Annette Mills v. Lynwood Unified School District, etal, No. 2:2007cv05055 - Document 68 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING in Part and DENYING in Part Motion for Summary Judgment 48 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. For the above reasons, Defendants motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to all claims except Plaintiffs claims for failure to accommodate her disability, and for race and disability discrimination. As no claims remain against Mener, she is DISMISSED as a defendant in this action. (sch)
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Annette Mills v. Lynwood Unified School District, etal Doc. 68 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANNETTE MILLS, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 16 17 v. LYNWOOD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, RACHEL CHAVEZ, MARTINA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA LOPEZ, JOSE LUIS SOLACHE, ALFONSO MORALES, GUADALUPE RODRIGUEZ, DHYAN LAL, ROBERTO CASAS, DIANE LUCAS; ANIM MENER, MALCOLM BUTLER, 18 19 Defendants. ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 07-05055 DDP (CTx) ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Motion filed on May 13, 2009] 20 21 22 I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Annette Mills, who is African American and over 40 23 years of age, has been a teacher working for Defendant Lynwood 24 Unified School District since 1994. 25 events at issue starting in Fall 2005, Plaintiff had never received 26 a negative employment review or been disciplined and, to the 27 contrary, had received numerous distinguished service teaching 28 awards over her career, including in 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1992, 1995, 1997, 2003, and 2007. (Mills Decl. ¶ 4.) Before the (Johnson Decl. Ex. 11.) Dockets.Justia.com 1 In Fall 2005, Plaintiff was working at Lynwood Middle School 2 (“LMS”), when Defendant Anim Mener became principal of the school. 3 (Id. ¶ 4.) 4 was diagnosed with sciatica, a nerve condition that results in 5 pain, muscular weakness, and difficulty for Plaintiff in moving her 6 legs. 7 herself presently disabled, and her back condition comes and goes. 8 (Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“SUF”) ¶¶ 2-3.) 9 In the summer before school started in 2005, Plaintiff (Mills Decl. ¶ 5.) However, Plaintiff does not consider When she returned to work in September 2005, a few days after 10 the school year had begun, Plaintiff informed Mener of her sciatica 11 and requested that she be able to drive to the front office, sign- 12 in, and then drive to the rear of the campus where her classroom 13 was located to park. 14 based on her sciatica and resulting pain. 15 Mener initially agreed to permit Plaintiff to do this, but later 16 became uncooperative. 17 Mener or the head of security would intentionally park in the only 18 available parking space at sign-in time, and Plaintiff would then 19 not have a location to park. 20 says she was often late to work. 21 Mener would remove the sign-in sheet before 8am, the required sign- 22 in time, to make her appear late (when, in fact, she was not). 23 (Id. ¶ 8.) 24 from Mener and her assistant to carry testing material to the 25 classroom, but was ignored by them. 26 Plaintiff explained that the request was (Mills Decl. ¶ 7.) (Id. ¶ 7.) (Id.) (Mills Decl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff states that As a result, Plaintiff Plaintiff also states that At some time in 2006, Plaintiff also requested help (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff also states that Mener treated African American 27 employees of the school differently. 28 that Mener had security follow her around and gave her “incessant 2 For example, Plaintiff states 1 memos” on a “daily basis,” 2 African-American employees. 3 that on May 2, 2006, there was an award ceremony at the school 4 where older, African-American teachers did not receive “legitimate” 5 certificates of appreciation signed by the Superintendent, and 6 instead received “generic” certificates. 7 which was not done to younger and non(Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff also alleges (Id. ¶ 11.) Regarding Plaintiff’s overall performance in 2005-06, 8 Defendants provide that Plaintiff was late to work 15 times, though 9 the parties dispute why, as described above. During Fall 2005, 10 Plaintiff also failed to attend five staff meetings, two “college” 11 meetings, and two department meetings. (SUF ¶¶ 15-17.) 12 On March 22, 2006, the District notified Plaintiff that she 13 would be transferred for the 2006-07 school year and, on June 1, 14 2006, Plaintiff was transferred to Cesar Chavez Middle School 15 (“CCMS”). 16 Plaintiff’s base pay, hours, classification, and benefits did not 17 change. 