Boustila, et al v. Scottsdale Unified School District et al, No. 2:2008cv00677 - Document 12 (D. Ariz. 2008)
Court Description: ORDER granting Dfts' 2 Motion to Dismiss Case. FURTHER ORDERED that the Court notes that Dfts have requested attorneys' fees and costs, that request is denied without prejudice. Dfts may file an appropriate motion and/or other document requesting fees and/or costs consistent with local and federal rules. Signed by Judge James A Teilborg on 12/5/08.(KMG, )
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Boustila, et al v. Scottsdale Unified School District et al 1 Doc. 12 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 ) ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) vs. ) ) Scottsdale Unified School District No. 48,) ) et al., ) ) Defendant. ) ) Sarah and Rachid Boustila, No. 2:08-CV-00677-PHX-JAT ORDER 16 17 18 Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Scottsdale Unified School District, et al. (“Defendants”) (Doc. #2). The Court now rules on that Motion. 19 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 20 The relevant facts, as alleged in the Complaint, are as follows: Plaintiff Sarah Boustila 21 (“Mrs. Boustila” or “Plaintiff”) serves as a tenured teacher in the Scottsdale Unified School 22 District (“District”) at Arcadia High School in Maricopa County, Arizona. (Plaintiffs’ First 23 Amended Complaint ¶ 2, Doc. #1, Attach. 1, Exhibit H.) On October 31, 2007, Mrs. Boustila 24 was given a “Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline” (“Notice”) by Jeff Thomas, Director of 25 Human Capital for District. (First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 18, 28.) The Notice of Intent to 26 Impose Discipline recommended a nine (9) day unpaid suspension. (First Amended 27 Complaint ¶ 28.) Present at that meeting were Mr. Thomas; Dr. Althe Allen, Executive 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Director Middle and High School; Ann Marie Woolsey, Principal of Arcadia High School; 2 and Kim Clark, General Counsel for the District. (First Amended Complaint ¶ 30.) 3 On November 9, 2007, Mrs. Boustila provided a written response to the District’s 4 Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline formally objecting to the Notice and the procedures 5 employed by the District. (First Amended Complaint ¶ 36.) On November 30, 2007, the 6 District advised Mrs. Boustila that it had decided to modify the Notice, dismissing certain 7 policy violation allegations and reducing the suspension without pay to five (5) working 8 days. (First Amended Complaint ¶ 37.) 9 On December 21, 2007, Mrs. Boustila made a written request for appeal of the 10 District’s decision to impose discipline. (First Amended Complaint ¶ 39.) On January 11, 11 2008, Mrs. Boustila presented her appeal brief to an appointed Hearing Officer, David 12 Peterson (“Hearing Officer”). (First Amended Complaint ¶ 40.) The Hearing Officer met 13 with Mrs. Boustila and her attorneys a week later and heard her appeal. (First Amended 14 Complaint ¶ 41.) The Hearing Officer issued his decision on January 25, 2008, sustaining 15 the discipline. (First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 42, 53.) 16 Plaintiffs then commenced this action, filing suit against the District in Maricopa 17 County Superior Court. Plaintiffs amended that Complaint to substitute their present claim 18 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to add the individual defendants to the action. Defendants 19 removed the case from Maricopa County Superior Court to this Court and filed the Motion 20 to Dismiss at issue here. 21 In their Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint fails to 22 state a claim upon which this Court may grant relief. Defendants maintain that, accepting 23 all of Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, they do not constitute a viable claim that the Defendants 24 wrongfully deprived Mrs. Boustila of a constitutionally protected property interest without 25 due process. With respect to the District, Defendants assert that, under § 1983, there can be 26 no respondeat superior liability against a political subdivision such as the District, and thus, 27 Plaintiffs’ assertions that the individual Defendants engaged in wrongdoing do not state a 28 claim against the District. Defendants argue that there is no §1983 liability against the -2- 1 individual Defendants because (1) the five day unpaid suspension does not implicate a 2 constitutionally protected “property interest,” (2) Plaintiff undeniably received “due process” 3 in any event, and (3) the individual Defendants are immune from suit under a qualified 4 immunity doctrine. Defendants further assert that, with respect to the Baracy Defendants, 5 Plaintiffs have failed to meet the pleading standards required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 6 Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual defendants are barred 7 for insufficiency of service. The Court will address those arguments here. 8 II. 9 In evaluating a motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and 10 construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g., Enesco Corp. v. 11 Price/Costco Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998). In order to survive a dismissal 12 motion, however, a plaintiff must allege facts that are enough to raise his or her right to relief 13 “above the speculative level.” See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 14 (2007). While the Complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it is nonetheless 15 “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ [which] requires 16 more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 17 action will not do.” Id. In short, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to 18 relief that is plausible on its face,” not just conceivable. Id. at 1974. