Fannie Jones-Hundley v. Lynwood Unified School District et al, No. 2:2007cv05025 - Document 74 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING Motion For Summary Judgment 59 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. For the above reasons, Defendants motion is GRANTED. (See Order for Details). (sch)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Fannie Jones-Hundley v. Lynwood Unified School District et al Doc. 74 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FANNIE JONES-HUNDLEY, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 16 17 v. LYNWOOD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, RACHEL CHAVEZ, MARTINA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA LOPEZ, JOSE LUIS SOLACHE, ALFONSO MORALES, GUADALUPE RODRIGUEZ, DHYAN LAL, ROBERTO CASAS, DIANE LUCAS; ANIM MENER, MALCOLM BUTLER, 18 19 Defendants. ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 07-05025 DDP (CTx) ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Motion filed on May 28, 2009] 20 21 22 I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Fannie Jones-Hundley, who is African American, has 23 been employed with Defendant Lynwood Unified School District (“the 24 District”) since 1976. 25 she was employed as a middle school teacher. 26 Plaintiff was working at Lynwood Middle School (“LMS”), when 27 principal Anim Mener began her first year. 28 Uncontroverted Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 5.) (Hundley Decl. ¶ 3.) From 1976 to 2005, (Id.) In 2005, (Statement of Dockets.Justia.com 1 On September 27, 2005, Plaintiff went to a District Board 2 meeting and described numerous problems with facilities at LMS, 3 including that she believed “a racist act has occurred at [LMS],” 4 and that she “was given a letter stating she was late for class and 5 someone else was not written up who arrived at the same time.” 6 (Urias Decl. Ex. 3.) 7 much going on” at LMS and that she did not want to continue working 8 there. 9 delivering papers to the front office, when she states Mener (Id.) Plaintiff further stated that there was “too The next day, on September 28, 2005, Plaintiff was 10 approached her, used a racial epithet against her (the word 11 “nigger”), and then told Plaintiff that Mener would get rid of her 12 if Plaintiff continued to embarrass her (as at the Board meeting). 13 (SUF ¶ 8; Hundley Decl. ¶ 8.) 14 epithet and believes Plaintiff was attempting to defame her. 15 (Urias Decl. Ex. 14.) 16 general, harassed her by not acknowledging her or speaking to her 17 when they passed on campus, although Plaintiff concedes she was 18 never subjected to another derogatory comment. 19 SUF ¶ 38.) 20 Mener denies making the racial Plaintiff also states that Mener, in (Hundley Decl. ¶ 8; Some time around October 4, 2005, Mener recommended that 21 Plaintiff be transferred from LMS to Lynwood High School. 22 Decl. ¶ 3; Urias Decl. Ex. 22.) 23 Plaintiff’s transfer was based on the events of September 28, 2005 24 and because she believed Plaintiff had defamed her. 25 Ex. 8.) 26 retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 27 (“EEOC”) on December 1, 2005. 28 11 and 25, 2005, Plaintiff returned to the District Board’s public (Hundley The reason Mener recommended (Garcia Decl. Plaintiff filed a first charge for race discrimination and (Garcia Decl. Ex. 10.) 2 On October 1 meetings and informed the Board that she had been transferred and 2 discriminated against. 3 then conducted by the District, based on Plaintiff’s comments to 4 the Board. 5 was found to have produced four witnesses who substantiated her 6 position, while Plaintiff provided none. 7 recommended dealing with any remaining problem according to the 8 union’s grievance procedures. 9 (Urias Decl. Ex. 20.) (See Urias Decl. Ex. 7.) An investigation was In this investigation, Mener (Id.) The Board Regarding her transfer to Lynwood High, Plaintiff states that 10 her transfer resulted in a loss of income, because she was no 11 longer able to work on an hourly basis on the weekend or in after- 12 school intervention programs. 13 had more students at Lynwood High and was forced to do more 14 preparation work, because of the different nature of the grades she 15 taught. 16 behavior problems. 17 with the EEOC on July 11, 2006. 18 (Id. ¶ 5.) (Hundley Decl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff also The students at Lynwood High also had more (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff filed a second charge (Garcia Decl. Ex. 11.) One year after being transferred, Plaintiff went on paid 19 administrative leave from October 2006 through May 2007 in 20 connection with an unspecified administrative action that resulted 21 in a confidential settlement agreement.1 22 returned to work, Plaintiff was placed at Vista High School 23 (“Vista”), which is a “continuation school.” 