Urena v. Schindler Elevator Corporation et al, No. 3:2015cv00223 - Document 164 (D. Alaska 2019)
Court Description: ORDER denying without prejudice 103 Renewed Motion for Ruling as to Matters of Law Applying to Case - Res Ipsa Loquitor ; granting 110 Motion to Certify Questions of State Law to the Alaska Supreme Court; denying without prejudice 113 Motion for Ruling as to Matter of Law Applying to Case Common Carrier Standard of Care to Defendants. The court's order certifying the question to the Alaska Supreme Court will follow. Signed by Judge John W. Sedwick on 3/3/19. (GMM, CHAMBERS STAFF)
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Urena v. Schindler Elevator Corporation et al Doc. 164 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF ALASKA 6 7 8 ROBERTA URENA, 9 10 Plaintiff, vs. 11 12 SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORPORATION and COLUMBIA SUSSEX, 13 14 Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 3:15-CV-00223-JWS ORDER AND OPINION [Re: Motion at docket 103, 110, 113] 15 16 17 I. MOTIONS PRESENTED At docket 103, Plaintiff Roberta Urena (“Plaintiff”) requests that the court rule in 18 advance of trial that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to this case, which involves 19 injuries allegedly caused by an elevator malfunction, thereby lessening Plaintiff’s burden 20 on the showing of negligence. Schindler Elevator and Columbia Sussex (“Defendants”) 21 oppose the motion at docket 132. 22 23 24 At docket 113, Plaintiff asks the court to rule that a heightened “common carrier” standard of care applies to this case. Defendants oppose the motion at docket 130. At docket 110, Plaintiff requests that the court, if not inclined to rule in her favor 25 on the appropriate standard of care, certify these issues as ones appropriate for the 26 Alaska Supreme Court to answer. Defendants initially opposed Plaintiff’s request at 27 docket 136. 28 -1- Dockets.Justia.com II. BACKGROUND 1 This lawsuit arises out of an elevator malfunction that occurred on September 21, 2 3 2013, at the Hilton Hotel in downtown Anchorage. Plaintiff was the sole passenger in 4 the Hilton elevator when it made an unexpected safety stop. Plaintiff alleges that the 5 elevator plunged in a free fall for eight floors before coming to a stop. Plaintiff was 6 trapped in the elevator between the fifth and sixth floors and had to be extracted by the 7 Anchorage Fire Department. She alleges that she suffered injuries because of the fall. 8 Defendants acknowledge that there was an unexpected emergency stop but dispute 9 that the elevator did a free fall and dispute the distance the elevator dropped during the 10 stop. III. DISCUSSION 11 12 A. Res Ipsa Loquitur 13 “The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits, but does not compel, an inference of 14 negligence from the circumstances of an injury.”1 “The doctrine, where applicable, is a 15 bridge, dispensing with the requirement that a plaintiff specifically prove breach of duty, 16 once that duty and proximate cause have been established.”2 The doctrine should be 17 applied when: 18 19 20 (1) the accident is one which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) the agency or instrumentality is within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) the injurious condition or occurrence was not due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.3 21 This three-part inquiry helps determine whether the plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to 22 show that it is more probable than not that the injury resulted from the defendant’s 23 breach of duty. That is, “where several causes of an accident are equally probable, a 24 plaintiff may still avail himself of res ipsa loquitur by presenting evidence which tends to 25 26 1 27 2 28 3 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 788 P.2d 726, 730 (1990). Widmyer v. Se. Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 10 (Alaska 1978) (footnotes omitted). Id. at 11. -2- 1 eliminate all but those causes resulting from defendant’s negligence.”4 If the plaintiff 2 succeeds in doing so, an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant arises 3 and the defendant must present rebuttal evidence.5 “[T]he doctrine makes recovery 4 possible where circumstances render proof of the defendant's specific act of negligence 5 impracticable and the defendant is the party in the superior, if not the only, position to 6 determine the cause of an accident.”6 7 Plaintiff asserts that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is generally applicable in 8 cases involving elevator malfunctioning. She asserts that “elevators which are correctly 9 constructed, kept in repair, and adequately inspected normally do not fall,” and when 10 one does fall there is a reasonable inference of negligence.7 The doctrine of res ipsa 11 loquitur, however, “does not allow negligence to be established from the mere fact of 12 injury itself.”8 Rather, as discussed above, its application depends on the 13 circumstances surrounding an injury.9 At this juncture of the litigation, the 14 circumstances surrounding the elevator’s emergency stop are not beyond reasonable 15 dispute. That is, at this time, Plaintiff has not shown that her evidence will be sufficient 16 to instruct the jury on the issue of res ipsa loquitur. 17 Plaintiff asks that in lieu of ruling on the application of res ipsa loquitur to this 18 case, it certify the issue to the Alaska Supreme Court. She wants the state court to 19 weigh in on whether res ipsa loquitur automatically applied to cases involving an 20 elevator malfunction. However, the court concludes that certification is not warranted 21 22 4 Lynden Transp., Inc. v. Haragan, 623 P. 2d 789, 794 (Alaska 1981). 5 23 Id. at 794-95 (quoting Am. Elevator Co. v. Briscoe, 572 P.2d 534 (Nev. 1977)). 6 24 25 State Farm, 788 P.2d at 730. 7 Doc. 90 at p. 10. 