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS 19 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable 20 legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. See 21 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); see William W. 22 Schwarzer et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 9:187, at 9-46 (2002). 23 Alternatively, dismissal may be appropriate when the plaintiff has included sufficient 24 allegations disclosing some absolute defense or bar to recovery. See Weisbuch v. County of 25 L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783, n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (“If the pleadings establish facts compelling a 26 decision one way, that is as good as if depositions and other . . . evidence on summary 27 judgment establishes the identical facts.”); see also Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial 28 -3- 1 § 9:193, at 9-47. The burden is on the defendant to show that no claim has been stated. See 2 Gallardo v. DiCarlo, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1165 (C.D. Calif. 2002). 3 A. 4 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the District under 5 § 1983. Specifically, Defendants argue that, while Plaintiffs have alleged wrongdoing on the 6 part of the individual defendants, they have failed to allege any independent wrongdoing on 7 the part of the District. Defendants note, as a threshold matter, that under § 1983, liability 8 may not be imposed against a political subdivision on the basis of respondeat superior. As 9 Plaintiffs concede that they are no longer raising allegations against the District in their 10 Response In Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Response”) (Doc. # 8), the 11 Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss as to the District. 12 13 B. DISTRICT LIABILITY LIABILITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 1. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 14 Under § 1983, a two-step inquiry is required to determine whether a plaintiff has 15 suffered a violation of her due process rights in the employment context. Specifically, the 16 Court must determine whether Plaintiff has suffered: (1) the deprivation of a constitutionally 17 cognizable property interest, and (2) lack of adequate procedural protections. See Huskey 18 v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 2000). Constitutionally cognizable property 19 interests are not created by the Constitution, but rather stem from an independent source such 20 as state law. See Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998)(citing Bd. of 21 Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972)). 22 In the instant matter, Plaintiffs allege that, by suspending Mrs. Boustila without pay, 23 Defendants deprived her of a protected property interest in her continued employment. 24 Plaintiffs further maintain that Defendants imposed such discipline through a procedure that 25 was arbitrary, capricious, and lacking in due process. Assuming without deciding that 26 27 28 -4- 1 Plaintiffs have established the deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable property interest,1 2 the Court considers whether the deprivation was imposed without due process. 3 It is well-settled that due process “unlike some legal rules is not a technical conception 4 with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 5 924, 930, 138 L. Ed. 2d 120, 117 S. Ct. 1807 (1997) (citations omitted). Rather, it “is 6 flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Id. 7 (citations omitted). In determining the type and amount of process owed, courts consider the 8 following three factors: 9 10 11 12 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 13 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). In the area 14 of public employment, constitutional due process “requires ‘some kind of hearing’ prior to 15 the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his 16 employment.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 17 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985)(quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-570). “[T]he formality 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 The Court notes that Defendants also challenge whether Plaintiff has a protected property interest. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff received due process, see infra, the Court need not decide whether Plaintiff’s suspension implicates a constitutionally protected property interest. The Court does note, however, that the cases relied upon by Plaintiff to support her assertion that her five day suspension constitutes a protected property interest are factually distinguishable from the instant matter. Although the court in Winegar v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. School Dist., 20 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 1994), recognized a § 1983 cause of action based on a four (4) day unpaid suspension, the parties in that case agreed that a protected property interest was implicated, and the suspension was accompanied by allegations of unjustified child abuse sufficiently stigmatizing to implicate the plaintiff’s liberty interests. Similarly, in Jones v. Bd. of Educ., 651 F. Supp. 760, 763 (N.D. Ill. 1986), the Court noted, in rejecting the “de minimis” notion of the three (3) day suspension, the harm to the plaintiff’s reputation from the allegations of excessive use of physical force involved in the disciplinary action. The Court does not find such stigmatizing allegations to be present here. -5- 1 and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the 2 interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” Id. at 545 (quoting Boddie 3 v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113, 91 S. Ct. 780 (1971)). The timing, 4 content of the notice and the form of the hearing will depend upon a proper balancing of the 5 competing interests involved. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 95 6 S. Ct. 729 (1975). 7 In this case, the Court finds that, in light of the notice and opportunity to be heard that 8 were given to Plaintiff, Plaintiff received “due process.” As explained above and as set forth 9 in Plaintiff’s own Complaint, Plaintiff had ample opportunity to be heard on the allegations 10 against her. She received written notice of the charges against her set forth in a formal 11 “Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline.” (First Amended Complaint ¶ 28.) The Notice was 12 delivered at a hearing in which various District officials were present. (First Amended 13 Complaint ¶¶ 28, 30.) Plaintiff and her lawyers submitted a written response to the proposed 14 discipline and were successful in persuading the District to dismiss certain allegations. (First 15 Amended Complaint ¶¶ 36, 37.) Plaintiff provided written witness statements from various 16 individuals to refute the allegations in the Notice of Discipline. (First Amended Complaint, 17 ¶¶ 57, 63, 79.) Through counsel, Plaintiff presented a written hearing brief to the District’s 18 designated Hearing Officer and also presented the case to that Hearing Officer in a live 19 session. (First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 40, 41.) 20 Applying the Mathews analysis to the foregoing facts, the Court concludes that 21 Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for a due process violation in this case. The first prong 22 in the Mathews analysis weighs against finding a due process violation. Mrs. Boustila’s lost 23 income (as the result of a five (5) day unpaid suspension) is relatively insignificant, 24 particularly when compared with the property interest that would be implicated in a 25 discharge. 26 The second prong of the Mathews analysis also weighs against Plaintiffs’ claim as 27 there was little risk of erroneous deprivation in light of the procedures used by Defendants. 28 Not only did Mrs. Boustila receive notice of the charges against her, an explanation of the -6- 1 District’s evidence, and an opportunity to present her side of the story, she was also given 2 the opportunity to submit a written response and opposition to the proposed discipline, to 3 present witness statements to refute the District’s allegations, to file a written appeal brief 4 with a designated Hearing Officer, and to meet with the Hearing Officer to present her 5 position, all of which occurred before any discipline was imposed. The minimal risk of 6 erroneous deprivation is evidenced by the fact that, through the procedures used, Plaintiff 7 was successful in persuading the District to dismiss certain alleged violations and to reduce 8 the suspension. 9 Finally, this Court finds that the property interest implicated here, which is minimal 10 at best, is outweighed by the District’s significant interest in expeditiously and efficiently 11 disciplining employees who occupy positions of great trust such as high school teachers. The 12 Court concludes, therefore, that under the Mathews balancing, even if Mrs. Boustila had a 13 protected property interest in her continued employment, she has failed to state a claim for 14 a violation of her due process rights. 15 On this point, the Court finds several cases to be instructive. For example, in Munno 16 v. Town of Orangetown, 391 F. Supp. 2d 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), the court dismissed an action 17 brought by a police officer who, like Plaintiff here, claimed that his suspension without pay 18 violated due process. The Court granted the town’s motion to dismiss, finding no deprivation 19 of due process where the plaintiff was informed of the charges against him prior to his 20 suspension, was provided with the details of his alleged misconduct and the applicable rules 21 and regulations, had engaged counsel and interposed answers to the allegations against him, 22 and had appeared with counsel at an internal affairs interview. 23 Similarly, in Garraghty v. Jordan, 830 F.2d 1295 (4th Cir. 1987), the Court, affirming 24 a directed verdict on a § 1983 claim, held that a deprivation caused by a short term 25 suspension did not violate due process where the employee was given an opportunity to 26 present his side of the story in an informal pre-deprivation hearing. The court rejected the 27 plaintiff’s arguments that the lack of pre-meeting notice deprived him of a meaningful 28 opportunity to respond to the charges against him and rejected the plaintiff’s argument that -7- 1 the lack of notice and the lack of a neutral decision-maker deprived him of due process. Like 2 Munno and Garraghty, this Court finds, given the allegations included in Plaintiffs’ 3 Complaint, there was no deprivation of due process here. 4 Plaintiff’s claim that she was not provided with the opportunity to review certain 5 privileged evidence or was not allowed to participate in an evidentiary hearing in which she 6 could call or cross-examine witnesses does not change this result. Plaintiff is not entitled to 7 perfect procedures or the procedures of her choice. See Bagentose v. D.C., 503 F. Supp. 2d 8 247, 257 (D.C. 2007). “‘The very nature of due process,’ the Supreme Court has repeatedly 9 held, ‘negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every 10 imaginable situation’ . . . Hence the Constitution does not require that all official 11 determinations be made only after a formal, judicial type hearing. . .Nor does it mandate a 12 specific set of procedures to govern even where formal hearings are necessary.” Id. (internal 13 quotations and citations omitted). 