MICHAEL WILLIAMS V. T. YUEN, No. 16-16034 (9th Cir. 2017)

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FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 21 2017 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MICHAEL B. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 16-16034 D.C. No. 3:14-cv-04507-EMC v. MEMORANDUM* T. MICHAEL YUEN, Court Executive Officer and Clerk of the San Francisco Court Superior Court, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 8, 2017** Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges. Michael B. Williams, a pre-trial civil detainee under California’s Sexually Violent Predators Act (“SVPA”), appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(ii), Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005), and we affirm. The district court properly dismissed Williams’s action because Williams failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (setting forth pleading standard); see also Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth elements of access-to-courts claim); People v. Fraser, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 424, 435 (Ct. App. 2006) (no right to self-representation in civil commitment proceedings under the SVPA). The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Williams’s state law claim after dismissing Williams’s federal claims. See Satey v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams leave to amend because Williams cannot cure the deficiencies in his complaint. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “a district court may dismiss without leave where . . . amendment would be futile”). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’s motion 2 16-16034 for reconsideration because Williams failed to state any grounds warranting relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)). AFFIRMED. 3 16-16034

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