18 had to “team teach” with another teacher, requiring her to teach 19 twice the number of students in cramped quarters; and that she did 20 not have adequate materials or supplies. 21 Plaintiff also lost the opportunity to work on weekends for pay at 22 LMS, to work in LMS’ “Summer Bridge Program,” and the opportunity 23 to substitute teach during the summer. 24 was part of two specialized programs at LMS (“Curriculum and 25 Development” and “Backward Design”) that did not exist at CCMS. 26 (Id.) (SUF ¶ 19.) CCMS and LMS are 1.77 miles apart, and (SUF ¶¶ 20-24.) However, Plaintiff states that at CMS she 27 28 3 (Mills Decl. ¶ 14.) (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff also 1 Plaintiff filed suit on August 2, 2007 and, in her Second 2 Amended Complaint (“SAC”), brings the following claims against the 3 District: 4 1) failure to accommodate her disability in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a); 2) disability discrimination in violation of FEHA § 12940(h); 3) discrimination based on retaliation in violation of FEHA § 12940(a); 4) race discrimination in violation of FEHA § 12940(a); 5) age discrimination in violation of FEHA § 12940(h); 6) failure to prevent harassment in violation of FEHA § 12940(k); 7) racial discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; 8) retaliation in violation of Title VII; and 9) age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 (SAC 5-15.) Plaintiff also brings a claim for failure to prevent 13 harassment under FEHA against Defendant Mener. Defendants now move 14 for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the 17 discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show 18 that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 19 movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining a motion for summary 21 judgment, all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn 22 in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 23 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A genuine issue exists if “the evidence 24 is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 25 nonmoving party,” and material facts are those “that might affect 26 the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 27 U.S. at 248. However, no genuine issue of fact exists “[w]here the 28 4 1 record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 2 find for the non-moving party.” 3 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 4 III. DISCUSSION Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 5 A. 6 The plaintiff’s prima facie burden is not “onerous,” but the Age Discrimination - FEHA and ADEA 7 plaintiff must at least show “actions taken by the employer from 8 which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is 9 more likely than not that such actions were based on [age].” Guz 10 v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 355 (Cal. 2000). 11 present a prima facie case under FEHA, Plaintiff must show that she 12 is: 13 her position; 3) suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) 14 replaced in her position by a significantly younger person. 15 Hersant, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 1002-03. 16 requires that the Plaintiff be replaced by a younger worker. 17 Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2003). 18 In order to 1) over 40 years of age; 2) performing competently in his or See As relevant here, ADEA also Plaintiff concedes that she has no evidence to demonstrate 19 that she was replaced in her position by a significantly younger 20 person. 21 B. 22 FEHA and Title VII use the McDonnell Douglas “three-stage Accordingly, these claims fail as a matter of law. Race Discrimination - FEHA and Title VII 23 burden-shifting test.” Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 24 317, 354 (Cal. 2000). Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie 25 case of discrimination, which the employer may then rebut with 26 evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale. 27 56. 28 prove that the employer’s reasons are pretextual. Id. at 355- If the employer satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must 5 Id. 1 Accordingly, the plaintiff must provide evidence showing that the 2 employer’s intent or motive was discriminatory; and the ultimate 3 burden of persuasion remains with the Plaintiff. 4 However, where a defendant moves for summary judgment, as here, the 5 framework is altered slightly. 6 of proving either that Plaintiff has not established an element of 7 her FEHA claim, or that Defendants have a legitimate, 8 nondiscriminatory rationale for any adverse employment action. 9 Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 165 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1247 Id. at 356, 383. Defendants have the initial burden 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)(citing Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc., 135 Cal. App. 11 4th 1088, 1098 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)). 