24 at Vista are placed there due to truancy, behavior, gang, family, 25 and psychological problems. (Hundley Decl. ¶ 7.) (SUF ¶ 23.) When she (SUF ¶ 24.) Students Accordingly, 26 27 1 28 Plaintiff requests that the Court review this settlement agreement in camera. The Court declines this request. 3 1 student conduct is much more of a problem than at Lynwood High or 2 LMS. 3 (Id.) Plaintiff then filed the present suit. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC) brings the 4 following claims. 5 against the District: Except for the fourth claim, all claims are 6 1) wrongful demotion based on race discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a); 2) retaliation in violation of FEHA § 12940(a); 3) discrimination based on age in violation of FEHA § 12940(h); 4) failure to prevent harassment in violation of FEHA § 12940(k), against both Mener and the District; 5) racial discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; and 6) retaliation in violation of Title VII. 7 8 9 10 11 12 (SAC 5-10.) Defendants now move for summary judgment on all of 13 Plaintiff’s claims. 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD 15 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the 16 discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show 17 that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 18 movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining a motion for summary 20 judgment, all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn 21 in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 22 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A genuine issue exists if “the evidence 23 is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 24 nonmoving party,” and material facts are those “that might affect 25 the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 26 U.S. at 248. However, no genuine issue of fact exists “[w]here the 27 record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 28 4 1 find for the non-moving party.” 2 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 3 III. DISCUSSION Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Age Discrimination under FEHA2 4 A. 5 The plaintiff’s prima facie burden is not “onerous,” but the 6 plaintiff must at least show “actions taken by the employer from 7 which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is 8 more likely than not that such actions were based on [age].” 9 v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 355 (Cal. 2000). 10 Here, Plaintiff presents literally no evidence of Guz 11 discriminatory intent based on age. 12 issue and Plaintiff’s age discrimination claims fail as a matter of 13 law. Therefore, there is no genuine 14 B. 15 FEHA and Title VII use the McDonnell Douglas “three-stage Racial Discrimination under FEHA and Title VII 16 burden-shifting test.” Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 17 317, 354 (Cal. 2000). Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie 18 case of discrimination, which the employer may then rebut with 19 evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale. 20 56. 21 prove that the employer’s reasons are pretextual. 22 Accordingly, the plaintiff must provide evidence showing that the 23 employer’s intent or motive was discriminatory; and the ultimate Id. at 355- If the employer satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must Id. 24 25 26 27 28 2 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies as to age because she did not check this box on her EEOC charge. (Garcia Decl. Ex. 11.) While this is true, Plaintiff does make an allegation of age discrimination within the text of her charge. (Id.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies as to discrimination based on age. 5 1 burden of persuasion remains with the Plaintiff. 2 However, where a defendant moves for summary judgment, as here, the 3 framework is altered slightly. 4 of proving either that Plaintiff has not established an element of 5 her claim, or that Defendants have a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 6 rationale for any adverse employment action. 7 Airlines, Inc., 165 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1247 (Cal. Ct. App. 8 2008)(citing Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 1088, 1098 9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)). 10 11 1. Id. at 356, 383. Defendants have the initial burden Avila v. Continental Prima Facie Case In order to present a prima facie case under FEHA, Plaintiff 12 must show that she is: 13 performing competently in the position she held; 3) suffered an 14 adverse employment action; and 4) that “some other circumstance 15 suggests discriminatory motive.” 