Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA

Justia.com Opinion Summary: Following the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA promulgated a series of greenhouse gas-related rules: (1) an Endangerment Finding, in which the EPA determined that greenhouse gases may "reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare"; (2) the Tailpipe Rule, which set emission standards for cars and light trucks; and (3) the Timing and Tailoring Rules, in which the EPA determined that only the largest stationary sources would initially be subject to the requirements for major stationary sources of greenhouse gases to obtain construction and operating permits. Petitioners, various states and industry groups, challenged all these rules. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction all petitions for review of the Timing and Tailoring Rules and denied the remainder of the petitions, holding (1) the Endangerment Finding and Tailpipe Rule are neither arbitrary nor capricious; (2) EPA's interpretation of the governing Clean Air Act provisions is unambiguously correct; and (3) no Petitioner has standing to challenge the Timing and Tailoring Rules.

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The court issued a Revised version of this opinion on December 20, 2012
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United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued February 28 and 29, 2012 Decided June 26, 2012 No. 09-1322 COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL., INTERVENORS Consolidated with 10-1024, 10-1025, 10-1026, 10-1030, 10-1035, 10-1036, 10-1037, 10-1038, 10-1039, 10-1040, 10-1041, 10-1042, 10-1044, 10-1045, 10-1046, 10-1234, 10-1235, 10-1239, 10-1245, 10-1281, 10-1310, 10-1318, 10-1319, 10-1320, 10-1321 On Petitions for Review of Final Actions of the Environmental Protection Agency Patrick R. Day, Harry W. MacDougald, and Jeffrey Bossert Clark argued the causes for Non-State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors. With them on the briefs were John J. Burns, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of the State of Alaska, Steven E. Mulder, Chief Assistant Attorney 2 General, Peter Glaser, Mark E. Nagle, Matthew Dukes, Paul D. Phillips, John A. Bryson, Ellen Steen, Eric Groten, John P. Elwood, James A. Holtkamp, Chet M. Thompson, Robin S. Conrad, Rachel L. Brand, Sheldon Gilbert, Quentin Riegel, Jeffrey A. Rosen, Robert R. Gasaway, William H. Burgess, Sam Kazman, Hans Bader, Matthew G. Paulson, Harry Moy Ng, Michele Marie Schoeppe, Michael R. Barr, Alexandra M. Walsh, Adam J. White, Jeffrey A. Lamken, Timothy K. Webster, Roger R. Martella, Neal J. Cabral, Theodore Hadzi-Antich, Ashley C. Parrish, Cynthia A. M. Stroman, Scott C. Oostdyk, Gordon R. Alphonso, Shannon L. Goessling, Edward A. Kazmarek, F. William Brownell, Norman W. Fichthorn, Henry V. Nickel, and Allison D. Wood. Paul D. Clement, Mark W. DeLaquil, Andrew M. Grossman, and David B. Rivin, Jr. entered appearances. E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia, argued the cause for State Petitioners Texas and Virginia on Denial of Reconsideration of the Endangerment Finding and State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors on Endangerment Finding Delegation Issues. With him on the briefs were Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, Stephen R. McCullough, Senior Appellate Counsel, Charles E. James Jr., Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Wesley G. Russell, Jr., Deputy Attorney General. Greg Abbott, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas, Bill Cobb, Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation, J. Reed Clay, Jr., Special Assistant and Senior Counsel to the Attorney General, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Michael P. Murphy, Assistant Solicitor General, Luther Strange III, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama, Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the 3 State of Florida, Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Indiana, Jack Conway, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, James D. âBuddyâ Caldwell, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Michigan, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Neil D. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General, Gary C. Rikard, Jon Bruning, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Nebraska, Katherine J. Spohn, Special Counsel to the Attorney General, Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of North Dakota, Margaret Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Scott Pruitt, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of South Carolina, Marty Jackley, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the States of South Dakota, Roxanne Giedd, Chief, Civil Litigation Division, Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Utah, and Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia were on the briefs for State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors. Robert D. Tambling, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama, entered an appearance. Christian J. Ward, Scott A. Keller, and April L. Farris were on the brief for amici curiae Scientists in support of Petitioners. Derek Schmidt, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Kansas, and John Campbell, Chief Deputy Attorney General, were on the brief for amicus curiae State of Kansas in support of Petitioners. Martin R. Levin, Michael J. OâNeill, Donald M. Falk, Mark 4 S. Kaufman, Steven J. Lechner, and Richard P. Hutchison were on the brief for amici curiae Landmark Legal Foundation, et al. in support of Petitioners. Jon M. Lipshultz and Angeline Purdy, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the causes for respondent. With them on the brief were John Hannon, Carol Holmes, and Steven Silverman, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Attorneys. Thomas A. Lorenzen, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, entered an appearance. Carol Iancu, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, argued the cause for State and Environmental Intervenors in support of respondents. With her on the briefs were Martha Coakley, Attorney General, William L. Pardee, Attorney Assistant General, Sean H. Donahue, Howard I. Fox, David S. Baron, Megan Ceronsky, Vickie L. Patton, Peter Zalzal, Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of California, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Marc N. Melnick and Nicholas Stern, Deputy Attorneys General, Joseph R. Biden, III, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Delaware, Valerie M. Satterfield, Deputy Attorney General, George Jepsen, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Connecticut, Kimberly P. Massicotte, Matthew I. Levine, Scott N. Koschwitz, Assistant Attorneys General, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, Gerald T. Karr, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Iowa, David R. Sheridan, Assistant Attorney General, Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maryland, Mary E. Raivel, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Delaney, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State 5 of New Hampshire, K. Allen Brooks, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William J. Schneider, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maine, Gerald D. Reid, Assistant Attorney General, Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Minnesota, Jocelyn F. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Gary K. King, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Mexico, Stephen R. Farris, Assistant Attorney General, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New York, Michael J. Myers and Yueh-Ru Chu, Assistant Attorneys General, John Kroger, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Oregon, Paul Logan, Assistant Attorney-in-Charge, Robert M. McKenna, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Washington, Leslie R. Seffern, Assistant Attorney General, Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island, Gregory S. Schultz, Special Assistant Attorney General, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Vermont, Thea J. Schwartz, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher King, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Corporation Counsel for the City Of New York, Ann B. Weeks, Helen D. Silver, David Doniger, Meleah Geertsma, Morgan Butler, Frank W. Rambo, Joseph Mendelson III, Craig Holt Segall, and Joanne Spalding. Deborah Sivas, Douglas A. Ruley, Edward Lloyd, and Susan J. Kraham were on the brief for amici curiae America's Great Waters Coalition, et al. in support of respondent. James K. Thornton entered an appearance. _____ 6 No. 10-1073 COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT AMERICAN FROZEN FOOD INSTITUTE, ET AL., INTERVENORS Consolidated with 10-1083, 10-1099, 10-1109, 10-1110, 10-1114, 10-1118, 10-1119, 10-1120, 10-1122, 10-1123, 10-1124, 10-1125, 10-1126, 10-1127, 10-1128, 10-1129, 10-1131, 10-1132, 10-1145, 10-1147, 10-1148, 10-1199, 10-1200, 10-1201, 10-1202, 10-1203, 10-1206, 10-1207, 10-1208, 10-1210, 10-1211, 10-1212, 10-1213, 10-1216, 10-1218, 10-1219, 10-1220, 10-1221, 10-1222 On Petitions for Review of Final Agency Action of the Environmental Protection Agency Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas, argued the cause for State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenor. With him on the briefs were Gregg Abbott, Attorney General, Bill Cobb, Deputy Attorney General, J. Reed Clay, Jr., Special Assistant and Senior Counsel to the Attorney General, Michael P. Murphy and 7 James P. Sullivan, Assistant Solicitors General, Luther Strange, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama, Herman Robinson, Donald Trahan, Kathy M. Wright, Gary C. Rikard, John Bruning, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Nebraska, Katherine J. Spohn, Special Counsel, Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of North Dakota, Margaret Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of South Carolina, J. Emory Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Marty Jackley, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of South Dakota, Roxanne Giedd, Chief, and Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia. Mark W. DeLaquil, Earle D. Getchell, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia, Andrew M. Grossman, David B. Rivkin, Jr., and Robert D. Tambling, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama, entered appearances. F. William Brownell and Peter Keisler argued the causes for Non-State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors. With them on the briefs were Norman W. Fichthorn, Henry V. Nickel, Allison D. Wood, Charles H. Knauss, Shannon S. Broome, Timothy K. Webster, Roger R. Martella, Eric Groten, Patrick R. Day, John A. Bryson, Matthew G. Paulson, John P. Elwood, Paul D. Phillips, James A. Holtkamp, Shannon L. Goessling, Harry W. MacDougald, William H. Lewis, Jr., Ronald J. Tenpas, Gordon R. Alphonso, Edward A. Kazmarek, Chet M. Thompson, Neal J. Cabral, Scott C. Oostdyk, Richard P. Hutchison, John J. McMackin, Jr., Robin S. Conrad, Sheldon Gilbert, Michael W. Steinberg, Levi McAllister, Jeffrey A. Rosen, Robert R. Gasaway, Jeffrey Bossert Clark, William H. Burgess, Ashley C. Parrish, Cynthia A.M. Stroman, Ellen Steen, 8 Leslie Sue Ritts, Peter Glaser, Mark E. Nagle, Terry J. Satterlee, Thomas J. Grever, Margaret Claiborne Campbell, Bryon W. Kirkpatrick, Quentin Riegel, Elizabeth Gaudio, Elizabeth Henry Warner, Harry Moy Ng, Michele Marie Schoeppe, Thomas J. Ward, and Peter H. Wyckoff. Mark A. Behrens, Paul D. Clement, Matthew Dukes, Virginia L. Hudson, and David B. Salmons entered appearances. Jonathan S. Massey was on the brief for amicus curiae Municipal Gas Commission of Missouri. John G. Horne, II, Samuel B. Boxerman and Leslie A. Hulse were on the brief for amici curiae the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the American Chemistry Council in support of petitioners. Angus Macbeth entered an appearance. Amanda Shafer Berman and Perry M Rosen, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the causes for respondents. With them on the briefs were Howard Hoffman, Elliott Zenick, Brian Doster, and David Orlin, Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Thomas A. Lorenzen and Kim N. Smaczniak, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, and John D. Gunter, II and Michele L. Walter, Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, entered appearances. Sean H. Donahue and Michael J. Myers argued the causes for State and Environmental Intervenors in support of respondents. With them on the briefs were Vickie L. Patton, Pamela A. Campos, Megan Ceronsky, Petere Zalzal, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New York, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Morgan A. Costello, Assistant Attorney General, Monica Wagner, Howard I. Fox, David S. Baron, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, Gerald T. Karr, Assistant Attorney General, Joanne 9 Spalding, Nathan Matthews, Craig Holt Segall, Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of California, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan Durbin, Raissa Lerner, Marc N. Melnick, and Nicholas Stern, Deputy Attorneys General, Martha Coakley, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, William L. Pardee and Carol Iancu, Assistant Attorneys General, David Doniger, Meleah Geertsma, William J. Schneider, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maine, Gerald D. Ried, Assistant Attorney General, Ann B. Weeks, Helen D. Silver, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Iowa, David R. Sheridan, Assistant Attorney General, Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maryland, Mary Raivel, Deputy Attorney General, Michael A. Delaney, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Hampshire, K. Allen Brooks, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Barbara Baird, William B.Wong, Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island, Gregory S. Schultz, Special Assistant Attorney General, Frank Rambo, Morgan Butler, Gary K. King, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Mexico, Stephen Farris, Assistant Attorney General, John Kroger, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Oregon, Paul Logan, Assistant Attorney-inCharge, Roy Cooper, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of North Carolina, and J. Allen Jernigan and Marc Bernstein, Special Deputy Attorneys General. Kenneth P. Alex and Gavin G. McCabe, Deputy Assistant Attorneys General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of California, entered appearances. 