12 13 1. Prima Facie Case In order to present a prima facie case under FEHA, Plaintiff 14 must show that she is: 15 performing competently in the position she held; 3) suffered an 16 adverse employment action; and 4) that “some other circumstance 17 suggests discriminatory motive.” 18 (citing Guz, 24 Cal. 4th 317). 19 1) a member of a protected class; 2) Kelly, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 1098 Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not present a prima facie 20 case because she did not suffer an adverse employment action. 21 adverse employment action must materially affect Plaintiff’s 22 “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 23 L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1054-55 (Cal. 2005). 24 Court finds that Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue on this 25 matter. 26 change, a number of other characteristics of her position did 27 change in ways that are plausibly material. 28 to “team teach” with another teacher, requiring her to teach twice An Yanowitz v. The Although her base compensation and benefits did not 6 Plaintiff was required 1 the number of students in cramped quarters, and where she did not 2 have adequate materials or supplies. 3 Plaintiff also lost the opportunity to work on weekends for pay, to 4 work in the “Summer Bridge Program,” as well as the opportunity to 5 substitute teach during the summer. 6 was part of two specialized programs at LMS (“Curriculum and 7 Development” and “Backward Design”), that did not exist at Cesar 8 Chavez Middle School. 9 10 (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff also (Id.) Accordingly, the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. 11 12 (Mills Decl. ¶ 14.) 2. Legitimate Business Rationale and Pretext Defendants next argue that there was a legitimate business 13 reason to transfer Plaintiff. 14 be “facially unrelated to [the] prohibited bias.” 15 at 358. 16 she was not performing competently. 17 Defendants provide that Plaintiff was late to work 15 times. 18 During Fall 2005, Plaintiff also failed to attend five staff 19 meetings, two “college” meetings, and two department meetings. 20 (SUF ¶¶ 15-17.) 21 “articulate” a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. 22 Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 23 2002). A legitimate business rationale must Guz, 24 Cal.4th Defendants argue that Plaintiff was transferred because In support of this assertion, Accordingly, Defendant has satisfied its burden to See 24 The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to raise a genuine issue 25 as to pretext regarding Defendants’ charge of incompetence, based 26 on race. 27 meetings or was late to school. 28 refute any of the evidence in Plaintiff’s declaration. Plaintiff does not deny that she missed the above However, Defendants also do not 7 Defendants 1 do not dispute that Plaintiff gave her “incessant memos” on a 2 “daily basis,” which was not done to younger and non-African- 3 American employees. 4 that at an awards ceremony in May 2006 Mener presented older, 5 African-American teachers with generic certificates of 6 appreciation, while giving younger, non-African-American teachers 7 legitimate certificates signed by the District superintendent. 8 (SGI ¶ 34.) 9 verbally communicate with Plaintiff or other older, African- (Mills Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendants do not dispute Defendants do not dispute that Mener would not 10 American employees at LMS, but would readily associate with and 11 greet other younger, non-African-American employees. 12 ¶ 9.) 13 guards to follow Plaintiff around and sit outside her classroom on 14 a daily basis, which was not done to younger, non-African-American 15 employees. 16 (Mills Decl. Defendants also do not dispute that Mener directed security (Id.) Instead, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s declaration is her 17 only evidence, that it is "uncorroborated and self-serving," and 18 therefore this cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact. 19 Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1061. 20 provides a large number of teaching awards, which demonstrate that 21 she has consistently been recognized for superior performance over 22 the last twenty-five years. 23 extensive history of teaching awards also contradicts Defendants’ 24 articulated rationale for her transfer. 25 Plaintiff did miss a number of meetings or was late to meetings, it 26 is reasonable to infer that these errors were not sufficient to 27 rise to actual incompetence, in light of Plaintiff’s superior, 28 previous performance. This is inaccurate. Plaintiff (See Johnson Decl. Ex. 11.) 