Victoria Gonzalez v. Drew Industries Incorporated et al, No. 2:2006cv08233 - Document 390 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 365 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs Motion for Order Directing Dissemination of Class Notice is DENIED as moot 372 . (See Order for Details). (sch)
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Victoria Gonzalez v. Drew Industries Incorporated et al Doc. 390 1 2 O 3 4 5 NO JS-6 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 VICTORIA GONZALEZ, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, 13 Plaintiff, 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 v. DREW INDUSTRIES INC., a Delaware corporation; KINRO, INC., an Ohio corporation; KINRO TEXAS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Texas limited partnership, d/b/a BETTER BATH COMPONENTS; and SKYLINE CORPORATION, an Indiana corporation, Defendants. ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 06-08233 DDP (JWJx) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Motions filed on 7/19/10 - NOS. 365 & 372] 21 22 Presently before the court is Defendants Kinro, Inc. And Kinro 23 Texas Limited (collectively, “Kinro”)’s Motion for Summary 24 Judgment. 25 oral argument, the court grants the motion and adopts the following 26 order. 27 /// 28 /// After reviewing the parties’ moving papers and hearing Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Victoria Gonzalez and Robert Royalty brought suit 3 against Kinro based on allegations that Kinro sold defective 4 bathtubs that did not comply with mandatory federal fire-safety 5 standards. 6 orders, Plaintiffs alleged that Kinro affixed stickers to their 7 bathtubs representing compliance with mandatory testing, without 8 any grounds to do so. 9 that contained these bathtubs, which were certified to be compliant As described more fully in this court’s previous Plaintiffs then purchased manufactured homes 10 with federal Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) safety 11 standards. 12 Plaintiffs initially asserted six claims in their Second 13 Amended Complaint (“SAC”), including claims under the California 14 Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, and 15 the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. 16 Code § 17200.1 17 for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs’ claims except for 18 their UCL cause of action. 19 18, 2009, Dkt. No. 349.) 20 representations of compliance with federal safety standards were 21 not supported by any reliable records or tests. On May 18, 2009, this court granted Kinro’s motion (Summary Judgement Order (“SJO”), May The court recognized that Defendants’ (SJO at 14.) The 22 1 23 24 25 26 27 28 The complete list of Plaintiffs’ claims consisted of: (1) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310; (2) breach of express warranty; (3) concealment or non-disclosure of a product defect; (4) violation of the CLRA; (5) violation of the UCL; and (6) violation of the California Song-Beverly Consumer Code Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 17990. (SAC 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26.) 2 1 court denied summary judgment on the UCL claim based, in part, on 2 the reasoning that Plaintiffs were not required to establish actual 3 reliance on Defendants’ misrepresentations in order to establish 4 standing under the UCL. 5 Id. at 17. The same day that this court issued the SJO, the California 6 Supreme Court expressly required actual reliance in fraud-based UCL 7 claims. 8 The California Supreme Court held that to establish standing, a 9 plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s misrepresentation is the 10 “immediate cause of the plaintiff’s conduct by showing that in its 11 absence the plaintiff in all reasonable probability would not have 12 engaged in the injury-producing conduct.” 13 See In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (Cal. 2009). Id. at 326. Accordingly, and considering that neither named plaintiff here 14 relied upon Kinro’s representations, this court on reconsideration 15 found that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a fraud-based claim 16 under the UCL. (Order, August 26, 2009 (the “Reconsideration 17 Order”), Dkt. No. 363.) 18 not address, whether Plaintiffs have standing to assert a claim 19 under the unfair practices prong of the UCL. 20 summary judgment on the remaining unfair practices UCL claim. 21 II. Kinro did not argue, and this court did Kinro now moves for LEGAL STANDARD 22 A motion for summary judgment must be granted when “the 23 pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 24 on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 25 no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 26 is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 27 56(c). 28 of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden 3 1 identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses 2 that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 3 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 4 Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an 5 issue at trial, the movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no 6 reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving 7 party. 8 burden of proof, however, the movant can prevail merely by pointing 9 out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving On an issue as to which the nonmoving party will have the 10 party's case. 11 burden, the non-moving party must set forth, by affidavit or as 12 otherwise provided in Rule 56, “specific facts showing that 13 there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 14 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). 