Grant v. Swarthout, No. 13-55584 (9th Cir. 2017)
Annotate this CaseA petitioner is entitled to use the full one-year statute-of-limitations period for the filing of his state and federal habeas petitions and he need not anticipate the occurrence of circumstances that would otherwise deprive him of the full 365 days that Congress afforded him for the preparation and filing of his petitions. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing the petition for habeas relief in this case and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held that it was improper for the district court to fault the petitioner for filing his state petition for postconviction relief late in the statute-of-limitations period in reliance on his having a full year to file both his state and federal petitions, as promised by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244. It was obvious in this instance that petitioner was diligent after the extraordinary circumstance had ended. Therefore, petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling from the time he requested his prison account certificate until he received that certification.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus. The panel reversed the district court’s order dismissing as untimely California state prisoner Willie Ulysses Grant’s federal habeas corpus petition, and remanded for further proceedings, in a case involving a prisoner’s right to equitable tolling for the period during which he was prevented from completing his federal habeas petition by an extraordinary circumstance. The panel held that a petitioner is entitled to use the full one-year statute-of-limitations period for the filing of his state and federal habeas petitions and that he need not anticipate the occurrence of circumstances that would otherwise deprive him of the full 365 days that Congress afforded him for the preparation and filing of his petitions. The panel therefore held that it was improper for the district court to fault the petitioner for filing his state petition for postconviction relief late in the statute-of-limitations period in reliance on his having a full year to file both his state and federal petitions, as promised by AEDPA. The panel held that Grant exercised reasonable diligence during the 20-odd day duration of an extraordinary circumstance, where he requested from the prison trust office, on the day he received notice of the California Supreme Court’s denial of his state postconviction petition, the prison account certificate required to file a federal habeas petition in GRANT V. SWARTHOUT 3 forma pauperis and filed a second request when he did not hear back from prison officials for two weeks. Because it is obvious that Grant was diligent after he received the prison account certificate, the panel did not resolve whether a petitioner needs to prove that he was diligent after the extraordinary circumstance has ended. The panel disagreed with the state that Grant did not experience an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to justify tolling. The panel wrote that where a prisoner is dependent on prison officials to complete a task necessary to file a federal habeas petition and the staff fails to do so promptly, this constitutes an extraordinary circumstance. The panel concluded that Grant is entitled to equitable tolling from the time he requested the prison account certificate until he received the certificate, and that his petition was therefore timely.
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