8 This Even assuming that 1 Furthermore, viewed in the context of Plaintiff’s declaration 2 and her prior job performance, the Court also considers Plaintiff’s 3 provision of statistics to be relevant. 4 State, County, and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME) v. State of 5 Wash., 770 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985)(“The weight to be 6 accorded . . . statistics is determined by the existence of 7 independent corroborative evidence of discrimination.”). 8 statistics demonstrate that the number of African American 9 administrators and teachers fell significantly within the District See American Federation of These 10 from 2001-2008. 11 administrators decreased by 28.7%, while the total percentage of 12 certificated staff decreased by 6%. 13 arguable whether this decrease is meaningful, this merely goes to 14 the weight of the evidence, and does not remove the inference of 15 discrimination within the above context. 16 (SGI ¶¶ 14-15.) The total percentage of (Id.) While it is certainly In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has raised a genuine 17 issue of material fact as to racial discrimination, in violation of 18 FEHA and Title VII. 19 C. 20 Plaintiff’s SAC does not provide a basis for her harassment Failure to Prevent Harassment 21 and instead alleges harassment by Mener generally. 22 Harassment must be based on a protected category, such as sex or 23 race. 24 App. 3d 590, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 25 (See SAC See, e.g., Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not demonstrated grounds 26 for her harassment. In response, Plaintiff points to no evidence 27 in support of her claim. 28 9 1 Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact and 2 Plaintiff’s claim for failure to prevent harassment fails, because 3 Plaintiff has not demonstrated harassment. 4 County Transit Dist., 63 Cal. App. 4th 280, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). Trujillo v. North 5 D. 6 A plaintiff establishes prima facie case of retaliation by Retaliation 7 demonstrating: 8 afterwards her employer subjected her to an adverse employment 9 action; and 3) a causal link between the two. 1) she engaged in protected activity; 2) that Morgan v. Regents of 10 University of California, 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 11 2001). 12 legitimate business rationale, which the plaintiff may then 13 overcome by showing the employer’s rationale is pretext for 14 retaliation. 15 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). 16 Defendant may rebut the prima facie case by presenting a Stegall v. Citadel Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061, As described above, Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of 17 material fact as to whether she suffered an adverse employment 18 action. 19 rationale - incompetence by Plaintiff. 20 Defendants’ argument as it applies to discrimination, Plaintiff 21 does not argue or present evidence to rebut Defendants’ legitimate 22 business rationale as it applies to retaliation for protected 23 activity. 24 any evidence which demonstrates that Defendants’ rationale was a 25 pretext for retaliation. Defendants have also articulated a legitimate business While Plaintiff does rebut In other words, Plaintiff fails to point the Court to Therefore, as there is no dispute of material fact, the Court 26 27 finds that Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation fails as a matter of 28 law. 10 1 E. Disability Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate 2 under FEHA 3 1. 4 Disability Discrimination Disability discrimination under FEHA is analyzed under the 5 same three-stage burden-shifting test as other protected 6 categories. 7 4th 986, 1004 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 8 9 Scotch v. Art Institute of California, 173 Cal. App. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was disabled during the time period at issue1 and, as described above, the Court finds 10 that there is a genuine issue as to whether Plaintiff suffered an 11 adverse employment action. 12 for transferring Plaintiff is her incompetent performance. 13 Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show pretext. 14 However, as with Plaintiff’s claims regarding race discrimination, 15 Defendants do not refute any of the allegations of Plaintiff’s 16 declaration related to her disability. 17 that Plaintiff asked to park in the visitors spot in the mornings 18 to sign-in, and that Mener or the head of security would park in 19 this spot so that Plaintiff could not sign in on time. 20 Decl. ¶ 7.) 21 her from her parked car in the visitors spot to taunt Plaintiff. 