United States v. Jimenez-Arzate, No. 12-50373 (9th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this CaseDefendant pleaded guilty to having illegally re-entered the United States after having previously been deported. Defendant was sentenced to thirty-four months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding that his prior conviction for violation of Cal. Penal Code 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence in an opinion filed January 12, 2015. Here the panel amended its opinion and denied Defendant’s petitions for panel rehearing and panel rehearing en banc, holding (1) contrary to Defendant’s contention, United States v. Grajeda, which held that a conviction under section 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence, remains good law; and (2) there was justification for the district court’s exercise of discretion in imposing supervised release.
Court Description: Criminal Law. The panel amended an opinion, filed January 12, 2015, affirming a sentence for illegal reentry after deportation; denied a petition for panel rehearing; and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, in a case in which the district court found that the defendant’s prior conviction for violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence for federal sentencing purposes. The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2009), which held that a conviction under § 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence, is no longer good law in light of People v. Aznavoleh, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901 (Ct. App. 2012), and People v. Wyatt, 229 P.3d 156 (Cal. 2010). The panel held that Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), does not abrogate Grajeda. The panel observed that Ceron, which addresses whether a § 245(a)(1) conviction is categorically a crime of moral turpitude, does not address the question of whether a § 245(a)(1) conviction is categorically a crime of violence; and that Ceron, which relied exclusively on the identical language from People v. Williams, 29 P.3d 197 (Cal. 2001), that is quoted in Grajeda, does not clearly indicate a different interpretation of the mens rea requirement for § 245(a)(1) than that set forth in Grajeda. UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE 3 The panel held that there was justification for the district court’s exercise of discretion in imposing supervised release.
This opinion or order relates to an opinion or order originally issued on January 24, 2014.
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