THOMAS NGUYEN V. EDUARDO LOPEZ, No. 15-56996 (9th Cir. 2017)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 20 2017 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT THOMAS NGUYEN, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 15-56996 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-02594-WQHMDD v. EDUARDO LOPEZ, San Diego Police Officer (#6654); DAVID VALDEZ, San Diego Police Officer (#6562), MEMORANDUM* Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 8, 2017** Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges. Thomas Nguyen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment following a bench trial in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging unlawful detention and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and retaliation in violation * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). of the First Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s conclusions of law and for clear error the district court’s findings of fact. Milicevic v. Fletcher Jones Imports, Ltd., 402 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm. The district court did not clearly err in its credibility determinations, and, based upon those findings, the district court properly concluded that defendants had probable cause to detain Nguyen under California Welfare and Institutions Code § 5150, and used reasonable force in doing so. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1220 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing and applying the probable cause standard under § 5150); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-97 (1989) (setting forth the objective reasonableness standard for excessive force determinations). The district court did not clearly err in entering judgment for defendants on Nguyen’s First Amendment claim because defendants submitted credible testimony that deterrence of Nguyen’s speech was not a substantial or motivating factor in their decision to detain him under § 5150. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 916-17 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 2 15-56996 appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. 3 15-56996
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