14 Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, the proceeding to which the employee is entitled 15 need not be a full evidentiary hearing with witnesses so long as the employee is given the 16 opportunity to answer the charges. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545. Indeed, the procedure 17 utilized by a public employer need not even approximate a trial-like proceeding. Id. This 18 Court is aware of no authority that would require a full adversarial evidentiary hearing under 19 the circumstances of this case, and the cases relied upon by Plaintiffs in this regard are 20 neither controlling nor persuasive. Notably, the cases relied upon by Plaintiffs to support 21 their assertion that Mrs. Boustila did not receive “due process” involve the termination of 22 employment rather than a short term suspension. Clearly, the property interest at stake in a 23 termination case is more significant and warrants more formal process than that which is due 24 here. 25 As Defendant correctly notes, “[T]he process to which the claimant might be due 26 [varies] depending upon the nature of the claimed property interest at issue.” (Reply 27 Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 5, Doc. # 9.) Given the five day 28 -8- 1 suspension that Plaintiff received, the process provided Plaintiff as stated in her own 2 Complaint was adequate and does not establish a due process violation under § 1983. 3 Finally, to the extent Plaintiffs now suggest that the discipline imposed by the District 4 would constitute a denial of due process no matter what procedures were followed if such 5 procedures were a sham or farce, Plaintiffs have not raised such allegations in their First 6 Amended Complaint. Moreover, the alleged facts included by Plaintiffs in that Complaint 7 are inconsistent with such a sham or farce theory in any event. Most notably among these 8 allegations is the fact that, through utilizing the very procedures that are at issue in this case, 9 Plaintiff was successful in persuading the District to dismiss certain alleged violations against 10 her and to reduce her suspension. See Early v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75, 79 11 (7th Cir. 1991)(A plaintiff may plead himself out of a cause of action by alleging facts 12 showing that he is not entitled to judgment.). 2. 13 RULE 8 PLEADING REQUIREMENTS 14 Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint fails to state a 15 claim against individual Defendant Dr. John Baracy. Specifically, Defendants assert that 16 Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to contain any substantive allegation regarding Dr. Baracy, i.e., 17 that he engaged in any acts or omissions that give rise to liability and, indeed, is devoid of 18 any reference to him at all other than listing him and his spouse as the first named individual 19 defendants. Defendants, therefore, argue that the pleading does not meet the bare minimal 20 requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In response, Plaintiffs assert that a proposed Second 21 Amended Complaint attached to their Response2 clarifies Plaintiffs’ allegations against the 22 Baracys and cures any defects with respect to those Defendants. The Court, however, need 23 not consider whether Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint or their proposed Second 24 25 26 27 28 2 Although Plaintiffs state that a copy of the proposed Second Amended Complaint was attached to their Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, no such proposed Second Amended Complaint was attached to that brief nor can one be located elsewhere in the record. It is not necessary for the Court to review that proposed pleading in any event, however, as the proposed pleading would not alter the Court’s decision in this matter. -9- 1 Amended Complaint satisfies the Rule 8 pleading requirements articulated in Twombly as the 2 Court finds that Plaintiff received sufficient process as a matter of law and will grant 3 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to all Defendants on that basis. 4 3. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND INSUFFICIENT SERVICE 5 Finding that Plaintiff received due process as a matter of law, the Court does not reach 6 the issue of whether the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and denies 7 that portion of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as moot and without prejudice. Similarly, the 8 Court will not consider the issue of insufficiency of service and also denies that portion of 9 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as moot and without prejudice. 10 Accordingly, 11 IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 2.). 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court notes that Defendants have requested 13 attorneys’ fees and costs; that request is denied without prejudice. Defendants may file an 14 appropriate motion and/or other document requesting fees and/or costs consistent with local 15 and federal rules. 16 DATED this 5th day of December, 2008. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 10 -
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