PAUL MOSELEY V. CITIMORTGAGE INC., No. 15-35210 (9th Cir. 2016)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DEC 22 2016 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS PAUL MOSELEY, No. 15-35210 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-05802-RJB v. MEMORANDUM* CITIMORTGAGE INC., Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding Submitted December 14, 2016** Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. Paul Moseley appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging state and federal claims arising from defendant’s alleged improper failure to discharge his mortgage loan. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs., Inc., 816 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Moseley’s claim under Washington Uniform Commercial Code § 3-603 because Moseley is neither an indorser nor an accommodation party under the deed of trust, and because a personal check with “ETF Only” written on it does not constitute an unconditional tender. See Wash. Rev. Code § 62A.3-603(b) (“If tender of a payment of an obligation to pay an instrument is made . . . and the tender is refused, there is a discharge, to the extent of the amount of the tender, of the obligation of an indorser or accommodation party having right of recourse with respect to the obligation to which the tender relates.” (emphasis added)); id. § 62A.3-204(b) (defining “indorser”); id. § 62A.3-419 (discussing “accommodation party”); see also Wash. Rev. Code § 62A.3-106(a) (“[A] promise . . . is unconditional unless it states . . . an express condition to payment . . . .”); Jones v. Best, 950 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (“We have held that tender of the amount due must be unconditional in order to stop interest from running.”). We lack jurisdiction to consider the district court’s award of attorney’s fees. See Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 719 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] 2 15-35210 supplemental notice of appeal is required for us to have jurisdiction over an attorney fees issue that becomes final subsequent to the initial notice of appeal.” (citation and emphasis omitted)). Moseley’s motion to strike CitiMortgage’s answering brief, filed on November 9, 2015, and request for a mandatory judicial notice, filed on December 4, 2015, are denied. AFFIRMED. 3 15-35210
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