22 (Id.) 23 the sign-in sheet from the front office before 8am, so that it 24 would appear that Plaintiff was late when she was not. 25 Defendants also do not dispute that Mener and her assistant refused Again, Defendants legitimate rationale Defendants do not dispute (Mills Defendants do not dispute that Mener would smirk at Defendants do not dispute that Mener would routinely remove (Id. ¶ 8.) 26 27 28 1 However, Plaintiff has conceded that she does not consider herself to be disabled (SUF ¶ 2) and instead has an “on-and-off back problem.” (Garcia Decl. Ex. 2 Mills Depo. 163:8-10.) 11 1 to provide help her during testing in 2006 with carrying materials, 2 because she was incapable of carrying them due to her back 3 condition. 4 Furthermore, the Court again finds that an inference of pretext is 5 supported by the undisputed evidence of Plaintiff’s extensive 6 history of superior performance as a teacher. 7 (Id. ¶ 10; Garcia Reply Decl. Ex. 15 126-27.) Therefore, the Court finds there is a genuine issue of 8 material fact as to whether Plaintiff was discriminated against on 9 the basis of her disability. 10 11 2. Failure to Accommodate The elements of a failure to accommodate claim are that: (1) 12 the plaintiff has a disability under the FEHA, (2) the plaintiff is 13 qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, and 14 (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's 15 disability. 16 Scotch, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1010. Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s requested 17 accommodation was unreasonable. 18 modification or adjustment to the workplace that enables the 19 employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or 20 desired.” 21 requested accommodations were that Defendants (1) permit her to 22 sign in late, (2) to park in the visitors spot before signing in, 23 and (3) during testing in 2006, to have help carrying materials. 24 Defendants argue that the first request was unreasonable, because 25 Plaintiff’s late sign-in required someone else to supervise her 26 students for her (which is an essential part of her job). 27 this accommodation may ultimately have been unreasonable, A reasonable accommodation is “a Scotch, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1010. 28 12 Plaintiff’s three While 1 Defendants provide no evidence which suggests that they actually 2 engaged in the interactive process with Plaintiff to discuss this. 3 Where an employee indicates disability to his employer and 4 requests a reasonable accommodation, FEHA requires the parties to 5 engage in the “interactive process.” 6 Fargo Bank, 85 Cal. App. 4th 245, 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)(on a 7 motion for summary judgment on a FEHA reasonable accommodation 8 claim, the employer must prove that it “did everything in its power 9 to find a reasonable accommodation, but the informal interactive See also Jensen v. Wells 10 process broke down because the employee failed to engage in 11 discussions in good faith”). 12 burdens on both the employer and employee.” 13 must initiate the process,” the burden is also placed on the 14 employer once it “becomes aware of the need to consider an 15 accommodation.” 16 quotation omitted). 17 initiated, the employer's obligation to engage in the process in 18 good faith is continuous”; and the employer and employee together 19 “must participate in good faith, undertake reasonable efforts to 20 communicate its concerns, and make available to the other 21 information which is available, or more accessible, to one party.” 22 Id. 23 objective circumstances surrounding the parties’ breakdown in 24 communication, and responsibility for the breakdown lies with the 25 party who fails to participate in good faith.” 26 quotation omitted). The interactive process “imposes Although “the employee Scotch, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1014 (internal However, once the “interactive process is The court’s determination of liability then “hinges on the Id. (internal 27 In this case, Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue regarding 28 Defendants’ failure to engage in the interactive process, because 13 1 Defendants fail to present any evidence that they actually 2 communicated their disagreement with Plaintiff’s requested 3 accommodation or requested a substitute accommodation. 4 Therefore, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of 5 material fact as to whether Defendants failed to accommodate 6 Plaintiff’s disability. 7 IV. 8 9 CONCLUSION For the above reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to all claims except Plaintiff’s claims for failure 10 to accommodate her disability, and for race and disability 11 discrimination. 12 DISMISSED as a defendant in this action. As no claims remain against Mener, she is 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 16 17 Dated: August 6, 2009 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14
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