15 See id. If the moving party meets its initial It is not the Court's task “to scour the record in search of a 16 genuine issue of triable fact.” 17 1278 (9th Cir. 1996). Counsel have an obligation to lay out their 18 support clearly. Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 19 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court "need not examine the entire file 20 for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the 21 evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate 22 references so that it could conveniently be found." 23 III. Discussion 24 Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, Id. To establish standing, a plaintiff bringing a claim under the 25 UCL must demonstrate that he “has suffered injury in fact and has 26 lost money or property as a result of unfair competition.” 27 II, 46 Cal.4th. at 305. 28 a plaintiff must demonstrate an “invasion of a legally protected Tobacco In order to demonstrate an injury in fact, 4 1 interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual 2 or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 3 Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2008), citing 4 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 5 D'Lil v. Best W. Here, Defendants manufactured almost 1.5 million bathtubs. 6 The tubs are intended to be installed in manufactured homes. 7 Defendants failed to keep records establishing that the tubs 8 complied with safety standards, yet sold the tubs with stickers 9 representing compliance with mandatory fire-safety tests. One tub 10 caught fire. 11 and, due to shoddy record-keeping, Defendants may not be able to 12 controvert the allegation that Plaintiffs’ tubs are non-compliant 13 without conducting destructive testing on each tub. 14 seems logical, at first blush, to assume that plaintiffs have been 15 damaged. 16 Plaintiffs’ homes may contain non-compliant tubs, Therefore it An assumption, however, cannot suffice to confer standing. To 17 survive summary judgment, Plaintiffs must present evidence of an 18 injury in fact. 19 opposing the motion [for summary judgment] ‘fails to make an 20 adequate showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 21 element essential to that party's case, and on which that party 22 will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 23 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989), citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 24 “There is no genuine issue of fact if the party Here, Plaintiffs argue that they have been deprived of the 25 difference in value between a HUD-compliant tub and a non-compliant 26 tub, and that such deprivation constitutes an economic harm.2 27 2 28 Contrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestion, this court is not bound (continued...) 5 1 (Opp. at 13). Plaintiffs’ proof, however, fails. Plaintiffs have 2 not presented any evidence that there is any actual difference in 3 value between the two types of tubs. 4 Plaintiffs, fearing for their safety, were compelled to buy new 5 tubs.3 6 for less had a purchaser been advised that a home might contain a 7 non-compliant tub. 8 unsupported by facts, cannot support standing. 9 Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc., 2010 WL 2528844 (N.D. Cal. 2010) There is no evidence that There is no evidence that Plaintiffs’ homes would have sold Conclusory allegations of decreased value, See Contreras v. 10 (dismissing complaint for lack of standing where plaintiffs 11 alleged, without factual support, that undisclosed defects reduced 12 the value of plaintiffs’ vehicles). 13 This might be a different case if Plaintiffs had feared for 14 their safety and incurred expense to replace a defective product. 15 In such cases, courts have found such injuries “minimally 16 sufficient” to confer standing. 17 Mart Stores, Inc., 2008 WL 3212101 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 18 however, Plaintiffs have not expended any money to replace their 19 tubs. 20 is more valuable than other tubs, nor have Plaintiffs shown that Id. at *5 (citing Sanchez v. WalHere, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that a properly-tested tub 21 2 22 23 24 25 26 27 (...continued) by the SJO’s reference to “the difference in value between what [Plaintiffs] paid for a HUD-compliant bathtub[] and what a tub would cost that has not been proven to satisfy fire-safety regulations.” (SJO at 18). The SJO, in analyzing the fraud prong of the UCL prior to reconsideration, defined the relevant injury as “the purchase of a defective or non-compliant bathtub, despite Defendants’ representations of compliance.” (SJO at 10 (emphasis added). This fraud prong injury, of which Defendants’ misrepresentations constituted a crucial part, is not applicable to the unfair prong analysis here. 3 28 Plaintiff Gonzalez did remove her tub for destructive testing, but at counsel’s suggestion. 6 1 the composition of their tubs had any effect on the price of their 2 homes. 3 suffered an economic harm. 4 In short, Plaintiffs have not offered any proof that they Accordingly, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have not 5 adequately demonstrated that they have suffered an injury in fact, 6 and therefore do not have standing to bring a claim under the 7 unfair practices prong of the UCL. 8 IV. Conclusion 9 For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS the Motion 10 for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Order Directing 11 Dissemination of Class Notice is DENIED as moot. 12 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 15 16 Dated: September 30, 2010 17 DEAN D. PREGERSON 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7
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