10 No. 10-1092 COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT LANGBOARD, INC. - MDF, ET AL., INTERVENORS Consolidated with 10-1094, 10-1134, 10-1143, 10-1144, 10-1152, 10-1156, 10-1158, 10-1159, 10-1160, 10-1161, 10-1162, 10-1163, 10-1164, 10-1166, 10-1182 On Petitions for Review of Final Actions of the Environmental Protection Agency Peter Glaser argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were John P. Elwood, Eric Groten, Patrick R. Day, John A. Bryson, Shannon L. Goessling, Harry W. MacDougald, Paul D. Phillips, James A. Holtkamp, Edward A. Kazmarek, Chet M. Thompson, Sam Kazman, Hans Bader, Gordon R. Alphonso, Richard P. Hutchison, Neal J. Cabral, Scott C. Oostdyk, Ronald J. Tenpas, Michael W. Steinberg, Levi McAllister, John J. McMackin Jr., Robin S. Conrad, Rachel L. Brand, Sheldon Gilbert, F. William Brownell, Norman W. Fichthorn, Henry V. Nickel, Allison D. Wood, Ashley C. Parrish, Cynthia A.M. Stroman, Mark E. Nagle, Michael Higgins, Ellen 11 Steen, Timothy K. Webster, Roger R. Martella, Matthew G. Paulson, Charles H. Knauss, Shannon S. Broome, Quentin Riegel, Elizabeth Gaudio, Thomas J. Ward, Harry Moy Ng, and Michele Marie Schoeppe. Greg Abbott, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas, Bill Cobb, Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, J. Reed Clay Jr., Special Assistant and Senior Counsel to the Attorney General, Michael P. Murphy, Assistant Solicitor General, Luther Strange, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Georgia, John E. Hennelly, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Gary C. Rikard, Jon C. Bruning, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Nebraska, Katherine J. Spohn, Special Counsel to the Attorney General, Wayne K. Stenehjem, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of North Dakota, Margaret Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of South Carolina, J. Emory Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Marty Jackley, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of North Dakota, Roxanne Giedd, Chief, Civil Litigation Division, and Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia, were on the briefs for State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenor. Paul D. Clement, James W. Coleman, Wayne J. D'Angelo, Mark W. DeLaquil, E. Duncan Getchell Jr., Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia, Andrew M. Grossman, Virginia L. Hudson, David B. Rivkin Jr., and Robert D. Tambling, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama, entered appearances. 12 Samuel B. Boxerman and Leslie A. Hulse were on the brief for amicus curiae American Chemistry Council in support of petitioners. Angus Macbeth entered an appearance. Eric G. Hostetler, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John Hannon and Steven Silverman, Attorneys, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Raymond B. Ludwiszewski argued the cause for intervenors Association of Global Automakers, et al. With him on the brief were Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sanford I. Weisburst, and William B. Adams. Gavin G. McCabe, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of California, argued the cause for intervenor State of California. On the brief were Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Marc N. Melnick and Nicholas Stern, Deputy Attorneys General, Sean H. Donahue, Howard I. Fox, David S. Baron, Pamela Campos, Megan Ceronsky, Vickie L. Patton, Peter Zalzal, Joseph R. Biden, III, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Delaware, Valerie M. Satterfield, Deputy Attorney General, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Iowa, David R. Sheridan, Assistant Attorney General, Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maryland, Roberta R. James, Assistant Attorney General, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, Gerald T. Karr, Assistant Attorney General, William T. Schneider, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maine, Gerald D. Reid, Assistant Attorney General, Martha Coakley, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the 13 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Carol Iancu, Tracy Triplett, and William L. Pardee, Assistant Attorneys General, Gary K. King, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Mexico, Stephen R. Farris, Assistant Attorney General, John Kroger, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Oregon, Paul Logan, Assistant Attorney-in-Charge, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Vermont, Thea J. Schwartz, Assistant Attorney General, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New York, Michael J. Myers and Yueh-Ru Chu, Assistant Attorneys General, Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island, Gregory S. Schultz, Special Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. McKenna, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Washington, Leslie R. Seffern, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher King, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, Joanne Spalding, Craig Holt Segall, David Doniger and Meleah Geertsma. Judith A. Stahl Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Mexico, and John D. Walke entered appearances. Richard E. Ayres, Jessica L. Olson, and Kristin L. Hines were on the brief for amicus curiae Honeywell International, Inc. in support of respondents. Richard L. Revesz, Michael A. Livermore, and Jennifer S. Rosenberg were on the brief for amicus curiae Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law in support of respondents. 14 No. 10-1167 AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, PETITIONER v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND LISA PEREZ JACKSON, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENTS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., INTERVENORS Consolidated with 10-1168, 10-1169, 10-1170, 10-1173, 10-1174, 10-1175, 10-1176, 10-1177, 10-1178, 10-1179, 10-1180 On Petitions for Review of a Final Action of the Environmental Protection Agency Timothy K. Webster, Roger R. Martella, Jr., James W. Coleman, William H. Lewis, Jr., Ronald J. Tenpas, Charles H. Knauss, Shannon S. Broome, Bryan M. Killian, and Matthew G. Paulson were on the briefs for petitioners. Peter D. Keisler, Leslie A. Hulse, and Quentin Riegel entered appearances. 15 Amanda Shafer Berman and Perry M. Rosen, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, and Elliott Zenick and Howard J. Hoffman, Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, were on the brief for respondents. Jon M. Lipshultz, Senior Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, entered and appearance. Ann Brewster Weeks, Sean H. Donahue, Vickie Patton, Peter Zalzal, Joanne Spalding, Craig Segall, David Doniger, and Meleah Geertsma were on the brief of intervenors in support of respondents. David S. Baron, Pamela A. Campos, Colin C. OâBrien, and John D. Walke entered appearances. Vera P. Pardee, Brendan R. Cummings, and Kevin P. Bundy were on the brief for amicus curiae Center for Biological Diversity in support of respondents. Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge; ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM. PER CURIAM: Following the Supreme Courtâs decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)âwhich clarified that greenhouse gases are an âair pollutantâ subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act (CAA)âthe Environmental Protection Agency promulgated a series of greenhouse gas-related rules. First, EPA issued an Endangerment Finding, in which it determined that greenhouse gases may âreasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.