John Delaney v. Lynwood Unified School District et al, No. 2:2007cv05049 - Document 70 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 46 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants motion for summary judgment. (See Order for Details). (sch)
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John Delaney v. Lynwood Unified School District et al Doc. 70 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN DELANEY, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 16 17 v. LYNWOOD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, RACHEL CHAVEZ, MARTINA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA LOPEZ, JOSE LUIS SOLACHES, ALFONSO MORALES, GUADALUPE RODRIGUEZ, DHYAN LAL; ROBERTO CASES; DIANE LUCAS, ANIM MENER, MALCOLM BUTLER, 18 19 Defendants. ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 07-05049 DDP (CTx) ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Motion filed on May 11, 2009] 20 21 22 I. BACKGROUND1 Plaintiff John DeLaney, who is Caucasian and over forty, was 23 working as a teacher at Will Rogers Elementary School (“Will 24 Rogers”) in Defendant Lynwood Unified School District (the 25 26 27 1 28 The evidence provided by the parties in this case does not always create a linear or coherent narrative of material events or, in particular, a background for relevant events. Nevertheless, the Court will describe the facts as presented by the parties. Dockets.Justia.com 1 “District”) during Summer 2005 and for the 2005-06 school year.2 2 (Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“SUF”) ¶¶ 1-2; Rees Decl. Ex. I 3 (“Delaney Depo”) 35.) 4 became the principal at Will Rogers. 5 Beginning in Fall 2005, Malcolm Butler (SUF ¶ 3.) During the 2005 school year, Plaintiff states that Butler 6 confronted him in front of his students, angrily berated Plaintiff 7 in a physically threatening manner, and intimidated Plaintiff so 8 that Plaintiff was afraid for his personal safety. 9 ¶ 9.) (Delaney Decl. March 20, 2006 was Plaintiff’s last day of work. (SUF ¶ 6.) 10 On September 1, 2006, Plaintiff officially retired from the 11 District. 12 retirement was “in reality a constructive discharge, or 13 termination, caused by principal Malcolm Butler’s threatening and 14 harassing conduct to such a degree that [he] could not then, and 15 still cannot, function as a teacher.” 16 (SUF ¶ 12.) However, Plaintiff states that his (DeLaney Decl. ¶ 8.) In addition, Plaintiff provides evidence that in 2005, Dhyan 17 Lal, who was the Superintendent of the District until 2008, 18 published an autobiography book in which he detailed negative 19 experiences within the African-American community in various school 20 districts in Los Angeles against Lal personally. 21 Genuine Issues (“SGI”) ¶ 2.) 22 evidence of general racial animus in the District, because the 23 District Board Members do not act to ensure there is no racial 24 discrimination or question Lal’s employment recommendations. 25 ¶ 9.) (Statement of Plaintiff argues that this book is (SGI Lastly, Plaintiff presents statistics from the District 26 27 28 2 Plaintiff also argues, without providing any evidence, that he is a “long tenured teacher with the District, who had never been laid off, terminated, demoted, or disciplined.” (Opp’n 4.) 2 1 that show, in general, the number of African-American teachers has 2 declined, while the number of Latino teachers has increased. 3 ¶ 11.) 4 5 (SGI In his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Plaintiff makes the following claims: 6 1) hostile work environment harassment based on race discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a); 2) discrimination based on age in violation of FEHA § 12940(h); 3) failure to prevent harassment in violation of FEHA § 12940(h); 4) constructive wrongful termination due to hostile work environment harassment based on age discrimination in violation of FEHA § 12940(k); 5) racial discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; 6) age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 (SAC 5-11.) 15 Plaintiff’s claims. 16 II. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all of LEGAL STANDARD 17 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the 18 discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show 19 that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 20 movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 22 judgment, all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn 23 in favor of the nonmoving party. 24 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 25 is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 26 nonmoving party,” and material facts are those “that might affect 27 the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 28 U.S. at 248. In determining a motion for summary Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., A genuine issue exists if “the evidence Anderson, 477 However, no genuine issue of fact exists “[w]here the 3 1 record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 2 find for the non-moving party.” 3 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 4 III. DISCUSSION 5 6 7 A. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Race and Age Discrimination under ADEA, FEHA, and Title VII Plaintiff’s race and age discrimination arguments all rest on 8 the same facts, so the Court will analyze these claims together, as 9 all suffer from the same flaw. Plaintiff has not presented 10 sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue regarding 11 discriminatory intent, whether based on age or race. 12 Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354 (Cal. 2000)(requiring, 13 under the burden-shifting analysis, evidence that the employer’s 14 intent or motive was discriminatory); Kentucky Retirement Systems 15 v. E.E.O.C., 128 S. Ct. 2361, 2366 (2008)(requiring under ADEA that 16 the employee’s age “actually motivated the employer’s decision”). 17 See Guz v. Plaintiff’s only evidence of discriminatory intent based on 18 race is Lal’s book and the statistics of district hiring patterns. 19 Neither of these create any reasonable inferences regarding 20 Plaintiff and his race (Caucasian), and their relationship to his 21 employment at Will Rogers. 22 County, and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME) v. State of Wash., 770 23 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985)(statistical evidence, by itself, is 24 insufficient to establish discriminatory intent without 25 corroborating evidence). 26 See also American Federation of State, Similarly, regarding age discrimination, Plaintiff’s only 27 evidence of age discrimination is his declaration, where he states 28 that it is his “information and belief” that he was replaced by 4 1 younger workers, in addition to his testimony that he talked to 2 three younger workers who reported fewer visits or discipline from 3 Butler. (DeLaney Depo. 105:-106.) 4 genuine issue of material fact, because no reasonable juror could 5 believe that these vague allegations establish animus based on age 6 or any motivation based on age. 7 is "uncorroborated and self-serving" testimony by Plaintiff, this 8 cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact. 9 Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). 10 This is insufficient to create a Where the only evidence presented Villiarimo v. Aloha As there is no genuine issue of material fact, the Court finds 11 that Plaintiff’s claims based on age and racial discrimination 12 fail. 13 B. 14 The elements of a claim for hostile environment age harassment Harassment and Failure to Prevent Harassment 15 are that Plaintiff was: “(1) subjected to verbal or physical 16 conduct because of his age, (2) the conduct was unwelcome, and (3) 17 the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 18 conditions of plaintiff's employment and create an abusive working 19 environment.” 20 2d 1141, 1157 (E.D. Cal. 2006)(internal quotations and brackets 21 omitted). 22 Juell v. Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 456 F. Supp. Again, Plaintiff provides no evidence which raises a genuine 23 dispute as to harassment based on age. 24 speculates about the District’s and Butler’s motivation for its 25 discipline practices, without providing any evidence that 26 Plaintiff’s harassment was tied to his age. 27 further present evidence that his or her workplace was “permeated 28 with discriminatory intimidation,” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 5 Instead, Plaintiff A plaintiff must 1 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), such that it is “subjectively and 2 objectively” abusive. Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 3 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff states generally that he had 4 confrontations with Butler on “more than one occasion,” where 5 Butler moved “into [his] personal space” to berate and angrily 6 reprimand Plaintiff in a physically threatening manner. 7 Decl. ¶ 9.) 8 abusive, there is no evidence the abuse is based on age. (Delaney Again, even assuming that this is subjectively 9 As Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact, 10 the Court finds that he has not presented a claim for hostile work 11 environment harassment based on age. 12 harassment fails, Plaintiff’s claim for failure to prevent 13 harassment also fails. 14 IV. 15 16 As Plaintiff’s claim for CONCLUSION For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 20 21 Dated: August 6, 2009 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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