26 8 27 9 28 Widmyer, 584 P.2d at 10. Id. at 13 (“While it is clear that [r]es ipsa loquitur is applicable in general to aviation cases, it is not necessarily applicable to every such case since the specific circumstances will vary.”). -3- 1 under Rule 407(a) of the Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure.10 An answer to the 2 question would not be determinative here, because, as noted above, even if the 3 doctrine may be generally applicable to malfunctioning elevator cases, it does not follow 4 that it would be applicable here since its application depends on the specific 5 circumstances of every case and whether Plaintiff’s evidence tends to “eliminate all but 6 those causes resulting from defendant’s negligence.” While there is no directly 7 controlling precedent related to elevator cases, there is sufficient Alaska Supreme Court 8 precedent explaining how the state court applies the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur so that 9 this court can “approximate state law as closely as possible” and predict how state court 10 would rule on this issue.11 11 B. 12 Common Carrier Plaintiff argues that the court should treat Defendants as “common carriers” 13 thereby subjecting them to a higher standard of care. She argues that the Alaska 14 Supreme Court has applied the heightened standard to airline operators. In doing so, 15 the Court reasoned that “a general duty of due care instruction is inadequate with 16 respect to common carriers transporting passengers for hire.”12 She argues that while 17 the Supreme Court has not articulated a test for determining whether a defendant is a 18 common carrier, elevators are akin to airplanes because passengers of each “are 19 completely at the mercy of the carrier and are entitled to assume that the highest 20 degree of care is being taken for their safety.”13 Given the similar vulnerabilities 21 22 23 24 10 Alaska R. App. P. 407(a) (“The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it by . . . a United States district court, . . . when requested by the certifying court if there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court of this state.”). 25 11 26 omitted). 27 12 28 13 Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation Widmyer, 584 P.2d at 5. Id. (discussing why airline passengers are owed a heightened duty of care). -4- 1 between an airline passenger and an elevator passenger, Plaintiff argues that Alaska 2 law would treat Defendants as common carriers. 3 Defendants argue that the Alaska Supreme Court has limited the common carrier 4 heightened standard of care to the context of an airline and its passengers and would 5 not extend its application any further. In support they cite State v. Johnson14 where the 6 Court noted that a heightened standard of care does not categorically apply to situations 7 where the plaintiff and defendant have a relationship that is comparable to an airline 8 and its passengers.15 They argue the appropriate standard under Alaska law is simply 9 that the defendant exercise the care that is reasonable and prudent under the 10 11 circumstances.16 Defendant also points to AS 05.20.010 in support of its argument. In that statute, 12 the state legislature declared that an owner or operator of ski equipment and devices, 13 as defined in AS 05.20.120, “is not considered a common carrier.”17 A “device” under 14 AS 05.20.120 includes those items “designed and operated for the conveyance or 15 movement of persons and that is used as a source of or aids in the promoting of 16 entertainment, pleasure, play, relaxation, or instruction including but not limited to ski 17 tows, roller coasters, merry-go-rounds, and Ferris wheels.”18 Defendants assert that 18 elevators are more akin to these ski “devices” than to airplanes and therefore the 19 common carrier standards should not apply to elevator cases. 20 The issue of common carrier liability for elevator owners has been decided in a 21 number of other states. As outlined by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in John 22 23 14 24 25 2 P.3d 56 (Alaska 2000). 15 Id. at 60 n.15 26 16 27 17 28 18 Id. 60. AS 05.20.010. AS 05.20.120. -5- 1 Hopkins Hospital v. Correia,19 21 states, including four states within the Ninth Circuit, 2 have concluded that elevator owners or operators are held to the standard of care of 3 common carriers, and 14 states, including three other states within the Ninth Circuit, 4 have held that elevator owners or operators are held to an ordinary care standard.20 5 In the absence of controlling precedent by the Alaska Supreme Court, this court 6 would normally attempt to predict how the Alaska Supreme Court would resolve the 7 issue based on related case law. However, it is difficult to approximate state law in this 8 instance given the Alaska Supreme Court’s existing case law on standards of care, the 9 legislature’s enactment of AS 05.20.010, and the split among other states. This 10 uncertainty, combined with the fact that the standard of care could be determinative, 11 leads the court to conclude that it is presented with a rare instance where certification of 12 the issue under Alaska Appellate Rule 407(a) is appropriate. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 13 motion to certify questions to the Alaska Supreme Court at docket 110 is granted as to 14 the common carrier issue. Plaintiff’s motion at docket 113 requesting that the common 15 carrier standard be applied here is denied without prejudice to renew pending the 16 Alaska Supreme Court’s certification decision. IV. CONCLUSION 17 18 Based on the preceding discussion, the motions at docket 103 and docket 113 19 are denied without prejudice. The motion at docket 110 is granted as to the common 20 carrier question. The court’s order certifying the question to the Alaska Supreme Court 21 will follow. 22 DATED this 3rd day of March 2019. 23 /s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK SENIOR JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 24 25 26 27 19 28 20 921 A.2d 837 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007). Id. at 841-44. -6-
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