16 (citing Guz, 24 Cal. 4th 317). 17 1) a member of a protected class; 2) Kelly, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 1098 Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not present a prima facie 18 case because she did not suffer an adverse employment action. 19 adverse employment action must materially affect Plaintiff’s 20 “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 21 L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1054-55 (Cal. 2005). 22 Plaintiff does not dispute that her base salary, benefits, and 23 teaching classification did not change when she transferred to 24 Lynwood High School. 25 she did suffer a loss of income, because the transfer precluded her 26 from working on an hourly basis on the weekend or in the after 27 school intervention programs at Lynwood Middle School. 28 Decl. ¶ 3.) (SUF ¶ 22.) An Yanowitz v. However, Plaintiff states that (Hundley Plaintiff also had more students at Lynwood High 6 1 School and was forced to do more preparation work, because of the 2 different nature of the grades she taught. 3 sufficient to raise a genuine issue for the prima facie case. 4 Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 5 2002)(plaintiff’s burden of production to establish a prima facie 6 case is “minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a 7 preponderance of the evidence”). 8 2. 9 (Id. ¶ 5.) This is See Legitimate Business Rationale and Pretext A legitimate business rationale must be “facially unrelated to 10 [the] prohibited bias.” 11 that Plaintiff was transferred because of an “irreconcilable 12 difference” between Mener and her. 13 Defendants provide a letter from Mener to Superintendent Dhyan Lal 14 dated November 21, 2005, where Plaintiff states her belief that 15 Plaintiff had defamed her. 16 defamation is facially unrelated to racial discrimination and, as 17 such, Defendant has satisfied its burden to “articulate” a 18 legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. 19 1062. Guz, 24 Cal.4th at 358. Defendants argue In support of this assertion, (Urias Decl. Ex. 14.) An allegation of See Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 20 The burden thus shifts back to Plaintiff to raise a genuine 21 dispute as to pretext regarding Defendants’ stated motivation of 22 defamation. 23 occasions where Mener purportedly used racial epithets, a book 24 written by District Superintendent Dhyan Lal where he describes 25 mistreatment by the African-American community (against him 26 personally), and statistics of hiring patterns in the District that 27 show a decrease in African-American administrators and teachers, Plaintiff’s argument is based entirely on two 28 7 1 and a racist remark by a District Board member (before she joined 2 the Board). 3 To begin, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how Lal’s book or his 4 deposition testimony in any way specifically relates to Mener’s 5 allegation of defamation by Plaintiff. 6 raise a genuine issue regarding a Board-wide policy which resulted 7 in Plaintiff’s reassignment (based on hiring practices of the 8 Board). 9 rarely, if ever, do more than approve the superintendent’s Similarly, Plaintiff cannot While Plaintiff presents evidence that Board Members 10 personnel recommendations, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate with 11 more than vague speculation that Lal or any Board Member 12 implemented any policy evidencing animus, particularly with 13 reference to Plaintiff. 14 believe these demonstrate pretext in Plaintiff’s case. 15 As such, no reasonable trier of fact could Next, Plaintiff’s statistical evidence demonstrates that in 16 the District there has been a 28 percent decrease in African- 17 American staff, teachers, and administrators from 2001 to 2008. 18 (Mot. 8.) 19 corroborative evidence of discrimination; and no rational trier of 20 fact could believe that they indicate either a policy of 21 discrimination or, specifically, that Plaintiff’s transfer was 22 motivated by race. 23 Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME) v. State of Wash., 770 F.2d 1401, 24 1407 (9th Cir. 1985)(“The weight to be accorded such statistics is 25 determined by the existence of independent corroborative evidence 26 of discrimination.”). 27 28 However, these statistics are unsupported by any See American Federation of State, County, and Finally, Plaintiff also provides evidence of two racist comments made by Mener. One is the comment directed to Plaintiff 8 1 (that Mener believed defamed her); the was purportedly overheard by 2 an administrator named Cornelia Davis, who states that she 3 overheard Mener refer to the students as “niggers” and “wetbacks.” 4 (Rees Decl. Ex. J “Davis Depo” 100:9-13.) 