â See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). Next, it issued the Tailpipe Rule, which set emission standards for cars and light trucks. Finally, EPA determined that the CAA requires major stationary sources of greenhouse gases to obtain construction and operating permits. But because immediate regulation of all such sources would result in overwhelming permitting burdens on permitting 16 authorities and sources, EPA issued the Timing and Tailoring Rules, in which it determined that only the largest stationary sources would initially be subject to permitting requirements. Petitioners, various states and industry groups, challenge all these rules, arguing that they are based on improper constructions of the CAA and are otherwise arbitrary and capricious. But for the reasons set forth below, we conclude: 1) the Endangerment Finding and Tailpipe Rule are neither arbitrary nor capricious; 2) EPAâs interpretation of the governing CAA provisions is unambiguously correct; and 3) no petitioner has standing to challenge the Timing and Tailoring Rules. We thus dismiss for lack of jurisdiction all petitions for review of the Timing and Tailoring Rules, and deny the remainder of the petitions. I. We begin with a brief primer on greenhouse gases. As their name suggests, when released into the atmosphere, these gases act âlike the ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of reflected heat.â Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505. A wide variety of modern human activities result in greenhouse gas emissions; cars, power plants, and industrial sites all release significant amounts of these heattrapping gases. In recent decades â[a] well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of [greenhouse gases] in the atmosphere.â Id. at 504-05. Many scientists believe that mankindâs greenhouse gas emissions are driving this climate change. These scientists predict that global climate change will cause a host of deleterious consequences, including drought, increasingly severe weather events, and rising sea levels. The genesis of this litigation came in 2007, when the 17 Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA that greenhouse gases âunambiguous[ly]â may be regulated as an âair pollutantâ under the Clean Air Act (âCAAâ). Id. at 529. Squarely rejecting the contentionâthen advanced by EPAâthat âgreenhouse gases cannot be âair pollutantsâ within the meaning of the Act,â id. at 513, the Court held that the CAAâs definition of âair pollutantâ âembraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe.â Id. at 529 (emphasis added). Moreover, because the CAA requires EPA to establish motor-vehicle emission standards for âany air pollutant . . . which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,â 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (emphasis added), the Court held that EPA had a âstatutory obligationâ to regulate harmful greenhouse gases. Id. at 534. âUnder the clear terms of the Clean Air Act,â the Court concluded, âEPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.â Id. at 533. The Court thus directed EPA to determine âwhether sufficient information exists to make an endangerment findingâ for greenhouse gases. Id. at 534. Massachusetts v. EPA spurred a cascading series of greenhouse gas-related rules and regulations. First, in direct response to the Supreme Courtâs directive, EPA issued an Endangerment Finding for greenhouse gases. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (âEndangerment Findingâ), 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). The Endangerment Finding defined as a single âair pollutantâ an âaggregate group of six long-lived and directly-emitted greenhouse gasesâ that are âwell mixedâ together in the atmosphere and cause global climate change: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflourocarbons, perflourocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. Id. at 66,536-37. Following âcommon practice,â EPA measured 18 the impact of these gases on a âcarbon dioxide equivalent basis,â (CO2e) which is based on the gasesâ âwarming effect relative to carbon dioxide . . . over a specified timeframe.â Id. at 66,519. (Using the carbon dioxide equivalent equation, for example, a mixture of X amount of nitrous oxide and Y amount of sulfur hexafluoride is expressed as Z amount of CO2e). After compiling and considering a considerable body of scientific evidence, EPA concluded that motor-vehicle emissions of these six well-mixed gases âcontribute to the total greenhouse gas air pollution, and thus to the climate change problem, which is reasonably anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.â Id. at 66,499. Next, and pursuant to the CAAâs requirement that EPA establish motor-vehicle emission standards for âany air pollutant . . . which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,â 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), the agency promulgated its Tailpipe Rule for greenhouse gases. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule (âTailpipe Ruleâ), 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010). Effective January 2, 2011, the Tailpipe Rule set greenhouse gas emission standards for cars and light trucks as part of a joint rulemaking with fuel economy standards issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Id. at 25,326. Under EPAâs longstanding interpretation of the CAA, the Tailpipe Rule automatically triggered regulation of stationary greenhouse gas emitters under two separate sections of the Act. The first, the Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality (PSD) program, requires state-issued construction permits for certain types of stationary sourcesâfor example, iron and steel mill plantsâif they have the potential to emit over 100 tons per year (tpy) of âany air pollutant.â See 42 U.S.C. § 7475; 7479(1). All other stationary sources are subject to PSD 19 permitting if they have the potential to emit over 250 tpy of âany air pollutant.â Id. § 7479(1). The second provision, Title V, requires state-issued operating permits for stationary sources that have the potential to emit at least 100 tpy of âany air pollutant.â Id. § 7602(j). EPA has long interpreted the phrase âany air pollutantâ in both these provisions to mean any air pollutant that is regulated under the CAA. See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans (â1980 Implementation Plan Requirementsâ), 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,711 (Aug. 7, 1980) (PSD program); Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule (âTailoring Ruleâ), 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,553-54 (June 3, 2010) (discussing history of Title V regulation and applicability). And once the Tailpipe Rule set motor-vehicle emission standards for greenhouse gases, they became a regulated pollutant under the Act, requiring PSD and Title V greenhouse permitting. Acting pursuant to this longstanding interpretation of the PSD and Title V programs, EPA issued two rules phasing in stationary source greenhouse gas regulation. First, in the Timing Rule, EPA concluded that an air pollutant becomes âsubject to regulationâ under the Clean Air Actâand thus subject to PSD and Title V permittingâonly once a regulation requiring control of that pollutant takes effect. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs (âTiming Ruleâ), 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010). Therefore, EPA concluded, major stationary emitters of greenhouse gases would be subject to PSD and Title V permitting regulations on January 2, 2011âthe date on which the Tailpipe Rule became effective, and thus, the date when greenhouse gases first became regulated under the CAA. Id. at 17,019. 20 Next, EPA promulgated the Tailoring Rule. In the Tailoring Rule, EPA noted that greenhouse gases are emitted in far greater volumes than other pollutants. Indeed, millions of industrial, residential, and commercial sources exceed the 100/250 tpy statutory emissions threshold for CO2e. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,534-36. Immediately adding these sources to the PSD and Title V programs would, EPA predicted, result in tremendous costs to industry and state permitting authorities. See id. As a result, EPA announced that it was ârelieving overwhelming permitting burdens that would, in the absence of this rule, fall on permitting authorities and sources.â Id. at 31,516. Departing from the CAAâs 100/250 tpy emissions threshold, the Tailoring Rule provided that only the largest sourcesâthose exceeding 75,000 or 100,000 tpy CO2e, depending on the program and projectâwould initially be subject to greenhouse gas permitting. Id. at 31,523. (The Tailoring Rule further provided that regulated sources must also emit greenhouse gases at levels that exceed the 100/250 tpy emissions threshold on a mass basis. That is, they must emit over 100/250 tpy of actual pollutants, in addition to exceeding the 75,000/100,000 tpy carbon dioxide equivalent. Id. at 31,523.) A number of groupsâincluding states and regulated industriesâfiled petitions for review of EPAâs greenhouse gas regulations, contending that the agency misconstrued the CAA and otherwise acted arbitrarily and capriciously. This appeal consolidates the petitions for review of the four aforementioned rules: the Endangerment Finding, the Tailpipe Rule, the Timing Rule, and the Tailoring Rule. âThe Clean Air Act empowers us to reverse the Administratorâs action in rulemaking if it is âarbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.ââ Med. Waste Inst. & Energy Recovery 21 Council v. EPA, 645 F.3d 420, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A)). Questions of statutory interpretation are governed by the familiar Chevron two-step: âFirst . . . if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.â Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). But âif the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agencyâs answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.â Id. at 843. This opinion proceeds in several steps. Part II explains why the Endangerment Finding was neither arbitrary nor capricious, while Part III does the same for the Tailpipe Rule. Turning to stationary source regulation, Part IV examines whether any petitioners may timely challenge EPAâs longstanding interpretation of the PSD statute. Because we conclude that they may, Part V addresses the merits of their statutory arguments, and explains why EPAâs interpretation of the CAA was compelled by the statute. Next, Part VI explains why petitioners lack standing to challenge the Timing and Tailoring Rules themselves. Finally, Part VII disposes of several arguments that have nothing to do with the rules under review, and thus are not properly before us. II. We turn first to State and Industry Petitionersâ challenges to the Endangerment Finding, the first of the series of rules EPA issued after the Supreme Court remanded Massachusetts v. EPA. In the decision ordering the remand, the Supreme Court held that EPA had failed in its statutory obligations when it âoffered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change.â 22 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534. On remand, EPA compiled a substantial scientific record, which is before us in the present review, and determined that âgreenhouse gases in the atmosphere may reasonably be anticipated both to endanger public health and to endanger public welfare.â Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,497. EPA went on to find that motor-vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases âcontribute to the total greenhouse gas air pollution, and thus to the climate change problem, which is reasonably anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.â Id. at 66,499. State and Industry Petitioners challenge several aspects of EPAâs decision, including (1) EPAâs interpretation of CAA § 202(a)(1), which sets out the endangerment-finding standard; (2) the adequacy of the scientific record supporting the Endangerment Finding; (3) EPAâs decision not to âquantifyâ the risk of endangerment to public health or welfare created by climate change; (4) EPAâs choice to define the âair pollutantâ at issue as an aggregate of six greenhouse gases; (5) EPAâs failure to consult its Science Advisory Board before issuing the Endangerment Finding; and (6) EPAâs denial of all petitions for reconsideration of the Endangerment Finding. We ultimately conclude that the Endangerment Finding is consistent with Massachusetts v. EPA and the text and structure of the CAA, and is adequately supported by the administrative record. A. Industry Petitioners contend that EPA improperly interpreted CAA § 202(a)(1) as restricting the Endangerment Finding to a science-based judgment devoid of considerations of policy concerns and regulatory consequences. They assert that CAA § 202(a)(1) requires EPA to consider, e.g., the benefits of activities that require greenhouse gas emissions, the effectiveness of emissions regulation triggered by the 23 Endangerment Finding, and the potential for societal adaptation to or mitigation of climate change. They maintain that eschewing those considerations also made the Endangerment Finding arbitrary and capricious. These contentions are foreclosed by the language of the statute and the Supreme Courtâs decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. Section 202(a) of the CAA states in relevant part that EPAâs Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). This language requires that the endangerment evaluation ârelate to whether an air pollutant âcause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.ââ Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532â33. At bottom, § 202(a)(1) requires EPA to answer only two questions: whether particular âair pollutionââhere, greenhouse gasesââmay reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,â and whether motor-vehicle emissions âcause, or contribute toâ that endangerment. These questions require a âscientific judgmentâ about the potential risks greenhouse gas emissions pose to public health or welfareânot policy discussions. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court rebuffed an attempt by EPA itself to inject considerations of 24 policy into its decision. At the time, EPA had âoffered a laundry list of reasons not to regulateâ greenhouse gases, including that a number of voluntary Executive Branch programs already provide an effective response to the threat of global warming, that regulating greenhouse gases might impair the Presidentâs ability to negotiate with âkey developing nationsâ to reduce emissions, and that curtailing motor-vehicle emissions would reflect âan inefficient, piecemeal approach to address the climate change issue.