, one month before she became a Board member. Plaintiff points the Court to no evidence to support this argument, other than an allegation from her complaint. 10 1 2003 that suggests discriminatory motive, direct evidence 2 contradicting one of Defendant’s reasons for her demotion, and 3 circumstantial evidence contradicting the second. 4 granting all reasonable inferences to Plaintiff, the statistics of 5 District hiring patterns have greater weight. 6 Federation of State, County, and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME) 7 v. State of Wash., 770 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985)(“The weight 8 to be accorded . . . statistics is determined by the existence of 9 independent corroborative evidence of discrimination.”). 10 As such, See American Finally, Defendant also argues that since the “same actor” 11 (the District) promoted and demoted Plaintiff, no inference of 12 discrimination should arise. 13 104 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1996)(“[W]here the same actor is 14 responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a discrimination 15 plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time, a 16 strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive.”). 17 As described above, any inference of non-discrimination based on 18 the District being the same actor is rebutted on this motion by 19 Plaintiff’s evidence. 20 See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., Therefore, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material 21 fact exists as to whether Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff 22 by demoting her in 2005 in violation of FEHA and Title VII. 23 B. 24 A plaintiff establishes prima facie case of retaliation by Retaliation and Failure to Prevent Retaliation 25 demonstrating: 26 afterwards her employer subjected her to an adverse employment 27 action; and 3) a causal link between the two. 28 University of California, 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1) she engaged in protected activity; 2) that 11 Morgan v. Regents of 1 2001). 2 legitimate business rationale, which the plaintiff may then 3 overcome by showing the employer’s rationale is pretext for 4 retaliation. 5 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). 6 Defendant may rebut the prima facie case by presenting a Stegall v. Citadel Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061, As described above, Defendants have articulated a legitimate 7 business rationale for their decision to demote Plaintiff - 8 incompetence. 9 it applies to discrimination, Plaintiff does not argue or present 10 evidence to rebut Defendants’ legitimate business rationale as it 11 applies to retaliation for protected activity. 12 Plaintiff fails to point the Court to any evidence which 13 demonstrates that Defendants’ rationale was a pretext for 14 retaliation. 15 While Plaintiff does rebut Defendants’ argument as In other words, Therefore, as there is no issue of material fact, the Court 16 finds that Plaintiff’s claims for retaliation or failure to prevent 17 retaliation fail as a matter of law. 18 C. 19 The elements of a claim of hostile environment harassment Failure to Prevent Harassment based on Race 20 under FEHA are: 1) plaintiff belongs to a protected group; 2) 21 plaintiff was subject to unwelcome harassment; 3) the harassment 22 was sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment 23 and create an abusive working environment; 4) the harassment was 24 based on a protected category (here - based on race); and 5) 25 respondeat superior. 26 App. 3d 590, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 27 must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive" that it “alter the 28 conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. 12 Furthermore, the harassment 1 environment.” 2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 3 Etter v. Veriflo Corp., 67 Cal. App. 4th 457, 463 In her brief, Plaintiff only points to one instance of 4 harassment, which is the “guns” comment by Lopez. This is not 5 sufficient to raise a genuine issue as to hostile work environment, 6 because it only occurred once and was not in her presence. 7 order to raise a genuine issue as to harassment, a plaintiff must 8 present evidence that his or her workplace was “permeated with 9 discriminatory intimidation,” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 In 10 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), such that it is “subjectively and objectively” 11 abusive. 12 1995). 13 harassment because of the complaints about her instigated by Lopez, 14 which she then reported to the District on several occasions. 15 (Harris Decl. ¶¶ 21-26.) 16 the only conduct described by Lopez consists of vague accusations 17 of harassment. 18 assistant superintendent recommended that Plaintiff hold a series 19 of three meetings with parents to discuss problems at the school. 20 (Harris Decl. ¶ 22.) 21 complaints that she considered frivolous and racially-motivated. 22 (Id. ¶ 22.) 23 frivolous, as a matter of law, that a school principal would be 24 forced to respond to twelve parent complaints or supervise three 25 meetings with parents cannot constitute racial harassment. 26 rational trier of fact could find that being forced to do these 27 activities is subjectively or objectively abusive. 28 plaintiff cannot demonstrate harassment by “occasional, isolated, Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. In her declaration, Plaintiff also states that she suffered However, apart from the “guns” comment, In response to this harassment, a District Harris also had to respond to 12 parent Even assuming these complaints and meetings were 13 No Furthermore, a 1 sporadic, or trivial” conduct, but must show a “routine of a 2 generalized nature.” 3 citation and quotation omitted). 4 find that three meetings and twelve parent complaints, over the 5 course of a school year, demonstrate harassment of a school 6 principal. 7 Etter, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 465 (internal No rational trier of fact could Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot state a claim 8 for harassment. 9 her claim for failure to prevent harassment also fails. 10 IV. 11 As Plaintiff cannot state a claim for harassment, CONCLUSION For the above reasons, Defendant’s motion is DENIED as to 12 Plaintiff’s claims for racial discrimination under FEHA and Title 13 IV. 14 Plaintiff’s claims. Defendant’s motion is GRANTED as to the remainder of 15 16 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 20 Dated: September 3, 2009 21 DEAN D. PREGERSON 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28 14
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