5 unconnected by time or relation to Plaintiff’s employment decision, 6 and is insufficient to create a genuine issue on a motion for 7 summary judgment. 8 Cir. 2003). 9 insufficient to raise a genuine issue, because this remark stands The comment by Davis is Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1142 (9th The remark overheard by Plaintiff is also ultimately 10 alone and is totally uncorroborated by any other evidence. 11 the only evidence presented is "uncorroborated and self-serving" 12 testimony by Plaintiff, this cannot raise a genuine issue of 13 material fact. 14 15 16 17 18 Where Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1061. As there is no genuine issue of material fact, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims based on racial discrimination fail. C. Failure to Prevent Harassment under FEHA - Defendants District and Mener The elements of a claim of hostile environment harassment 19 under FEHA are: 20 plaintiff was subject to unwelcome racial, national origin, or sex 21 harassment; 3) the harassment was sufficiently pervasive to alter 22 the conditions of employment and create an abusive working 23 environment; 4) the harassment was based on race, national origin, 24 or sex; and 5) respondeat superior. 25 Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 26 1) plaintiff belongs to a protected group; 2) Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Again, as with her age discrimination claim, Plaintiff 27 provides no evidence which raises a genuine dispute as to 28 harassment based on race. Instead, Plaintiff references one racial 9 1 epithet and says generally that Mener was unpleasant to work for. 2 In order to raise a genuine issue as to harassment, a plaintiff 3 must present evidence that his or her workplace was “permeated with 4 discriminatory intimidation,” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 5 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), such that it is “subjectively and objectively” 6 abusive. 7 1995). 8 with Mener are insufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to 9 infer harassment based on race. 10 Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. Plaintiff’s vague statements of unpleasant interactions The Court finds that Plaintiff has not presented a claim for 11 harassment. 12 claim for failure to prevent harassment also fails. As Plaintiff’s claim for harassment fails, Plaintiff’s 13 D. 14 A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by Retaliation in Violation of Title VII and FEHA 15 demonstrating: 16 afterwards her employer subjected her to an adverse employment 17 action; and 3) a causal link between the two. 18 University of California, 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 19 2001). 20 rebut the prima facie case by presenting a legitimate business 21 rationale, which the plaintiff may then overcome by a showing that 22 the employer’s rationale is pretext for retaliation. 23 Citadel Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). 24 1) she engaged in protected activity; 2) that Morgan v. Regents of Assuming the prima facie case has been met, Defendant may Stegall v. As described above, Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of 25 material fact as to whether she suffered an adverse employment 26 action. 27 rationale - defamation by Plaintiff. 28 attempts to rebut Defendants’ argument as it applies to Defendants have also articulated a legitimate business 10 However, while Plaintiff 1 discrimination, Plaintiff does not present evidence to rebut 2 Defendants’ legitimate business rationale as it applies to 3 retaliation. 4 any evidence or argument which demonstrates that Defendants’ 5 rationale was a pretext for retaliation. 6 party's memorandum opposing summary judgment, without designation 7 of specific facts supported by the evidence, do not create a 8 genuine issue of material fact. 9 San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 845 F.2d 1300, 1307 (9th Cir. In other words, Plaintiff fails to point the Court to Mere assertions in a See Nissho-Iwai American Corp. v. 10 2001); S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter Kidde & 11 Co., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1980). 12 not required to comb the record to find some reason to deny a 13 motion for summary judgment." 14 Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988). 15 Further, the Court "is Forsberg v. Pac. Northwest Bell Tel. Therefore, as there is no issue of material fact, the Court 16 grants Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation. 17 IV. 18 CONCLUSION For the above reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 23 Dated: August 6, 2009 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28 11
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