â Id. at 533 (citations omitted). The Court noted that âthese policy judgments . . . have nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change. Still less do they amount to a reasoned justification for declining to form a scientific judgment.â Id. at 533â34. In the Courtâs view, EPAâs policybased explanations contained âno reasoned explanation for [EPAâs] refusal to decideâ the key part of the endangerment inquiry: âwhether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change.â Id. at 534. As in Massachusetts v. EPA, a âlaundry list of reasons not to regulateâ simply has ânothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change.â Id. at 533â34. The additional exercises State and Industry Petitioners would have EPA undertakeâe.g., performing a cost-benefit analysis for greenhouse gases, gauging the effectiveness of whatever emission standards EPA would enact to limit greenhouse gases, and predicting societyâs adaptive response to the dangers or harms caused by climate changeâdo not inform the âscientific judgmentâ that § 202(a)(1) requires of EPA. Instead of focusing on the question whether greenhouse gas emissions may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, the factors State and Industry Petitioners put forth only address 25 what might happen were EPA to answer that question in the affirmative. As EPA stated in the Endangerment Finding, such inquiries âmuddle the rather straightforward scientific judgment about whether there may be endangerment by throwing the potential impact of responding to the danger into the initial question.â 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,515. To be sure, the subsection following § 202(a)(1), § 202(a)(2), requires that EPA address limited questions about the cost of compliance with new emission standards and the availability of technology for meeting those standards, see infra Part III, but these judgments are not part of the § 202(a)(1) endangerment inquiry. The Supreme Court made clear in Massachusetts v. EPA that it was not addressing the question âwhether policy concerns can inform EPAâs actions in the event that it makes such a finding,â 549 U.S. at 534â35, but that policy concerns were not part of the calculus for the determination of the endangerment finding in the first instance. The Supreme Court emphasized that it was holding âthat EPA must ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute.â Id. at 535. The statute speaks in terms of endangerment, not in terms of policy, and EPA has complied with the statute. State and Industry Petitioners insist that because statutes should be interpreted to avoid absurd results, EPA should have considered at least the âabsurdâ consequences that would follow from an endangerment finding for greenhouse gases. Specifically: having made an endangerment finding, EPA will proceed to promulgate emission standards under § 202(a)(1). Issuing those standards triggers regulationâunder EPAâs PSD and Title V programsâof stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases at levels above longstanding statutory thresholds. Because greenhouse gases are emitted in much higher volumes than other air pollutants, hundreds of thousands of small stationary sources would exceed those thresholds. This would subject those sources to PSD and Title V permitting 26 requirements despite what Petitioners claim was Congressâs clear intent that the requirements apply only to large industrial sources. Petitioners assert that even EPA believed such overbroad regulation to be an absurd result, which it attempted to rectify by adopting the Tailoring Rule to raise the statutory thresholds, see infra Part VI. However âabsurdâ Petitioners consider this consequence, though, it is still irrelevant to the endangerment inquiry. That EPA adjusted the statutory thresholds to accommodate regulation of greenhouse gases emitted by stationary sources may indicate that the CAA is a regulatory scheme less-thanperfectly tailored to dealing with greenhouse gases. But the Supreme Court has already held that EPA indeed wields the authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA. See Massachusetts v. EPA. The plain language of § 202(a)(1) of that Act does not leave room for EPA to consider as part of the endangerment inquiry the stationary-source regulation triggered by an endangerment finding, even if the degree of regulation triggered might at a later stage be characterized as âabsurd.â B. State and Industry Petitioners next challenge the adequacy of the scientific record underlying the Endangerment Finding, objecting to both the type of evidence upon which EPA relied and EPAâs decision to make an Endangerment Finding in light of what Industry Petitioners view as significant scientific uncertainty. Neither objection has merit. 1. As an initial matter, State and Industry Petitioners question EPAâs reliance on âmajor assessmentsâ addressing greenhouse gases and climate change issued by the Intergovernmental Panel 27 on Climate Change (IPCC), the U.S. Global Climate Research Program (USGCRP), and the National Research Council (NRC). Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,510â11. These peerreviewed assessments synthesized thousands of individual studies on various aspects of greenhouse gases and climate change and drew âoverarching conclusionsâ about the state of the science in this field. Id. at 66,511. The assessments provide data and information on, inter alia, âthe amount of greenhouse gases being emitted by human activitiesâ; their continued accumulation in the atmosphere; the resulting observed changes to Earthâs energy balance, temperature and climate at global and regional levels, and other âclimate-sensitive sectors and systems of the human and natural environmentâ; the extent to which these changes âcan be attributed to human-induced buildup of atmospheric greenhouse gasesâ; âfuture projected climate changeâ; and âprojected risks and impacts to human health, society and the environment.âId. at 66,510â11. State and Industry Petitioners assert that EPA improperly âdelegatedâ its judgment to the IPCC, USGCRP, and NRC by relying on these assessments of climate-change science. See U.S. Telecom Assân v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2004). This argument is little more than a semantic trick. EPA did not delegate, explicitly or otherwise, any decision-making to any of those entities. EPA simply did here what it and other decisionmakers often must do to make a science-based judgment: it sought out and reviewed existing scientific evidence to determine whether a particular finding was warranted. It makes no difference that much of the scientific evidence in large part consisted of âsynthesesâ of individual studies and research. Even individual studies and research papers often synthesize past work in an area and then build upon it. This is how science works. EPA is not required to re-prove the existence of the atom every time it approaches a scientific question. 28 Moreover, it appears from the record that EPA used the assessment reports not as substitutes for its own judgment but as evidence upon which it relied to make that judgment. EPA evaluated the processes used to develop the various assessment reports, reviewed their contents, and considered the depth of the scientific consensus the reports represented. Based on these evaluations, EPA determined the assessments represented the best source material to use in deciding whether greenhouse gas emissions may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,510â11. It then reviewed those reports along with comments relevant to the scientific considerations involved to determine whether the evidence warranted an endangerment finding for greenhouse gases as it was required to do under the Supreme Courtâs mandate in Massachusetts v. EPA. 2. Industry Petitioners also assert that the scientific evidence does not adequately support the Endangerment Finding. As we have stated before in reviewing the science-based decisions of agencies such as EPA, â[a]lthough we perform a searching and careful inquiry into the facts underlying the agencyâs decisions, we will presume the validity of agency action as long as a rational basis for it is presented.â Am. Farm Bureau Fedân v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In so doing, âwe give an extreme degree of deference to the agency when it is evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise.â Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The body of scientific evidence marshaled by EPA in support of the Endangerment Finding is substantial. EPAâs scientific evidence of record included support for the proposition 29 that greenhouse gases trap heat on earth that would otherwise dissipate into space; that this âgreenhouse effectâ warms the climate; that human activity is contributing to increased atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases; and that the climate system is warming. Based on this scientific record, EPA made the linchpin finding: in its judgment, the âroot causeâ of the recently observed climate change is âvery likelyâ the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,518. EPA found support for this finding in three lines of evidence. First, it drew upon our âbasic physical understandingâ of the impacts of various natural and manmade changes on the climate system. For instance, EPA relied on evidence that the past half-century of warming has occurred at a time when natural forces such as solar and volcanic activity likely would have produced cooling. Endangerment Finding, Response to Comments (RTC) Vol. 3, at 20. Other evidence supports EPAâs conclusion that the observed warming patternâwarming of the bottommost layer of the atmosphere and cooling immediately above itâis consistent with greenhouse-gas causation. Id. EPA further relied upon evidence of historical estimates of past climate change, supporting EPAâs conclusion that global temperatures over the last half-century are unusual. Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,518. Scientific studies upon which EPA relied place high confidence in the assertion that global mean surface temperatures over the last few decades are higher than at any time in the last four centuries. Technical Support Document for the Endangerment Finding (TSD), at 31. These studies also show, albeit with significant uncertainty, that temperatures at many individual locations were higher over the last twenty-five years than during any period of comparable length since 900 A.D. Id. 30 For its third line of evidence that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases spurred the perceived warming trend, EPA turned to computer-based climate-model simulations. Scientists have used global climate models built on basic principles of physics and scientific knowledge about the climate to try to simulate the recent climate change. These models have only been able to replicate the observed warming by including anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases in the simulations. Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,523. To recap, EPA had before it substantial record evidence that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases âvery likelyâ caused warming of the climate over the last several decades. EPA further had evidence of current and future effects of this warming on public health and welfare. Relying again upon substantial scientific evidence, EPA determined that anthropogenically induced climate change threatens both public health and public welfare. It found that extreme weather events, changes in air quality, increases in food- and water-borne pathogens, and increases in temperatures are likely to have adverse health effects. Id. at 66,497â98. The record also supports EPAâs conclusion that climate change endangers human welfare by creating risk to food production and agriculture, forestry, energy, infrastructure, ecosystems, and wildlife. Substantial evidence further supported EPAâs conclusion that the warming resulting from the greenhouse gas emissions could be expected to create risks to water resources and in general to coastal areas as a result of expected increase in sea level. Id. at 66,498. Finally, EPA determined from substantial evidence that motor-vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases contribute to climate change and thus to the endangerment of public health and welfare. Industry Petitioners do not find fault with much of the substantial record EPA amassed in support of the Endangerment 31 Finding. Rather, they contend that the record evidences too much uncertainty to support that judgment. But the existence of some uncertainty does not, without more, warrant invalidation of an endangerment finding. If a statute is âprecautionary in natureâ and âdesigned to protect the public health,â and the relevant evidence is âdifficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge,â EPA need not provide ârigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effectâ to support an endangerment finding. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976). As we have stated before, âAwaiting certainty will often allow for only reactive, not preventive, regulation.â Id. at 25. Congress did not restrict EPA to remedial regulation when it enacted CAA § 202(a). That section mandates that EPA promulgate new emission standards if it determines that the air pollution at issue âmay reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.â 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). This language requires a precautionary, forward-looking scientific judgment about the risks of a particular air pollutant, consistent with the CAAâs âprecautionary and preventive orientation.â Lead Indus. Assân, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Requiring that EPA find âcertainâ endangerment of public health or welfare before regulating greenhouse gases would effectively prevent EPA from doing the job Congress gave it in § 202(a)âutilizing emission standards to prevent reasonably anticipated endangerment from maturing into concrete harm. Cf. id. (â[R]equiring EPA to wait until it can conclusively demonstrate that a particular effect is adverse to health before it acts is inconsistent with both the [CAA]âs precautionary and preventive orientation and the nature of the Administrator's statutory responsibilities. Congress provided that the Administrator is to use his judgment in setting air quality standards precisely to permit him to act in the face of uncertainty.â). 32 In Massachusetts v. EPA the Supreme Court confirmed that EPA may make an endangerment finding despite lingering scientific uncertainty. Indeed, the Court held that the existence of âsome residual uncertaintyâ did not excuse EPAâs decision to decline to regulate greenhouse gases. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534. To avoid regulating emissions of greenhouse gases, EPA would need to show âscientific uncertainty . . . so profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming.â Id. Clearly, then, EPA may issue an endangerment finding even while the scientific record still contains at least âsome residual uncertainty.â Industry Petitioners have shown no more than that. In the end, Petitioners are asking us to re-weigh the scientific evidence before EPA and reach our own conclusion. This is not our role. As with other reviews of administrative proceedings, we do not determine the convincing force of evidence, nor the conclusion it should support, but only whether the conclusion reached by EPA is supported by substantial evidence when considered on the record as a whole. See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2005). When EPA evaluates scientific evidence in its bailiwick, we ask only that it take the scientific record into account âin a rational manner.â Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Industry Petitioners have not shown that EPA failed to do so here. C. State Petitioners, here led by Texas, contend that the Endangerment Finding is arbitrary and capricious because EPA did not âdefine,â âmeasure,â or âquantifyâ either the atmospheric concentration at which greenhouse gases endanger public health or welfare, the rate or type of climate change that it anticipates will endanger public health or welfare, or the risks 33 or impacts of climate change. According to Texas, without defining these thresholds and distinguishing âsafeâ climate change from climate change that endangers, EPAâs Endangerment Finding is just a âsubjective conviction.â It is true that EPA did not provide a quantitative threshold at which greenhouse gases or climate change will endanger or cause certain impacts to public health or welfare. The text of CAA § 202(a)(1) does not require that EPA set a precise numerical value as part of an endangerment finding. Quite the opposite; the § 202(a)(1) inquiry necessarily entails a case-bycase, sliding-scale approach to endangerment because â[d]anger . . . is not set by a fixed probability of harm, but rather is composed of reciprocal elements of risk and harm, or probability and severity.â Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 18. EPA need not establish a minimum threshold of risk or harm before determining whether an air pollutant endangers. It may base an endangerment finding on âa lesser risk of greater harm . . . or a greater risk of lesser harmâ or any combination in between. Id. Ethyl is instructive. There, EPA made an endangerment finding for airborne lead. During its endangerment inquiry, EPA initially tried to do what Texas asks of it here: find a specific concentration of the air pollutant below which it would be considered âsafeâ and above which it would endanger public health. Id. at 56. However, EPA abandoned that approach because it failed to account for âthe wide variability of dietary lead intakeâ and lacked predictive value. EPA substituted a âmore qualitativeâ approach, which relied on âpredictions based on uncertain dataâ along with clinical studies. Id. at 56â57. This court upheld the endangerment finding that used that qualitative approach despite the lack of a specific endangerment âthreshold.â In its essence, Texasâs call for quantification of the 34 endangerment is no more than a specialized version of Industry Petitionersâ claim that the scientific record contains too much uncertainty to find endangerment. EPA relied on a substantial record of empirical data and scientific evidence, making many specific and often quantitative findings regarding the impacts of greenhouse gases on climate change and the effects of climate change on public health and welfare. Its failure to distill this ocean of evidence into a specific number at which greenhouse gases cause âdangerousâ climate change is a function of the precautionary thrust of the CAA and the multivariate and sometimes uncertain nature of climate science, not a sign of arbitrary or capricious decision-making. D. EPA defined both the âair pollutionâ and the âair pollutantâ that are the subject of the Endangerment Finding as an aggregate of six greenhouse gases, which EPA called âwell mixed greenhouse gasesâ: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N 2 O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). Industry Petitioners argue that EPAâs decision to include PFCs and SF6 in this group of greenhouse gases was arbitrary and capricious primarily because motor vehicles generally do not emit these two gases. No petitioner for review of the Endangerment Finding has established standing to make this argument. Industry Petitioners concede that EPAâs decision to regulate PFCs and SF6 along with the other four greenhouse gases does not injure any motorvehicle-related petitioner. Nor has any non-motor-vehiclerelated petitioner shown an injury-in-fact resulting from EPAâs inclusion of these two gases in the six-gas amalgam of âwellmixed greenhouse gases.â At oral argument, Industry Petitioners asserted for the first time that certain utility 35 companiesâmembers of associations that petitioned for review of the Endangerment Findingâown utility transformers that emit SF6. However, they never demonstrated or even definitively asserted that any of these companies would not be subject to regulation or permitting requirements but for EPAâs decision to include SF6 as part of the âwell-mixed greenhouse gasesâ that are the subject of the Endangerment Finding. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898â900 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (requiring that a petitioner seeking review of agency action demonstrate standing by affidavit or other evidence if standing is not âself-evidentâ from the administrative record). Absent a petitioner with standing to challenge EPAâs inclusion of PFCs and SF6 in the âair pollutionâ at issue, this court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits of Industry Petitionersâ contention. E. EPA did not submit the Endangerment Finding for review by its Science Advisory Board (SAB). Industry Petitioners claim that EPAâs failure to do so violates its mandate to âmake availableâ to the SAB âany proposed criteria document, standard, limitation, or regulation under the Clean Air Actâ at the time it provides the same âto any other Federal agency for formal review and comment.â 42 U.S.C. § 4365(c)(1); see Am. Petroleum Inst., 665 F.2d at 1188. To begin with, it is not clear that EPA provided the Endangerment Finding âto any other Federal agency for formal review and comment,â which triggers this duty to submit a regulation to the SAB. EPA only submitted a draft of the Endangerment Finding to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs pursuant to Executive Order 12,866. EPA contends that this was merely an informal review process, not âformal review and commentââat least when compared with a 36 statutory review-and-comment requirement in which other agencies are given the opportunity to provide written comments about the impacts of a proposed regulation on the reviewing agencyâs universe of responsibility. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 32902(j). Industry Petitioners failed to respond to this contention. In any event,